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ABSTRACT 
This is a study of the formation of the psychology of the indivrdua~ 
in England in the period from 1870 to 1939. The psychology of the 
individual was a scientific discourse and body of practices which had 
as its object the mental capaci ties and attributes of individuals. 
It concerned itself with the assessment, causes and consequences of 
the variation of these capacities and attributes among individuals. 
It formed and was deployed with~n a range of practices concerned with 
the identification and administration of pathological individuals and 
sought to become an autonomous clinical practice in respect of them. 
The study uses a method based upon Michel Foucault's 
'archaeological'studies of the human sciences. It identifies the 
the ore tical and social condi tions for the formation of individual 
psychology and describes its conceptual structure, social existence 
and strategic functioning. The psychology of the individual was 
founded on the belief that socially desirable qualities in the 
population were distributed according to the incidence of statistical 
variations in large populations. It formed in England around a 
problem of defective mental capacities. The study describes the 
conceptions of social regulation and individual character within 
which such a problem emerged. It describes the psycho-eugenic 
strategy in which individual psychology operated, and the reasons for 
its defeat by a neo-hygienist medical strategy. A new problem of 
maladjusted and delinquent children emerged which was conceptualised 
by a 'new psychology' as arising from disturbed emotional relations 
in the family. This operated in a new site, the Child Guidance 
Clinic, in alliance with social workers in a psycho-social strategy. 
But individual psychology remained subordinate and failed to become a 
clinical instance in its own right. This was, in part, because of 
the way in which it conceptualised normality and abnormality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In studying the psychology of the individual, sleep, madness, 
delirium, somnambulism, hallucination offer a far more 
favourable field of experience than the normal state. Phenomena 
which in the normal state are almost effaced because of their 
tenuousness appear more palpable in extraordinary crises because 
they are exaggerated •.• human psychology will have to be 
constructed by studying the madness of mankind, the dreams and 
hallucinations to be found on every page of the history of the 
human spirit. 
Ernest Renan,1890 1 
Since the end of the Second World War, psychological expertise has 
been increasingly deployed with respect to a range of practical 
problems and within a large number of administrative and reformatory 
practices. Psychological agents and techniques are involved in 
assessment and diagnosis of problems of individual conduct in 
institutional sites such as hospitals, schools, prisons, factories 
and in the army. They are frequently responsible for recommending 
treatments, and often for carrying them out. And an analogous range 
of psychological specialisms have arisen - clinical psychology, 
educational psychology, criminal psychology, industrial psychology, 
military psychology and so forth. How is one to account for the 
emergence and functioning of these new know ledges and techniques for 
the conceptualisation, regulation and amelioration of the problems of 
individuals in their personal and social lives? 
If one reads the authori ta tive histories of psychology, these 
5 
developments are grouped together under the rubric of applied 
psychology. Psychology is considered to be fundamentally the science 
of the normal mental functioning of human beings, and the accounts of 
the origins of the modern psychological enterprise are constructed in 
this light. The roots of psychological modernity appear to be 
traceable through a long tradition of reflections on the human 
psyche, stretching back across the span of written history. Anything 
which has been said about the human mind can form part of such a 
history, of which our modern science of the mind is the inheritor and 
cUlminator. A history which takes as its organising principle the 
normal human mind can order the texts it examines along a continuous 
path, in terms of the extent to which they grasped, enabled us to 
grasp, or were obstacles to the grasping in thought of this real 
object of knowledg~ 
Considered from this perspective, the social deployment of 
psychological expertise can only be seen as a by-product, often 
unexpected and unintended, of the advances of our know ledge of the 
functioning of the normal mind and its role in behaviour. Thus the 
various aspects of psychology which concern themselves with practical 
and technical questions can be conceived of as the application to 
specific problems of the knowledge gained in the study of the normal 
mind. The flow of psychological truth is from the centre of 
normality to the periphery of applicatio~ And the practical issues 
with which psychology as a social practice is bound up are thus 
pertinent only to this low status penumbra of applied psychology; the 
central core of psychological discourse has a history which is 
indifferent to them. 
Even where it is allowed that there are links in this field of 
'application' between social questions and psychological 
developments, these concern only the pressing need to derive useful 
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techniques from our knowledge of psychological normality. Whilst it 
is indeed the fortunate status of psychology to be enlivened by, and 
relevant to, questions of everyday life, its 'status as a knowledge is 
independent of them. Thus if the constitution of psychology as a 
scientific discipline was quickened or even induced by certain 
practical problems, even if it allowed of an application of this 
scientific knowledge to certain technical tasks, it was nonetheless 
an occurrence in a pure theoretical space, in which a union was 
achieved at last between a discourse motivated only by a desire to 
know and its object, the human individual, which pre-existed it and 
awaited it. 
So if, in this practical field, psychology has been chiefly 
concerned with problems of pathology, of those who, for some reason 
are failing to function normally, it is implied that psychology can 
recognise and diagnose such pathology because of the knowledge which 
it already possesses of the normal mind. A knowledge of normal mental 
processes thus appears to be the condition and basis for the 
application of scientific techniques to the problems posed by 
abnormality. 
A line of development, then, from the past to the present; from 
the normal to the abnormal; from an understanding of normality to an 
ability to recognise abnormality and hence utilise that knowledge; 
and, at this stage only, the incidence of social concerns upon the 
field of deployment of psychological expertise. 
The present study contests such an analysis. Modern scientific 
psychology in England was not born in the quiet and reflective 
atmosphere of the academy. The place now occupied by psychology 
within the practices of social administration and regulation has not 
been established through the application of established psychological 
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doctrines to pressing practical problems. Nor have we seen a 
knowledge of the normal mind turned to account in the understanding 
of pathology. If anything, the issue is more usefully posed the 
other way round. The conditions which made possible the formation of 
the modern psychological enterprise in England were established in 
all those fields where psychological expertise could be deployed in 
relation to problems of the abnormal functioning of individuals. The 
investigation which follows seeks to describe these conditions, which 
made it possible for a positive science of the human individual to 
form in England in the period from about 1870 to about 1939. The 
function of this Introduction is to outline the approach which will 
be adopted, the structure of the study, and its rationale. 
Most histories of psychology trace the roots of psychology back 
through a continuous series of speculations about the mental life of 
humans from time immemorial. Yet there is also a common acceptance 
that something significant occurred in a period from about 1875 to 
about 1925. Both from the standpoint of the historian, and that of 
contemporary partiCipants, something appears to happen over this 
fifty year period, in Bri tain and Western Europe as well as in the 
Uni ted States, which has the character of an 'event'. This event 
appears to consist of the translation or extension of certain 
recurrent questions about the nature of humans from the closed space 
of philosophy to a domain of positive knowledge: the formation of 
psychology as a coherent and individuated scientific discourse. 
Obviously there is nothing definite about the boundaries of this 
period of transition: they can be drawn differently according to the 
criteria brought to bear upon the texts and documents which make up 
the historical record. Nonetheless one can trace over this period a 
shift within the organisation of disciplines in the universities, and 
the progressive insti tu tional delineation of psychology from 
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philosophy and logic on the one hand and from biology and medicine on 
the other. One can see the establishment of institutions and 
departments specific to psychology - psychological laboratories for 
example. One can see the formation of groupings of individuals who 
identify themselves as psychologists, who are trained by 
psychologists and who have qualifications as psychologists. And one 
can observe the establishment of a professional apparatus of 
psychology - associations which constitute a specifically 
psychological community, with its own rules and traditions for 
designating who is competent to make psychological statements, what 
are appropriate objects to speak of and in what ways, and a network 
of psychological journals which operationalise these rules in their 
cri teria for selection of articles for publication, and reconfirm 
them through the nature, as well as the results, of the psychological 
research which they disseminate. 
Thus it was in 1879 that Wundt obtained permission to use one 
small room at Leibzig for the novel purpose of a psychological 
laboratory. In England, under the influence of Alexander Bain, a 
journal entitled Mind appeared in January 1876, declaring itself in 
its opening editorial "the first English journal devoted to 
Psychology and Philosophy" and setting itself no less an aim than "to 
procure a decision as to the scientific standing of psychology" 
James Sully, Grote Professor of Philosophy of Mind and Logic, 
established the first English laboratory for experimental psychology 
at University College London in October 1897, and in the same year a 
similar laboratory was founded in Cambridge. In October 1901 the 
British Psychological Society was inaugurated, in 1904 the British 
Journal of Psychology first appeared - the list of similar 
developments could be considerably extended.2 
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Yet, as Hearnshaw points out in his Short History of British 
Psychology, the subsequent grow th of academic psychology in Grea t 
Britain was remarkably slow. At the outbreak of the Second World War 
there were only six university chairs in psychology, and a total 
lecturing staff of about thirty. The central subject matter of 
university psychology, the science of mental life, was consciousness 
or experience. Philosophers disputed psychology's claim to this 
domain, and psychologists disagreed as to the merits and demerits of 
different theorie& But the analysis of the conscious experiencing 
self defined the space of controversy and its principal terms. 
However Hearnshaw argues that the impetus for the development of 
psychology in England did not come from this field of questions and 
deba teo It came, rather, from all' those social fields where 
psychology was deployed - in particular, medicine, education and 
industry. nHere indubitably, and beyong the boundaries of 
philosophical controversy, progress was being made, new disciplines 
were being forged, new professions created. The academic world could 
not indefinitely refuse to recognise these developments. n3 It was 
outside the academy that the claims to truth which psychology mi3-de 
were first recognised, it was here that psychologists first gained 
social recognition, professional status and a practical role, it was 
this that powered the lift-off of psychology in the post-war period. 
Now the psychology which began to establish itself in these 
social apparatuses prior to the Second World War characterised itself 
in a particular way. Its proponents termed it 'the psychology of the 
individual' and claimed that if psychology was to become a scientific 
discipline it must become a science of the individua1. 4 The 
psychology of the individual had as its object, not the general laws 
of functioning of the human psyche, but the specific mental 
capacities and attributes of human individuals. It particularly 
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concerned itself with the variation of these capacities. and 
attributes among individuals and the causes and consequences of such 
variations. The psychology of the individual was, that is to say, a 
psychology of individual differences, of their conceptualisation and 
their measurement, of the interpretation of pathologies of conduct in 
the light of them, and of the prognosis of future conduct in terms of 
them. A psychological science of the individual emerged through this 
act of differentiation and quantification. The objects and problems 
around which the psychology of the individual formed were not, 
however, produced in the laboratory or in the study. They were 
those prioritised by the objectives and mode of functioning of 
particular social practices and institutions themselves. The school, 
the reformatory, the court, the army and the factory were the 
surfaces upon which emerged the new objects which individual 
psychology sought to make its own. The problems which these objects 
posed for the functioning of these apparatuses set the conditions 
which would have to be fulfilled if there were to be a socially 
effective science of the individual psyche. It was not a question of 
external stimuli to the development of know ledge. The condi tions 
which made individual psychology possible established the issues to 
be resolved, and the functions which its techniques would have to 
fulfil: they set the terms which individual psychology would have to 
abide by if it were to establish its claims to truth. And the 
psychology of the individual claimed that its concepts and techniques 
were appropriate to deal with the problems posed for social 
apparatusses by dysfunctional conduct - to understand, to diagnose, 
to prescribe and to carry out treatment. 
Further, the objects around which individual psychology formed 
had one thing in common - they were phenomena deemed to be 
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pa thological. Psychological know ledge of the individual was 
consti tuted around the pole of abnormality. Far from knowledge of 
the pathological being an unlooked for and advantageous consequence 
of a science seeking only a knowledge of the normal, the opposite is 
closer to the truth. No doubt it would be too much to claim that 
psychology's conception of the normal is in general construed as no 
more than the absence of abnormality. But it is certainly the case 
that practices whose object was the identification and administration 
of abnormality were more .than merely external condi tions for the 
development of the psychology of the individual. They also allowed 
the normal to be construed as that which did not need to be 
regulated. Normality was thus conceived of as merely a lack of 
socially disturbing symptoms, or an absence of social inefficiency. 
And this particular form of the division normali ty /pa thology is a 
constitutive feature of modern psychological knowledge of the 
individual. Both the strengths and the weaknesses of individual 
psychology were inscribed within the notions of normality and 
abnormali ty which constituted it. 
To understand the psychology of the individual in this light 
enables us to place its emergence as a scientific discourse, not 
within a history of reflections upon the nature o~ the soul, but 
within the changing conceptions of pathologies of thought, belief, 
intellect, emotion and conduct. It is to these conceptions and the 
practices of government, regulation, surveillance, segregation, and 
therapy within which they were deployed, that we must look if we are 
to begin to identify the conditions which made such a psychology 
possible. Not a history of ideas, then, but a history of practices, 
techniques, institutions and agencies, of the forms of knowledge 
which made them thinkable and which they, in their turn, transformed. 
And a history of the categories and problems around which such 
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complex apparatuses formed, Nhich provided the motivation for their 
emergence and the targets of their tactics. The feeble-minded 
individual, the shell shocked soldier, the inefficient worker, the 
maladjusted child, the juvenile delinquent - no doubt these are 
simply the ones which have been most obvious in this particular 
study. 
To trace the emergence of the formation and functioning of this 
type of psychological knowledge from such a perspective is to 
introduce discontinuity into the history of psychology. Where the 
standard histories see a progressive evolution of knowledge from past 
to present, we can now discern radical shifts, the elimination of 
certain themes, the rise and decline of others, the eruption of new 
questions from unexpected quarters. We can, for instance, both 
appreCiate the significance of the issue of the feeble-minded for 
about three decades at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, and understand why it is that the debates around this 
problem are so foreign to our contemporary concerns with the mentally 
handicapped. We can no longer trace a Single line through all those 
discourses which address the mental functioning of man, for the 
development of the science of psychology is no longer ordered around 
the apparently reassuring stability of the normal human psyche. We 
now seek the condi tions for the forma tion of the psychology of the 
individual wi thin a history of the emergence and transformation of 
concerns over the pathologies of mind and conduct and their 
consequences. 
But if such an approach implies that we cannot so easily 
relegate the social conditions wi thin which psychology emerged and 
functioned to a domain external to that of its concepts and theories, 
we must also avoid committing the opposite error. Psychological 
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know ledge of the individual was no mere function or effect of its 
social conditions. There were specifiable discursive conditions for 
the ways in which social problems were conceptualised at particular 
times, the measures which were directed towards them, the evidence 
gathered as to the consequences of such measures and the conclusions 
drawn. These discursive conditions were neither effects of political 
imperatives or social objectives, nor the consequences of the class 
positions or interests of the theorists involved. It is misleading 
to perform any such reduc~ions, for they involve flattening out the 
mUlti-dimensional discursive space within which particular modes of 
conceptualisation became possible. The scientific discourse of 
individual psychology did not form in a pure space of knowledge, but 
neither was it called into existence through the force of social 
exigencies. 
In order to clarify this point, it is necessary to consider what 
is implied in designating the psychology of the individual a 
scientific discourse. The term discourse designates a body of 
statements for which a regular and systematic pattern of organisation 
can be described. If a body of statements forms a discourse it will 
be possible to identify a number of rules of formation, succession 
and derivation for these statements. These rules will be such that 
one can specify the conditions which a particular statement Or group 
of statements will have to fulfil if they are to be part of this 
discourse. 
Individual psychology is a discourse of a particular type: a 
scientific discourse. I class a discourse as scientific on the basis 
of two criteria. Firstly, scientific discourses are theoretical in 
character. They are systematic organisations of statements which 
purport to name, analyse, classify and explain particular phenomena. 
Theoretical discourses may be described in terms of the rules which 
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govern this acti vi ty of naming, analysis, classification and 
explanation. In the present study, we will pay particular attention 
to the way in which objects for analysis are specified, and the 
systems of conceptualisation which produce classifications, define a 
domain of relevant evidence, and establish what is to count as an 
explanation. The terms in which one may carry out such a description 
are distinct from those in which an evaluation of such a discourse 
may be conducted. 
The second cri terion for a scientific discourse is that it is 
truthful. Scientific discourses seek to produce explanations that 
are true, contain means by which that truth is demonstrable, and 
deploy and evaluate statements in terms of a division between the 
true and the false. Their systematicity is regulated by this 
fundamental relationship with truth, and that systematicity 
establishes the conditions which theories and explanations will have 
to fulfil if they are to be 'in the true'. To characterise a 
scientific discourse as truthful is not to imply any commitment to 
its epistemological status. For the present analysis the point is 
not that scientific discourses are true, or that some are truer than 
others, but that they seek truth, establish cri teria for wha t is to 
count as truth and contest among one another according to the 
opposition between truth and error.5 
To the extent that individual psychology is a systematic and 
describable body of statements which has a theoretical character and 
which is regulated by a norm of truth, it is a scientific discourse. 
But scientific discourses do not only seek truth, they also claim 
truth. The extent to which a scientific discourse can establish its 
claims to truth, can command acceptance of the veracity of its 
explanations of certain phenomena, is crucial for the relations which 
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can obtain between that discourse and the various social practices 
within which it circulates. Firstly, within the field of scientific 
practice itsel~ But furthermore within the various other practices 
- technical, judicial, pedagogic, governmental and so forth - within 
which that discourse or the explanations which it produces may be 
deployed. The social functioning and consequences of the psychology 
of the individual were condi tioned by the ways in which its 
explanations laid claim to truthfulness and the extent to which their 
veraci ty was accepted. 
So a study of the emergence of the psychology of the individual 
will have to consider not only the condi tions for the formation of 
the problems around which such a scientific discourse formed, but 
also the internal organisation of that discourse, the ways in which 
it sought to establish its claims to provide truthful explanations of 
these problems and the arguments and disputes within which these 
truth claims contested others. But, as we have seen, the psychology 
of the individual existed as more than merely a set of arguments and 
explanations of problems embodied in books, articles, reports of 
experiments and so forth. It also consisted in a set of practical 
instruments and techniques which embodied the explanations proposed 
and deployed them in relation to the practical problems which had 
occasioned them. A whole technology was constructed, consisting in 
manuals of instruction, testing and assessment procedures, rules of 
diagnostic practice and classification, techniques of therapy and 
reformatio~ These practices were carried out by agents designated 
competent to pronounce the explanations of the psychology of the 
individual and to utilise its practical skills, by virtue of their 
training, qualifications and experience. These psychologists sought 
to locate problems of individual conduct within the jurisdiction of 
the psychology of the individual, and hence to claim the right to 
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adjudicate upon them. They formed professional bodies to designate, 
who was competent to speak and practice as a psychologist, to control 
teaching, training and admission to the ranks of the professionally 
qualified, to regulate standards of professional conduct, and to give 
voice to the claims of psychology as a professional instance. 
This study thus seeks to chart the conditions for the emergence 
of the psychology of the individual as a scientific discourse and a 
body of social practices organised around problems of individual 
pa thology which were thesel ves constructed through the functioning 
and objectives of various social apparatuses. It was the existence 
of this psychology - as a complex of discourses, practices, agents 
and techniques, deployed wi thin schools, clinics, the judicial and 
penal processes, the factories and the army - which provided the 
basis for the generalisation and development of 'applied' and 
'clinical' psychology during and after the Second World War. For it 
had become possible to think scientifically about the mental 
capacities and attributes of human individuals, to understand their 
conduct in these terms, to conceive of their problems and potentials 
in terms of these psychological capacities, and to construct 
techniques of regulation and reformation with reference to this 
psychological domain. 
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The structure of the study 
This is a lengthy study, and it ranges over a large body of material. 
For reasons which will become clear in our discussion of methodology, 
it also does not follow a linear chronological pa tho Material from 
the same period is discussed in different contexts in different 
chapters; additionally some chapters lip~ together events and texts 
from dates and times which are far apart. It is hence not, in any 
conventional sense, a history. A brief overview of the route which 
we will travel may thus help to provide the reader with some 
guidelines as to the order of exposition and its rationale. 
The first two chapters are theoretical and methodological. In 
the first we consider critically some current approaches to the 
history of scientific discourses. The training of psychologists 
usually involves an introduction to the history of their discipline 
through a number of 'au thori ta tive' texts - weighty tomes, usually 
written by psychologists themselves, which trace the development of 
psychology from its origins in the speculations of the ancients 
through to its modern scientificity. We examine the problematic 
assumptions which underpin such histories, their implications for our 
conception of the nature and determinants of psychological discourse, 
and the function of such histories wi thin psychology itself. 
If these texts are usually wri t ten in a triumphalist fashion, 
celebra ting the freeing of knowledge from prejudice and illusion, 
sociological studies have turned a more jaundiced eye upon the 
history of sciences in general and the human sCiences in particular. 
One influential approach seeks to show that the conditions in which 
sciences emerge, and their theoretical content itself, as well as the 
lines of dispute and the positions of groups within such disputes, 
can be explained sociologically. This explanation is carried out in 
terms of the social interests and goals of sCientists, which are 
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themselves regarded as the product of the social positions which 
scientists occupy. A further current trend of sociological thought 
sees the historical development of the human sciences as part of a 
process of rationalisation and medicalisation of social control. In 
this process socially troublesome individuals and groups are 
increasingly deal t wi th by apparently neutral scientific experts. 
They use the supposed scientificity of their knowledge and expertise 
to legitimate politically motivated ways of ensuring the smooth 
running of the social order. The critical discussion in this chapter 
shows how the methodological approach of such sociologies makes it 
impossible for them to ask, let alone answer, important questions 
about the emergence and social operation of the human sciences. 
The sacond chapter outlines an alternative approach which is 
adopted in the present study. Michel Foucault has conducted a number 
of studies of the formation and functioning of the human sciences. 
He has termed these analyses 'archaeological' and 'genealogical'. 
This chapter demonstrates the utility of archaeology in conferring 
intelligibility upon the emergence and deployment of the human 
sciences, describes the analytic procedures employed, and 
differentiates archaeology from the less satisfactory genealogical 
approach. Archaeology does not form a systematic analytic machine 
for 'application' to particular domains; the present study utilises 
it as a set of conceptual tools which, together with equipment 
borrowed from elsewhere and a few home-made devices, provides the 
means of putting together an analysis of the emergence of the 
psychology of the individual as a discursive practice. Such analyses 
are suiceptible to rigorous evaluation, and the chapter closes by 
suggesting the terms in which such an evaluation may be carried out. 
Whilst the bulk of the study deals specifically with events in 
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England, the third chapter has a different function and a different 
focus. It considers the characteristics of the conception of a 
specifically psychological subject which emerged in the nineteenth 
century, and which allowed the formation of a psychological notion of 
individual variatio~ The study utilises the debate in France at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century over the 'Wild Boy of Aveyron' -
a feral child who became the object of considerable controversy - to 
examine this conceptio~ This debate provides a context within which 
the parameters of such a conception can be displayed. It entailed 
the emergence of a notion of a 'moral' domain, internal to the 
subject, which organised conduct, within which pathologies could 
arise, and to which treatment should be directed. This discussion 
also allows us to examine conceptions of one particular form of 
pathology - idiocy - in the nineteenth century. This is relevant 
because individual psychology was born in England in a shift in the 
way in which defects of intellect and their consequences were 
construed. 
The central portion of this study, Chapters Four to Seven, 
considers these events. The psychology of the individual took shape 
in England around a problem of defective mental capaci ties. From 
1869, when Francis Galton published Hereditary Genius,· up until 1913, 
when Cyril Burt was appointed 'the first official psychologist in the 
world', it concerned itself wi th the measuremer.Lt of the intellect, 
with the consequences of intellectual defect, and with the procedures 
which should be adopted for ascertaining and dealing with defective 
individuals. The social problem of defectives - their prevalence in 
the population, their effects and how to minimise them - was seen as 
an appropriate object for government concern and action. Chapter 
Four sets the scene for the detailed archaeological examination which 
follows. It examines the emergence and transformation of conceptions 
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of the population in political and social discourse, and how. its 
regulation became a proper object for government and administration. 
It demonstrates that, in the late nineteenth century, strategies of 
social regulation constructed a problem of population in terms of a 
dar.ger of its progressive deterioration. It shows the relationship 
between these concerns and the emergence of a notion of degeneracy in 
theoretical texts on mental pathology. Chapters Five and Six discuss 
the emergence of eugenic arguments, which combined analyses in terms 
of natural selection with a particular theory of heredity and a 
statistical conception of the population. These transformed the way 
in which the problem of degeneracy was conceived. A group termed the 
'feeble-minded' came to occupy a central place in these debates, as a 
potent threat to the future quality of the population, and it was 
argued that there was an urgent need to discover them and prevent 
them from proliferating. 
It was within these. eugenic arguments that the psychology of the 
individual was established. Chapter Seven considers the theoretical 
conditions which allowed the formation of a distinctively 
psychological conception of intelligence and its measurement, based 
upon a particular statistical conception of the distribution of 
variation in the population. Individual psychology was founded in 
the belief that socially desirable qualities in the population were 
distributed according to statistical conceptions of the incidence of 
varia tion in large groups, and hence that these q uali ties could be 
conceptualised and assessed on the basis of a symmetry between 
statistical and social norms. The psychological conception of 
intelligence and its assessment was predicated upon this assumption. 
We consider the construction of techniques for the assessment of 
intelligence in relation to this, and the formation of a 'psycho-
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eugenic' strategy wherein individual psychology claimed to be the 
appropriate expertise to handle the issue of feeble-mindedness. This 
claim was largely unsuccessful, and medicine extended its dominion to 
these new problems; we explain why this was the outcome. 
The success of medicine was bound up with a shift in medical 
strategies themselves. Throughout the nineteenth century, medicine 
had construed social problems and its role in combatting them in 
terms of hygiene. It promoted - and was the beneficiary of - grand 
schemes of environmental -reform - efficient sewage disposal, pure 
water, air and food and so forth - and regarded social ills as a 
consequence of the effects of environment on largely passive and 
receptive bodies. In the early years of the twentieth century its 
strategy changed. The 'neo-hygienist' strategy sought to promote 
heal th as a posi tive value, through acting on the habi ts of 
individuals and families - ways of cooking, washing, cleaning, 
coughing, spitting and the like. In the early decades of the 
twentieth century, this strategy was directed to the problem of 
infant mortali ty, which became a major concern. Chapter Eight 
considers this strategy, why it became socially effective whilst 
psycho-eugenics was marginalised, and the conceptions of the family 
and techniques of its regul ation which developed within it. Neo-
hygienism was the rationale for the development of infant welfare 
clinics, health visitors and a peculiar amalgam of statutory and non-
statutory 'welfare' practices and agencies which began to fill out 
the space between the details of home and family life and the 
objectives and expectations of government. The 'welfare' work which 
developed consisted primarily in co-ordinating the various agencies 
which impinged upon families, and in providing advice on household 
management and child rearing. It acted upon mothers in order to 
utilise the home and family as a mechanism for the construction of 
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physical health and sober habits amongst family members, especially 
children, with a view to averting the problems which poor health and 
bad habits would lead to in the future. 
Neo-hygienist conceptions could also be applied to mental 
health, and when they were, a new set of problems amenable to social 
regulation emerged. It now appeared that major mental disturbances 
in adul ts - leading to crime and social inefficiency as well as to 
insanity - had their origins in minor and apparently inconsequential 
disturbance of emotion and conduct in childhood, which were 
themselves the product of family problems. This argument allied 
itself with one which was emerging in the newly formed Juvenile 
Courts - that juvenile delinquency was not so much a bad act as a 
manifestation of mental or emotional disturbance. One now had a 
spectrum of troubled and troublesome children ranging from the child 
with temper tantrums, through the school truant to the young thief. 
The solution to all these problems was early treatment of children 
Jf 
and reformation of the family. The Child Guidance Clinic was a 
specialised site for the organisation of these new measures. A new 
problem had formed - the maladjusted or delinquent child - alongside 
that of feeble-mindedness - which individual psychology sought to 
make its own. 
Chapters Nine and Ten demonstrate that these new problems 
entailed a shift in the way in which the problems of childhood were 
conceptualised, and hence also in the strategies of intervention and 
regulation which were promoted. The most significant way of 
understanding these issues was that put forward by the 'new 
psychology', which combined arguments from psychoanalysis and from 
psychological theories of the instincts to propose that childhood 
disturbances resulted from problems in the emotional relations of the 
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family, which caused failures of adjustment. These came from the 
blocking and repressing of instinctual energy, instead of it being 
chanelled in socially useful directions. The psyche became a sort of 
internal representation of the family, and the family became a domain 
of psychological relationships. The new psychology allowed the 
development of a normalising strategy of intervention into families 
because of the way in which it linked up personal contentment, 
psychological health, family feelings and social adjustment. It 
provided the rationale for the type of child guidance work done in 
England in the thirties. It also allowed for the transformation of 
the old type of 'welfare worker' into a new 'social worker', who 
could assume a directly therapeutic role by acting on the 
disturbances in the emotional and psychological economy of the family 
which were considered to lie at the root of childhood problems. 
But paradoxically this new psychology was mainly espoused by 
doctors, and doctors maintained the role of direction of the clinics 
and of diagnosis and therapy with children. This was not simply an 
effect of medical hostility and jealousy of its clinical privilege. 
It was partly because of the acceptance of the claims of doctors that 
only they had the expertise to differentiate between disturbances 
caused by physical, mental or social condi tions, and to assess the 
relative weight to be assigned to different factors. But it was also 
a consequence of the means of conceptualisation that constituted 
individual psychology, for this impelled it to try to ground its 
understanding of these new problems in terms of a conception of 
temperament which could be assessed and evaluated in the same manner 
as intelligence. It searched for an objective technique to test 
temperament, a technique which would enable the normality or 
abnormality of any individual to be ascertained by seeing their 
relationship to population norms. It had little success in England, 
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in the period under investigation, developing an analogue of, the 
intelligence test to use in the diagnosis of maladjusted and 
delinquent children, and offered few al ternative techniques. The 
very conceptions of normali ty and abnormali ty which had made 
individual psychology possible played an important part in limiting 
its ability to attain a clinical status before the Second Viorld War. 
Tw 0 further points should be made in introduction. Firstly, this 
study neither seeks nor pretends to provide an exhaustive account of 
psychological happenings in England from 1870 to 1939. There were 
certainly many questions raised in academic discussions whose 
relationship to the concerns, methods and theories of individual 
psychology was tenuous. In addition, there was one very significant 
area of 'applied psychology' in England during and after the First 
World War which is barely touched upon here. This concerned the 
psychologisation of problems of industrial organisation and 
efficiency, carried out in the Health of Munitions Workers Committee, 
the Industrial Fatigue Research Board and the National Institute of 
Industrial Psychology. This was one of the most substantial fields 
for the employment of psychologists at this time. Questions raised 
in psycho-physiology were tranformed in this set of concerns, and new 
questions were posed concerning the psychology of sensation, 
discrimination, attention and co-ordination in relation to industrial 
fatigue and accidents, industrial training and skills and the 
technical organisation of the production process. A large proportion 
of papers to the psychological journals were directly or indirecly 
indebted to this work. 
Questions of individual differences certainly did emerge in 
relation to the psychology of industry, in particular the issues of 
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job selection and vocational guidance. But by and large, the new 
means of 'conceptualisation which constituted the psychology of the 
individual were forged in relation to the problems of social life 
rather than industrial labour. In order not to further burden an 
already overlong study, the psychologisation of production has been 
considered only where it is essential to the intelligibility of the 
birth of the psychology of the individual. The principle of 
selection which has guided this study is this: In what ways, and 
with what consequences', did it become possible to think 
psychologically about the variations of capaci ties and attributes 
amongst individuals? 
Finally, to avoid misunderstanding, I must point out that this 
study is not a cri tique of the psychology of the individual. It is 
not wri tten in favour of one sort of psychology as against another 
sort of psychology, nor against psychology and in favour of the 
absence of psychology.6 It does not seek to show the falsity of 
individual psychology, nor to discredi tit by revealing its 
associa tion with discredi table social interests or political 
ideologies. The study simply seeks to uncover what made it possible 
to think psychologically about individual differences, how this was 
connected up with other social, political and theoretical events, and 
what this psychological individualisation, in its turn, permitted.' 
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NOTES TO INTRODUCTION 
Renan [1890] 1923, quoted in Canguilhem, 1978, pp 14-15. 
2 Hearnshaw, 1964, is the best general accou:r.t of the history of 
Engl ish psychology. 
3 Ibid, P 211. 
4 This psychology also termed itself 'individual psychology, and 
the present study also uses this term. However it should be 
pointed out that the phrase 'individual psychology' was 
appropriated in the 1920s and 1930s by Alfred Adler and his 
followers to designate his particular doctrines. Except where 
specified, the present study does not use the term in that sense. 
5 This discussion is dependent upon the work of Georges Canguilhem 
and Michel Foucault which is discussed in Chapter Two below. 
6 In using this formulation I am deliberately allying myself with 
the remarks made by Michel Foucault at the close of the preface 
to his study of medicine, The Birth of the Clinic (Foucaul t, 
1973, p xix). 
27 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 
The object of this chapter is cri tically to examine some different 
approaches to the analysis of the history of scientific discourses 
which are pertinent to the study of the history of individual 
psychology. The discussion which follows will be in three parts. I 
will first consider the approach adopted in the 'authoritative' 
histories of psychology -' those weighty standard texts, usually 
wri tten by psychologists themselves, a knowledge of which is 
considered a necessary part of the training of those who would wish 
to be psychologists. Second, I will consider some recent work in the 
sociology of science which advocates the study of scientific 
discourses according to a 'strong programme' in which sociological 
explanations are applied not only to the circumstances of emergence 
and deployment of scientific discourses, but also to the internal 
organisa tion of theories and the posi tions taken up by individuals 
and groups in scientific disputes. Thirdly, I will briefly discuss 
some recent analyses of the history and functioning of the human 
sciences in terms of 'social control' and 'the medicalisa tion of 
social control. In the chapter which follows I will'discuss Michel 
Foucault's analyses of the history and functioning of scientific 
discourses in terms of 'archaeology' and 'genealogy' and indicate the 
approach to be adopted in the present study. 
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The production of a sanctioned history 
Psychology has a long past but only a short 
history. 
Hermann Ebbinghaus 1 
The standard histories of psychology - for example Boring, Brett, 
Murphy, Flugel 2_ tell a t~le which might appear convincing, if only 
because of the frequency wi th which it is repeated. Man, and the 
mental life of men have always, it would appear, been objects of 
fascinati~n for the inquiries of philosophers, intellectuals and 
savants, and yet for many hundreds of years their deliberations 
contained little that might count as scientific knowledge. Over these 
centuries two broad paths may be distinguished, in whose convergence 
are to be found the origin of our modern scientific psychology. On 
the one hand there is a path traced through the speculations of 
philosophers, probably as old as humanity itself but dating back at 
least to the times of Plato and Aristotle. This concerned the nature 
of the human soul; it approached the question of a knowledge of the 
human mind through a rationalist metaphysics. Despite its insights, 
despite the occasional flash of inspiration or genius, a series of 
recurrent and misleading oppositions precluded the development of any 
genuine understanding of the human mind. Mind versus body, for 
example, with its alternative 'solutions' of innatism or parallelism. 
Faculties versus associations, with its related problems of 
essentialism versus empiricism. The age-old opposition between 
activity and structure applied to the analysis of the human mind. 
And inevitably, the problem of determinism or free will. These 
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philosophical dilemmas obscured, it would seem, the real issues which 
had to be tackled if scientific advance was to be possible. 
But a second path may be traced bearing on the question of 
psychology - certainly more recent and often opposed, explici tly or 
implicitly, to the first. It can be followed through the progressive 
developments of medicine, biology and physiology, which stressed the 
material and organic basis of human characteristics and gradually 
discovered the structures and processes which comprised the complex 
enclosed volume of the human body, and described the means by which 
it came into contact with its milieu: the anatomy of the brain, the 
localisation of sensory functions, the discovery of lesions, the 
elaboration of the structures of the nervous system and its 
mechanisms of reaction and transmission, the tabulation of its ills 
and defects. 
This, then, is the long past of psychology, a past structured by 
an opposition between two paths, in each of which the proper object 
of a psychological science suffered a certain reduction - on the one 
hand through a philosophical appropriation of the psyche into the 
closed circles of metaphysics, on the other hand through an 
organicist reduction of the psyche to the biological processes of the 
body. And between these two paths the absence of a science of the 
mental life of man can only appear to be enigmatic, that of which it 
was the object of so many to speak but which, in one way or another, 
always resisted being spoken. 
And then, in the middle of the nineteenth century, things began 
to change. The change is marked in these histories, first of all, at 
the level of methodology. For the problem, it would appear, was 
above all this: the peculiar subject matter of psychology, the human 
mind, was proscribed as a possible object of experimental methodology 
by the dogmata of religion, of philosophy, and even of science 
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itself. Either mind had to be divorced from body - the latter., at 
least by the eighteenth century, a possible object for scientific 
study, the former too noble for such an enquiry, the privileged arena 
of religion and metaphysics. Or else mind had to be reduced to body, 
to no more than the mechanical interplay of sensations and 
associations (as, for example, in the heretical theses of the 
Ideologue Cabanis who pushed the sensationalist theses of Locke and 
Condillac to their extremes). In either case the investigation of the 
mind could not be scientific; it proceeded only by deriving the 
necessary principles of human mental activity from a series of 
speculative premises. Rather than going about their work through the 
laborious process of hypothesis, experimentation, reformulation, 
replication and so forth these writings were based, in the last 
instance, upon adherence to one or other general metaphysical 
doctrine. 
Yet in the middle of the nineteenth century these blockages 
began to give way. Not all at once, it is true, but slowly and 
arduously the fundamentals of a science began to be established in 
the domain proper to psychology. No doubt Herbart was still within 
the old frameworks when he modelled his proposals for a scientific 
psychology upon mathematics, but nonetheless he did so in the attempt 
to provide specifically psychological laws of operation of the mind. 
Fechner's psychophysics was doubtless affected by his theological 
beliefs, but it certainly ini tiated the tradition of quanti ta tive 
experimentation upon mental phenomen~ Wundt was indeed handicapped 
by the attempt to contain his experimental approach within the old 
practice of introspection - wi th the privilege it accorded to the 
subject in gaining knowledge of mental processes - but through these 
pioneering experiments psychology gradually began to organise itself 
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as a distinct and legitimate scientific activity, and to define its 
external Telations with the enquiries proper to biology, medicine and 
philosophy. 
Thus in these accounts it would seem to be the change to an 
experimental methodology which marks the birth of psychology as a 
science after its lengthy gestatio~ And from this moment of 
parturition one sees the infant science undergoing a slow process of 
development and maturation: the successive advances in theory and 
methodology, the accumulative tradition of experimentation and 
observation, of the elaboration of testable hypotheses and 
synthesising laws, the cumulative record of crucial experiments, 
innova tory conceptions, proofs and disproofs. Not that psychology 
yet has the unity which can be found in the 'model' sciences of 
physics and chemistry - this distinction between psychology and its 
methodological mentors is noted repeatedly. But if psychology is 
still a heterogeneous discipline, with diverse and competing theories 
often displacing one another without regard to the proper processes 
of comparative evaluation, or even subsisting side by side without 
entering into proper dispute, if there is so little agreement on the 
investigative procedures proper to the object of psychology and even 
polemic and controversy concerning the very terms wi th which this 
object should be defined, nonetheless this is a diversity in unity, 
characteristic of the youth of any science, healthy and proper to the 
emergence onto the field of knowledge of a new science of ma~ 
Thus, for Murphy and Kovach, whilst "the very birth cry of the 
infant science is still resounding" throughout the "vast melange" of 
"experiments, measurements, hypotheses, dogmas, disconnnected facts 
and systematic theories" of psychology, yet "in another sense 
psychology is as old as civilisation, and this seething multitude of 
investigations and opinions springs from a rich and variegated 
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history ... Whatever difficul ties there may be in finding uni ty in 
the various psychological disciplines, there is at least one unity to 
which we can cling for orientation and perspective, for appreciation 
and synthesis; and this is the tranquil unity of history.,,3 
It is within this 'tranquil unity of history', then, that such 
accounts reconstruct the trajectory of psychology from prehistory to 
history, a trajectory which has the form, on the one hand, of a 
necessity, and, on the other hand, of a tradition. A necessity: 
above all else, the unity of the history and the prehistory of 
psychology, and the unity of all those distinct 'disciplines' which 
are considered to make up psychology at any given moment, is a unity 
of the ob ject. If these different theories, these competing 
arguments, these differing methodologies, exist in a form which 
enables them to be unified from the perspective of history this is 
simply the result of the fact that they are deemed to have a common 
object - man. The uni ty of psychology, of the history-prehistory 
couple, is thus a unity of the referent. It is the fact for all 
these accounts that these discourses, whatever their diversity, seek 
to speak of the same given object, which exists independently of them 
and awaiting discovery by them. Characteristic of this given object 
is both its modernity and its antiquity: to incorporate a discourse 
into the prehistory of psychology it must be rewritten in the future 
anterior - these discourses speak of that which will become the 
object of a scientific psychology. The fundamental operation of such 
historical surveys is thus a triangulation - the construction of a 
conceptual space, thought of as 'history' which has as its apex 
contemporary scientific know ledge of a given obj ect, from which a 
series of lines of descent are constructed so that they appear to 
converge upon it. Appear to: of course they do not so much converge 
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upon this apex as radiate from it. They are necessarily thought 
according to a teleological logic. If that of which modern 
psychology speaks is the truth of an object which is given in reality 
external to it, and is therefore itself trans-historical, one could 
only be seeing, in these discourses of the past, the halting attempts 
made in other times, in other places, to gain access to an object 
which is the very same. 
So the condition for such an appeal to the unity of history in 
psychological historiography is, first of all, an epistemological 
stance which has no way of avoiding empiricism whatever its 
pretensions. The object of a scientific discourse must be conceived 
as existing in a given form which is adequate to a knowledge of it. 
Man must exist in all his fullness as the horizon to which all 
discourses of psychology point. The progress of psychology is thus a 
process of 'discovery' - a process whose goal is to achieve a 
relationship of adequacy between these discourses on man and the 
essential nature of man. It would not be appropriate to rehearse 
here the epistemological paradoxes to which such a position leads; 
our concern is with the effects of this posi tion upon these 
historiographic discourses themselves.4 
There is a second important consequence of the' conception of 
history as unity entailed in these accounts. Historical time for the 
progress of psychology is constituted as a single vector which has 
the object at its horizo~ Time is thus unilinear - the time of the 
history of psychology is that of a simple movement from past to 
present, within which all elements must march in step. The texts 
which make up the corpus from which such an history is constructed 
may thus be arranged in a single sequence from ancient to modern. 
Thus the uni ty of history becomes that of a tradi tion, and for any 
given aspect of the past or present of psychology a series of 
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precursors may be identified along this dimension. Historical 
advance consists in the transmission of truths which have been 
acquired, of problems solved or left unsolved, of flashes of insight 
or accumulated evidence from one scientist to another "along the 
thread of linear and homogeneous time whose only virtue is to pass 
(or to be past)".5 It is no wonder that the favoured form of 
argument in these historical accounts is the identification of such 
precursors - of those who, before their time, thought something upon 
which a whole theory will be elaborated by those who follow. The 
precursor is one who, at SOme time now past, forged a short length of 
the path towards a given object which, more recently, has been 
extended, broadened, consolidated by another. 
As George Canguilhem has pointed out, the writing of history as 
tradition is dependent upon a conception of the unity of the object 
of scientific discourse across its history, for it is only the trans-
historical nature of the object which is capable of supporting the 
procedure whereby two texts from different historical periods may be 
mapped onto one another as precursor and successor:6 
A precursor is supposed to be a thinker of several periods, of 
his own and of those assigned to him as his continuators; as the 
executors of his uncompleted undertaking. Hence the precursor 
is a thinker whom the historian believes he can extract from his 
cultural frame in order to insert him into another, which 
amounts to considering concepts, discourses and speculative 
experimental acts as capable of displacement or replacement in 
an intellectual space in which reversibility of relations has 
been obtained by forgetting the historical aspect of the object 
dealt with. 
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For these historians, then, psychology forms itself in a 
unilinear tradition structured along a dimension of truth - as the 
historical sequence unfolds, error progressively diminishes and truth 
is correlatively increased. Time and truth appear to exist in a 
fundamental complicity, so that one may assert with some certainty 
that chronological priority equals logical inferiority. Time appears 
to function also in SOme more profound way, not merely as a marker or 
index of progress but as something like its motive force. If 
progress is linked in this ,necessary way with temporality, then this 
linkage must be unconditional, that is, without conditions external 
to temporality ~ se. It is the very passage of time, the fact of 
an event being past, allowing a future event to utilise it as a 
precursor, which produces the accretion of truth and the diminution 
of erro~ The conditions which affect the progress of knowledge are 
external to it, contingent with respect to the forward march of 
truth. Truth, in this sense, is immanent to the object of knowledge, 
or at the very least to the relation between the sCientist, as 
subject of knowledge, and the real object which he seeks to know. 
Within historiography of this type the elements which can enter 
into the history of a scientific discourse are both reduced and 
proliferated. On the one hand, elements beyond ·the essential 
scientist-object relationship are reduced to the status of 
externali ties. Such elements may facilitate that relationship or 
they may obstruct it, but in any event they can only affect it from 
outside. Hence these accounts accord such a critical importance to 
the question of methodology, for historical movement is to be located 
here, within the activities of a subject striving to grasp the object 
which motivates its search. Yet, on the other hand, the elements 
which may act as stimuli or obstacles to progress become, in 
principle, without limits. The explanatory structure of a science at 
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any given historical moment exerts no intelligible constraints upon 
the nature of the transforma tions to which it may be subject. Nor 
does it limit the elements which can affect the activity of the 
scientist in such a way as to advance or impede progress~ Since 
anythir~ might be said about an object of scientific knowledge at any 
time, what causes something to be said or not said can itself be 
anything. No wonder' these historical accounts think their meagre 
chronologies in terms of such a limited set of scenarios - adv~ntures 
of the imagination, accidents of biography, flashes of insight, 
discoveries of forgotten writings, unexpected events, unanticipated 
consequences, miracles of invention. Where there is a relation of 
immanence between knowledge and its object, all which is external to 
that relation may eXist only as a field of pure contingency with 
respect to it. 
Yet if this is the form of so many of the accounts of the 
history of psychology with which one is confronted, one might be 
forgiven for wondering just what the motivation was for a labour of 
writing which repeats the same tale endlessly, which is so meticulous 
and yet so impoverished in the insights which it provides into the 
processes involved in the formation of this new domain of scientific 
explanatio~ Indeed it would be an error analogous to that for which 
we would criticise these histories themselves if we were to see, in 
this form of writing history, a simple mistake of methodology, 
continually repeated due to a lack of analytic awareness or 
philosophical correctness. These accounts are better understood 
somewhat differently. They do not occupy a field external to that of 
the psychological discourse with which they are contemporary. On the 
contrary, they gain their rationality from the way in which they 
function internal to psychology itsel~ We can single out two 
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aspects which are of some importance. 
Firstly, historiographic discourse in psychology serves to 
demarcate the field of psychology's modernity and to produce a 
redistribution of elements within the corpus of past texts. This 
redistribution effects a distinction between the sanctioned and the 
lapsed, between those elements which are consonant with the 
contemporary regime of scientific truth (and may therefore be 
included wi thin the canon of texts and arguments which have formed 
the precursors of modernity) and those elements which are discrepant 
with this regime (which must be expelled to a lapsed history of 
errors, illusions false paths and byeways, diversions from the 
forward march of knowledge).7 In this sense the texts of 
psychological historiography are programmatic: the object of which 
they speak - scientific psychology - is both an existence to be 
ra tified and a reali ty to be produced. Many discourses establish 
their claim to truth in part through such a construction of a 
sanctioned history. At one and the same time the discourse is 
legitimised through the construction of lines of ancestry and descent 
and its novelty is demonstrated with respect to this filiation. 
Within scientific discourses themselves this operation has a certain 
justificatio~ It is, no doubt, vital to distinguish' between those 
concepts, experiments, speculations, bodies of evidence which remain 
contemporary and those which are obsolete. The former must be taken 
into account in the formulation of new data, the construction of new 
arguments and proofs and so forth; the latter are impertinent to the 
current concerns of scientific activity. It is in this sense, as 
Georges Canguilhem has pointed out, that history is an internally 
functioning element in the organisation of scientific truth. 8 
Scientific discourses are governed by defini te norms of tru th, and 
modes of formulation and recognition of true propositions, and this 
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entails a certain conception of the history of these norms and a 
constant and recurrent evaluation of the transformations which have 
produced it. 
Yet if a standard of truth and falsity functions as a necessary 
internal element in the recurrent histories which sanction 
contemporary science, we must nonetheless recognise its consequences 
for scientific historiograp"~ itself. Histories of this type have a 
horizon which is necessarily that of the contemporary. They are thus 
unable to grasp the norms according to which the contemporary 
operates to construct truth, precisely because these norms constitute 
the very ground and the limit of the historical enterprise. If 
present norms of truth are deployed as the unquestioned means of 
evaluation of past norms of truth, such histories must remain unable 
to think the historicity of truth within the history of psychology. 
They are condemned to provide a philosphico-historical reprise on the 
operation of those discourses which are their obj ect. Their 
histories are teleologies which serve to grant an imprimatur to the 
psychology of the present. 
These histories have a second function. We have seen that to 
write the history of psychology as a history of truth is to be unable 
to pose the question of the historicity of psychological truth 
itsel~ It is also to elide the issue of the conditions under which 
psychology's norms of truth could become historically established. 
We have already seen that such histories construct the scientist-
object relation in such a way that other social relations can only 
enter into psychological discourse as externalities, as obstacles or 
facilitations to the passage of knowledge to its truth, as mere 
contingencies. It is impossible for these histories to form the 
following question. Were there particular social, political, 
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insti tutional and technical conditions which, at a given historical 
moment, established the conditions of possibility for the formation 
and functionir~ of psychology's regime of truth? In these histories, 
this question is replaced by another, characteristically expressed 
through the use of the terms influence and application. Influence: 
the fact that anything from an author's childhood, a chance meeting, 
a contigui ty of time and place, a text published elsewhere, may in 
its passage through the synthesising psyche of the scientist so 
stimulate and direct the'mind as to accelerate the process of 
scientific discovery. Application: the fact that a discovery, once 
made, may have important social uses in a variety of domains. What 
concerns us at this point are not the epistemological underpinnings 
of such historical accounts - the privileging of authorship, notions 
of creativity, discourses as tools for utilisation ••• - but the 
consequences for the form of history which is produced. For the 
effect is to propose a pure domain of interiority to scientific 
know ledge and to scientific progress. In such histories, then, the 
social and historical conditions which made a science possible must 
necessarily be non-pertinent to the explanatory structure of that 
science. 
For this 'authori ta ti vet historiography of psychology, it is 
contemporary psychology itself which forms the horizon and the limit 
of historical analysis, the perspective from which the past is 
unified as a tradition of precursors and from which judgments may be 
dispensed upon the past as to the validity of its truths. This is an 
operation which certainly has a function internal to psychology. 
However even if one places epistemological questions to one side, 
such an approach is somewhat limited if one is concerned with 
understanding how a scientific discourse on the mental life of human 
individuals became possible, the structure and transformation of the 
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explanations and conceptualisations in which it consisted, and the 
social consequences of such an historic event. 
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Sociological approaches to the history of the sciences 
The sociology of science has produced many studies of the historical 
emergence of scientific discourses, and of their social existence and 
consequences. It is beyond the scope of the present chapter to 
provide a comprehensive review or analysis of this field. 9 Instead I 
will investigate in detail one currently popular approach. This is 
the so-called 'strong programme' which argues that the nature and 
content of scientific knowledge is amenable to sociological 
explanatio~ In the most recent writings in this approach the notion 
of 'interest' has been deployed as the principal means of explanation 
of the link between a scientific discourse and its social conditions, 
and therefore this notion will be a major focus of the present 
discussion. Wherever possible I will illustrate my account with 
reference to work which has dealt with aspects of psychology and its 
history. However in order to examine some of the theoretical 
problems which arise in such an approach, it will on occasion be 
necessary to examine studies of rather different substantive areas. 
Until about two decades ago, sociological studies of science 
operated, by and large, according to a division between 'internal' 
and 'external'. There was a realm internal to any given science: the 
organisation of its theories and concepts, the changes, developments 
and transformations of its theoretical structure. The analYSis of 
this internal aspect of the sciences was a matter for scientists and 
philosophers of science. Scientists themselves were the appropriate 
people to understand the errors, sidetracks, insights and discoveries 
which had led up to the present state of knowledge in any particular 
science. Philosophers of science were the appropriate people to 
evaluate this history, and their evaluation had a double exigency. 
Firstly it entailed an attempt to provide criteria for what was to 
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count as a science and its appropriate logical, epistemological or 
methodological characteristics. This was a demarcatory process, 
whose fundamental operation was the separation of the true from the 
false, of science from pseudo-science. But secondly, the history of 
science constructed by philosophers of science attempted to give a 
pos t hoc justification for the scientifici ty of those activities 
already known and accepted as scientific. This is a procedure which 
is thus premised on an acceptance of the history of the sciences as a 
progressive growth of knowledge. The whole notion of a 'rational 
reconstruction' of the history of the sciences, of a 'logic of 
scientific discovery' arises from the paradoxical project of trying 
to reconcile the latter exigency with the former. 10 
But separate from these internal questions was the analysis of 
a realm external to science, which concerned not the details of its 
theoretical organisation but its institutional and social existence 
and role. This included such questions as the career patterns of 
sCientists, the nature, organisation and even funding of scientific 
institutions, the rate of growth of sciences, the spread of knowledge 
amongst a scientific communi ty, the disputes which characterised 
scientists as social individuals: science as a social activity 
taking place in a political context. These areas were considered 
amenable to sociological investigation, and this investigation could 
be conducted without, in the main, touching upon the structure or 
content of scientific discourse itself, far less the knowledge claims 
which it made. 11 
In such analyses, however, there was one issue in relation to 
which the two realms came into contact, and where sociology could 
extend its remit into the internal domain of science. This was where 
contemporary science itself had characterised certain previously 
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accepted theories or explanations as false or irrational, as 
imposters masquerading as science. The rational character of science 
itself and its progress towards truth needed no social explanation -
it was the noble consequence of enquiring and conscientious minds 
working upon nature in order to understand it. Where deviations 
occurred, then and only then did a social explanation have to be 
invoked in terms of the intrusion of elements which had no place 
within proper science - irrationality, religious prejudice, dogmatic 
beliefs and so forth. Like· the authoritative histories discussed in 
the previous section, such accounts adopt an empiricist conception of 
scentific knowledge. Where the object itself is conceived of as 
dictating a knowledge of it through the medium of experience, false 
knowledge must be a consequence of biases entering into and 
distorting that experience, often by means of the use of incorrect 
methodological protocols. 12 Hence, for example, the Popperian 
project to ensure the scientifici ty of science by controlling the 
activities of the scientist, thus ensuring the correct acquisition 
and u tilisa tion of experience.13 
The strong programme in the sociology of science explicitly 
opposes such approaches. 14 The term which it uses to describe its 
orientation is 'naturalistic'. This term is ill defined, but its 
main purport is to suggest that science should be studied like any 
other social phenomenon. For the sociologist, knowledge should 
simply be what is taken to be knowledge by people in a particular 
cui ture at a particular time. Scientific knowledge is part of 
culture like any other, and can be studied in the same way as other 
aspects of cultural beliefs. What is scientific is simply what 
actors believe to be scientific. The strong programme is thus not 
concerned to evaluate know ledges in terms of their truth or falsity, 
rationality or irrationality, or the extent to which they form a part 
44 
of the progress of science. It is concerned with the analysis of. the 
social and other condi tions, or 'causes', which give rise to 
particular scientific beliefs. It bases itself upon the assumption 
that the same types of explanations are, in principle, applicable to 
'true' and 'false' beliefs. It stresses, to head off certain simple-
minded objections, that of course the sort of explanations it 
proposes are applicable to sociological knowledge itself, and hence 
to sociological accounts of science. However this reflexivity is not 
regarded as a problem, for to demonstrate that certain beliefs or 
theories have social determinants does not invalidate them - all 
knowledge has social determinants, even true knowledge. 
We can see that the strong progra~me sets up its problem in 
terms of a separation and a relatio~ First of all there is a 
separa tion into two general realms - that of knowledge (part of a 
realm of ideas or beliefs) and that of society or social conditions. 
It then poses itself the question of the relations between the two, 
in terms of the direct incidence of the 'social' upon knowledge 
itself, rather than simply upon its social deployment. In order to 
examine the approach being proposed more closely, and to evaluate its 
claims, it is necessary to look first of all at how the two realms 
are characterised and demarcated, and then to consider the relation 
which is proposed between the two, and how the central claim of the 
strong programme is justified. 
What, first of all, of knowledge? Knowledge, for the strong 
programme, consists in ideas or sets of beliefs. It thus forms part 
of a general domain of cul ture, which includes religious, political 
and aesthetic beliefs, for example, as much as those designated 
scientific. And these latter include logic and mathematics as well 
as the natural sciences. These beliefs form a general class: no 
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means are provided for distinguishir~, say, between the belief in a 
particular mathematical theorem and the belief in a particular 
political doctrine. However, as we shall see presently, the argument 
does distinguish between some types of belief, if only to establish a 
relationship of priority and reflection between them. Hore 
generally, however, beliefs are distinguished from something else 
which might have a claim to form part of the same class - opinion. 
Knowledge is amongst those "beliefs which are taken for granted, 
institutionalised, or invested with authority by groups of men" that 
is to say "collectively endorsed", as opposed to those ideas which 
are individual, idiosyncratic, "mere opinion".15 As we shall see 
presently, there is more than a touch of circularity in the argument 
which will subtend from this initial definition: the argument as to 
the social status of knowledge is dependent upon a definition of 
knowledge in terms of the very social factors whose pertinence the 
argument is supposed to demonstrate. 
Scientific knowledge, for the strong programme, does have a 
relation to trut~ However this does not differentiate it from other 
types of belief. Scientific knowledge is simply that which is 
conventionally accepted to be true in a particular society at a 
particular historical moment. When a society designates certain 
beliefs as true, it gives those beliefs an authoritative status which 
may then be utilised in the social processes which seek to transmit 
and enforce settled opinions and conventions. This, it is stressed, 
is not to belittle scientific knowledge. Bloor, for example, goes 
out of his way to say that it is not a case of mere conventions since 
these are not arbitrary. They have to be able to obtain a social 
credibili ty and a practical utility, to be acceptable and consonant 
with other settled beliefs. Conventions are not facile or trivial, 
they are often harsh and demanding. To say that truth is a 
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convention, then, is not to demean it but to enable the analysis of 
its social constitution and functions. 
Tradi tionally, histories of sciences have accorded a crucial 
role in scientific progress to the experiment, for this is the moment 
of confront a tion be tween a theory and its obj ect, where na ture has 
its chance to say 'ye s' or 'no' to though t. For the strong 
programme, experiments can have no such status. 16 Bloor, for 
example, demonstrates that Priestly's experiments, which are 
traditionally conceived of as refuting the phlogiston theory of 
combustion, were in no sense such a confrontation. The construction 
of the experiment, the interpretation of the results, the 
'recognition' of anomaly and the rectification of the theory all 
happen internal to the space of theory itself. Thus there was 
nothing wi thin the phlogiston theory which led to its replacement 
with the oxygen theory of combustion, for it had an available 
explanation for the 'anomalous' experimental results which did not 
question the basis upon which the theory was founded. 17 The 
conclusion which is drawn from this argument is tha tit must be to 
extra-theoretical developments that we must look if we are to be able 
to explain the theoretical shift which did occu~ These are 
transformations in the social conventions which accorded the status 
of truth to certain beliefs and witheld this authoritative status 
from others. 
What content does the strong programme give to its claim that 
knowledge consists in ideas which are taken to be true because they 
are social conventions with authoritative status? Over and above the 
general assertion that knowledge is social, neither a property of the 
object nor of the individual, it is argued that these conventions 
may be related in a non-general, and non-trivial, way to the nature 
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of the society of which this knowledge is a part. This question is 
posed in ~arious ways by different authors within this approac~ 
Bloor adopts a position which is familiar within the sociology 
of knowledge. He seeks to demonstrate a convergence between the 
conventionally accepted features of a science and other beliefs which 
are prevalent in the society in question at the appropriate 
historical moment. This congruence proposes a unity within the realm 
of beliefs - culture - which may be analysed in terms of 'underlying 
social metaphors'. In fact this unity is thought of in terms of a 
small number of general oppositions. For example, there is the 
general opposition between 'enlightenment' and 'romanticism'. This 
can be shown to underlie a variety of cultural beliefs. It also can 
be shown to characterise various oppositions within 'knowledge. Bloor 
chooses as an example the opposi tion in the philosophy of science 
between Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper. Popper's thought is congruent 
in tone, style, metaphor and content with 'enlightenment social 
thought': both appeal to an apparatus of natural rights of the 
individual, social contracts between rational individuals who use an 
unchanging moral calculus, and an ethos of social reform. On the 
other hand, Kuhn's account of science represents 'romantic' thinking: 
focussing on the property of social wholes, their historically 
changing nature, the inextricability of facts and values in the real 
social existence of individuals. 
These general cultural oppositions are linked in turn to 
congruent social and political oppositions, and argued to be also 
represented in economic theory, political theory, moral theory and so 
forth. Thus Bloor claims to have demonstrated that scientific 
theories stand squarely on conceptions of society. He can thus 
advance the hypothesis that "theories of knowledge are, in effect, 
reflections of social ideologies" - where a social ideology is a 
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taken-for-granted pattern of ideas which individuals have acquir~d as 
a resul t of their socialisation and which gets 'unconsciously 
embedded' into theoretical discourse. 18 
If Bloor's analysis is radical, it is only in the application 
to science of a position which is well worn elsewhere. He himself 
recognises in places that were he speaking of aesthetics or ethics 
his view would be utterly conventional. The characterisation of 
epochs in terms of broad uni ties of 'images' or 'world-views', the 
opposition between enlightenment and romantiCism, the treatment of 
discourses as wholes which express a certain style, tone, metaphor 
and so forth - all these are familiar devices in the sociology of 
knowledge. Hence the account shares some familiar shortcomings, 
which it is useful to briefly enumerate. 
Such an account runs together discourses of various types -
scientifiC, religious, political, philosophical, aesthetic - into 
global unities which are then said to manifest something like a 
Weltanschaung. Texts and ideas inhabit an homogeneous space of 
'culture' behind which lies a 'spirit of the age', which expresses 
itself within them. Texts are then read as signs of these underlying 
world views, and the interpretation of the former in terms of the 
latter is what counts as an explanation of the social existence of a 
particular text. 
The corollary of such an analysis is an inattention to the 
details of texts and discourses. The statements which make them up, 
with their specific objects, systems of explanation and modes of 
conceptualisation are read through a pre constructed grid. This grid 
enables the selection of elements of the discourse on the grounds of 
their consonance with the images or metaphors which are supposed to 
inhabit them, merely on the grounds of their apparent congruence with 
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other social and cultural forms. There is no attempt to assign 
particul~r weight to differing concepts or arguments in the discourse 
under scrutiny. When a congruence can be shown it is triumphantly 
held up as a demonstration of the operation of the social in the 
textual. Those aspects which do not so conform are passed over in 
discreet silence: their social status remains unexamined. 
Social positions, social images, cuI tural metaphors and 
knowledges are treated as if they existed in a relation of reflection 
to one another. This ignores the specific properties and modes of 
formation and operation of each. It also performs contradictory 
operations at the various levels. On the one hand positions taken up 
in the field of scientific knowledge are argued to reflect 
conceptions of the nature of society, thus assigning a posi tion of 
priori ty and determination of the latter over the former. On the 
other hand, both are considered to be expressions of a process more 
fundamental still - the 'unconscious ideas' which are instilled by 
socialisation, by the ways in which individuals are trained up in 
particular ways of seeing, thinking and so forth. Hence one has a 
paradoxical combination of sociological and psychological reductions 
of scientific knowledge. In either case, whichever form of reduction 
is accorded temporary priority, scientific knowledges'are explicable 
only to the extent that they may be regarded as the expression of 
something outside them which determines and animates them. 
Two further points may be made before turning to a different 
approach. Firstly it should be noted that the move towards 
psychological reduction is necessary, given that no other analytical 
means are developed for specifying the mechanism for the realisation 
of social factors wi thin scientific knowledge. In the absence of 
these, the most obvious option is to imply that this occurs during 
the passage of experience through the mind of individual scientists 
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equipped with particular psychological characteristics as a result of 
their socialisation. Secondly, this approach fails to account for 
the specifici ty of scientific discourse, for precisely that which 
gives scientificity to particular discourses. Is there nothing 
peculiar to those know ledges which are taken at a certain historical 
moment to be explanations of a domain of phenomena, and explanations 
which are truthful? It is not accidental that scientific truths 
cannot be discriminated from religious, aesthetic, political or moral 
truths within this approa'ch, for the analysis is, as we have seen, 
premised upon the identity of science with other aspects of a single 
field of cul ture. 
Recent writings from wi thin the strong programme have turned 
away from the globalising form of explanation proposed by Bloor, 
although propositions of this type are sometimes utilised to fill in 
corners of their arguments. The explanatory strategy which has been 
adopted appears more highly specified. Within the general objectives 
of the strong programme, a specific mechanism is proposed for the 
relationship between the social and the scientific. This is the 
familiar sociological mechanism of 'interests'. It is claimed that 
the emergence and transformation of scientific theories, and the 
positions which are taken up within scientific disputes, may be 
explained in terms of the social or cognitive interests of the 
scientists concerned. 19 
Let us consider an example taken from an area pertinent to the 
present study. Donald MacKenzie has analysed the development of 
sta tistical theories in Engl and in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. He relates this to the social, poli tical and 
professional interests of the parties concerned, as expressed also in 
their at ti tudes to eugenics. Eugenics, it is argued, was a reading 
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onto nature of the practice and experience of an intellectual 
aristocracy, with its commitment to change and increasing efficiency 
within capitalism. The concern of 'positive eugenics' with 
encouraging the fertility of the middle classes expressed the 
interest of middl e cl ass professional males, confronted with 
feminism, in returning women to home and motherhood. Similarly it is 
argued that there is a 'fit' between Gal ton's statistical theory, 
with its concern for measures of statistical dependency, and the 
naturalism of eugenics and the interests of a rising scientific 
sector of the professional middle class. And in the case of the 
dispute between the Biometricians and the Mendelians, MacKenzie 
argues that "the detailed technical judgments made by the two sides 
reflect at least in part the social interests of groups of scientific 
practi tioners with differing skills".20 
In other examples of such an approach, Shapin argues that the 
views advanced by phrenologists in the nineteenth century concerning 
the relations between shape of skull and trai ts of personali ty and 
intellect were a function of their social interests; Harwood argues 
that the positions adopted by hereditarians and environmentalists in 
debates concerning the relation of race to intelligence were shaped 
by the differing professional interests of the opposing parties, and 
so forth. 21 In one of the key theoretical statements for this 
approach, Barnes writes: 22 
There is little or no knowledge which does not to some extent 
reflect in its content the operation of unacknowledged 
interests; there is no knowledge where such interests do not 
influence its organisation and distributio~ Knowledge grows 
under the impulse of two great interests, an overt interest in 
prediction, manipulation and control, and a covert interest in 
rationalisation and persuasio~ 
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Know-ledges, it is argued, are resources which participants in 
social and political life draw upon and utilise, consciously or 
unconsciously in order to advance their own interests and defeat 
those who are opposed to them. They do this sometimes cynically but 
often with genuine belief. Knowledge is not to be understood in 
terms suggesting passive and dispassionate contemplation; its 
development and deployment is an active social process. This process 
is frequently characterised in terms of a distinction between the 
goals and objectives around which social actors explicitly organise 
and to whose furtherance they direct their efforts, and interests, 
which are more fundamental and often unrecognised by those who pursue 
them. Thus MacKenzie concludes his study:23 
Science is an activity not of passive contemplation and 
'discovery' but of invention. It is goal oriented, and, while 
its goals may all in a general sense have to do with the 
enhancement of the human potential to predict and control the 
world, they represent different particularisations of this 
overall obective. The pursuit of particular goals is typically 
sustained by social interests located either in the internal 
social structure of science or in that of society· at large. 
Scientific knowledge is thus a social construct in two senses. 
First, in that it is typically the product of interacting groups 
of scientists. Second, in that social interests affect it not 
merely at the organisational level but at the most basic level 
of the development and the evaluation of theories and 
techniques. Because science is goal oriented, and because its 
goals are socially sustained, scientific knowledge is 
constitutionally social. 
It can be seen that this version of the strong programme is similar 
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to that already discussed, with the mechanisms of socialisation, 
unconscious ideas and images replaced by those of goals and 
interests. I will therefore focus my criticisms upon the question of 
interests. 
There are two general ways in which the link between social 
interests and science is conceived. Firstly there is the case where 
the interest is explicit, in that the individual concerned is overtly 
attached to a particular position and actively mobilises scientific 
findings and activities in support of that position and the 
objectives and goals which it seeks. Here the strong programme 
suggests that there are no analytical problems in the identification 
of interests. However in a second case certain 'technical 
difficulties' in this identification are acknowledged. In this case 
the interests at work are covert or concealed, they are denied or at 
least never mentioned by the scientist in question, and often unknown 
to them. The identification of such concealed interests is 
considered a complex and difficul t task; it is not, however, 
impossible in principle and is the appropriate objective for 
sociological analysis. 
Consider first the case where the interest is apparently 
evident, and where an overt and explici t link between the interest 
and the theory is said to be observable. An example here would be 
the link between the attachment of Galton and Pearson to eugenics and 
the statistical theories and measures of association which they 
developed. The relationship between the theory and the interest 
might be thought to be clear. Knowledge, it was argued, is a 
resource drawn upon by social actors and deployed in pursuit of their 
interests. The ra tionalisa tion and justifica tion of eugenics 
required that associations be demonstrated to exist between certain 
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variabl es. The measures of dependency developed by Galton and 
Pearson provided an apparently scientific, neutral and objective 
measure of such associations. They thus legitimated eugenic beliefs 
and enabled Galton and Pearson to deploy such theories in support of 
their social goals. This is not to imply that the development of 
these measures was done cynically, but merely that actors with 
particular interests, organised around particular goals, are 
predisposed to make and believe certain knowledge claims rather than 
others. However, a number of problems arise in such an analysis. 
Knowledge, it is argued, is a resource. However these 
arguments tell us nothing about the conditions under which certain 
knowledges become available as possible resources. Clearly there is 
only a limited number of scientific theories which are possible at 
any given time, and hence available for selection in the service of 
particular interest~ Yet these analyses are silent about the 
circumstances under which a particular range of options are present, 
and others are absent. How, for example, did it become possible to 
think statistically about human attributes at all, and what were the 
theoretical conditions which allowed certain arguments to count as 
statistical at particular times? Interest analyses take these 
fundamental questions concerning the constitution'of scientific 
discourses with particular explanatory structures as given. For the 
purposes of the analysis, the conditions of possibility of scientific 
knowledges are reduced to their suitability for deployment in support 
of interests. 
The interests of agents who mobilise around particular goals 
are considered to be related in a self- evident manner firstly to 
those goals themselves, and secondly to the precise theoretical form 
which will help to achieve or further them. But how are particular 
goals derived from general interests, and how are these realised in 
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specific theoretical choices? Interest analyses take this deriva.tion 
and realisation as self-evident: given these interests, any rational 
agent would formulate these goals and realise them through a choice 
of this particular theoretical posi tioD. It appears that this occurs 
independently of the particularities of the conditions, discourses 
and contestations in which the agents are engaged. However such an 
assumption is unwarranted. Neither goals nor theoretical choices can 
be simple realisations of 'interests', since any 'interest' will 
allow the formulation of 'a number of specific goals, and any goal 
would allow the choice of a number of distinct theoretical positions 
to realise it. 
Eugenicists explicitly saw their interests in terms of 
increasing social and national efficiency, raising the quality of the 
population, reducing the social threats caused by the rapid breeding 
of unemployables and defectives. But these interests could certainly 
have been satisfied by other than eugenic means, as we shall see in a 
later chapter, and even within the general strategy of eugenics the 
interests in themselves are an insufficient explanation of the 
particular policies, emphases, and proposals which were put forward 
by the varying groups. And similarly, these interests were quite 
compa tible wi th a number of different theoretical choices wi thin 
evolutionary biology and statistical theory. The way in which 
objectives were specified and the particular working through of 
theoretical choices was the product of complex systems of explanation 
and calculation available to the agents engaged in these practices. 
It is these, rather than the supposed 'interests', which require 
analysis if the formation of eugenic theories and arguments is to be 
made intelligible. Nor can this difficul ty be overcome in the way 
which is commonly utilised in these accounts - the ad hoc generation 
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of further interests to account for different aspects of these 
processe~ illustrates the weaknesses of the type of explanation 
rather than rectifying i~ Nei ther obj ecti ves nor theor etical 
posi tions can be adequately analysed in terms of such an interest 
realisation model. 
Let us turn to consider the case where interests are said to be 
concealed, in the sense that scientists are not explicitly attached 
to them, and do not actively organise around them. It will be 
evident that even in the case discussed above it was assumed that 
there were interests involved which were unrecognised by the 
participants. Whilst Gal ton and Pearson explici tly acknowledged 
their concern with certain social probl ems, their commitment to 
certain types of social policies and so forth, their adoption of 
these goals was explained in terms of interests not consciously 
avowed - those of the rising male professional middle classes in 
countering the threat of feminism and achieving social power through 
technical control. These interests are attributed to agents on 
account of the category into which they fall - male - or their social 
location - professional, middle class. They are conceived of as 
objectively given, as ontological. The problem with such an analysis 
is one of sociological reductionism. Where desires, forms of 
calculation and so forth are attributed to agents simply by virtue of 
their social location, the mechanisms by which the desires and 
calculations are produced remain unspecified, and disputes between 
Similarly located agents become unintelligible. Once it is accepted 
that definite processes are involved in the construction of desires, 
and in the production and selection of particular means of 
cal cuI a ti on, the expr essi v e relationship between acti vi ties, 
calculations, desires and social location is threatened. For if 
these mechanisms produce real effects, and if they have a genuine 
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existence of their own, then the 'realisation' of interests must 
always be dependent on condi tions exterior to those interests 
themsel ves. If this is accepted, then the very reference to 
'concealed interests' is unhelpful. Since there is no 'natural' 
relation, or simple congruence, between a social location and 
particular desires, it becomes necessary to specify in particular 
cases the way in which social agents have come to be constituted with 
specific desires, and the ways in which these have been formulated 
into interests and objectives through certain discursive means. 
Interest arguments assume the existence of given social 
locations occupied by human subjects who calculate according to a 
natural rationality. Subjects situated in these locations could do 
no other than wish, believe, think and act as they do. This form of 
reductionism is common to much sociology, and to the sort of marxism 
which forms the theoretical back-drop to many of the interest 
explanations in the strong programme. It has been extensively 
criticised elsewhere.24 Explanation by reduction to interests is a 
mode of analysis which may be termed 'critique'. Jeri tique' will be 
discussed in more detail in the next section of this chapter. It is 
a form of argument which seeks to explain events at one level through 
an interpretation of them as expressions of events or processes at 
another level. This second level is conceived of as deeper and more 
fundamental, and as the motive or truth of surface events. Interest 
accounts vacillate over the causal status to be accorded to the 
hidden interests which are 'discovered' in relation to the surface 
events which are being analysed: sometimes interests 'explain', 
sometimes they 'influence', sometimes they 'fit' or 'match', 
sometimes they merely 'help one understand'. However the reference 
to interests in these accounts functions as a claim to demonstrate 
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what events and disputes were 'really about' and hence also as an 
exposr:e of pretensions to scientific neutrali ty. Once the ontology 
of interests is rejected, the bankruptcy of this exercise is exposed 
and the explanatory priority of interests upon which it depends can 
no longer be sustained. 
Of course, parties in scientific and social disputes do 
sometimes mobilise around what they conceive to -be their interests, 
and relate their objectives and goals to such interests. However 
these interests cannot be regarded as prior to the disputes in 
question, as the given starting point for analysis or as the ultimate 
explanation for action. They are themselves constituted through 
particular discourses, and in relation to the specific practices in 
which agents and forces are caught up. 
The issue for analysis is thus, in part, the construction of 
interests and the mobilisation of' forces around them. However the 
relationship between these constructed interests and particular 
objectives is not one of realisation. It is necessary for analyses 
of the social existence and functioning of scientific discourses to 
take these problems as a focus for analysis and not regard interests 
as an unproblematic explanatory resource. 
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The medicalisation of social control 
A further sociological approach is gaining currency in analyses of 
the human sciences. This is one which analyses their mode of 
operation in terms of 'social control' and which sees their 
historical development over the last century in terms of the 
'medicalisation' of social control. I will consider first the 
question of social control, and then turn to the issue of 
medicalisation. 
Analyses in terms of social control are currently fashionable 
in sociologies of welfare, social policy and medicine, and in studies 
of psychiatry25. The histories of policies, programmes and practices 
are explained as ways in which threats to the smooth functioning of 
the social order are averted or dealt with. Such arguments entail 
the belief that events may be adequately explained by demonstrating 
the functions which they serve. In this case the function at issue 
is one of suppressing deviant behaviour. Deviant behaviour is that 
which poses actual or potential threats to existing social and 
poli tical condi tions. To designate a social process with regard to 
deviant behaviour as one of social control is simultaneously to 
characterise that process, to account for its social existence, and 
to criticise it. 
These arguments are predicated upon a particular view of 
deviance. Deviance is here conceived as having a certain direction, 
meaning and social genesis. It is both a result of and a protest 
against prevailing condi tions of life, or the beliefs and 
expectations of an imperfect social order. However its political 
potential may be assessed, the fact of deviance is regarded as 
representing a impl ici t cri tici sm of exi sting social relations. 
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Whilst the content of deviant activities and their social 
distribution might change, the meaning of deviance remains the same, 
and its regulation by various social agents has a double function. 
It both suppresses a source of social danger and simultaneously 
reinforces and legi timates those norms, beliefs and values which 
deviance threatens. Social control of deviant behaviours is thus 
essentially a 'police matter', which is brought into play when other 
mechanisms for ensuring social stability and contentment - for 
example, ideology - break down. 
There are two central problems with such arguments. First, 
there is an illegi timate homogenisation of all 'social problems' 
under the rubric of deviance. Witchcraft in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, insani ty in the nineteenth century and 
hyperactivity amongst schoolchildren today are all fundamentally the 
product of the same social mechanisms and have the same social 
significance. They share an essential property wi th criminality, 
homosexuali ty and drug taking. They violate social norms. This 
common non-normativity is the justification for seeking to embrace 
them all wi thin a general sociological theory of deviant behavior.26 
Such a sociological reduction of 'deviance' is unhelpful for a 
number of reasons. The argument is indifferent ~o the form of 
expression of deviance, for its meaning and significance is not at 
this level. Social control processes work upon any violation of 
norms in the same way - the fact of the violation is of more 
significance than the particular norm which is violated. This is to 
leave unanalysed that which in any of these behaviours is more than 
the mere violation of a norm: for example the specific social 
processes which, from the late nineteenth century on, have 
constructed the homosexual as both a functioning social category and 
a particular type of personality. 
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The homogenisa tion of deviance further obscures the specifi.ci ty 
of the terms and conditions under which 'social problems' are 
constructed, and assumes a continuity and interchap..geability betw"een 
them. Thus Szasz, for example, can argue that there is a continuity 
between mediaeval witch-hunting and contemporary psychiatry: the two 
have the same origins in the persecution of the deviant, the same 
social functions of the suppression of a threat to social beliefs and 
a reaffirma tion of the values of normali ty, and the same inhuman 
consequences. Paradoxically Szasz is in accord with the 
anachronistic historiography of the 'authori ta tive' historians of 
psychiatry; both suggest that mediaeval witches and modern mental 
patients are in some sense equivalent - though they disagree on what 
sense is in question. 27 But mediaeval Europe would disagree, not 
because it did not recognise the category of madness, but because the 
condition of being a witch was precisely that one was not mad. The 
point at issue is that the category of deviance obscures the crucial 
social consequences of the divisions and relations amongst the forms 
of behaviour that particular societies regard as problematic or 
troubl esome. Thus, for example, in eighteenth century Europe, 
"blasphemy, religious profanation and witchcraft fell into the same 
category because they disturbed the public order" whilst the 
attribution of such behaviours to madness relieved the individual 
concerned of the severe penalties which would otherwise follow, 
because the behaviours were no longer regarded as the product of evil 
intent.28 It is necessary to establish the r..ature and significance 
of the designations of, and divisions within, pathological 
behaviours; a general theory of deviance obscures them by suggesting 
that processes which are in principle identical are brought to bear 
on all categories of individuals singled out on account of breach of 
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norms. 
Theories of deviance and social control routinely purport to 
have a cri tical function. However it should be pointed out that to 
designa te a certain social mechanism as one of social control can 
only function as a criticism in itself if it is presumed that any 
such control is necessarily unjust or improper. The problem is that 
this is precisely what a criticism must seek to demonstrate; 
contemporary sociologies of social control tend to assume it at the 
outset. Are all processes of construction and regulation of social 
norms unjust, immoral, violations of some inherent right of 
individuals to define their own social reality? If this is not so, 
then a demonstration of the fact of social control is either otiose 
or irrelevant. Either it merely demonstrates what the analysis takes 
as a premise: that the social order is unjust, exploitative, and that 
any practice which tends to sustain it is automatically condemnable. 
Or what need to be demonstrated are the specific points upon which 
particular social mechanisms and processes are to be cri ticised. The 
tedious repetitions of the 'unmasking' of the 'social control 
functions' of the human sciences, psychiatry, social policy and the 
welfare state seldom approach the level of analysis of the existence 
and opera tion of the implicated knowledges and apparatuses which 
would be required to address these questions. 
Despite the apparent radicalism of the sociology of social 
control, its proponents fail to consider seriously some central 
'sociological' questions, and hence produce a versatile and empty 
form of analysis in which everything and nothing can count as an 
instance of social control. A reflection on some elementary points 
about social relations, which one might be forgiven for thinking had 
long been established, illustrates the unhelpful ness of setting up 
analyses in terms of deviance and social control. 
63 
All forms of human social organisation require and construct 
certain norms of behaviour and conduct.29 Human attributes, from 
basic bodily movements such as posture or walking to the experience 
and expression of psychical states such as emotions, are 
underdetermined biologically. They have no natural or given form and 
cannot be merely expressions of biological or psychological givens. 
Hence social relations require a limitation and construction to be 
placed upon them. Personal and social behavior is constructed and 
regulated by practices such as those of family, education, language 
and law, and by belief systems ranging from 'popular culture' to 
explici t and organised political or religious ideologies. This is 
not, it should be noted, a simple matter of 'socialisation': social 
practices work upon biological and psychical processes which have 
their own mechanisms and can never merely reflect or internalise 
social conditions which act upon them. 
The very complexity of norms of personal and social existence, 
and of the biological and psychical conditions upon which they work, 
entails the variability of human behaviours and the occurrence of 
behaviours which are discrepant from norms and which constitute a 
repertoire of pathologies. At the very least, this will be the case 
because cuI tures are not totali ties, and norms are heterogeneous -
any given individual will be the terminal for distinct practices with 
varying and sometimes incompatible norms. All societies thus contain 
agencies whose obj ect is the social construction of the 'normal' and 
the constraint and regulation of the 'pathological'. Societies 
consist in defini te practices, agencies and ideologies which 
constrain and regulate, produce and administer normali ty and 
pa thology in personal attributes and behaviours. Neither normality 
nor pathology have any ontological status, but a society wi thout 
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categories of pathology is as unthir~able as a society without norms. 
This is as true of socialist and communist societies as it is of 
mediaeval Europe, societies without organised state forms, and 
'laissez faire' market societies. The nature, content and means of 
construction of social norms will vary. But the mere discovery of 
the existence of norms and of social processes for their regulation 
cannot pass for analytic acuity, still less for effective social 
criticism. To this extent the proclamation of the discovery of a 
practice of 'social control' as if this were both an adequate account 
of the practice, a condemnation of it, and an exposure of its corrupt 
truth is surely a little naive. 
Contemporary sociological arguments over the social role of the 
human sciences frequently suggest mor-e than their implication in 
practices of social control. They represent, it is said, a 
'medicalisation' of social control. The argument, in brief, is that 
the contemporary role and importance of the human sciences can be 
understood in terms of a general trend in social control practices in 
modern societies, Such societies rationalise and legitimise their 
practices of control of deviant and troublesome groups and 
individuals by allocating this task to 'experts'. The human sciences 
provide the pseudo-scientific back-up to such .experts, the 
intellectual counterparts of the practical technology which controls 
threatening social elements under the guise of helping them, and 
which purveys normalisation under the guise of therapy.3 D 
This new arrangement in the or ganisa tion of social control is 
said to have a number of advantages. It first of all legi timates 
such control by redefining behaviour which departs from social norms 
as sickness, control as therapy, and the activities of the social 
controllers as el'l~ightened, objective, scientific and motivated by 
humanitarian concern for the good of the sick individual, rather than 
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social concern for the maintenance of a docile population. Secondly, 
it allows the State and its agents themselves to feel that their 
practices of control are actually motivated by humanitariar~sm rather 
than narrow calculation of political advantage. Thirdly, it defuses 
the radicality of deviants themselves, since it leads individuals to 
accept the social defini tions of their norm-breaking behaviour as 
Sick, accepting the 'sick role', invalidating their active or passive 
rejection of the status~, and rendering them dependent upon 
professional expertise rather than having their fate in their own 
hands. Finally, it provides lucrative employment, social status and 
great power for the rising professional middle class in general and, 
in particular, for the agents on the borders of psychology and 
medicine who specialize in providing scientific legitimation for the 
labelling and control of deviant behaviour. 
In addi tion to the aspects of such arguments which have been 
cri ticised above, there are two elements in these approaches which 
deserve consideration. Firstly it is suggested that the know ledges 
promulgated by these experts in control of behavioural deviation are 
merely pseudo-scientific legi timations of their control practices. 
Particularly prevalent is the view, that the medical profession can 
be analysed as 'moral entrepreneurs' and that their knowledge claims 
concerning certain issues are spurious rationalisations of a wish to 
obtain monopoly rights over a domain of social power.31 They are, 
tha t is to say, not scientific but ide ological. The utili ty of the 
opposi tion between science and ideology will be discussed in detail 
in the next chapte~ Here I will confine myself to pointing out that 
this type of argument mimics the worst history of ideas in 
adjudicating upon the inadequacy of past beliefs on the basis of its 
own unquestioned wisdom. The idea that the authors of texts in the 
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eighteenth or nineteenth century, any more than today, cynically 
invented 'a set of categories and a body of theory in order to justify 
or advance their own position is simply absurd. Certainly every 
science has its share of charlatans, and of those who mistake wishful 
thinking for theoretical argument. But the exposure of the few 
provides no means of evaluating the reasons why the vast majority of 
serious and dedicated scholars and practitioners accepted, at a 
particular historical moment, certain theories of pathology, 
practiced in the light of them, and argued for the correctness of 
their posi tion and for it to be taken seriously by poli ticians and 
administrators. 
Secondly, the notion of medi calisa tion implies a continui ty 
between the medicine of the nineteenth century and that of today, in 
that our contemporary arrangements are supposed to bear witness to 
the success of the 'moral entrepreneurship' of the medical 
profession. But there is no such continuity. As has been argued 
elsewhere, in relation to Scull's account, "the history of modern 
psychiatric practice is irreducible to medicalisation".32 The 
emergence of moral treatment of madness in the nineteenth century was 
nei ther a turning away from medicine, nor a victory for it. It was 
promulgated by clergy as well as doctors, and involved a 
transformation of the place of operation of medicine in relation to 
madness and a reformulation of the rationale for medical treatment of 
madness. It entailed as much conflict within the 'medical 
profession' as between medicine and other practices. There is no 
theoretical or organisational continuity in medicine across the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries which allows one usefully to 
postulate a general process of medicalisation. A ra:r..ge of dispersed 
changes established new relations between medically qualified agents, 
the organisation of local and national governments, the family, legal 
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practices, philanthropy and later social work. Terms like 
medicalisation, monopolisation and professionalisation at best 
describe certain elements of the historical shifts involved, but 
these limited terms of description can hardly pose as explanatory of 
the complex changes in dispersed practices which occurred. 
The medicalisation argument, like that of social control, is 
intended to be a critique. Medicine is interfering in areas in which 
it has no right, for what is involved is not a medical matter but a 
social and political one 'concerning norms and expectations as to 
proper behaviour. However such arguments have a remarkably primitive 
notion of the theory and practice of modern clinical medicine. The 
authors imply that medical interventions are legi timate when, and 
only when, an individual can be demonstrated to be suffering from an 
identifiable organic malfunction. But such a criterion would deem 
illigi timate virtually all contemporary medical practice. It may 
conform to a view of clinical medicine held by its less enlightened 
theoreticians, but it is far from characteriSing its reality. 
Diagnosis of physical illness is a complex act of cultural judgment, 
invol ving assessment of both 'physical' and 'behavioural' symptoms. 
Defini tions of heal th and illness in the case of 'physical illness' 
are just as much 'social' as they are in relation to conditions 
identifiable only through particular forms of behaviour or belief, 
such as 'mental illness'. 
All medicine, physical no less than any other, involves the 
application of culturally determined norms concerning 'heal thy' and 
'sick' functioning of organs, bodies and persons. The 
counterposi tion of the proper use of medicine in relation to organic 
malfunction to its improper use in cases of behavioural deviation is 
over simple. Both involve an act of diagnosis in terms of deviation 
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from social norms. It is more appropriate to pose criticism of the 
use of clinical techniques in respect of abnormal forms of conduct or 
behaviour somewhat differently. For example, criticism of the norms 
themselves, the condi tions of their application to cases, the 
practices in which they are deployed, the relations of power and 
distribution of rights and competences within them.33 
It is not therefore appropriate to conduct the present analysis 
in terms of an history of social control and its medicalisatio~ In 
the following chapter we will outline the 'archaeological' technique 
utilised by Michel Foucault, which will provide the principal 
conceptual tools for the present study. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE 
Quoted in Boring, 1929, pvii. 
2 Boring, 1929; Brett, 1912-21; Murphy, 1928; Flugel, 1933. 
3 Murphy and Kovach,1972, p3. 
4 The literature pertinent to the epistemological questions is 
venerable and massive. I will simply single out three axes 
which have been important to the approach adopted here. 
Firstly, the (mainly French) criticisms of the conception of 
the presence of an object to knowledge, from Saussure's 
linguistics, the work of Bachelard and Canguilhem discussed in 
Chapter Two below, through Al thusser (1970) to the writings of 
Derrida (1975) and the different approach of Foucault discussed 
in the next chapter. Secondly the (largely anglo-saxon) 
debates on the history of science, which alII in some ways 
focus upon the work of Thomas Kuhn (1970). Thirdly the 
(philosophico-anthropological) debates on the universali ty of 
reason and the issues of relativism and rationality, as 
represented, for instance, in the collections edited by Wilson 
(1970) and Hollis and Lukes (1982). Richard Rorty (1980) 
provides a recent discussion and cri ticism of correspondence 
theories of truth. 
5 Lecourt, 1975, p167. 
6 Canguilhem, 1968, p21; quoted in Lecourt, 1975, p168. 
7 These terms come from Bachelard. See in particular, Bachelard, 
1951 and the accounts given in Lecourt, 1975; Gaukroger, 1976 
and Bhaskar, 1975. 
8 See especially Canguil hem , 1977. 
9 In particular I will not discuss the rather frui tless recent 
attempt to apply Kuhn's notion of scientific revolutions to the 
history of psychology. See Palermo, 1971; Warren, 1971, Weimer 
and Palermo, 1973; Weimer, 1974. 
10 See, for example, Popper, 1972; Lakatos, 1971. 
11 See the discussion in Barnes, 1974, Ch. 5, for a clear account. 
12 Cf Bloor, 1976, Chs 1 and 2. 
13 Cf Williams, 1975. 
14 The most explici t statements are in Barnes, 1974 and Bloor, 
1976. This approach is reviewed in Lukes, 1975; Meynell, 1977; 
Millstone, 1978 and Freudenthal, 1979. 
15 Bloor, 1976, pp 2-3. 
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16 The same conclusion is reached, by a very different route" in 
the texts cited in note 6. 
17 Bloor, 1976, pp 32-39. 
18 Ibid, Ch 4. 
19 In my di scussion of 'interest expl ana tions' I have benefited 
from the critical arguments advanced by Woolgar, 1981, although 
I differ from the position adopted there about the pertinence 
of ethnomethodology for future work in the sociology of 
science. I have also drawn on the cri ticism of the notion of 
interests put forward by Hindess, 1982. Barnes, 1981 and 
MacKenzie, 1981b, in their reply to Woolgar confirm, rather 
than resolve, the difficulties in their approac~ 
20 MacKenzie, 1981a, p 129. See also MacKenzie, 1976. Other 
examples of explanations in terms of interests in the area 
which concerns the present study are the contributions of 
MacKenzie, Norton and Searle to Past and Present Society, 1978; 
and the works cited in notes 21 and 22 below. 
21 Shapin, 1975; Harwood, 1976; see also Shapin and Barnes, 1979 
and other papers in Wallis, ed, 1979. 
22 Barnes, 1977, p38; this posi tion is further developed in 
Barnes, 1982, especially Ch 5. 
23 Op cit, n20, p225. 
24 Rose, 1977; Hirst, 1979, Ch 4; Cutler et al, 1977, Ch 11; 
Hindess, 1982. 
25 For an introduction to the recent radical inflection of this 
venerable sociological concept, see Watkins, 1975; for its use 
in histories of welfare see Donajgrodski,1977; for contemporary 
analysiS see Simpkin, 1979; for its use in the field of 
education see Johnson, 1970. For psychiatry, see Ingleby, 
1981, especially the paper by Conrad and, for an historical 
account, Scull, 1979. Most radical texts in this field tend to 
use the notion of social control in an off-hand manner, even 
when it does not appear as a central concept for their 
arguments. I have made some of the arguments which follow 
elsewhere: cf Adlam and Rose, 1981. 
26 The clearest example of this type of approach is Szasz; see for 
example his 1972 and 1973. 
27 Szasz, 1973; Zilboorg, 1941. 
28 Rosen, 1968, p169. 
29 A useful recent compilation of evidence and discussion is Hirst 
and Woolley, 1982. 
30 See, for example, Scull, 1979; Conrad, 1981; Conrad and 
Schneider, 1980; Schrag and Divoky, 1981. This view is widely 
promulgated in a range of 'radical' texts, both on deviance and 
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so ci al policy. 
31 cf 'Scull, 1974; Cor~ad and Schneider, op cit. 
32 Minson, 1980, p196. 
33 Some of these changes will be discussed in less abstract form 
in the next chapter. For discussion of these questions in 
relation to the category of 'mental illness' see Adlam and 
Rose, 1981; Hirst and Woolley, 1982; Sedgwick, 1982; Clare, 
1980. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
ARCHAEOLOOY AND GEtlEALOOY OF THE IlUHAH SCIENCES 
In the last chapter, I criticised a number of approaches to the 
analysis of the history of scientific discourses, in particular the 
human sCiences, and the modes of their social existence and 
functioning. The approach to be adopted in the present study was 
outlined in the Introduction. In this chapter I will consider the 
conceptual bases of such an approach. I will proceed through a 
discussion of the work of Michel Foucault, for reasons which I will 
now make clear. 
From his early Mental Illness and Psychology to his most 
recently translated text History of Sexuality, Michel Foucault has 
been concerned with the origin, nature and destiny of the empirical 
sciences of man.' In his early texts, which he designated 
'archaeologies', he developed a form of analysis of theoretical 
discourses which exploded the simplifications and unifications common 
to sociology, marxism and the history of ideas. The positive 
achievments of these works form the basis for much of the criticism 
in the last chapter, and the majority of this chapter will be 
concerned to set out this approach and its implications. It is, 
however, Foucault's later writings which have recently had the most 
impact on the social sciences. These writings, which Foucault terms 
'genealogies', analyse the formation and functioning of the sciences 
of man in relation to political strategies centering upon the health, 
well being, good order, productivity and tractability of populations 
and of individuals. Such analyses are influential because they 
provide the means for a critical attention to the historical 
emergence and contemporary functioning of what has been termed "the 
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professional apparatus of health and hapPinessn2• They appear to 
allow an,analysis of the complex machinery of social regulation which 
has emerged since the nineteenth century in relation to sexuality, to 
punishment and justice, to pedagogy, to heal th, hygiene and 
'welfare' • 
With respect to the human sciences, the crucial term of these 
analyses is pouvoir-savoir or power-knowledge. The juxtaposition and 
hyphenation serve to mark the fact that, in these genealogies a 
symbiotic relationship is ~uggested between practices of regulation 
of persons and populations and systematic, codified and organised 
knowledges of persons and populations. And the use of the term 
'power' indicates that, in these accounts, the analysis of the social 
exi&tence of the empirical sciences links these theoretical 
discourses on individuals and populations with effects of domination 
in respect to them. What I shall argue here is tha t, at least wi th 
regard to the questions which concern this study, these genealogical 
analyses mark a retreat from the radical implications of archaeology, 
a retreat towards sociology. In this retreat the conditions of 
possibili ty, social consequences and effects of truth of the human 
sciences suffer an analytical reduction: they appear to be functions 
of the way in which know ledges can be deployed wi tl+in social and 
political strategies. And I shall argue that the limitations which 
this imposes upon the analysis of the human sciences is exacerbated 
by an ambiguity within the notion of power itself, such that there is 
a tendency to reduce the specific contribution made by the human 
sciences to the field of contemporary reality to the repetitive terms 
of domination. 
The human sciences 
Perhaps one can begin by asking why it is that Foucaul t has paid so 
74 
much attention to the emergence of those theoretical discourses which 
take man as their scientific object. In the first instance it is 
clear that this work had amongst its own conditions of possibility 
the formulation of a mode of argument which one might term 
'theoretical anti-humanism'. That is to say, these texts share with 
the work of Althusser, Levi-Strauss, much semiology and recent French 
psychoanalysis, a theoretical interrogation and critique of the 
ca tegory of the subject) These texts participate in the opposition 
to the central doctrinal support of humanist philosophy which treats 
man as the origin and founda tion of his social world and therefore 
the locus of its transformation (as in existentialist and 
sociological versions of phenomenology); as the principle and subject 
of history and therefore capable of 'understanding' it (man can know 
history because man makes history, as in the trajectory from Vico to 
hermeneutics); as the measure upon which a critique may be grounded 
(as in all the philosophies of reification and alienation). Anti-
humanist analyses reject such a philosophy of the cogito, founded as 
it is upon a uni ty which is both the subject of thought (that which 
thinks) and which can potentially take itself as an object, and that 
of which one can be sure when all else is doubted (cogito ergo sum). 
Anti-humanism regards such a conception of the subject as a 
metaphysical illusion and an obstacle to analysis. It rejects the 
philosophical and theoretical anthropology which underpins the notion 
of the subject as the empirically synthesiSing uni ty which is the 
locus of beliefs, feelings, emotions, intentions, actions and values. 
And it criticises the approach which makes the self, as an agent 
conscious of itself and its own continuing identity, integrity, 
wholeness, separateness and crea tivi ty, the principal term of its 
analysis of language, of production or of ~~story. 
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This contestation took a number of forms, but each sought to 
demonst~ate that the apparently originary and unified self'was 
dependent for its existence and operation upon a set of relations 
which were other than it, which exceeded it, and in respect to which 
it was consequence rather than cause. But whilst theoretical anti-
humanism was content, in the main, to denounce the reliance of 
humanist philosophy upon the category of the subject and to elaborate 
theories not so dependent, or to argue that the metaphysical fiction 
of the subject was both im~inary and eternal, Foucault's approach to 
the question of the subject took a different tack. Marxism, 
lip~istics and psychoanalysis, the three major protagonists, adopted 
a realist strategy in their attack on the presumptions of the 
subject: the reality of the domain addressed - social relations, 
language, the psyche - is and always has been other than that dreamed 
of in humanist philosophy. Foucault, by contrast, turned not to 
truth but to history, towards a sustained and mul ti-pronged 
investiga tion of the historical conditions and consequences of the 
emergence of man as both a scientific object and as the touchstone 
and foundation for true discourses. Let me begin with a 
consideration of the way in which this is done in the group of texts 
which end with the methodological formalisation of The ,Archaeology of 
Knowledge. 4 
The Order of Things closes with these words: 5 
One thing in any case is certain: man is neither the oldest nor 
the most constant problem that has been posed for human 
knowledge. Taking a relatively short chronological sample 
within a restricted geographical area - European culture since 
the sixteenth century - one can be certain that man is a recent 
invention within i~ It is not around him and his secrets that 
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knowledge prowled for so long in the darkness. In fact, among 
all the mutations that have affected the knowledge of things and 
their order, the knowledge of identities, differences, 
characters, equivalences, words - in short, in the midst of all 
the episodes of that profound history of the Same - only one, 
that which began a century and a half ago and now perhaps 
drawing to a close, has made it possible for the figure of man 
to appear. And that appearance was not the liberation of an old 
anxiety, the transition into luminous consciousness of an age-
old concern, the entry into objectivity of something that had 
long remained trapped within beliefs and philosophies: it was 
the effect of a change in the fundamental arrangements of 
knowledge. As the archaeology of our thought easily shows, man 
is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its 
end. 
If those arrangements were to disappear as they appeared, 
if some event of which we can at the moment do no more than 
sense the possibility - without knowing either what its form 
will be or what it promises - were to cause them to crumble, as 
the ground of Classical thought did, at the end of the 
eighteenth century, then one can certainly wager that man would 
be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the se~ 
This text, together wi th Madness and Civilisation and Birth of the 
Clinic seek to trace out not the causes of this 'event' but its 
conditions of possibility, and they carry out this task in rather 
different ways.6 The Order of Things examines the emergence of man 
in terms of the epistemic transformations which made it possible. It 
seeks to describe what is referred to as the 'positive unconscious' 
of knowledge - the rules common to a range of theoretical discourses 
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at a certain moment, rules not present to the consciousness or 
experience of the scientist but rather which make that consciousness, 
that experience possible, which constitute its .a priori. The Order 
of Things is the study of this type of rule of formation of 
theoretical discourse, rules never formulated in their own right but 
found in widely different theories, concepts and ways of arguing. It 
is not, then, a question of studying theoretical discourse from the 
point of view of the individuals who are speaking, or the structure 
of what they are saying, but the rules which come into play in the 
very existence of such a discourse, the rules which a statement will 
have to fulfil if it is to be, at the time when it is written, an 
instance of natural history, political economy, general grammar or 
whatever. 
The Order of Things argues that the human sciences form in a 
space which emerges consequent upon a fundamental shift which occurs 
at this epistemic level at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
This shift is traced through marking the correlative transformations 
in three domains - biology, economics and philology - unlikely 
choices for those familiar with more convential histories of the 
human sciences. In the Classical age there was a congruence between 
theories of language, theories of natural history and theories of 
wealth and value; in this epistemic formation, man, as an object of 
systematic theoretical discourse, could not exist. It is the theory 
of representation common to these discourses which is of central 
importance, a theory which allows the formation of an unambiguous 
link between representations and things, in which the scientific 
truth of objects is equivalent to the construction of a well ordered 
scientific language, whose ideal form is the reduction of apparent 
disorder to the harmony of a taxonomy, of a classificatory table:7 
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The sciences always carry within themselves the project, however 
remote it may be, of an exhaustive ordering of the world; they 
are always directed, too, towards the discovery of simple 
elements and their possible combination; and at their centre 
they form a table on which knowledge is displayed on a system 
contemporary with itsel~ The centre of knowledge, in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, is the table. 
This relationship of transparency between representations and their 
objects, such that ordering ,the former is equivalent to production of 
a knowledge of the latter means that, for the Classical episteme, the 
'problem of man' was simply non-pertinent. The establishment of a 
classificatory table of species, genera and classes which was the 
desire of natural history, posed a problem not of life, common to all 
the animals, man included, but of language to be perfected to be 
adequate to its taxonomic task. To posit human nature is, 
paradoxically, to make unnecessary any question of man as the object 
of theoretical elaboration - man is absent from the classificatory 
schema and the knowledge that this purveys is dependent upon no 
subject for its status. Similarly, for eighteenth century economics, 
money is the representation of wealth and designates it in the 
process of circulation; the Physiocrats and the Utilitarians share a 
body of fundamental propositions: all wealth springs from the land; 
the value of things is linked with exchange; money has value as the 
representa tive of weal th in circulation; circulation should be as 
simple and complete as possible. Here too the place of man is 
external to the table of weal th, pertinent only in that that which 
enters into the process of exchange is, or represents, objects of 
need. 
What happens in the nineteenth century to establish the 
sovereignty of man over the field of discourse, as the subject who 
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know s and the obj ect of know ledge? In each of these three areas a 
reversal can be observed, as philology, biology and political economy 
establish themselves, not in continuity with general grammar, natural 
history and the analysis of wealth, but in a space outside the 
horizon of their thought, in a domain of which they could not think. 
For the modern age man speaks, man resides among the animals, man's 
labour is the principle of productio~ The domains of language, life 
and labour are now subject to their own specific laws and principles 
and man enters the field of their operation. Yet these laws are no 
longer the play of identities and differences which may be adequately 
represented in a classificatory schema or a well made language. They 
are laws which have retreated to the heart of things themselves, to 
the organic depths of their posi ti ve reality, laws concerning 
internal relations between elements whose totality performs a 
function, not a table of unbroken simultaneities but a system of 
series or sequences on different levels. 
The Classical space of Order served as a common place for 
representations and for things, for empirical visibilities and for 
essential rules, a common space which made it possible systematically 
to scan elements contemporaneous with one another. Representations 
grounded themselves; the organising problem for modern epistemology 
of the relations between knowing subject and object was not merely 
not posed - it was not thinkable. In the modern episteme, however, 
representations have lost their power to provide their own foundation 
and no analysis or remaking of representations themselves, no 
construction of a language however unambiguous, can itself justify a 
cl aim to know ledge. The possibility of there being links between 
representations and things is now given in a realm which lies beyond 
their immediate presence, in a world-behind-the-scenes deeper and 
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denser than representation itself. The characteristic movement of 
the modern episteme is not taxonomia but interpretation. The 
Classical space of Order is shattered; there is now no mode of being 
which is common to things and to knowledges. On the one hand there 
are things, with their own organic structures and temporality, on the 
other hand there are representations addressed to a subjectivity, a 
"psychological" individual who is trying to know. 
It is this fundamental reorgapisation in thought and experience 
which begins to isolate a specific domain proper to man, and begins 
to make of man the very principle of knowledge, because it is his 
strivings alone that can penetrate the density of reality and attempt 
to apprehend and reconstitute its laws in consciousness. This also 
makes 'man' possible as an object of positive investigation since he 
is himself no more than a natural being, subject to those laws which 
he seeks to reconstruct: 8 
[Man], with his own being, with his power to present himself 
with representations, arises in a space hollowed out by living 
beings, objects of exchange, and words, when, abandoning 
representation, which had been their natural site hitherto, they 
withdraw into the depths of things and roll up upon themselves 
in accordance with the laws of life, production and language. 
In the middle of them all, compressed within the circle they 
form, man is designated. 
The epistemic configuration which makes possible political 
economy, biology and philology thus forms the surface upon which the 
human sciences establish themselves, and, for Foucault, the regional 
organisation of these sciences retains something of this original 
triparti te division - 'linguistic' studies of literature, myth, the 
verbal traces of man; 'sociological' theories of labouring man, the 
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producing and consuming individual in society; ~sychologicall man 
who repr~sents to himself his experience as a living being. But The 
Order of Things is not concerned to analyse the emergence of specific 
discursive formations upon this epistemic redistribution, but with 
establishing the fundamental conditions under which their emergence 
became possible: 9 
There can be no doubt, certainly, that the historical emergence 
of each one of the human sciences was occasioned by a problem, a 
requirement, an obstac+e of a theoretical or practical order: 
the new norms imposed by industrial society upon individuals 
were certainly necessary before psychology, slowly, in the 
course of the nineteenth century, could constitute itself as a 
science; and the threats that, since the-French Revolution, have 
weighed so heavily on the social balances, and even on the 
equilibrium established by the bourgeoisie, were no doubt also 
necessary before a reflection of the sociological type could 
appear. But though these references may well explain why it was 
in fact in such and such a determined set of circumstances and 
in answer to such and such a precise question that these 
sciences were articulated, nevertheless, their intrinsic 
possibility, the simple fact that man, whether in.isolation or 
as a group, and for the first time since human beings have 
existed and have lived together in societies, should have become 
the object of science - that cannot be considered or treated as 
a phenomenon of opinion: it is an event in the order of 
knowledge. 
No doubt a number of objections can immediately be raised to such an 
analysis. Certainly the tendency towards totalisation in the notion 
of the episteme - giving it something of the status of a 
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vlel tanschauung - is unwarranted, but neither is it a necessary part 
of such an analysis. The global terms of Classicism and Modernity, 
and the notion of a single general rupture between them, might do 
useful discursive and organisational duty for a time, but they should 
not be taken too seriously and certainly not made the principl e of 
any analysis. But another set of linked questions were most often 
put to The Order of Things: what were the conditions for this 
enigmatic yet fundamental transformation - how does change occur and 
what are its causes; what are the links between discourses - their 
form and transformation - and social relations more generally? Of 
course such questions were most frequently posed by those attempting 
to refight the heroic battles of the nineteenth century between 
'materiaiism' and 'idealism,.10 But in seeking to characterise 
Foucaul t's work in terms of this venerable opposition, they mistook 
the point at issue. 
In his comments appended to the English translation of The 
Order of Things Foucault states that, in this text, he deliberately 
laid to one side the question of causality in respect to 
transformations in order to concentrate on a description of the 
transformations themselves, which he considered an essential 
precondi tion for the construction of a theory of scientific change 
and epistemological causality. Yet it would be a mistake to believe 
that such an approach, or the distinction between knowledge and 
opinion put forward in the passage quoted above, was effectively 
signalling an elementary differentiation into levels or orders, 
ontologically given and hierarchically organised. It is rather an 
analytic distinction designed to free a certain group of phenomena 
for analysis without posing too rapidly certain repetitive and 
intractable problems concerning the relation of 'knowledge' to 
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'reali ty', the determination of ideas etc. And partly, too, it is a 
polemical choice, designed to free a domain, that of theoretical 
discourse, for an analysis in terms of its own internal rationalities 
and modes of functioning without reducing it to a stage upon which a 
play is acted out whose plot is written elsewhere - in the forms of 
economic organisation, in the minds of its authors, in the nature of 
the 'real' objects themselves. Yet, in freeing this domain, a series 
of radically new ways of addressing these tradi tional problems is 
opened up. These may be briefly illustrated with reference to Hadness 
and Civilisation and Birth of the Clinic. 
Madness and Civilisation is not a history of madness, of 
attitudes to madness, of ways of treating the mad, or even a history 
of psychiatry. What the book attempts, as has been pointed out 
elsewhere, is to describe the conditions of possibility for the 
emergence of psychiatry, and the correlative constitution of madness 
as a scientific object and as the 'reality reference' for a range of 
technical and institutional practices in respect of those so 
designated.11 Madness and Civilisation is concerned wi th the 
characteristics of the internal organisation of this theoretico-
practical space, with its regularities in terms of the theories which 
circulate, the deployment of concepts and explanationS', the forms of 
treatment, the relations between doctors and patients, the types of 
institution and their organisation, the relations established with 
other theories and practices. But this space, and the range of 
tactical options possible within it, is regarded as largely mapped 
out by the conditions which made it possible. The rationality of the 
theoretico-practical space of psychiatry is thus seen as established 
by the conditions of possibility for the formation of psychiatry. 
What are these conditions? 
Central to the argument is that psychiatry, as a practice in 
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which madness is consti tuted as a proper object for rational 
scientific discourse and for medical techniques and practice, emerges 
in the nineteenth century as a consequence of transformations in a 
variety of social fields many of which had little or nothing to do 
with madness itself. Consider the 'founding moment' of modern 
psychiatry, Pinel's liberation of the insane in Bicetre, 1793. Most 
histories of psychiatry see this as a gesture at one and the same 
time of humanisation, the recognition of the essential humanity which 
the mad share with the sane; of scientisation, the start of a 
scientific as opposed to religious or ethical approach to madness; of 
medicalisation, the recognition that madness shares something with 
diseases of the physical body and hence is mental illness; and of 
institutionalisation, the formation of the modern medicalised asylum, 
the mental hospital.12 This shift into modernity is regarded as the 
outcome of the application of newly enlightened medical thought to 
the given problem of insanity. A transformation in medical ideas, 
and more generally the displacement of religious beliefs by 
scientific ra tionali ty at the level of philosophy, produces a 
transformation in treatment, in institutional care, in understanding. 
In Madness and Civilisation madness becomes a possible object 
for medical practice and a reformatory therapeutic regime as a result 
of transformations of a rather different order. Legal changes in 
France at the time of the Revolution made detention unlawful except 
in respect of specific crimes and as a result of definite legal 
procedures, thus posing a specific problem for the mad who could 
neither be released nor easily be assimilated to criminals. Medical 
nosologies, in systematising the conditions with which doctors dealt, 
categorised the mad as both distinct from, and within, the field of 
medicine, with a defini te symptomatology, aetiology and prognosis. 
85 
The 'moral treatment' developed by Tuke at the York retreat, inspired 
by a particular ethical stance, appeared to demonstrate the 
possibility of reformation of the insane through a regime of enforced 
moral conformity, maintained by the systematic application of 
sanctions and rewards, and directed towards the soul present in all. 
Condillac's empiricist philosophy provided the means to displace the 
religious notion of morality into that of a moral space internal to 
each subject and amenable to transformation through the systematic 
regulation of experience. This created a new role for the 
tradi tional devices of medicine in respect to madness - bleeding, 
purging, spinning, bathing - and gives a specific therapeutic 
rationale for confinement: the asylum became the only adequate regime 
for the treatment of insanity because only there could the conditions 
of experience be rigorously and continuously supervised. The 
therapeutic rationale for confinement creates the possibility for the 
modern mental hospi tal, annexed to medicine partially through the 
theoretical alliance struck in the nosologies, partly through the re-
utilisation in the asylum of the old medical treatments for new 
purposes, partly because of the authority which the intellectual, 
social, therapeutic and legal status of the doctor conferred upon the 
post of asylum management in respect both to the field of poli tics 
and the compliance of patients. 
The shift thus documented was conditional upon transformations 
in diverse areas, in relation to diverse concerns and obeying diverse 
chronologies. Together they formed a space within which the new 
problem of madness could take shape, and within which a new range of 
strategies and tactics could be deployed. These conditions, whilst 
certainly in many cases directly 'political', cannot be reduced to a 
general political constraint exercised by 'capitalism', the 
development of the market, the need for a healthy workforce, any more 
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than they can be seen as fundamentally a shift in philosophy or 
Weltanschauung - the rise of posi tivism, or scientism, or the 
'medicalisation of social problems'. Archaeology refuses to operate 
in terms of a general ontological distinction beween a realm of 
'ideas' and a realm of 'practices', or to take up a position within 
the philosophico-political paradigm which opposes 'idealism' to 
'materialism'. But whilst no general question of causality, 
determination, or articulation is posed, the analysis always seeks to 
specify in the most precise terms the relations which obtain between 
different sorts of events and processes - in theories, in 
institutions, in morality, in the organisation of production, in the 
machinations of political forces. 
A further example, this time from Birth of the Clinic will 
clarify this point. This concerns neither the possibility of an 
empirical science of man, nor a specific discourse and its objects, 
but a formation which is both a theoretical category and a technical 
practice - the case. Clinical medicine depends upon the notion of 
the case - the unique intersection between a body, a life history and 
a condition - as the proper object for medical knowledge and the 
practice of the cure. The case designates, in part, a particular 
rela tion between subj ects in the practice of clinical medicine, a 
particular disposition of medical agents in relation to their 
patients in consulting room, ward, surgery, lecture theatre and 
textbook. Recent political accounts of the history of medicine tend 
to treat this notion of the case as a consequence of the emergence of 
posi tivist philosophy, as a sign of reifica tion - the treating of 
persons like things, subj ects like obj ects - characteristic of 
capitalist societies, as a manifestation of the fact that persons are 
only important for capitalism as equivalent, interchangeable labour 
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power and their uniqueness and individuality is of no concer~13 
Th~ analysis in Birth of the Clinic demonstrates in con"tra-
distinction that the formation of the case certainly was conditioned 
by social and institutional changes, was certainly 'political', but 
that the conditions of its emergence were dispersed, complex and non-
intentional. Crucial was the emergence of the hospital in the 
context of increasing urbanisation and industrialisation, and also as 
a result of a change in the laws of assistance which made 
institutionalisation a condition of medical treatment for those in 
receipt of relief. Hospitalisation of the sick allowed a change in 
relations between doctors and patients such that doctors could now 
observe a whole series of instances of any particular condition, 
making possible the tabulation and statisticalisation of diseases and 
the development of classifications and diagnoses based on the link 
between symptoms and prognoses, between symptoms at different levels, 
between individuals, and between successive events for anyone 
individual. Changes elsewhere resulted in new criteria to designate 
those who receive by law the right to hold a medical qualification 
and the formation of a new method for transmitting medical knowledge 
whereby the poor, benefi ting from the care they receive for free, 
compensate through the medical lesson they provide. rhe case, then, 
certainly implies a new relation between doctor and patient but 
nothing much can be learned of its condi tions or consequences from 
the mode of cri tique adopted by so many of its recent 
investigators. 14 The relations which archaeology seeks to analyse 
are those reduced or obscured by the methodologies criticised in the 
previous chapter. 
Archaeology 
The Archaeology of Knowledge seeks to clarify, formalise and develop 
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the methodological and analytic protocols for these analys~s.15 
Archaeology is a technique for the analysis of the conditions of 
appearance and transformation of regular bodies of statements, termed 
discursive formations. The mode of existence of such regulated 
bodies of statements is within discursive practices and archaeology 
seeks to describe their rules of formation, the rules which govern 
the functioning of regulated, individuated and describable bodies of 
statements. 
It is relevant to provide an exposition of some of the main 
features of archaeology for two reasons. Firstly, in order to set 
out the basis for the earlier criticisms of currently available ways 
of analysing the nature and social existence of scientific 
discourses. Secondly because the theses of archaeology provide the 
analytical guidelines for much of the substantive analysis undertaken 
in the present study. This is not in the sense that I would claim my 
own investigations to be a realisation or application of the 
protocols laid out in The Archaeology of Knowledge (any more than, in 
fact, are Birth of the Clinic, or Madness and Ci vilisa tion, or The 
Order of Things). It is rather that the considerations developed in 
The Archaeology of Knowledge provide the orientation for my own 
study, suggest the sorts of questions which it asks, and supply many 
of the analytical tools which it uses. These will be drawn together 
at the end of this chapter. To the extent that the account here 
provided is selective, this selection attempts to bring out points 
which are of particular significance for what follows. 
The domain of investigation of archaeology is the archive. The 
archive is a level somewhere between the grammatical rules of a 
language and the collection of words spoken, it is the level within 
which operates a system of formation, preservation and transformation 
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of statements. The archive consists in a multiplicity of statements 
organised as regular events. Archaeology seeks to describe the 
regularities governing these statements, and to specify the 
modifications which they are able to undergo. statements can come 
into existence and enter into relations with one another only under 
certain conditions, conditions which are termed an historical £ 
priori. A priori because it is the very condition of possibility of 
a certain order among statements, the ground and the horizon from 
within which they can be formulated; historical because it is itself 
mutable. When we recognise in the texts of, say, Broussais and 
Bichat, that they are 'talking about the same thing' or that they are 
disputing over the same questions it is because the statements which 
make up their texts operate upon the same a priori; when we see no 
possibility of a debate between Diderot and Darwin it is because the 
a priori which makes Darwin possible differs radically from that 
which grounds Diderot. 
The historical .§. priori is what Foucaul t refers to as a 
posi ti vi tv. It is not a deep or hidden level of meanings or 
intentions of individual or collective subjects, nor is it the 
foundation, origin or purpose of statements; it is merely the 
regularity that characterises the form of their actual existence. 
Archaeology thus attempts to individuate a group of statements in 
terms of the regularity of their dispersal through a description of 
the rules immanent wi thin it. If linguistiCS since Chomsky has based 
its theoretical revolution on the proposition that a finite number of 
transformational rules can generate an infinite number of grammatical 
sentences, archaeology could be said to differ in at least two 
respects. Firstly, its objective is to describe the rules that make 
possible a certain rarity of statements - not all which could have 
been said but only those statements that did, in fact, come into 
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existence. Secondly, these rules do not exist behind, below, be~eath 
or before the regime of statements they make possible -
archaeological description does not uncover a tdeep structuret but 
operates at a superficial level. There is not something beyond 
statements that is embodied in them - archaeology seeks to remain at 
the level of the statement itself. The rules which it seeks to 
describe are those through which actually existing statements do 
relate to one another wi thin a particular discursive formation. And, 
correlatively, a discursive formation can only be identified if such 
a description is possible. 
Similarly, the archive which is pertinent for archaeological 
analysis is itself determined by the statements that make it up. It 
is neither a questi on of accepting the parti tioning of statements 
according to conventional disciplinary boundaries, nor of limiting an 
archive by reference to a particular sector of reality which it might 
be deemed to be attempting to explain. Statements themselves, 
through their systems of reference and address, through the other 
statements which they take into account or distance themselves from, 
through the forms of connection which they themselves establish, 
define the scope and limits of an archive. 
A t the risk of repeti tion, it is necessary to stress the type 
of analysis involved here. It is, first of all, non-interpretive. 
The rules which it identifies do not generate statements from 
wi thout, they do not refer to the truth of wha t is being expressed. 
They are rather a means of description of regularities as, when, and 
where they appear. Archaeology is thus very different from the way 
of analysing texts which terms itself criticism or critiQue, as it 
has developed from German biblical cri ticism through Hegelian and 
Marxist philosophies of history. It is critique which is currently 
91 
so popular as a radical technique which seeks to interpret back 
through discourses to reveal the social and political concerns which 
animate them, the structural relations' which determine them, the 
functional exigencies which motivate them, the hidden causes which 
alone are believed to make discourse intelligible. 
Further, archaeology is non-anthropological. It is not an 
hermeneutics and does not seek to return from these statements and 
traces to the intentions of the authors who spoke them, to recover 
the meanir~s which subject~ embedded within them or the experiences 
to which they are linked. For this is another interpretive mode of 
analysis which analyses discourses by seeking to uncover or recover 
tha t which was originally hidden wi thin them. 
Archaeology, as we'have seen, operates at the level of the 
statement. statements may be linguistic, and indeed this is their 
principal form. But they may also be maps, pla'ns, diagrams or tables 
of numbers. A statement is the form of organisation of signs 
appropriate to discourse - it is the way in which signs exist as more 
than mere marks, traces or objects. Foucault uses the term 
'enunciative function' to designate the way in which signs are 
distributed into systematic and organised bodies of statements. As 
we have seen, this does not lead into an analysis of the meaning 
embedded in signs, the activi ty of the individual who spoke them, 
their propositional structure or the unique combinations of signs 
which make up utterances. On the contrary, what is involved is a way 
in which signs are related to a field of objects, the positions 
established between subjects in a discourse, the relations between 
one statement and the others of that discourse, the repeatability and 
strategic potential of statements. These make up the four directions 
along which archaeological analysis proceeds. Archaeology seeks to 
describe discursive practices in terms of the rules of formation of 
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ob jects, enunciative modalities, concepts and strategies. I will 
consider' each in turn. 
Archaeology denies that the given or consti tuted uni ty of an 
object is what identifies a discursive formation. All those 
statements concerning madness in post-revolutionary France could not 
be characterised by the singularity of that to which they referred. 
Certainly not in the sense that there was some real, external state 
of affairs which discourse, more or less adequately, expressed or 
grasped. But archaeology' is not content to repeat the wisdom, 
becoming conventional, that the object of a theoretical discourse is 
constituted internally to that discourse through the operation of its 
concepts and their forms of connection. Rather, for a discursive 
practice, say concerning madness, to be individuated, the rules which 
specify not a single object but a dispersion of objects must be 
described. Madness in a court of law is not the same as madness for 
medicine, which differs again from that which concerns the police. 
But if a discursive formation is to be individualised, this variation 
of objects must be systematic and delimited, and describable in terms 
of certain rules of formation of objects. 
What is at issue here is not so much a regularity in the 
objects themselves but in a certain way of forming them. To describe 
the rules of formation of objects is to describe the way in which a 
systematic set of relations are established between three types of 
elements. Firstly what archaeology terms the 'surfaces of emergence' 
of objects, the practices within which they are designated and 
operated upon. Family, work, religion, artistic, sexual or penal 
practices and many more - all or any of these may be the loci within 
which particular objects of a discursive practice may be thrown up. 
Secondly, certain authoritative institutions - medicine, the church, 
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the law and so forth - act in relation to this grouping of objects as 
authori ties of delimitation of these objects, competen:t to name 'them 
and pronounce upon them. Thirdly, there is a certain way in which 
objects are specified, divided, related, classified and 
differentiated. A way which concerns not the details of a conceptual 
armoury but the general divisions wi thin which appropriate objects 
may be organised - the division, say, between body and soul, or 
between physiology and life history. "Institutions, economic and 
social processes, behaviour patterns, systems of norms, techniques, 
types of classification, modes of characterisation" (p45) offer 
discourses the objects of which they can speak, or rather "determine 
the group of relations that discourse must establish in order to 
speak of this or that object, in order to deal with them, name them, 
analyse them, classify them, explain them etc" (p46). An analysis of 
discursive practices would thus first of all take the form of a 
specification of the rules of formation of objects in terms of the 
surfaces on which they appear, the way in which they are delimited, 
the way in which they are specified and differentiated. We have seen 
how the analysis undertaken in Madness and Civilisation is 
predominantly of this type. 
Birth of the Clinic, on the other hand, i!3 principally 
concerned with a second direction of analysis, the new positions for 
subjects established with the formation of clinical medicine in the 
early nineteenth century. In The Archaeology of Knowledge, this 
analysis of the possible places which may be occupied by subjects 
wi thin a discursive practice is conceived in terms of the rules of 
formation of enunciative modalities. These concern the regularities 
in statuses, sites and positions of subjects. Statuses: who is 
empowered to make a medical statement and in what ways. Sites: from 
whence does a medical statement derive its legitimacy and point of 
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application - the hospital, the private practice, the laboratory, the 
library. Subject positions: the possible relations between subjects 
and subjects, subjects and objects, subjects and techniques -
teaching, observing, examining, diagnosing, operating. Not a subject 
with its unity of intentions and meanings but a dispersal of possible 
posi tions which individuals must occupy if they are to enter into a 
particular discursive practice. The same individual may occupy a 
number of distinct positions, different individuals might occupy the 
same position, but the choice, character, scope and possibilities are 
features of the practices themselves. As was the case for objects, 
there are a set of condi tions of possibility for a discursive 
formation which are themselves neither adequately characterised as 
discursive or as non-discursive. 
If the rules of formation of objects and enunciative modalities 
form, in some respects, a space of exteriority in relation to a given 
regime of statements, the rules according to which concepts are 
formed are the very texture of the field of statements itself. To 
constitute a discursive formation, statements must be organised 
according to describable rules of succession, coexistence, 
construction and circulatio~ Thus The Order of Things, which 
concentrates upon an analysis of this type, seeks to layout the 
r egul ar mode s of deri va ti on, val ida tion and verification of 
statements, the structures of possible explanations, the nature and 
role of evidence and so forth in the domains of language, life and 
labour. It seeks to demonstrate a congrui ty in these rules across 
these three domains. It also tries to show that there are such 
fundamental transformations in these systems of rules between 
discursive formations that it is necessary to conceive of a radical 
discontinuity between them. No continuity, for example, can be 
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established between Aldrovandi's History of Serpents and Dragons 
written.at the beginning of the seventeenth century and Jonston's 
Natural History of Quadrupeds written only a few years later. This 
is not a matter of the formal structure of the discourse, the logical 
status of its arguments, the epistemology it espouses or the 
methodology it utilises. Still less is ita case of an increase in 
knowledge or a new dedication to observation. It is rather a 
transformation in the rules which groups of statements will have to 
fulfil if they are to fQrm possible concepts of a particular 
discourse. 
The fourth direction of analysis proposed concerns strategies 
or thematic choices - the linking together of certain objects, 
concepts, modes of enunciation into recurrent themes such as that of ' 
an original language, or the circulation of weal th on the basis of 
agricultural productio~ Strategies are selections, amongst all the 
possible combinations opened up by the rule of a given formation, of 
certain options rather than others within the space available. To 
define the formation of strategies is to describe the links which 
obtain between the different choices made within the set of possible 
concepts and to relate these to more general constellations of 
discourse, such as those outlined in The Order of Things. But it is 
suggested that it is also necessary to describe strategies in terms 
of a different set of relations. Thus Foucault argues that the 
strategies deployed in the analysis of wealth in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries must be examined in relation to "how these 
choices are linked to the function carried out by economic discourse 
in the practice of emergent capitalism, the process of appropriation 
of which it is an object on the part of the bourgeoisie, the role 
that it can play in the realisation of interests and desires" (p69). 
But again it is not a question of something anterior to discourse -
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world views, interests, opinions - being more or less hypocritically 
translated into a selection of theoretical positions. Strategies are 
systematically different ways of treating obj ects of discourse, forms 
of enunciation, regularities of concepts, working not prior or 
posterior to the ra tionali ty of a discursive formation bu t on its 
surface as part of its very fabric. 
It is, however, the case that strategies are extremely ill 
specified in The Archaeology of Knowledge, and that the account which 
is given is ambiguous and' contradictory. It is almost as if there 
were a pure body of discourse which was then linked to external 
exigencies - "a whole non-discursive field of practices, 
appropriations, interests and desires." (p69). Such an argument 
threatens to return to the positing of a separation and relation 
between two general realms, of discourse and non-discourse, which we 
have already criticised, and from which archaeology promises an 
escap~ If one turns to Madness and Civilisation or to Birth of the 
Clinic, however, one can observe that strategies in archaeology 
entail no such separatio~ Strategies entail the immediate 
engagement of theoretical options within a practical field - of 
research and experimenta tion, of pedagogy and reform, of 
investigation and record keeping, of the organisation of 
architectural space and time. It is upon the question of such 
strategies that Foucault's later genealogical works concentrate. Let 
me delay further discussion of this issue until our consideration of 
these texts. 
Archaeology certainly does not constitute a systematic machine for 
the analysis of discourse, nor does it attempt a formalisa tion of 
discourses in terms of the problematics which underlie them or the 
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combinatories to which they may be reduced. It is perhaps best seen 
as a means of opening up a set of questions in the analysis of the 
formation and functioning of theoretical discourses whilst, at the 
same time, avoiding a number of familiar pitfalls. It is worth 
briefly enumerating the challenges which archaeology poses to 
sociology, marxism and the history of ideas, before enumerating the 
questions which it places upon the analytical agenda. 
Firstly, it explodes the great unities that form the categories 
of historical analysis in the history of ideas - Weltanschauung, the 
evolution of ideas, oeuvre, the division between the traditional 
(which only repeats what has already been said and is therefore 
intelligible in terms of what it shares) and the original (the text 
without ancestors which points forward to a new future and, in 
relation to the regular, can only be deviant). Where the history of 
ideas sees uni ty, archaeology sees a regulated dispersion, where it 
sees the sudden spark of innovation, archaeology sees rather an 
effective field for the appearance of statements in which the 
frequent and the infrequent equally follow forms of regularity. 
Secondly, it dispenses with the stabilising influence of the 
object. What enables the history of ideas to construct the tale it 
tells as a continui ty is the gi venness of an extra-discursive obj ect. 
This performs a number of functions for the analysis. It enables the 
grouping together of statements at different times and with different 
points of appearance into a uni ty and con tinui ty in that what they 
share is the reference towards which they strive. The stability of 
real bodily illness, for example, would provide the means of linking 
together statements which sought to speak of it at different times 
and in different cultures as medical. And further, the reality and 
stability of the object provides the means for organising statements 
along a single dimension according to how accurately they speak of 
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it, how close they come to grasping its essence. We have seen how 
archaeology challenges this givenness of the object, and with it the 
modes of analysis which the assumption of stability makes possible. 
Thirdly, it disrupts the opposition of truth and falsity, an 
opposition which marxist accounts of theoretical discourses and their 
history share with their 'bourgeois' opponents. We have seen how the 
history of ideas organises and evaluates statements in terms of such 
a division, which provides a means both of categorising discourses 
and suggesting something of their relation to social conditions. 
FalSity is a consequence of the incursion of extraneous social 
factors into science where they act as obstacles or as active 
distorting agents - religion, prejudice, social interests and desires 
can all enter scientific practice only at a cost to its truth. And 
where one sees the social deployment of theoretical discourse for 
practical and political ends, there too, according to these accounts, 
one has good grounds for suspecting that one is dealing with a 
pseudo-science. The move towards science is at one and the same time 
a move towards truth and objectivity, towards independence from 
social conditions and the mundane interests of the world of opinion, 
towards neutrality in respect of political motivations and 
utilisabil i ty. False knowledge internalises its conditions of 
utilisabili ty and deployment wi thin the discourse; for truth, 
utilisa tion is external to know ledge and, in the case of evil ends, 
is a distortion, misappropriation or recuperation of it. 
The division and opposi tion between science and ideology in 
marxist accounts of theoretical discourse operates in a rather 
similar way. Whatever the particular account provided of the 
character and criteria of scientificity, discourses are inevitably 
di vided into those which conform with such criteria and those which 
99 
do not. If the former are considered scientific on account of their 
veracity', the latter are considered ideological because of their 
departure from truth. It is the falsi ty of those discourses 
designated ideological that enables their deployment for the ends of 
1 egi timation, mystification, social control, reproduction of 
capitalist relations of production or whateve~ The designation of a 
discourse as ideological is only possible when undertaken from a 
position outside ideology, for it is only science that can reveal the 
claims of ideology to be false. 
The designation of a discourse as ideological, in marxist 
accounts, is more than a judgment on its epistemological status. It 
entails conceiving of it as an element in a domain which is unified 
in that its characteristics and organisation are the effects or 
representations of social processes conceived of as more fundamental. 
Particular ideological discourses are regarded as having developed at 
a particular time, and with a particular form, as a consequence of 
the determination exercised upon social phenomena by economic 
relations. The characterisation of a discourse as ideological thus 
serves both as an explanation of the social existence and functions 
of that discourse and as a critique of it on the grounds of its 
falsi ty. Cri tique is the confrontation of the falsity. of ideologies 
with their reason and their truth. And for the critique of ideology 
it is the falsity of a theoretical discourse which enables it to 
perform its reactionary social functions and, correlatively, one 
might suppose it to be the truth of science which founds its 
progressiveness. 
Archaeology refuses this division and evaluation of discourses 
according to an epistemological conception of truth. It refuses also 
the position which would denounce a discourse as false on the basis 
of the social conditions which allowed for its formation, or the 
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social effects which it made possible. To say its account of 
theoretical discourse is non-epistemological is not to say that it is 
unconcerned with truth. But rather than utilising truth as an 
independently available cri terion for the evaluation of discourse, 
and rather than seeing truth and social functioning as somehow 
opposed, archaeology recognises that if discourses function socially 
it is not on account of their falsity but rather because it is in and 
through them that effects of truth are produced. 
In this sense archae'ology clearly links to the studies of the 
histories of the sciences undertaken by Gaston Bachelard and Georges 
Canguilhem. 16 For in these studies too, the history of a science is 
not conceived as a progress from falsity to truth, nor are theories 
and concepts distributed and divided in terms of any philosophically 
legitimated epistemological criterion of truth/falsity. This is not 
merely a disdain for that conceit which allows philosophy to assert 
the right to adjudicate upon the claims to scientificity of any 
particular discourse. It is also because to understand the history 
of a science it is necessary to recognise that sciences themselves 
are discourses continually seeking to adjudicate upon their own truth 
claims in terms of their own criteria for truth. For one crucial 
thing about scientific discourses is the way in which they function 
in terms of a division between truth and falsi ty. Scientific 
discourses, for Bachelard and Canguilhem, are not 'true' discourses, 
they are 'veridical' (or 'truthful') discourses, discourses governed 
by a norm of truth, discourses whose desire is to speak the truth. 
Each scientific discourse, at each moment in its history, produces 
its own specific norm of truth, and means by whic that truth can be 
evidenced,in relation to which it engages in a practice of critical 
rectification of its concepts and theorie~ It is this fundamental 
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relation to truth which characterises a practice which is scientific, 
but it is a conception of truth, and of the appropriate forms of 
evidence and demonstration which accompa!'..y it, established internal 
to that scientific practice. The historiographer of the sciences is 
thus an historian of truth itself, where truth is inscribed neither 
in things nor in the intellect, but in the organisation of the 
statements of a science into a discourse subject to continuous 
critical rectification according to an historically specific norm of 
truth. 
The question of truth, as it is posed in archaeology, is in the 
same vein. Theoretical discourses establish, as a consequence of the 
rules which govern them, what Foucaul t later terms a 'regime of 
truth,.17 The question for archaeological analysis is not one of the 
evaluation of this regime in terms of some other conception, either 
substantive or methodological, derived from the current state of 
knowledge or from a particular philosophical commitment. It is 
rather one of examining how, for a particular discursive formation, 
this regime of truth is set up, what it entails in terms of what is 
to count as evidence, explanation, proof or disproo~ But also, and 
in this sense going beyond the internal organisation of a body of 
statements, how this regime of truth sanctions certain subjects as 
competent to pronounce upon it, is implicated in therapeutic, 
experimental and institutional practices, operates in relation to a 
certain domain of objects. That is to say, archaeology is concerned 
with the conditions which statements will have to fulfil, within a 
given discourse, if they are to be 'in the true', and the means and 
consequences of the production in discourse of the effects of trut~ 
It is not only on the grounds of truth that archaeology opposes 
ideology, but also because of the conception of ideology as a bounded 
and unified domain upon which a determination is exercised by 
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processes of a more fundamental nature. Such a form of analysis is 
rejected, as we have seen, on a number of grounds. First because it 
would seek to interpret discourses as a level of expression to be 
analysed by a process of cri tigue. Second because it would reduce 
the operations of discourses to, at the most, variant means of 
fulfilling functions prescribed elsewhere. Third, because discourses 
could never be more than registers of effects. To rej ect the 
ideology/economy couple, and the philosophical notion of 
determination upon which it depends is not, of course, to argue that 
there is a realm of 'Discourse' which is free floa ting, autonomous, 
undetermined. Discourses do not consti tute a 'realm' and are not 
analyzed in terms of any general ontological distinction between 
ideas, language, signs, representations on the one hand and material, 
real or economic processes on the othe~ In this sense archaeology 
could be regarded as working on the limits of the modern episteme as 
Foucault himself has analysed it. Discursive practices are 
conceptualised in terms that simply are not divisible according to 
the distribution which forms the horizon of most 'modern' 
epistemologi cal thought. And in terms of what it makes possibl e, 
archaeology opens up the possi bili ty of conceiving of connections, 
dependencies and determinations which are more limited, more direct 
and more specifiable than those assumed in explanations in terms of 
some general conception of determination. For references to economic 
exigencies, functions or needs are never able to identify or specify 
the mechanisms through which these are transformed into a particular 
orgap~sation of statements, except through the explicit or implicit 
postulation of a subject who recognises these economic necessities 
and more or less cynically produces an appropriate discourse. And 
references to 'interests' either require the postulate of a similarly 
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equipped calculating subject who recognises them and acts 
accordingly, or else are reduced to postulating something like an 
elective affinity between a theoretical form and the social position 
of the theorist, again without being able to specify any mechanism of 
realisation of these 'objectively' determined interests in discursive 
form. In displacing the central opposi tions which underpin these 
explanatory failures, it is archaeology, and not its critics, which 
opens up the possibility for an instructive examination of the 
relations between the internal structure of a regime of statements 
and its social and political conditions. 
Finally, the category of the subj ect. Archaeology certainly 
attempts to free the analysis of discourses from those reductions of 
them to expressio~s of the beliefs, intentions, motives or interests 
of the subjects who speak and write. But it does so not to expel the 
questions of subjects speaking, writing, acting, but to allow 
analyses of how certain activities of subjects become possible. The 
biographical studies of milieu and influences which make up much of 
the history of ideas may, no doubt, explain why this rather than that 
individual came to write a particular treatise. But they would see 
only factors of time and influence in the fact that, for example, 
Galton's texts were not written in the eighteenth century. 
Similarly, historical accident would account for the loss and 
rediscovery of Mendel's 'revolutionary' findings. It is not that 
biography, or even personality, is unimportant for archaeology. 
Characteristics of individuals can, however, determine only how 
something was thought, not explain that which made it possible to 
think it. 
So archaeology denies the primacy of the object, re-poses the 
epistemological question of the relation between truth and falsity, 
fragments the ontological division between words and things, breaks 
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up the problem of 'determination in general', and rem.oves the 
privileges accorded to the subject who speaks. It does so not in a 
negative gesture, but in the course of opening up a range of new 
questions to be posed concerning the formation and functioning of 
theoretical discourses. The questions which it places upon the 
agenda will be those which will concern us in this study of the birth 
of the psychology of the individual. But first, a few words are in 
order as to why the approach to be adopted draws principally upon 
archaeology rather than genealogy. 
Genealogy 
In many senses Foucault's later studies - Discipline and Punish and 
History of Sexuality - continue and clarify the methods and 
aspirations of archaeology. For our present purposes, this 
clarification is in two areas. Firstly, in relation to the type of 
historiography which is proposed. And secondly, in relation to the 
issue of strategy. 
Perhaps one can approach the first of these questions by asking 
how fields of investigation are specified and condi tions of 
possibility delimited. The arguments in the Order of Things and The 
Archaeology of Knowledge sometimes give the impression that 
archaeology seeks to provide a description of a domain of events 
which presents itself to the historian as an historical fact. The 
explicit designation of the later studies as genealogical indicates 
that Foucault is not a latterday Ranke, seeking to show "wie ~ 
eigentlich gewesen" (how it really was). Genealogies are historical 
investigation undertaken from a particular point of view - the point 
of view of the present. They do not wish to produce a progressive 
history which demonstrates the inevitabili ty of the lines of 
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development which have led up to the present in terms of 
enlighteqment, rationalisation, modernisation, bureaucratisation or 
whatever. Rather they try to trace back from a problem prioritised 
from a certain posi tion today, to discover the varied and unlikely 
elements which entered into its formatio~ Thus genealogical 
investigation seeks to disturb, to fragment, to reveal heterogeneity 
where unity had been supposed, dispersal where we imagined solidity. 
It reveals that our present has its conditions of possibility in a 
variety of unexpected elements, objects and surfaces: 18 
to follow the proper course of descent is to maintain passing 
events in their proper dispersion; it is to identify the 
accidents, the minute deviations - or conversely, the complete 
reversals - the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty 
calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to 
exist and have value for us; it is to discover that truth or 
being do not lie at the root of what we know and what we are, 
but the exteriori ty of accidents... The search for descent is 
not the erecting of foundations: on the contrary, it disturbs 
what was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was 
imagined consistent wi th itself. 
This discussion makes clearer the approach to history which the 
archaeological studies adopt. Starting from a particular way of 
thinking as acting in relation to human beings - clinical medicine, 
madness as mental disease ••• - archaeology asks the question 'how'. 
Not why, but how, by what means, in relation to what events and 
problems did it become possible to specify and act upon human beings 
in this way, through what techniques and with what consequences. 
This is what is implied by an analysis of conditions of possibility. 
It is true that, in principle, such a specification of conditions 
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could never justify a claim to exhaustivity, and nor does it make 
one. The pertinence of particular condi tions is established in terms 
of the discursive practices under consideration - in terms of the 
problems which they address, the objects which they bring into 
relation with one another, the institutions which they form and 
circula te wi thin, the au thori ties which enunciate them and which 
they, in their turn, designate as competent and so forth. Conditions 
of possibility are thus established by examining the elements which 
are actually lip~ed up within a discursive practice, rather than 
through the interpretative methods of hermeneutics or critique. And 
they are established from the perspective of a problem and with the 
objective of seeking to make it intelligible. That much the later 
studies share with the earlier ones. 
Secondly, these later investigations clarify the conception of 
strategy which is so ill-defined in The Archaeology of Knowledge.19 
In marxist analyses, like many others, strategies emanate from 
particular agents - individuals, classes or other entities - who are 
accorded certain interests. Strategies are the means by which agents 
act upon social relations in order to realise objectives which 
conform to their interests. The origin of a strategy in a unified 
entity confers a unity upon its elements and tactics, and their 
strategic nature is a consequence of their being expressions of 
calcula tions engaged in by this unified enti ty in order to realise 
its will. In genealogies, the unity of a strategy is not a unity of 
origins, of interests, or of calculations. Strategies are unified at 
the level of objectives, the discursive configuration which provides 
the rationale for the specification of such objectives, the relations 
established amongst the objects of a discursive practice and the 
subjects positioned by it. A strategy, that is to say, is a field of 
107 
elements oriented to the production of particular effects. Whilst a 
s tra tegi.c field may include wi thin it the more or less cons cious 
calculation and tactics of agents and social forces, it is the 
outcome of the interaction between them, and also includes the 
'unintended consequences' of actions, and the possibilities 
established or precluded by the intersection of widely dispersed 
practices. In this sense strategies may be regarded as intentional 
but not subjective. They tend towards the realisation of certain 
obj ecti ves as the resultant of the interplay of genuinely dispersed 
elements and tactics. Strategies may be individuated in terms of the 
effects they seek, the techniques they use, the the agents and modes 
of conceptualisation which they entail; thus it can be seen that they 
are not' di v isi bl e ac cordi ng to the dicursi ve/non-discursi ve 
opposition suggested in The Archaeology of Knowledge. 
Foucault's genealogical investigations thus enable us to clarify 
the approach to history entailed in the archaeologies, and the 
conception of strategy deployed within them. However genealogical 
investigations are historical investigation undertaken from a very 
different perspective from the archaeologies - the perspective of 
power.20 Achaeologies are histories constructed from ~he perspective 
of trut~ They seek to establish the historical conditions for, and 
consequences of, the formation of certain 'regimes of truth'. But 
genealogies are not histories of truth but of power. They are 
histories of techniques of domination - the exercise of power over 
individuals in order to turn them into subjects at once governed - in 
the sense of channelled and directed, having their actions organised 
and directed in certain ways - and subjected - in the sense of a body 
and will no longer their own. Indeed, these analyses are not of 
power, but in terms of power. They use the issue of power as a grid 
of intelligibility, as a way of displaying the effects of domination 
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which i~~ere in the details of the relations and techniques in which 
individuals are caught up. Power is not a property directed 'from 
above' - it inheres in the microstructures of the relations of 
bodies, spaces, gazes and actions. 
It is through a consideration of this analytic of power that we may 
see how genealogies differ from archaeologies. For they propose that 
investiga tion from the point of view of the present and the 
perspective of power reveal together something over and above, or 
rather across and between, the fragmentations and dispersions which 
are opened up for inspection. History can be analysed as the 
repetitive play of dominations and the struggle of resistances 
against them. In his discussion of Nietszche, which is also the 
occasion for his most explicit methodological reflection on the 
nature of genealogy, Foucault writes that Nietszche's history is not 
so much for knowing as for cutting. History, that is to say, has 
more in common with medicine than philosophy, for the task of 
effective history is to become a curative science. History 
undertaken from the perspective of power constructs the history of 
our present as a history of dominations, and thus produces a way of 
conceiving that history in which the truths tha t are purveyed may 
become instruments within struggles against such dominations.21 This 
perspectivism is not merely a means of historical intelligibility, it 
is what gives to geneaology its critical function. This critical 
function is thus dependent upon the construction of historical forms 
as forms of domination, which in turn relies upon a conception of all 
power effects as also effects of domination. In what follows, I wish 
to consider only the consequences of this approach for the analysis 
of the formation and functioning of theoretical discourses. 
The shift to power has clearly been attractive to many, for it 
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appears to reinstate the political radicality of critique which 
archaeology deliberately eschewed. But in respect to the analysis of 
discursive practices, it represents a retreat rather than an advance 
from the propositions of the earlier work. Let us examine a single 
example: the considerations concerr~ng the emergence and functioning 
of psychology vlhich appear in Discipline and Punish.22 Psychology, 
in this account, is a know ledge of the modern' soul', a know ledge 
which functions within a certain type of power termed 'disciplinary' 
power or simply discipline. In Foucaul t's conception of power, to 
term discipline a type of power is to say that it comprises a 
particular range of techniques, modalities, relations be tween 
elements and forces of a number of different sorts - bodies, spaces, 
gazes, architectural arrangements, the organisation of institutions, 
instructional techniques, the construction of timetables and so 
forth. These have the objective of domination, of a particular mode 
of subjection and subjectification of human individuals. 
Discipline is a type of power that centres upon the maximisation 
of the forces of the body, having as its objective the parallel 
increase of its utility and its docility. What is characteristic 
about discipline in particular is that it works on the body through a 
range of small and detailed techniques, and that these.do not operate 
directly, as it were - forcing the body, marking it, breaking it to 
the will of another - but indirectly, through the soul. The soul (a 
psychic or moral space, which is rather loosly specified in 
Discipline and Punish) is thus seen as the targe t of a certain type 
of power, or a certain mode of domination of bodies, domination 
through instrumentalisation, turnir~ the body into a socially useful, 
productive and amenable resource. This soul is also the 
indispensable 'reality reference' of a certain type of knowledge: 
psychology. Indispensable because a knowledge of the nature and 
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functioning of this domain is a necessary condi tion for the 
techniques which seek to affect, transform or mo~ld it in particular 
ways. This genealogical analysis thus conceptualises psychology, and 
the other 'psy' knowledges, in terms of their functionali ty for a 
particular type of power - they provide the various strategies of 
discipline with the intelligibility and rationality which is a 
condition of their possibility. 
The articulation of knowledge ( particular theoretical 
discourses) and power (particular modalities of domination) is 
inscribed in the object around which they are both organised: each is 
a necessary condition for the other. Through such an interconnection 
of psy knowledge and disciplinary power the modern soul is born:23 
It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an 
ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a 
reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body 
by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those 
punished - and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, 
trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at 
school, the colonised, over those who are stuck at a machine and 
supervised for the rest of their lives. This is the historical 
reality of this soul, which, unlike the soul represented by 
Christian theology, is not born in sin and subject to 
punishment, but is born rather out of methods of punishment, 
supervision and constraint. This real, non-corporeal soul is 
not a substance; it is the element in which are artic~lated the 
effects of a certain type of power and the reference of a 
certain type of knowledge, the machinery by which the power 
relations give rise to a possible corpus of knowledge, and 
knowledge extends and reinforces the effects of tb~s power. On 
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this reality-reference, various concepts have been constructed 
and .domains of analysis carved out: psyche, subjectivity, 
personality, consciousness, etc; on it have been built 
scientific techniques and discourses, and the moral claims of 
humanism. But let there be no misunderstanding: it is not that 
a real man, the object of knowledge, philosophical reflection or 
technical intervention, has been substituted for the soul, the 
illusion of the theologians. The man described for us, whom we 
are invited to free, i~ already in himself the effect of a 
subjection much more profound than himsel~ A 'soul' inhabits 
him and brings him to existence, which is itself a factor in the 
mastery that power exercises over the body. The soul is the 
effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the 
prison of the body. 
It is this form of argument, and the concept of power-knowledge 
which it constructs, which is the central theoretical device utilised 
in genealogy for the analysis of the social and historical existence 
and functioning of theoretical discourses, in particular the 
empirical sciences of man. The emergence of man as an object of 
positive knowledge is in absolute complicity with the emergence of a 
type of power which targets man as an instrumentalisable resource. 
We must abandon a tradi tion which counter poses knowledge to power 
because: 24 
power and knowledge directly imply one another; ••• there is no 
power relation without the correlative constitution of a field 
of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and 
constitute at the same time power relations. These 'power-
knowledge relations' are to be analysed, therefore, not on the 
basis of a subject of knowledge who is or is not free in 
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relation to the power system, but, on the contrary, the subject 
who 'knows, the objects to be known and the modalities of 
knowledge must be regarded as so many effects of these 
fundamental implications of power-knowledge and their historical 
transformations. In short, it is not the activity of the 
subject of knowledge that produces a corpus of knowledge, useful 
or resistant to power, but power-knowledge, the processes and 
struggles that traverse it and of which it is made up, that 
determines the forms and possible domains of knowledge. 
What are the consequences of conceiving of the forms and 
possible domains of knowledge as fundamentally implicated in regimes 
of power-knowledge and their historical transformations? With 
respect to the objectives of the present study, this may be regarded 
as a retreat from the radical implications of archaeology in two 
respects. Firstly, in the form of analysis to which this conception 
of a fundamental linkage between knowledge and power leads. 
Secondly, in the conceptualisation of the social functioning of 
knowledge in terms of dominatio~ 
When posed in its abstract form, the notion of power-knowledge 
might appear to imply no priority between its two elements. However 
in the specific analyses carried out under its rubric,in particular 
the analysis of the emergence of discipline in Discipline and Punish, 
it is clear that this even-handedness is not maintainable; when the 
emergence of knowledges is conceptualised from the perspective of 
power, the selection of elements for inclusion in the analysis is 
determined by that perspective. Thus there is a reduction from the 
range of considerations which archaeology proposes, to, on the one 
hand to something akin to the formation of objects and, on the other 
hand, to something akin to the formation of strategies. Objects for 
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psy discourses are those that are offered to them in the practices 
where th~ new modalities of disciplinary power operate and wherein 
the now authori tative insti tutions, in particular the psy agents _ 
petty judges of the psyche - are beginning to establish themselves. 
Thus objects are considered only in so far as they are immediately 
implicated in power effects; hence it is not surprising that the 
conditions of possibility and rules of formation of psy knowledge 
suffer an analytical reduction to power. 
A similar analytic reduction occurs in relation to the 
conception of strategy. strategies in archaeology are forms of 
thematic unification in the texture of a regime of statements itself, 
which are linked in variable but describable ways to mode$ of social 
functioning. When genealogy links the conception of strategy into 
the perspective of power, strategies become specifiable only in so 
far as their objectives may be characterised in terms of power. 
Stra tegies, for genealogy, are individuated in terms of the power 
effects which they produce. They are ensembles of force relations, 
relations of power, whose objective is the realisation of some effect 
or set of effects of domination through a particular disposition of 
objects, bodies, spaces, temporality etc. To the extent that the 
conditions of formation and functioning of theoretical.discourses are 
eXamined only in respect to their pertinence to such strategies, it 
is not surprising that these discourses appear to be subsumed within 
their strategic deployment. Again, in a circular movement of 
analysis, the perspective of power appears to cop..i'irm what was the 
presumption of its analysis, the ubiquity of the implication of forms 
of knowledge within modes of power conceived of in terms of 
techniques of dominatio~ 
There is a virtual absence within geneaology of any examination 
of the heterogenei ty of the nature, form and implications of what 
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archaeology terms the rules of formation of concepts: the internal 
organisation of the regime of statements which make up a discourse, 
as discussed earlier in this chapter. The complex space of analysis 
of the social eXistence of discourses which archaeology opened up is 
rapidly flattened down again, reduced to the deployment of discourses 
in strategies of power. And the effects and modes of functioning of 
theoretical discourses are reduced to the conditions of their 
implementation in particular social and political strategies. This 
reduction is exacerbated by the way in which the notion of power is 
set up; it is to this second question that I now wish to tur~ 
In discussing archaeology, it was argued that archaeology 
concerned itself with the establishment of what might be termed 
regimes of truth. Now it can be argued that one might conceive of 
these regimes as entailing effects of power in at least two respects. 
Firstly in terms of the constraints that are placed upon the 
eXistence of statements, within any discursive formation, if they are 
to conform to the norms of truth established within that formatio~ 
Not anything can be said at anyone time, and the very division 
between truth and falsity interdicts the inclusion of some statements 
'wi thin the true'. Secondly, in relation to what are termed 
'authoritative institutions' in respect to the formation of objects, 
and to what are characterised as 'enunciative modalities', 
constraints are placed upon those who are able to pronounce certain 
judgments and effective statements. In addition, discursive 
practices, and the effects of truth which they constitute, 'produce a 
whole range of social effects, allowing the setting up of particular 
social practices, making possible the thinking of certain 
institutional forms, conditioning the establishment of techniques of 
social organisation and administration. The truth effects of 
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theoretical discourses are manifold and heterogeneous, including, of 
course, those arising in the same or other theoretical discourses -
making possible the posing of new questions, the conducting of new 
experiments and so forth. Yet, within the conception of power-
knowledge, one finds not only a reduction of all these truth effects 
to the term power - not in itself particularly helpful as a 
unification of a genuinely and interestingly diverse field - but also 
a reduction of power effects to the repetitive terms of domination. 
We have seen how this is a crucial element of the critical edge 
with which geneaology seeks to equip itself, but again it is a 
cri tical edge imposed by fiat, and for which no grounds are given. 
It is difficult to see how the truth-effects of theoretical 
discourses in general, or the human sciences in particular, can be 
reducible to effects of domination, unless anything which is 
implicated in any form of social arrap~ements is thereby implicated 
in a strategy of domination. In this case the term becomes otiose 
and the apparent critical force of geneaology which depends upon it 
is illusory. The conditions and consequences of the human sciences 
over and beyond those envisaged in power-knowledge, the distinctive 
contribution they have made to the field of our social arrangements 
above and beyond effects of domination, are never examined. This is 
because the very way in which genealogy sets up its perspectivism 
prevents the relevant questions from being posed. 
In short, genealogy represents a retreat from archaeology 
towards sociology, a retreat to an 'analytic' which has something in 
common wi th 'interpretation' and 'cri tique', in that it seeks to 
reveal beneath the apparent neutrality of theoretical discourses, 
their disreputable origins and unpalatable functions. Paradoxically, 
too, genealogy entails a retreat towards conceptions of discourses in 
general and the human sciences in particular - as 'ideologies' -
116 
certainly shorn of many of the unacceptable epistemological 
underpinnings of these theories but occupying much the same place in 
political argument. Hence the popularity of geneaology, which can be 
absorbed into the canon without disruption. 
It is for these reasons that the study which follows principally 
utilises the conceptual advances and analytic devices of archaeology 
rather than genealogy. These do not constitute an automatic 
programme in which texts are inserted at one end and archaeologies 
produced at the other. What archaeology provides is a number of 
conceptual tools which may be used in combination wi th equipment 
gathered from elsewhere in order to construct an account of what made 
the psychology of the individual possible. One may summarise the 
terms of analysis which the present study adopts as follow s. 
The study seeks to identify the conditions of possi bili ty for 
the formation of the psychology of the individual as a particular way 
of thinking and acting in relation to human beings. How did it 
become possible to specify and act upon human beings in terms of a 
psychological conception of the variability and measurability of 
mental capacities? Starting from this question, the study seeks to 
trace out the diversi ty and heterogenei ty of the events vlhich gave 
birth to the psychology of the individual as a discursive practice. 
Following the terms of The Archaeology of Knowledge for the purposes 
of exposition, one can separate out four directions of analysis, 
which intersect and overlap within the actual investigaton. Firstly, 
through what events did the objects of such a discursive practice 
form - in which institutional sites and practices, upon what 
surfaces, did its problems emerge; which authoritative bodies 
specified these problems and according to what general divisions. 
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Secondly, how were these objects conceptualised - in terms of what 
systems pf argument and explanation; what counted as evidence' and 
what as proof; what were the theoretical conditions for the 
formulation of the truth claims of a scientific discourse in these 
terms. Thirdly, from what si tes were the statements of the 
psychology of the individual enunciated, by whoLl and to whom were 
they applied; what were the criteria which had to be satisfied for 
those who were to pronounce such psychological statements; what 
relationships were established between psychologists and other 
agencies, and between psychologists and their subjects of 
investigation and reformatio~ And fourthly, in what strategies was 
the psychology of the individual embodied - towards what objectives 
did they tend and with what rationale; with what other claims and 
strategies did individual psychology dispute and what was the extent, 
and the social consequences, of the establishment of its claims to 
truth. 
What claims to veraci ty does such an account itself make, and 
how is it to be evaluated? It would be paradoxical if this account 
were to seek to justify itself by reference to a domain of real 
historical events to whih it Simply 'corresponded'. Archaeological 
accounts are themselves means of representing, and ,as such may be 
subjected to an analysis in exactly the same terms as those which 
they propose for the discursive practices which they seek to 
describe. Nevertheless, four directions do suggest themselves for 
the evalua tion of archaeologies. Firstly, wi thin their own terms. 
With what success are the analytical protocols themselves utilised, 
and to what extent does the account avoid the theoretical pitfalls 
which archaeology identifies? Secondly, in relation to accounts 
provided within other approaches to similar problems. To what extent 
does the account provided bear out the promises of archaeology over 
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and above the methods of interpretation and critique which it 
opposes? Thirdly, in relation to the historical record itself. Do 
the texts and documents deployed in evidence allow the 
systematisation which is placed upon them, or do they, or others 
which might be brought forward and conceived as pertinent, resist 
their description in such terms? Fourthly, and perhaps most 
pertinently, in terms of their utility. What new ways are opened up 
by archaeologies for thinking about the problems they address; what 
new and unexpe ct ed r ela ti onships do they highl igh t; w ha t 
unanticipated questions do they pose; what intelligibility do they 
confer upon our present? 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE MORAL SUBJECT OF PSYCHOLOGY 
This chapter seeks to establish a point from which the specificity of 
the discourse and practice of individual psychology can be marked. 
It has three specific tasks. Firstly to consider certain of the 
characteristics of the subject which psychology constitutes as its 
theoretical obj ect. Between the organism, which is biological - a 
complex of organs and physiological processes of body and brain - and 
the person, whose forms of conduct are the concern of morali ty and 
government, is interposed a psychological domain. Here is the origin 
of volition, speech and action, the locus of thought, the site of 
conscience and judgment. Psychology requires that this realm have 
its own systematicity and laws which differ from those of biology on 
the one hand and ethics on the other. We will discuss the emergence 
of this conception of the subject in relation to eighteenth century 
sensationalist philosophy. The sensationalism of Locke and Condillac 
precluded the development of a psychological conception of individual 
varia tion. Individual psychology required not merely the existence 
of such a psychological domain but its inherent variability, whilst 
sensa tionalism stressed the universali ty of the processes it 
discovered. But it nonetheless, as we shall see, provided essential 
philosophical conditions for the formation of a psychological 
conception of the subj ect. 
Secondly, to outline the characteristics of the 'moral' domain 
as it was conceptualised at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
This was a domain internal to the subject which organised conduct, 
within which pathologies arose and to which treatment could be 
directed. It was systematised first of all within conceptions of the 
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origin and treatment of madness associated with the work of Pinel in 
France and Tuke in England. But the notion of such a moral order was 
of more general significance in the debates over social problems and 
their solutions in nineteenth century England within which individual 
psychology began to take shape. 
Thirdly, in relation to these two issues, to examine 
conceptions of idiocy and its treatment in the early nineteenth 
century. Sensationalist ph~losophy and moral treatment made possible 
a conception of idiocy as treatable, and the development of 
techniques for the socialisation of idiots. When individual 
psychology took shape around a problem of deficit of intellect, it 
was through a transformation of these conceptions of idiocy. 
These three issues are exemplified in a particular event. This 
revol ved around the discovery in France in 1799 of a 'wild boy' who 
became the focus of considerable popular and scientific debate.1 The 
'incident' of the Wild Boy of Aveyron may thus serve as a thread 
linking the questions of the subject of psychology, the notion of a 
'moral' sphere of pathology and treatment, and of the nature and 
status of idiocy. 
The sensationalist individual 
If it was proposed to resolve the following metaphysical problem 
vis 'to determine what would be the degree of understanding, and 
the nature of the ideas of a youth, who, deprived, from his 
infancy, of all education, should have lived entirely separated 
from individuals of his species'; I am strongly deceived or the 
solution of the problem would give to this individual an 
understanding connected only with a small number of r..is wants, 
and deprived, by his isolated condition, of all those simple and 
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complex ideas which we receive from education, and which ar~ 
combined in our minds in so many different ways, by means only 
of our knowledge of signs. WeIll the moral picture of this 
youth would be the Savage of Aveyron, and the solution of the 
problem would give the measure and the cause of his intellectual 
sta teo 
J M Itard, 1801 2 
It is widely recognised t~at the sensationalist philosophies of the 
eighteenth century stressed the essentially common nature of the 
human mind, spirit and understanding, and attributed individual 
variations to differences in 'experience'. It is also usual to note 
a shift which occurred at the end of the eighteenth century from such 
a belief in universal reason and the unity of man to the study and 
documenta tion of individual differences) This is frequently 
attributed to the rise of the Romantic movement, and the supplanting 
of enlightenment rationalism by organicism and historicism.4 Michael 
Donnelly attributes greater weight to the criticism of sensationalism 
mounted by Cabanis and other physiological researchers, which 
systematised and generalised diverse 'observation~ of differences 
amongst individuals.5 Many of these observations were derived from 
medicine and from medical psychology. The new clinical medicine of 
the. hospi tal systematised methods of examina tion, observation and 
record keeping. It thus allowed the emergence, on the one hand, of 
general norms of physiological functioning and, on the other hand, 
attention to individual cases which could be described in relation to 
such norms.6 Donnelly accords a particular influence to the work of 
medical psychologists. Whilst early alienists had constructed 
typologies of the different types of madness, the rise of the asylum 
as a clinical site allowed the description and cataloguing of 
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variations which, coupled with the increasing prominence of madness 
in medical, psychological and philosophical discussions, "reflected 
back ul timately on the discussions of 'man' in philosophical 
discourse.,,7 Developed further by phrenologists, physiologists and 
craniologists, this led to a break with notions of the universality 
of reason and the emergence of a notion of a variable constitution. 
We will propose a somewhat different account in the present study. 
But let us begin by examining in more detail the conception of the 
individual formed within the philosophy of sensationalism. 
What is important for present purposes about the philosophical 
doctrines of eighteenth century sensationalism is that they provide 
conditions of possibility for the formation of the modern 
psychological enterprise through the elaboration of a particular 
doctrine of epistemology. As philosophy began to order itself around 
the problem of 'the theory of know ledge', to pose this question as 
one of the relation of representations to represented, and to 
conceive of this relation on the model of vision, occurring through 
the mediation of the senses, a surface formed upon which the 
psychological subject could begin to find a foothold. 
This is because the subject was freed from everything about it 
that was non-empirical except that which could be referred to the 
body. For nothing pertinent to the question of knowledge - no ideas, 
values or beliefs - were inscribed in the nature of the subject of 
sensationalist epistemology. A double separation was established. 
On the one hand, a separation between two orders of the subject - the 
bodily (organs, juices, sensations, senses, wants) and the moral 
(ideas, beliefs, values, desires). On the other hand, a separation 
between this subject - the duplex of an ideal realm enclosed in a 
discrete bodily order, bounded by the skin pierced only by the senses 
- and its milieu - the domain of objects from which experiences 
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spring •. Thus if ideas, beliefs, values and desires existed at all, 
this could only come about through the insertion of the body, wi th 
its senses and capaci ties, into the world of things, by means of an 
empirical process which could therefore be the object of empirical 
investigation. This empirical experiencing subject is the minimum 
condi tion of psychological discourse, the object which it comes to 
claim for its ow n sector of reality and upon which it can carve out 
its zones and specialisms. 
John Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding was a work of 
moral philosophy, an attempt to use the principles underlying 
Newton's revolutionary studies for the investigation of the human 
soul, or at least its most elevated faculty.8 The consequences oT 
the soul becoming a scientific object within the problem of knowledge 
were far reaching. The division between 'inner' and 'outer' space 
was installed at the very origin of a science of man. Thus the 
problem for Locke, broadly speaking, was as follows. All we have in 
inner space are representations, since the objects of our 
understanding are for ever external to us. How then can we be sure 
that our knowledge is certain, rather than mere opinion? The problem 
of the certainty of knowledge came to be posed in. terms of the 
accuracy of representations to that which is represented. 
It is well known that Locke opened the Essay by arguing against 
the proposition that the mind contains innate ideas. What is less 
clear is exactly what it is that is designated by the notion of idea 
itself. Locke defined it as "whatever is the obj ect of the 
understanding when a man thinks".9 Ian Hacking has pointed out that 
Locke, like Descartes, Port Royal, Condillac and others, had no 
theory of meaning in the modern sense. There is no problem of 
meanir..g; ideas are conceived of as objects of mental vision: "there 
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is a class of objects that mediates between the.§gQ and the rest of 
the world. These objects are called ideas. Secondly we are aware of 
ideas through a facul ty akin to sight ••• Thirdly ••• words signify 
ideas but signification is a relation of precedence-or-consequence of 
an almost causal sort."10 For Locke, then, no ideas were innate -
the objects which were the focus of mental vision were all 
constructed from the products of experience and sensa tion. Locke 
accepted, however that it was necessary to postulate an inner faculty 
of reflection, which perceived, remembered and combined the primary 
quali ties which come into the mind through the senses into ideas, and 
which had therefore to be considered as acting in itself as an 
original source of knowledge. 
Locke accorded language a secondary and instrumental role in 
the formation of knowledge, indexed by the order of exposition which 
he adopted in the Essay. The origin of ideas is discussed in the 
second book; the third book is entitled "Of Words". Words are 
arbitrary and nominalistic. They are secondary and derivative marks, 
invented by men, formalised by convention, having a purely technical 
function and exerting no independent effect upon ideas. They are 
worthy of consideration, however, in that certain areas - especially 
logic and the liberal sciences - perplex thought by introducing words 
of obscure, uncertain or indeterminate signification. Condillac 
described his 1746 Essai sur l'origine des connaissances humaines in 
a subtitle, as a supplement to Locke's Essay.11 But in it he 
reversed the priority, epistemological and discursive, which Locke 
accorded to ideas over signs. He asserted the centrality of the 
process of signification of ideas, arguing that ideas are only 
remembered, reflected upon, combined into complex forms and operated 
with through the medium of signs. Thus the study of the ordering and 
combination of signs, of the nature of language in its development, 
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was central to any attempt to understand the method of operation of 
the mind. And conversely, a necessary condition for, and a sure path 
towards certain knowledge became the construction of a well made 
language. Analysis was the process by which the ideas which man had 
of the world as a result of his experience were ordered and reduced 
to the rational, logical forms which were the closest that man could 
ever get to the rational, logical truths which lay beyond the limits 
of human experience. The principles of such an analysis formed the 
method of methods, the science of sciences, which defined the 
regularities of Enlightenment scientific discourse and the prinCiples 
of rationality which guided it. 
Science sought, through the rigorous analysis of experience 
into its smallest parts, and the ordering and recombination of those 
parts according to the principles of reason and logic, and in a 
strict relation to the facts of experience which must never be gone 
beyond, to constitute a rational order of knowledge. This order had 
the form of the unknowable laws of the universe but could nei ther 
hope nor wish to compare with them. Scientific procedure consisted 
in the rational ordering of representations so that they might 
conform with the facts of experience. Sense data were to be analysed 
into their simplest elements, to each element was to be ascribed an 
unambiguous and distinctive sign, the signs were to be recombined and 
ordered into a hierarchy from simple to complex within a logical and 
rational structure. Thus the work of science was that of 
constructing a well made language.12 
When, in the Origin, Condillac applied the method of analysis 
to knowledge itself, his objective could therefore be immediately 
pedagogic. Whilst the relations of epistemology and pedagogy are 
hardly unique to this discourse, the way in which these relations 
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were established is of great significance. For it was not simply 
that sen?ationalist epistemology had pedagogic implications but "that 
a practical project was inscribed at the heart of epistemology 
itsel~ Human understanding was simultaneously to be the object of 
investiga tion and the target of reformation. What Nichel Foucault 
notes of general grammar is true of sensationalist epistemology - a 
part of its very nature is to be prescriptive. 13 Questions of the 
formation and adequacy of knowledge could now be shifted from a 
philosophical to an empirical terrain. The subject of knowledge was 
an empirical individual, and the practice of enquiry was a judicious 
combination of observation, experimentation and attempts at 
individual reformation. The psychological conception of the 
individual begins to form when a philosophy of the subject casts 
itself in a mode which is amenable to observational elaboration, open 
to pr acti cal veri fica tion, and u tilisa bl e for individual 
transformation • 
. For sensationalism, man's means and possibilities of obtaining 
knowledge are confined to the limits of his senses. The 
epistemological subject was fabricated on the model of the empirical 
and corporeal existence of man. And conversely, empirical human 
beings could provide, through their systematic invest~gation, answers 
to philosophical questions concerning the nature of knowledge and 
demonstrations of the epistemological propositions of sensationalism. 
The consequence of such an alliance between philosophy and positive 
science is a continual oscillation between a certain model of 
knowledge and a certain philosophy of man. Paradoxically, 
philosophy, in seeking to resolve its metaphysical difficulties 
through an appeal to the empirical, merely succeeds in transferring 
its accumulated baggage of presuppositions concerning the nature of 
the human subject onto that very individual who is supposed to 
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relieve philosopy of them. 
In this epistemology of sensation, it is vision that provides 
the model of the sensible.14 Empirical questions concerning the 
knowledge of those deprived of vision, or those who lose their sight 
later to regain it, were amongst the first points of intersection of 
philosophy and experimentation. But the relativising of knowledge 
with regard to the human subject placed epistemology in a field which 
contained not only the senses but the passions, and gave the question 
of human wants a place of primacy in the origin of knowledge. We 
a t tend to obj ects, and order our ideas in relation to them, because 
we must satisfy our wants. On this relation between knowledge and 
wants a developmental epistemology can be constructed. 
In outlining the objectives of the Origin, Condillac set out 
his wish to reduce whatever related to the human understanding to a 
Single principle. In his Traite des sensations he achieved the 
promise of finally eliminating the residual dualism of Locke's 
ascription of certain key epistemological functions to faculties of 
the human mind. 15 Thus whilst Locke maintained in his Essay that 
there were two sources of ideas, sensation and reflection, in the 
Sensations sensation was the sole source, and even the so-called 
faculties of the soul were to be rigorously derived from the features 
of sensation without assuming any innate properties of the mind. 
Condillac's exposi tion proceeds through a metaphor which had 
conditions of formation in contemporary scientific practice and would 
react back upon such practice. He imagined a statue, complete with 
all the organic structures of the human body but initially deprived 
of all its sensory faculties. By examining the forms of knowledge, 
the ideas which the statue would develop if one sense after the other 
were successively awakened, he purported to derive all the features 
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of human knowledge from a single sufficient source - experience 
conceive<;t as sensory impr.essions upon the body. From a consideration· 
of a subj ect limited to the sense of smell alone, Condillac 
demonstrated that, even limited to a single mode, sensation could 
generate all the faculties of the soul - the faculties of attention 
(including remembering, comparing, judging, discerning, imagining, 
forming abstract ideas, ideas of number and duration and knowing 
general and particular truths - all modes of attention), the 
different modes of desire (expression of passions, loving, hating, 
willing, the capabilities of hope, fear and wonder) and contracting 
habits. Sensation could thus be demonstrated to contain all the 
facul ties of the soul wi thout presupposing any ideas or abilities 
innate within the subject save one - th~ biologically given and 
universal ability to distinguish between pleasure and pain. For the 
derivation of the faculties from the sensations occurred at the price 
of assuming that no sensation was indifferent in regard to the 
pleasure or pain which it produced in the mind. 
The dtstinction between pleasure and pain, and the tendency of 
the subj ect to seek to repeat the former and avoid the latter, was 
the single principle to which Condillac believed he had reduced all 
the attributes of man: "the different degrees of pl~asure and pain 
are the laws by which the germ of all we are is developed, and that 
they have produced all our facul ties." 16 We can see here the si te 
wi thin which a whole utili tarian ethics was to be installed in the 
work of Hel vetius and the Ideologues. 
Condillac himself, however, remained upon the terrain of 
epistemology. The sensationalist reduction of the subject to the 
universals of the senses, the calculus of pleasure and pain, and 
experience, had to solve two related questions. Given that all that 
could be known of objects external to the soul were the sensations 
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which modified that soul, how was it that we developed ide~s of 
external objects, and ascribed these modifications to them? Given 
that the soul was nothing more than the sum of its modifications, 
those remembered from the past and those experienced at the present, 
how did the idea of the body as the unified and distinct site of the 
subject emerge? Condillac argued that a subject limited to the 
senses of smell, hearing, taste and sight would not develop any 
conception of the existence of objects external to itself, that is to 
say it would have no self ~eparate from that which it senses. 17 It 
would, however, even if limited to these senses, develop a sense of 
self, by virtue of its memory, and hence of the ability to mark a 
difference between present and past states. This was possible 
because subjects had the ability to take the totality of their 
present and past states as an object of reflection, and to make a 
judgment as to their coherence, when motivated by wants and according 
to the natural and universal calculus of pleasures and pains. And 
the subject's knowledge of itself as both separate from the external 
world and the unified subject of sensa tions, needs, wants, desires 
and passions was the condition for the attribution of the source of 
sensations to objects in that external world.18 
Condillac recognised the insufficiency of this philosophical 
argument, which was premised on the assumption of the very uni ty 
between sensations, needs, wants and judgments which it purported to 
explain. He resolved this problem through the often repeated 
founding gesture of developmental epistemology. The empirical 
subject - the child, its needs, its passage through the world - was 
called in to resolve the philosophical problem. Thus Condillac 
asked, rhetorically, "How could a new born babe be occupied with its 
needs if it had no knowledge of its body, and if it could not as 
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easily acquire some ideas of bodies able to take care of it?n19 The 
watchful eye and prior arrangement of nature and the body were 
accorded the ability to resol ve the problem, that epistemological 
discourse has itself constructed, of the adequacy of knowledge to its 
object. Philosophy had begun to cede its epistemological rights to 
the space of positive science through the notion of the su~ect which 
it had constructed. 
This then was the birth of a subject which a positive science of man 
could take as its object. There were no innate ideas or faculties, 
just a subject form which could support self-consciousness, awareness 
of others, simple and complex ideas, attention and acts of judgment, 
given only possession of the senses, natural wants, the ability to 
distinguish pleasure and pain and the possibility of experience. All 
ideas developed from sensations as directed by needs, wants and 
desires to produce experience. Simple experiences could be directly 
annexed to simple ideas; the more complex must be analysed, 
classified and combined through signs. Knowledge consisted in a 
regular, rational and systematic relation between signs and ideas. 
And epistemology was immediately a pedagogic activi ty, in that it 
recognised this as the condition of knowledge, sought ,to reform other 
sciences such that they too possessed such a structure, and to 
instruct others in the correct methods for gaining knowledge. 
A philosophical surface had formed which made possible a 
positive science of the empirical hUman individual. This science 
began to form itself in the last decades of the eighteenth century 
around figures which to our eyes appear marginal and heterogeneous: 
those suffering from cataracts, deaf mutes, wild childre~ But for 
the eighteenth century these figures were unified in virtue of their 
philosophical significance. To be deprived of SOme sense organ, or 
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of some experiences, was not a mere accident or freak of na tur~, it 
was an event of considerable philosophical importance. For to found 
an epistemology exclusively upon the sensations was to accord, for 
the first time, a demonstrative function in philosophical discourse 
to those who, for some reason, were deprived of one or more of the 
full complement of the senses. It gave an even more important place, 
crucial in the resolution of philosophical conflicts, to those who, 
having been deprived of a particular faculty, were enabled to regain 
it by an act of man or God: the deaf who hear again, the blind given 
sight. Thus Diderot wrote studies of the deaf and dumb, and of the 
blind. 20 The expository device of the statue whose senses 
progressively unfold which was at the centre of Condillac's 
Sensations, was clearly inspired by the development of new techniques 
to restore sight to those without it, and the observations made upon 
their experiences of a newly visible world.21 The empirical subject 
and its vi cissi tudes provided the means of demons tra tion and 
elucidation of the epistemology of sensationalism, but simultaneously 
a new importance was conferred upon these events and experiments 
themselves. 22 
It is thus possible to understand how a small child, apparently 
first brought into contact with human society in the Department of 
Aveyron in 1800, at the age of about twelve years, to all appearances 
deaf, mute and a savage, without the manners and habits appropriate 
to children of his age, could become the focus of learned and popular 
discussion throughout France. How this small child could attract the 
attention of the leading scientists of that revolutionary period -
Bonnaterre, Virey, Sicard, Pinel - and become the subject of a state 
financed experiment lasting some six years. And how this could 
secure the fame of its principal actors - Victor the Wild Boy and 
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Jean-Marc Itard his governor, te~cher and doctor - until the present 
day. It,is this philosophical configuration which made it possible 
for every facet of this unfortunate little boy's existence - his 
tastes in food, his cries and the expressions of his face, his 
happiness and sadness, his pleasures and pains, his sexual 
difficulties - to become the object of a massive apparatus of texts, 
of academic disputes and technological innovatio~23 Victor, that is 
- -
to say, has a good claim to the status of the first psychological 
subject. 
The Wild Boy of Aveyron entered the domain of philosophy not on 
the grounds of his lack of senses but on the grounds of his lack of 
experience and all that flows from it. Defects in experience had 
become a philosophical problem. And the epistemo-pedagogy of 
sensationalism made of the Wild Boy the simultaneous object of a 
knowledge and target of a therapeutic practice of reformation and 
normalisa tio~ A link was beginning to be systematised, certainly 
not wi thout precedent but now organised, generalised and provided 
with a methodological rationale, between the formulation of true 
propositions about subjects, their systematic observation, 
experimental manipulation and therapeutic socialisa tio~ And these 
latter mundane operations thus acquired a scientific status because 
of their philosophical significance. At the same time philosophy 
had, in a move that would prove irreversible, abrogated the 
requirement that it internalise all its means of demonstration and 
proof. An alliance had been struck between a mode of argumentation 
that remained speculative and a mode of investigation which purported 
to be empirical - an alliance which governs psychological discourse 
on cognitive processes even until today. 
In relation to the Wild Boy of Aveyron, Lucien Malson writes, 
"A hundred and thirty years before the Kelloggs, Itard was already 
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talking like a modern psychologist n • 24 And Harl an Lane's 
comprehensive recent study sees, in the work of Itard, the example of 
a great and original mind which, working within the diverse strands 
of thought which constituted the spirit of Enlightenment science and 
humanism, found in Victor the occasion to synthesise and transcend 
them, and to originate a whole range of theories and techniques which 
anticipated and helped to bring into existence much of modern 
scientific psychology and pedagogy:25 
Itard had set out to train an enfant sauvage; by his journey's 
end he had become the originator of instructional devices, the 
inventor of behaviour modification, the first speech and hearing 
specialist, founder of otolaryngology, creator of oral education 
for the deaf and father of special education for the mentally 
and physically handicapped. 
We should be critical of the familiar play of originality and 
continuity which inform these accounts of Itard's encounter with his 
enfant sauvage. But we should recognise that this incident of the 
Wild Boy of Aveyron illustrates a further fundamental feature of the 
modern psychological enterprise. Subjects defective in sensory 
abili ties or in experience gained their pertinence from the answers 
they could provide, the test they represented, the demonstration they 
allowed, for the theses of sensationalist philosophy. But Itard is 
implica ted also in a crucial reversal of the direction of incidence 
of theoretical discourse and empirical subject.26 The question here 
became not simply what Victor could do for science, but what science 
could do for Victor. 
We have already remarked upon the pedagogic thrust of 
sensationalist epistemology. Central to the medical psychology and 
scientific pedagogy of the early nineteenth century was this linkage 
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between the theoretical and the practical, the simultaneous 
constitution of an object to be known and a target to be transformed. 
Theory and practice combined in a sort of phenomenotechnics cf the 
subject, a process in which the abstract object of a theory of the 
subject was concretised, in which theory was materialised. 27 
Psychological theory was, from the moment of its inception, always a 
theory 'in action', and the 'theory of the subject' ""I~ys operated in 
and through a set of technical and practical procedures for its 
'realisation'. A positive science of man produces its object within 
a set of practices in which it is to be known through its 
transformation. Hence the founding moments of psychology always 
concern the pathological, as that which is to be normalised and known 
through the procedures and results of reformatory tactics. Itard's 
treatment of Victor was the reproduction in microcosm of the major 
institutional sites within which such a science of man would be 
elaborated - the asylum, the prison and the school were only the 
first of these. Let us turn to examine this question in relation to 
the procedures of moral management which were deployed in the early 
nineteenth century for the reformation of the mad. 
The moral space 
Indeed, when we consider the little time he has been in society, 
the Savage of Aveyron is much less like a simple youth, than an 
infant of ten or twelve months old, and an infant who should 
have against him anti-social habits, an obstinate inattention, 
organs scarcely flexible, and a very blunted sensibility. In 
this last point of view his situation became a case purely 
medical; and the treatment of it belonged to moral medicine - to 
that sublime art created by the Willis's and the Crichton's of 
England, and lately introduced into France by the success and 
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writings of Professor Pinel. 
J M Itard, 1801 28 
For the eighteenth century, conduct, in the case of madness at any 
rate, existed in very close proximity to the ducts of the body and 
their contents - the nerve fibres, the blood, the bowels, the 
humours. The contacts between medicine and madness (initially 
limited to those with money to pay, and occuring within the family or 
in one of a small number of private establishments for the deranged 
of the weal thier classes) 'had the objective of the restoration of 
these bodily fluids to their proper states. Thus, for example, a 
range of noxious substances were administered in an attempt to 
strengthen the spirits or fibres which had been weakened in madness. 
And techniques of purification - blood transfusions, bleedings, 
purges - were utilised, linked to a theory of madness involving the 
clogging of the fibres of the mind or viscera. A third set of 
treatments involved the use of immersions - hot or cold baths, 
showers or douches - with the aim of restoring suppleness to the 
fibres and the added advantage of cooling or shock to bring sufferers 
to their senses. Fourthly, the movements of the body could be 
regulated - through the use of restraints or of specialised pieces of 
apparatus for spinning or revolving the lunatic - partially with the 
aim of adjusting the movements of the bodily fluids, partly in an 
attempt to restore the links between the deranged internal time of 
the body and the real external time of the world. 
It was, paradoxically, the very intractabili ty of madness to 
these physical cures, and the conclusions that were drawn from this 
tha t madness was beyond cure, which provided the condi tions under 
which, towards the end of the eighteenth century, a space could begin 
to open between the fibres and the ravings, delusions, hallucinations 
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and melancholias of the mad. This space would be designated moral. 
Let me o~tlinethe steps which were involved. 
One can start with Battie. Having argued that there is no cure 
for original madness - though the physician may treat consequential 
madness with some success - Battie concluded that the chief function 
of the physician was that of 'management' - general care of the 
patient, confinement away from friends or families, the checking of 
unruly appetites and the pursuit of a quiet, well ordered life.3° 
Pargeter's Observations on Maniacal Disorders (1792) reversed this 
connection between madness and a well ordered life: whilst we cannot 
search for the real causes of insanity, one thing we can conclude is 
the part played by immoderate passions in its genesis - sudden 
emotions, luxury, the reversal of the proper functions of day and 
night, fanaticism - indeed a range of conditions arising not so much 
from the fibres as from the morals. And while the physician should 
apply the full armoury of physical treatments - bleeding, cupping, 
cathartics, emetics, cold and hot bathing, drugs - since of the 
ul timate causes of these disorders we must remain ignorant nchief 
reliance in the care of insanity must be rather in management than on 
medicinen• Further, 'since the maniacal disorders originated wi th 
moral excess, they could be governed and subdued by moral dominatio~ 
The physician was to become an expert in the art of governing maniacs 
through the exercise of moral mastery.31 This was how Pinel 
described the method of Reverend Doctor Francis Willis: 32 
His face, usually friendly and affable, changes completely its 
character the moment he catches sight of one of his patients. 
It undergoes a metamorphosis instantaneously and commands the 
attention and respect of the madma~ Penetrating eyes seem to 
read his heart and to divine his thoughts as soon as they come 
into being. Over them he exercises something resembling 
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sovereign authority, which subsequently becomes a therapeutic 
instrument and which in no way contravenes the employment of 
gentler instruments. 
The development of moral treatment is habi tually identified with 
Tuke's foundation of the York Retreat in 1792, and Pinel striking the 
chains from the insane in Bicetre in 1793.33 It was not accidental 
that the methods involved in this 'act of liberation' were developed 
by clergymen-doctors like Pargeter and Willis. For the relations of 
patient to doctor established within moral treatment were reminiscent 
of that of sinner to priest.34 One strong, pure, knowledgable, 
authorised to excise the undesirable in thought and behaviour by 
means of the power and prestige attached to his standing as much as 
by the specialised techniques he employed; the other weak, sly, 
having transgressed and wishir~ only to avoid responsibility for such 
transgression; the enforced contact, the patient interpellated as one 
who was sick and was known to be sick by another stronger, wiser and 
more powerful. Thus was the madman bent to the will of the doctor, 
whose will was only to make the madman accept that he was mad and in 
doing so regain the possibility of judgment and control. If 
restraint and coercion were utilised, it was only to ~nable this end 
to be carried out, if the well being of the mad was promoted it was 
only to provide the conditions under which this reformation of morals 
could become possible. 
Note the space in which this domination occurred. It was not an 
act of force, of repression, of the threat of violence ensuring 
submission. It was a case of will operating upon will, of a 
contestation in a moral space, in which the madman enslaved himself 
to his ~aster as if of his own desire. A will which, in being 
mastered, accepted the mastery as its own will. Dependence, 
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domination, transformation - these were three of the central terms of 
the operation of moral treatment. 
Moral treatment thus defj.ned itself through oppositions along a 
number of axes. It opposed physical with moral causes of insanity -
passions, vices, lusts, griefs and desires rather than humours, 
spi ri ts, fi bre s, lesions in the brain. It constructed moral 
classifications and characterisations of insanity, as opposed to 
physical nosologies. And it deployed moral rather than physical 
treatments of insanity - the management of the moral life, relations 
and milieu of the madman rather than his purging, bleeding, bathing 
or rotation. 
The treatment required the creation, around the patient, of a 
domain of pure morali ty. Hence the asylum became the right place, 
and the family became the wrong place, for curing insanity. Firstly, 
of course, because the institution provided the appropriate 
conditions for the realisation of the dominance/dependence relation 
which successful treatment required. But secondly because treatment 
depended upon the possibility of manipulating the experiences, 
plesures, pains, movements and timetable of the insane. The family 
environment was unsuitable not only because within it the mad were 
constantly reminded of their past, of the exci ting causes of their 
indisposition, but also because the family milieu was inherently 
unprogrammable. The new asylum was to become a moral domain, but not 
one that sought to activate the principles of morality associated 
with religion - love, piety, brotherhood, asceticism - but rather one 
which deployed a set of moral principles purely social in origin and 
orienta tion. "Formerly the locus of confinement had inheri ted, in 
the social sphere, the almost absolute limits of the lazar house; it 
was a foreign country. Now the asylum must represent the great 
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continui ty of social morality. The values of family and work, all 
the ackn.owledged virtues, now reign in the asylum.,,35 All those 
moral principles whose violation had now achieved the status of cause 
in insanity were to be restored in the ethical uniformity of the 
asylum. Drunkenness, promiscuity, laziness, apathy, misconduct of 
any sort were to find their antidote in the extension to the inmates 
of the homogeneous and unbroken rule of morality. 
But how was this rule of morality to prevail over the deranged, 
the melancholic, the manic, the perverse? It could do this for two 
principal reasons. Firstly, because insofar as the mad, for all 
their moral transgressions, remained human, there existed within them 
some core to which treatment could direct itself. It was the lack of 
this possibility which made idiots, for Pinel and Esquirol, 
impervious to the action of moral treatment. But lodged deep in the 
interior of the mad lay an essential nature, a primi ti ve morality 
which was both the conditon of treatment and that which manifested 
itself during such treatment. Secondly, this core was accessible to 
a therapeutics because it was organised by principles which governed 
any sentient organism - the pursuit of pleasure, the avoidance of 
pain, the ability to form associations. Thus the moral order could 
be constructed, shaped, organised and re-educa ted through 
disciplining the body, imposing habits and regularities through the 
tactical utilisation of this utilitarian calculus. 
Hence the asylum was not merely a domain of morali ty, but a 
domain of the enforcement of morality, by virtue of the principle of 
punishment for transgression and reward for obedience. Thus Reil 
wrote "Rewards that bring pleasure and punishments that bring 
displeasure should be meeted out in a proportion caculated to lead 
patients back to the path which is necessary and proper for them and 
which will cause them to be submissive and to practise strict 
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obedience.,,36 Punishment was not given in anger, or as the 
appropriate means for the subduing of those who partake in the nature 
of the beast. It was given coolly, dispassionately, according to a 
pedagogic calculus that sought to form and shape conduct in morally 
desirable directions. All aspects of the asylum were informed by 
such a calculus and organised around the constant evaluation of the 
behaviour of the insane individual. The giving or withholding of 
anything which the inmate might require, or any object that might be 
desired, could be integra ted within this calculus - isolation, 
hunger, thirst, defamation, humiliation, chastisement - but, in 
addition, moral treatment created the conditions where the old 
medical treatments could be reactivated, outside their original 
therapeutic rationale, as threats or punishments for transgressio~ 
Esquirol found that the threat of sending the insane to the incurable 
ward soothed them like magic)7 But also the douche was an admirable 
instrument for curbing rage, breaking a dangerous resolution or 
forcing a patient to obey. And similarly Pinel believed, of the 
shower, that "considered as a means of repression, it often suffices 
to subject to the general law of manual labour a madman who is 
susceptible to it, in order to conquer an obstinate refusal to take 
nourishment, and to subjugate insane persons carried 'away by a sort 
of turbulent and unreasoned humour".3 8 The asylum, wi th its 
continual surveillance, was certainly a moral regime, but it was a 
juridicalised morali ty. It was a morali ty in which the law 
transgressed was only secondly the law of God, but firstly the law of 
the social space of the asylum, the assemblage of norms which the mad 
had to make their own if they were to return to normality. Thus 
Sonnenstein made no bones about it; if the desired results were to be 
obtained, "Punishment ought to be meeted out as speedily as possible 
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fol19wing the offence.,,39 
He~ce the necessity of continuous monitorip~ of moral rules, of 
continuous assessment of behaviour in relation to transgression. The 
violation of a norm became an offence; hence the institution of a 
frankly juridical regime. The inmate had to be aware that all 
behaviour was judged according to a rule, and that the transgression 
of any rule would be known and punished. But the function of this 
surveillance and judgment was not the simple one of the production of 
a well ordered institutional regime, as it would beoome later in the 
nineteenth oentury. On the contrary, the conduct of the asylum, all 
those harsh words and unsympathetio responses whioh we have just been 
dooumenting, had a speoifio therapeutic rationale. This continual 
play of judgment had the objective of forcing the inmate to take into 
himself the role of judge, to internalise that moral order which 
consti tuted the asylum, to incorpora te the rules and principles of 
that institutional space of morals into the moral space of his own 
character. Michel Foucault oomments that: 40 
Everything was organised so that the madman would recognise 
himself in the world of judgment that enveloped him from all 
sides; he must know that he is watohed, judged and condemned; 
from transgression to punishment, the connection ~ust be evident 
as a guilt recognised by all... This almost arithmetic 
obviousness of punishment, repeated as often as necessary, the 
recognition of transgression by its repression - all this must 
end in the internalisation of the judicial instance, and the 
birth of remorse in the inmate's mind: it is only at this point 
that the judges agree to stop the punishment, certain that it 
will continue indefinitely in the inmate's oonscience. 
The moral spaoe of the asylum reduplicated, in material form, the 
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contours of the domain that had begun to form between the body and 
its conducts - the formation of this moral space of the soul was thus 
the condition, referent, target and product of the regime of moral 
treatment. This particular domain, at once mental, medical and 
ethical, made possible more than just the reformation of the insane. 
Indeed, despite the rapid building of asylums during the nineteenth 
century, moral treatment in its original form lasted but a few 
decades. It gave way before the massive overloading and 
underfinancing of the asylums, and a critique of the therapeutic 
disapPointments of moral management. But the conceptual counterpart 
of this institutional site - a particular way of constructing objects 
for investigation and an explanatory structure consisting in a 
specific way of conceptual ising those objects - was destined to play 
a fundamental role in the social and political debates of the 
nineteenth century, and in the formation of individual psychology. 
Let me rapidly outline some of the contours of this space as it took 
shape in England and in France in the decades bridging the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. 
It was first of all a space of character: in it the ethical 
conditions and consequences of past habits, present conduct and 
future behaviour intersected. The moral domain became the place of 
organisation and integration of the passions, the will and the 
understanding. It formed a matrix for the operation of desires, 
ideas, signs and actions; a domain where what was felt could affect 
and could be affected by what was done; where what was said could 
have consequences for what was learned; where what was desired could 
relate to what was understood. It was the place which both 
condi tioned wha t was experienced and was condi tioned by such 
experiences. Here the passions and the will found their proximate 
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source; here experiences had their effects and such vices as 
intemperance, immoderation, over indulgence and the like, took their 
toll. The moral space remained a space of morality in the restricted 
sense of rules and principles governing right conduct, but the field 
of incidence and form of organisa tion of moral questions was 
radically transformed by the links forged with medicine, with a 
science of the understanding, and with the exigencies of personal 
biography. 
Yet for all its complexity, the moral space remained two-
dimensional, a space wi thout hidden depths or secret laws. It was 
certainly structured historically - things past were laid down and 
affected things present and future - but it had no thickness to it. 
In it things remained exactly what they seemed and what they were. 
Excess was thus not the sign of something hidden, deeper, but only of 
itself - a tendency to excess - or something exterior to the moral 
space - the physical make-up of the body, the nerves, blood, colon or 
urine. 
The inventories of the causes of insanity produced at the turn 
of the eighteenth- and nineteenth century form a strange amalgam to 
our eyes: excesses of joy, grief, fright, fear, anger or love; 
religious fanaticism; intemperance; immoderation in food; gambling; 
vices of all sorts; onanism; shock; disappointment or sudden success 
in personal or business affairs; rapid changes of fortune; extremes 
of heat or cold; excessive vanity or ambition; failures of management 
in the nursey, especially early indulgences; fever; blows to the 
head; - the possibilities proliferated. 41 But to the early 
nineteenth century, the intermixing of the phYSical, the emotional, 
the physiological, the financial, the intellectual, the aCCidental, 
the unethical and the vicious formed a rational distribution. The 
conception of a moral domain had allowed the systematisation of 
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elements which were prviously evaluated in distinct spheres into a 
single register of evidence for, and promoters of, insanity. 
There was a moral space responsible for the organisation and 
determination of the actions of the subject. It consisted in a nexus 
of relations betwen predispositions, experiences and conduct, between 
desires, understandings and actions. The notion of character 
described this space. It integrated the flows of the body, the 
effects of passion and vice, the excesses of will and the exigencies 
of fortune within a moral matrix. Here the forces of the body were 
mustered and directed, channelled towards particular objects, good or 
ill, vicious or virtuous. And here these forces could be neutralised 
or blocked, or, on the other hand, amplified and intensified. In the 
nineteenth century this moral space, with its medicalisation of the 
conditions and consequences of conduct, played a crucial role within 
a complex discourse of police and social economy; it provided a 
particular way of forming and conceptualising social questions, and 
established the place where a theory of degeneration, already 
glimpsable here, would form itself. 
The educability or idiots 
It has been noted that the so-called Wild Boy of Aveyron has 
several characteristic traits in common with many children whose 
sensory functions or intellectual faculties are more or less 
impaired and who are condemned to vegetate sadly in our asylums, 
since they are not susceptible to any training... Some of the 
children in our asylums reduced to a state of idiocy are 
inferior in intellectual faculties to the child of Aveyron; 
others are his equal or even superior to him... Do these facts 
not assert that the child ought to be categorised among the 
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children suffering from idiocy and insanity, and that there is 
no ~ope whatsoever of obtaining some measure of success through 
systematic and continued instruction? 
P Pinel, 180042 
The problem of classification which oriented the natural history of 
medicine of the eighteenth century was interwoven with the theory of 
language and of knowledge which we have already examined. To 
decompose the language of everyday life, and to recompose it through 
the mechanisms of analysis was not merely to provide a regular and 
orderly classificatory table but to establish a valid set of 
relations amongst classes and sub-classes of words, and hence both 
amongst the complex ideas which they annexed and amongst the real 
objects to which they referred. To place a particular phenomenon in 
a specific class was not merely to systematise it, but to establish a 
certain knowledge of it. The construction of a classification was 
thus an activity which was at once epistemological and philosophical. 
It could also be, as we shall see, an activity which was practical 
and therapeutic. 
The systems of classification of illness which were proposed at 
the end of the eighteenth century were dependent upon the emergence 
of a medicine of the clinic, which had the case as its object. As 
Michel Foucaul t has demonstrated, the formation of the clinic as a 
mode of medical know ledge and a si te of medical practice was made 
possible by a complex of political, social, technical and theoretical 
shifts which took place at the end of the eighteenth and the 
beginning of the nineteenth centuries. Amongst these were the 
emergence of the hospital as the principal site for the practice of 
medicine, as a result of increasing urbanisation and 
industrialisation cou.pled with a change in the laws of assistance 
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which made institutionalisation a condition of medical treatment for 
those on relief. This was linked to a change in relations between 
doctors and patients, so that doctors were now able to observe a 
whole series of instances of a particular condition. This made 
possible the tabulation and statisticalisation of diseases and the 
development of classifications and diagnoses based on the links 
between symptoms and prognoses, between symptoms and individuals and 
between successive events in anyone condi tion. Simultaneously there 
was a change in the methods of transmitting medical knowledge, 
whereby the hospital became a pedagogic apparatus in which the poor, 
benefiting from the care they received for free, compensated through 
the medical lesson which they provided. These shifts made possible 
the clinical conception of the ~ - the unique intersection between 
a body and a life history, as the proper object for medical knowledge 
and for the practice of the cure.43 
We can note in passing that clinical medicine was an 
individualising theory and practice. The case was unique, but 
intelligible. Its individuality could be charted in relation to its 
deviation from the general standards of functioning which could now 
be constructed. The case was the locus 'of knowledge and of 
treatment. It s status was quite different from that of the 
individual in the old medicine where the doctor treated his patients 
in their own homes, and as friends. There, the common nature of 
diseases and the particular nature of individuals existed on 
different registers. When, in clinical medicine, disease became a 
process of life, the essential normativity and variability of life 
processes brought the individual within the scope of knowledge in a 
way which ontological conceptions of disease entities had 
precluded. 44 
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Thus, as Donnelly notes, the observations produced by clinical 
medicin~ began to be deployed in questioning whether human 
individuals were all equivalent prior to differences contributed by 
environment and education. The article on equality in the 
Dictionnaire Philosophiaue had proclaimed that all men enjoying their 
natural facul ties were equal. Idiots, blind, the deaf and the 
grossly deformed represented only boundary cases which defined the 
limits of humanity.45 But Cabanis, utilising clinical evidence, 
disputed this claim, arguing that there was no communality of all 
types of humani ty, but tha t individuals varied in their nature and 
capacity to feel. 46 And it was to the results of moral medicine that 
Itard referred when he criticised education for being: 47 
never adapted to the innumerable variatiqns in the intellectual 
make-up of individuals. Let us take one hundred children of the 
same age and subject their intellectual state to an analytical 
examination. We will become convinced that there are as 
many points of disSimilarity as of similarity among them ••• 
psychological man more than physical man has his idiosyncracies 
or individual differences. 
It would be many decades before a psychology of individual 
differences would be constituted, and the emergence of the 
possibility of precisely such a clinical approach was, as we shall 
see in a subsequent chapter, to playa vital role in its formation. 
As, too, did the question which Itard was discussing in this very 
passage - that of "idiots ••• or ••• those individuals whom we 
generally call slow witted; further ••• those who are noticeable in 
our society for their lack of imagination, their faul ty judgment, 
their lack of purpose or their highly circumscribed ideas.,,48 
Pinel's Nosographie Philosophigue was published in three 
volumes in 1798.49 Mental illness was divided into four classes; 
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mania, melancholia, dementia and idiocy. There was nothing original 
abou t this division, or the place of idiocy wi thin it. Idiocy was 
set apart from the other forms; it was afforded a less extensive 
symptomatology and aetiology, but was marked by an absence of 
intellectual faculties, almost certainly with an organic basis, 
almost invariably incurable. Indeed, whilst the Traite medico-
philosophique sur l'alienation mentale reported 51% of cures in cases 
of mania, 62% in melancholia, 19% in dementia, it found none at all 
in cases of idiocy.50 Thus for Pinel, whilst idiocy could pose 
interesting legal problems, it remained marginal to a mental medicine 
which centred around a therapeutic practice and depended upon the 
existence of a core of reason and humanity which remained within the 
insane. When the Wild Boy of Aveyron was brought to Paris, the 
Society of Observers of Man appointed a commission to study him and 
to report its observations: Pinel; Sicard, the Director of the 
Institute for Deaf Mutes; Jauffret, naturalist; de Gerando, 
philosopher of language and ideology; Cuvier, anatomist. At the end 
of December 1800, Pinel's report documented the imperfections of the 
senses and their dissonance, the absence of speech, the fleeting 
character of his ideas, the limits of his feelings. On the basis of 
comparison with others who had been placed in various positions in 
the range covered by the class of idiocy, Pinel drew the necessary 
conclusion: the Wild Boy was properly to be classified among the 
idiots, ineducable and incurable. It was as a member of this class 
that the child was entrusted to the Institute for Deaf Mutes. The 
chief physician, who was appointed just two days after Pinel's report 
was delivered, was Jean-Marc Gaspard Itard.51 
Deaf mutes in eighteenth century France were not merely objects 
of philosophical interest, they were also the focus of a 
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philanthropic pedagogy. The Abbe de l'Epee, who founded the 
Institu~e for Deaf Mutes, had recognised the revolutionary 
implications for the deaf of the relationship which sensationalist 
epistemology proposed between ideas and the signs by which they were 
marked. If articulate sounds were adopted by man in the beginning 
simply because of the ease and variety with which they might serve to 
mark ideas, there was no reason why this mythical origin of language 
should not be replayed for those who by virtue of physical accident, 
lacked the means to utilise spoken language and oral signs. Thus 
they too might be provided with the means to mark, recall and order 
their ideas. The deaf and dumb, hitherto conceived of as 
irremediably ignorant, were so only because of their absence of a 
spoken language for communication and for the organisation of their 
own understanding. To teach them a language then would be pedagogic 
in both a restricted and an expanded sense - not simply through the 
immediate activity, but also through the prescriptive and analytic 
benefits which the learning of a language conferred. 
Epee had regarded gesture as the natural language of the deaf, 
a language of signs to which they were led directly by the 
intersection of nature and their wants. This natural language of 
gesture could be developed and conventionalised, transforming it from 
the immediate expression of physical needs through to signs 
designating objects and grammatical relations. Epee produced a 
conventionalised language of gesture by translating the structure of 
French language and grammar into signs, both gestural and written. 
And in his institution in Paris, he taught his pupils to communicate 
in gesture signs, and to translate these signs into established 
written words by committing the association between word and sign to 
memory. 52 
Sicard was no less committed to sensationalist philosophy and 
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the methods of analysis which it proposed. But he disagreed with the 
techniques which Epee had utilised. Epee, he argued, had produced 
only copyists - the deaf mutes could translate written French into 
signs and vice versa, but they could not compose for themselves even 
simple sentences of French, nor carry out the instructions in a 
letter which they could translate into signs. Epee had recognised 
this, and considered it the inescapable limit to pedagogy for the 
deaf mutes. But Sicard considered that it arose from a technical and 
methodological error. This was the teaching of invented signs 
corresponded to each word, rather than the elucidation of signs from 
the pupils which corresponded to particular ideas. 53 
It was for these reasons that Sicard transformed his pedagogy 
into a practice which was more clinical than educational. He 
individualised his pedagogic techniques, directing them towards the 
particular propensities of specific individuals, adjusting them in 
the light of their particular requirements and orienting them in the 
light of a definite doctrine of the subject. The target of these 
practices was the soul, and the nature of that soul, the rules of the 
moral space, determined the techniques and their means of 
applica tion. 
It was these techniques, refined and developed'in relation to 
the doctrines of moral treatment, which Itard utilised in his work 
with the Wild Boy of Aveyron. And less than six months after Pinel's 
pessimistic conclusions, the Society of Observers of Man, at the 
ini tiati ve of Sicard, invited I tard to submi t a further report on 
the Savage Child, and concluded after hearing it, "These observations 
made by Citizen Itard, who has tried to conduct the education of this 
child, lead us to conclude that his faculties have been developed up 
to a certain point, and hope that more substantial development will 
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be seen subsequently. The assembly applauds this effor~"54 
But neither for Itard nor for the assembly had the traditional 
view of idiots as incurable and ineducable been transformed. It was 
by disputing Pinel's diagnosis of the wild boy as an idiot that Itard 
was able to develop his system of treatment, utilising Sicard's 
methods of individualised instruction wi thin a regime modelled on 
moral treatment, which sought to reawaken, develop, instrumentalise 
and channel Victor's wants. Thus it is not surprising that Esquirol 
could still write, in 1818, after the results and limits of Itard's 
attempts at methodical education were well known: 55 
Everything about the idiot betrays a organisation imperfect, or 
arrested in progress of development. We can conceive of no 
possibilitY,of changing this state. Nothing teaches us how to 
impart, for a few moments even, to the wretched idiot, an 
increase of reason or intelligence ••• It will be observed, 
that I have nothing to say, respecting the treatment of a 
constitutional conditio~ 
Yet the incident of the Wild Boy of Aveyron, and Itard's treatment, 
had provided the condi tions for a transformation in the place and 
status of the idiot in philanthropic and pedagogic practice. 
In 1839 Edouard Seguin opened the first school for idiots. 56 
Inspired by the philanthropic socialism of Saint-Simon, he sought a 
class of unfortunates to whom he could extend its benefits. He 
discovered idiots intermingled, without aid or hope, with convicts, 
epileptics and the insane. Moral treatment of the Wild Boy had only 
been possible for Itard on the condition that the boy was not an 
idiot. But for Seguin, Victor was indeed an idiot; his progress 
under the regime of medico-pedagogy demonstrated that, given 
appropriate methods, idiots could be educated; they had become 
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improvable, a new target for philanthropy. Seguin, it should be 
noted, did not dispute Esquirol's belief that idiocy was incurable. 
Vlhat he contested was the view that was still maintained as late as 
1837 in the standard Dictionaire de Medicine: "It is useless to 
combat idiocy. In order to establish intellectual activity, it would 
be necessary to change the conformation of organs which are beyond 
the reach of all modification.,,57 Idiots remained incurable for 
Seguin, but despite this they were not ineducable. 
Education for the id~ot had a moral function, a philosophical 
basis and a physiological method. The idiot was one isolated from 
humanity by virtue of cerebral incapacity, deprivation of stimuli to 
the senses or by some combination of mental and physical defect. The 
physiological method was a sequence to reopen the linkages between 
the idiot and the physical, emotional and moral world which 
surrounded him: 58 
From the feeling of pressure in the tactile organs which taught 
prehension to our feeling of duty towards our pupils which 
taught them affection, from the distinction of the difference 
between a circle and a square and that between right and wrong 
we have followed a continuous path, beginning where the 
functions refuse to soar higher in the atmospher~ of idealism. 
Seguin's physiological method entailed the systematic exercise 
of the senses and the organs in a programme of instruction, general 
yet individualised, the training of the speed and extent of the 
cerebral functions, muscular functions, sensory functions, organs of 
thought, of movement and extension. Sensationalist philosophy had 
left the question of the training of the senses to nature, and had 
refused to differentiate between the faculties of the understanding 
in the child and the man. Senses were either present or absent, and 
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if they were present no organised pedagogy of the sensory abilities 
is requi!;'ed, for the natural interaction of wants with experiences 
was ample. 
Seguin, following Itard, systematised some significant shifts 
in the sensationalist field. Where sensationalism found intellectual 
error, it located the blame not in the senses but in the field of 
signs; for Seguin the abilities and senses themselves were variable 
and could be educated, the body and its organs, the senses and the 
muscles, could be systema~ically awakened, taught to move and to 
discriminate. They could be mustered, organised, governed through a 
systema tic programme of instruction. Secondly, variation was 
introduced into the intrinsic nature of the moral realm - it was not 
a case of a universal reason or intellect being present or absent but 
of variation of a psychological order which in interaction with 
experiences of certain types, in a certain sequence, produced results 
in the sense of both intellectual abilities and morality. And 
thirdly, the conditions were formed for a conception of distinct laws 
of childhood moral organisation. It was from the space of pathology, 
from the problem of idiocy, that the possi bili ty of a knowledge of 
the normal child arose. 
It was for Maria Montessori to effect this transformation in 
the field of pedagogy. Whilst others wondered that idiots, in the 
schools she established for their training, did so well at 
examina tions in rela tion to normal children, she wondered why the 
normal children did so badly. But despite Montessori's own desire to 
trace her heritage back to Seguin and Itard, the transformation with 
which she is linked occurred in a practical and discursive space very 
different from that within which they worked. For schooling had 
become universal, assessment in the form of examinations was a 
commonplace, idiocy had become feeble-mindedness, and feeble-
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mindedness had become a matter of intelligence. This transformation 
had occurred in the context of a field of debate that was to rack 
nineteenth century social and political discourse on 'the social 
problem' - the problem of degeneration. For Montessori's initial 
attention to the feeble-minded arose from a trajectory leading from 
the criminal anthropology of Lombroso to the preventive anthropology 
of Giuseppe Serge. This sought to utilise anthropology preventively 
through a scientific pedagogy which was based on a knowledge of 
childhood: 59 
By means of education we shall seek to prevent the ultimate 
consequences of degeneration and disease. If criminal 
anthropology has been able to transform punishment in modern 
society, we ought to set ourselves to transform the individual 
in the school of the future. And with the triumph of this 
ideal, pedagogical anthropology will, in large measure, have 
taken the place of criminal anthropology, just as schools for 
the abnormal and weak will in large measure have taken the place 
of jails and hospitals. 
In the light of this discussion of the psychological subject, the 
moral space and the educable idiot we may now proceed, to examine the 
formation of individual psychology in England in the last years of 
the nineteenth century, the transformations in problems, objects, 
means of conceptualisation and strategies which were entailed and the 
condi tions which made them possible. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF POPULATIONS 
What man pasessed of sense, curiosity or fancy, could gaze 
unmoved on this mixed mass of poverty, destitution and crime 
which makes up the lower stratum of our artificial society? How 
resist the question, what part of all this misery is the result 
of personal defects an~ vices - of sloth, unthrift, incapacity; 
how much of what may be called inaptitude in the state! How is 
it possible to resist the inquiry whether when more than three 
centuries ago, our ancestors established a poor law, they ought 
not rather to have given us a good police force. 
William Guy, 18731 
A psychology of the individual formed in England at the end of the 
nineteenth century around a problem of defective mental capacities: 
feeble-mindedness. We can, in crude terms, formulate the issue thus. 
The problem concerned not the plight of the individuals themselves, 
as it had for Seguin, but the consequences of such individuals with 
respect to the population as a whole. It was argu~d that feeble-
mindedness was an hereditary phenomenon, that it was passed down from 
parents to children. Since the feeble-minded bred more rapidly than 
others, their proportion in the population would increase. Feeble-
mindedness produced all sorts of social problems, and these problems 
were becoming increasingly evident in the heart of the new centres of 
population created by the grow th of manufacture. What was occuring 
was a deterioration or degeneration of the race, which would weaken 
the country at home, and hamper it in competition abroad. Here was a 
matter of the gravest concern, and a proper issue for government 
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action. It was necessary as a matter of urgency to discover those 
who were mentally defective and to take steps to prevent them 
propaga tinge 
The problem of the feeble-minded was posed in these terms by 
linking up three somewhat distinct themes. Firstly, the doctrine 
that the regulation of the quality of the population was a proper and 
important issue for government policy and action. Secondly, the 
argument that the condi tions of urban life were deleterious to the 
habi ts and abili ties of tlie labouring classes, and that the effect 
was a cumul a ti ve demoralisa tion of the population. Thirdly, the 
theory that pathological physical and moral states were the 
expression of a constitutional predisposition which was transmitted 
by heredi ty and which tended to become more marked wi th each 
generation, thus forming a process of degeneracy. 
Each of these three themes was established by the mid-nineteenth 
century. When they were linked up around the problem of the feeble-
minded, each was transformed. The object of this chapter is briefly 
to sketch out the characteristics of each theme, to set the scene for 
the detailed archaeological investigation which follows. 
Governaent and population 
Next to the blessings which a Nation derives from excellent Laws 
ably administered, are those advantages which result from a 
well-regulated and energetic Police, conducted with purity, 
activity, vigilance and discretion. 
Patrick Colquhoun, 1797 2 
From the middle of the eighteenth century it is possible to identify 
the emergence of a recurrent theme in texts on the problems and 
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objectives of government. It has at its core a question of the 
organisation of the population and the creation and maintenanc~ of 
order, morality and public tranquillity, and it is posed, in part, in 
terms of police. Police in the sense in which Colquhoun wrote in 
1800: 3 
Police in this country may be considered as a new science; the 
properties of which consist not in the judicial powers which 
lead to punishment, and which belong to the magistrates alone; 
but in the prevention ~nd detection of crimes; and in those 
other functions which relate to internal regulations for the 
well ordering and comfort of civil society. 
It is pertinent to consider in more detail what is at stake in this 
"subject of great importance to be known and understood". For 
Colquhoun it was "an improved state of Society", yet the introduction 
of a programme of police was opposed in England for some four 
decades, on the grounds that, in the words of a Parliamentary 
Committee of 1822:4 
It is difficult to reconcile an effective system of police, with 
that perfect freedom of action and exemption from interference, 
which are the great privileges and blessings of ~ociety in this 
country; and Your Committee think that the forfeiture or 
curtailment of such advantages would be too great a sacrifice 
for improvements in police, or facilities in detection of crime, 
however desirable in themselves if abstractly considered. 
Put simply, what police represented was a new conception of 
government, of its role and functions, of its objects and of its 
legitimate mechanisms. It would, therefore, be wrong to see the 
introduction of a professional police force in 1829 as merely an 
extension and reorganisation of the office of constable. As is well 
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known, the constable, from the thirteenth century, was an elected 
officer who had as his responsibility the maintenance of the King's 
peace, by hue and cry and other means. But this merely was a 
systematisation of the duties of all subjects, as clarified in the 
Statute of Winchester of 1285, which laid down the principles of 
policing until 1829. Critchley summarises them as follows: 5 
First, it was a duty of everyone to maintain the King's peace, 
and it was open to any citisen to arrest an offender. Second, 
the unpaid, part-time'constable had a special duty to do so, and 
in the towns he was assisted in this duty by his inferior 
officer, the watchman. Third, if the offender was not caught 
red-handed, hue and cry was to be raised. Fourth, everyone was 
obliged to keep arms with which to follow the cry when required. 
Finally, the constable had a duty to present the offender at the 
court leet. 
This Act, toge ther wi th the Justice of the Peace Act of 1361, which 
established the Justices as the representatives of the King, 
concentrated judicial and administrative power in their hands and 
made constables subordinate to them, established the mechanism for 
the maintenance of the King's peace and removed the l,ast elements of 
feudal rule in this area. This apparatus took shape within a 
conception of the Crown as the sole source of law with the sole right 
to hold courts and dispense justice. Law was a part of the 
relationship between a sovereign and his territory, and crime was an 
offence not against another subject but against the King's peace and 
the person of the sovereign himself.6 
Michel Foucault has argued that we can observe here the 
opera tion of a par ticular conception of government - one tha twas 
negative, repressive, spectacular, violent, discontinuous, visible 
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and ex post facto. Certain acts were forbidden, but outside the 
infraction of a law the Sovereign had no business to interfere with 
the lives of his subjects. This does not imply, of course, that 
there was a domain of liberties, spontaneous and unregulated, but 
that regulation here was of a different order - dispersed, directed 
through custom and convention, through local bonds of deference, 
obligation and reciproci ty. When a law was infringed, the wrong 
against the Sovereign was righted by a spectacular public 
manifestation of the power of the King. The force of law was the 
force of the King, and the public trial and punishment was not so 
much a legal as a political ritual in which the injured sovereignty 
was restored, and the might of the prince was re-established in the 
minds of his subjects) 
Against this, we can counterpose a different conception of 
government, one linked to that sense of police which was decried in 
the opposition to Colquhoun. As Pasquino has pointed out, it was 
this that Von Justi had in mind when he entitled his text of 1760 
Foundations of the power Jl.lli1 happiness of states, or an exhaustive 
presentation of the science of police, and of which Beccaria spoke in 
a course he gave in 1769: 8 
But, neither the products of the earth, nor those of the work of 
the hand, nor mutual commerce, nor public contributions can ever 
be obtained from men with perfection and constancy if they do 
not know the moral and physical laws of the things upon which 
they act, if the increase of bodies is not proportionately 
accompanied by the change of social habits; if, among the 
multiplicity of individuals, works and products one does not at 
each step see shining the light of order, which renders all 
operations easy and sure. Thus, the sciences, education, good 
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order, security and public tranquillity, objects all 
comprehended under the name of police, will constitute the fifth 
and last object of public economy. 
In the eighteenth century Europe was a policed society, not in 
the sense of the realisation of all these programmes for the 
regulation of that space between the commands of the Sovereign and 
the daily lives of his subj ects, but in the sense that these 
programmes were active elements in debates and practice. And we can 
see that these programmes entailed the organisation of the 
administration of multiplicities of individuals in terms of a 
know ledge of those mul tiplici ties, a know ledge, that is to say, of 
populations. As Pasquino argues, the central tasks of police were 
happiness and information - the construction of a well ordered 
political machine and an enlightened administration depended upon a 
knowledge of the state of the population. "One can locate here ••• 
the ideal point of departure for a set of knowledges and practices 
which are born and develop in the 17th and 18th centuries, which bear 
upon the social body as a population and which slowly constitute it 
and fashion it. I am thinking on the one hand of demography and 
statistics, which, as its derivation from the word staat shows, is 
nothing other but the science of the State ••• [ On the other hand] the 
health of the population ••• becomes a value, a new object of 
analysis and intervention.,,9 
This links up with a thesis developed more extensively by 
Foucault: that it was the problem of population which enabled the 
positive deployment of the new art of government. Prior to the 
emergence of popula tion as the object of government, this new 
rationale for social regulation encountered obstructions in both 
Mercantalism and Political Oeconomy. Mercantalism attempted to 
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develop a rational practice of government to be utilised by the State 
but nonetheless took as its instruments the very apparatus of 
sovereignty which it sought to oppose - laws, decrees, regulations 
and so forth. Further, the art of government was conceived on the 
model of the family. Political Oeconomy was a discourse which 
attempted to apply to a State a mode of government modelled upon that 
of a household, in particular a royal household. As Tribe has 
pointed out, the derivation of oeconomy from the Greek root oikonomia 
is crucial - for it separates the lIeffective and thrifty ordering of 
a household from the business of money getting and trade ••• it 
covers the wise administration of the household and the maintenance 
of the objects of administration in their rightful Place ll • 10 Tribe 
quotes Steuart: 11 
Oeconomy, in general, is t.he art of providing for all the wants 
of a family, with prudence and frugality. If any thing 
necessary or useful be found wanting, if any thing provided be 
lost or misapplied, if any servant, any animal, be supernumerary 
or useless, if anyone sick or infirm be neglected, we 
immediately perceive a want of oeconomy. The object of it, in a 
private family, is therefore to provide for the nourishment, the 
other wants, and the employment of every individual... The 
whole oeconomy must be directed by the head, who is both lord 
and steward of the family. 
A conception of government as oeonomy thus fails to pose either 
a shift in the mechanisms of government, (which it conceives in terms 
of acts of a sovereign-like statesman) nor in the object of political 
government (which it conceives on the model of the household). It 
was first of all a transformation of this second element through a 
change in the conception and status of the population, which enabled 
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the unblocking of the new art of government. 
Th:i.s transformation can be partially understood in terms of the 
operation of the discourse of statistic~ Statistics, the science of 
state, had been initially conceived as the means of calculation to be 
deployed bya statesman in the determination of appropriate forms of 
legislation. Thus Sinclair, in 1791, defines it as enquiries 
"respecting the Population, the Political Circumstances, the 
Productions of a Country and other Matters of State,,,12 and similar 
positions are advanced in the texts of Conring and Aschenwall in 
Germany, or the Political Arithmetic of Petty and Davenant in 
England. These were concerned, in the main, with the means of 
estimating and comparing the wealth of nations, the contribution to 
this wealth of the size of population and its division into those 
pursuing different trades, with problems of the circulation of 
wealth, of taxation, and of the laws which regulate all these. But 
these statistics themselves transformed the conception of the 
population which they studied, gradually revealing:13 
that the population has its own regularities, its own rate of 
death, of diseases, its cycles of scarcity, etc.; statistics 
shows also that the domain of population carries a range of 
intrinsic, aggregate effects and that its phenom~na, such for 
instance as the great epidemics, endemic levels of mortality, 
and the spiral of labour and wealth, are irreducible to those of 
the family; lastly it shows that, through its displacements, 
habits, activities, etc., population causes specific economic 
effects: statistics, in that it makes it possible to quantify 
the phenomena specific to population, also shows that this 
specificity is irreducible to the dimension of the family. 
But further, it is now this population, its welfare, the 
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condition of its members, the increase of their health, longevity and 
wealth" which becomes the objective and end of government. 
Government now seeks to intervene in various ways into these areas, 
improving health, stimulating births, directing the flow of the 
population to various localities. These interventions require a 
knowledge of the immanent laws of this domain, for it is through 
acting upon them, rather than directly upon the consciousness of 
subjects, that the new art of government will operate. 
However, in respect to the question which concerns the present 
study, the effective deployment of these new techniques of government 
was delimited by a corollary development. If the emergence of the 
problem of population separated the question of its government from 
issues of trade, taxation, production, and the creation and 
circula tion of weal th, it simul taneously freed these elements for 
their independent elaboration, for them to become the object of a 
specific discourse now termed, in the nineteenth century, political 
economy.14 This discourse had as its object a realm of the 'economy' 
in something like its modern sense, but also as something which does 
not have to be governed. The economy, as it began to take shape in 
the economic discourse of the early nineteenth century, was no longer 
to be managed like a household; it was no longer the role of the 
statesman to ensure that there was a proper distribution of labour to 
different tasks, and proper links and circul a tion be tween the 
different parts. It was a realm which governed itself, in virtue of 
its internal laws and principles, in respect to which the role of 
legislation is merely to provide the external conditions in which it 
can function. This new conceptualisation, which has been 
retrospectively attributed to Adam Smith, allowed the valorisation of 
his notion of the 'invisible hand', as that which regulates economic 
activity, which could be counterposed to the guiding hand of the 
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statesman. 
Crucial for our purposes were the consequences of the 
establishment, by Mill, Spence and Torrens of a new 'Smi thian 
orthodoxy' which regarded labour, not nature, as the source of all 
weal th and converted Smith's classification of labour according to 
employment into a philosophy of the unique powers of human labour. 15 
vle had now, on the one hand, police and the administration of 
populations; on the other hand, political economy and the self 
regulation of the economy in which wealth is a product of hUman 
labour. Let us consider the consequences of this configuration in 
terms of the reformation of two problems which had concerned 
statesmen, parish officials and others since at least the time of the 
passage of the Poor Laws - the problems of poverty and pauperism. 
For political economy, poverty was the necessary and inexorable 
counterpart of wealth. 16 It was the outcome of differences in 
condition and an outcome which had considerable utility. It was a 
spur to those in poverty to better themselves and a warning which 
helped promote the industriousness of the middle classes. Thus 
poverty acted, on rich or poor alike, as an economic mechanism 
regulating the propensity of individuals to engage in labour. It 
proVided a source of labour for the expansion of production, and a 
space within which such expansion could occur, through the extension 
of existing needs and the creation of new ones. The relation between 
poverty and wealth was functional and non-eliminable, and poverty was 
not an issue for government since it existed internal to the 
regulated order of the economy. Who better to illustrate this than 
that English pioneer of the art of police, COlquhoun: 17 
Poverty is therefore a most necessary and indispensable 
ingredient in society without which nations and communities 
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could not exist in a state of civilisatio~ It is the lot of 
men,- it is the source of wealth, since without poverty there 
would be no labour, and without labour there could be no riches, 
no refinement, no comfort and no benefit to those who may be 
possessed of wealth ••• 
For most of the nineteenth century inadequacies of income as 
such, whether caused by 10\0[ wages, irregular employment or sickness, 
could form nei ther a legi timate object of state intervention nor a 
specific problem for economic theory. No overall imbalance could 
exist between production and consumption, or between the supply and 
demand of labour. The aggregate wage fund at any given time was 
inelastic; if workmen were unable to obtain employment it was simply 
because they tried to sell their labour a too high a price. 
Gratuitous assistance to such workmen would therefore merely depress 
the general level of wages, discourage mobility of labour and 
encourage reckless procreation incommensurate with the true position 
of the labourer. Schemes of public employment were similarly futile 
and dangerous, for they diverted capital from private industry and 
thereby depleted the wage fund for privately employed workme~ Want 
of employment was thus either a short-term effect of transfer between 
jobs, for which workmen should provide out of their earnings whilst 
employed, or a voluntary condition wilfully incurred by those 
unwilling to accept the responsibilities of labour. 
Pauperism, or indigence, however, was a different matter.· It 
was a question external to the domain of the economy and a proper 
matter for regulation in the form of police. The pauper came to 
represent all those conducts which were anti-social, for pauperism 
was a rejection of regular employment which meant also an existence 
outside those benign self-regulating mechanisms of the economy. 
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Hence pauperism stood for vagrancy, promiscuity, improvidence, 
ignorancy, insubordination - a refusal of all those relations which 
were so essential to a healthy, wealthy and well ordered polity. 
Thus Colquhoun wrote: 18 
mendicity, vagrancy, female prostitution and criminal offences 
••• still continue to afflict society... The cause of these 
evils may be traced principally to one source. There exists in 
this country nothing in the shape of a systematic superintending 
police, calculated to check and prevent the growth of vicious 
habits, and other irregularities incidental to civil SOCiety. 
The doctrine of police was unable to conceptualise pauperism as 
engendered by economic conditions. However despite, or rather 
because of this, it was able to produce a mechanism for the 
regula tion of pauperism, at least as far as the economy was 
concerned. The New Poor Laws, like the laws of 1601 which they 
replaced, were thus not concerned with poverty at all - with 
categories of individuals defined in relation to the necessities of 
life and so forth. They were concerned wi th pauperism, as a 
particular way of conceptualising certain problems of social 
organisation. The Elizabethan Laws had allowed relief for the 
impotent (aged, chronic sick, blind, lunatics) in' poorhouses or 
almshouses; for the able-bodied, however, whether vagrant, persistent 
absconder or idler, the remedy was to be set to work in a House of 
Correction. But political economy rejected the existing ways of 
conceiving of and providing for those who did not appear to fit into 
those categories and yet were unable to provide for themselves 
adequately through their own employ. 'Speenhamland' arrangements, 
originally allowances based upon the price of bread to supplement the 
low wages of those in employment, but later extended to a variety of 
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measures including payments to families based upon the numbers of 
children, were widely utilised at the end of the eighteenth'and 
beginning of the nineteenth centuries to cope with threats of unrest 
in response to the scarcity resulting from bad harvests and economic 
fluctuations. Such arrangements were first called into question on 
account of the variations between locali ties, the soaring costs of 
poor relief to which they were believed to have led, and their 
failure to avert the burning of hayricks and threats of mass v-iolence 
- as in the Surrey Riots of 1830, for which nine were hanged and nine 
hundred transported.19 
But it was not the disruptions themsel ves which produced the 
New Poor Law: change may have been condi tional upon disruption bu t 
the form of the change depended upon the way this disruption was 
conceptualised. The different tendencies and positions within 
political economy all combined in their view of the Poor Laws as 
self-defeating and a cause of the very problems they sought to solve. 
Thus Smith condemmed them as interfering with the construction of a 
free marke.t through the restrictions which the Laws of Settlement 
imposed upon the mobility of labour; Malthus considered allowances 
based upon family size to be an encouragement to improvident marriage 
and the production of children and hence of more pauperism; Ricardo 
considered that what was paid out in relief was withdrawn from the 
wage fund and hence reduced employment and threw more into 
pauperism. It was from wi thin political economy that Chadwick and 
Senior wrote their famous Report, from a commission set up in 
response to the riots. Their Report has recently been much 
criticised, in respect to whether the statistics it gathered 
supported the interpretations drawn. This is, of course, beside the 
point; what is of consequence is what was considered to be the case, 
why, and what the consequences were.20 
173 
The central principle through which the New Poor Laws we~e to 
restore the economy to its free and automatic functioning was that of 
'less eligibility'; it was this which enabled Chadwick to argue that 
they were the first great piece of legislation based upon scientific 
principles and a great engine of social improvement. Less 
eligibility sought to solve the problem of pauperisation, to remove 
the poor from the operation of the Poor Law, and to restore the 
principle of work: 21 
The first and most essential of all conditions; a principle we 
find universally admitted ••• is that [the pauper's] situation 
on the whole shall not be made really or apparently so eligible 
as the situation of the independent labourer of the lowest class 
Every penny bestowed that tends to render the condition of 
the pauper more eligible than that of the independent labourer 
is a bounty on indolence and vice. 
There was, as has been well recognised, a definite conception 
of the determinants of individual action within political economy. 
This formed the underpinning for both its conception of economic 
activity and for the operation of the principle of less eligibility: 
the rational calculus of pleasures and pains most clearly stated by 
Jeremy Bentham. But such a conception depended upon the assumption 
that it was universal - nothing specific marked out the pauper, the 
criminal or any other from the mass of the people, apart from those 
actions to which the operation of this universal calculus of desires 
had lead them. Whilst the character of those who stood outside the 
social order might well have been the subject of moral or religious 
criticism, or the target of reformatory techniques, it did not have a 
specific and systematic status within this discourse. A 
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reformulation of the problem of population and the objectives and 
means of. its regulation; a shift in the location and formulatioh of 
the central problem facing government; a new conception of the 
determinants of socially unacceptable conduct; a new way of posing 
the issue of 'want of employment' - all these would have to take 
shape before a psychological conception of individual pathology could 
form and play a central role in a strategy of social regulatio~ 
Hobsbawm writes that "by the middle of the nineteenth century, 
government policy in Britain came as near laissez-faire as has ever 
been practicable in a modern state".22 But laissez-faire was not a 
real state of absence of governmental regulation, it was a definite 
poli tical doctrine determining the form and objectives which 
governmental action should take. Dicey recognised this when he wrote 
that "sincere believers in laissez-faire found that for the 
attainment of their ends the improvement and strengthening of 
government machinery was an absolute necessity"23 However, political 
economy as a doctrine of government placed definite limits upon the 
form and extent of social regulation of the conditions of the 
population in the early decades of the nineteenth century. By the 
middle of the century the dominance of political economy was 
displaced as a range of problems for government emerged not in the 
co un tryside bu t in the towns. In this shift of focus, the order of 
priority of political economy and police was reversed, and the 
conception of population which was the object of government action 
was transformed. The problem of pauperism, with all that it 
represented in the way of anti-sociality, was, first, linked to the 
towns, and, second, referred back in a new way to the question of 
labour. By the end of the nineteenth century a new and systematic 
mode of conceptualisation of the social problem was operative, one 
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posed in terms of the danger of urban degeneracy, the key role of 
casual l~bour, the rate of reproduction of unemployables and, its 
consequences. These transformations provided conditions for the 
formation of a psychological conception of individual pathology. The 
practices of health, hospitals, hygiene, philanthropy and police 
threVT up new problems for psychological conceptualisation and, later, 
a strategic configuration formed within which these psychological 
conceptions had a leading role - that of eugenics. 
Demoralisa tion in towns 
The emergence of a social theory of urban demoralisation in the mid-
nineeenth century has been well documented, and here I will outline 
only its essential form. 24 , The concentration of the lower orders in 
the heart of the great cities created by industrialisation gradually 
came to dominate the concerns of politicians, the early social 
investigators organised in Statistical Societies, philanthropists and 
the Church. The problem was first posed as one of the loss of moral 
values engendered by the condi tions of existence of this class. It 
was disease which provided the model for this analysis; to be more 
precise it was a particular conception of the nature and causes of 
epidemics. The pathology which threatened this class, and which 
threatened to spread from them to other sections of society, was 
engendered by the characteristics of the social space in which they 
were located, a space in which moral contagion could spread through a 
kind of pernicious miasma, existing within the milieu and having its 
deleterious effects upon those forced into contact with it.25 
The 10VTest elements attracted into towns by the prospect of 
easy pickings, and others forced into towns by the necessity of 
finding work, were concentrated together into large and impenetrable 
masses, isolated from the beneficent influences of civilisation, 
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losing whatever virtuous habits they might have had and contracting 
bad ones - intemperance, irreligion, insubordination, prostitution, 
idleness. In brief, they were subject to demoralisation. Thus a 
Select Committee of 1838 was extremely disturbed that there were: 26 
districts in London through which no great thoroughfare passed, 
and which were wholly occupied by a dense population composed of 
the lower class of person who being entirely secluded from the 
observation and influence of better educated neighbours, 
exhibited a state of moral degradation deeply to be deplored. 
In these colonies and rookeries, vice and immorality flourished 
without check, leading to the degradation of the worker and the 
transmission of these immoral habits to their offspring who wel'e 
brought up in an overcrowded, insanitary atmosphere, forced at a 
tender age into contact with sights and experiences of corruption and 
crime. The solution proposed in the early decades of the century was 
one consistent with the way in which the problem was construed. It 
consisted of grand schemes of social hygiene which attempted to break 
up these enclaves, to render them accessible to the influences of 
civilised society and its systems of regulation and police, to 
disperse these teeming multiplicities, regulate tpe promiscuous 
interminglings, eliminate anti-social habits and so forth. The 
proposals of William Farr, the street clearance schemes, the 
programmes for the construction of model dwellir~s were within this 
strategy; they sought to reorganise the moral milieu and conditions 
of life of those not yet hopelessly degraded, to produce an 
atmosphere of decency and morality within these homes, and effect a 
separation between what Hary Carpenter was to term the 'perishing' 
and the 'dangerous' classes. 27 
But the history of these schemes, whether undertaken by 
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philanthropy, by local administrators, or regulated centrally through 
legislation, was perceived as one of failure. The street clearances, 
the model dwellings, the sanitary regulations, whilst they reclaimed 
a small number of the respectable poor, actually appeared to be 
exacerba ting the demoralisa tion of those others who, displaced by 
these very schemes, were forced into even worse conditions of life.28 
In the middle of the nineteenth century, a very significant 
inflection occurred in the way in which the social problem of the 
towns began to be posed.' It began to be argued that schemes of 
social hygiene increased overcrowding through large-scale demolition 
whilst doing nothing to change the situation whereby honest working 
men, in order to obtain employment, had to reside in the centre of 
towns. And the question of employment and its relation to socially 
undesirable habits and morals, rapidly came to centre upon the 
problem of casual labour. 
A number of factors conspired, no doubt, to produce the 
centrali ty of the problem of casual labour in the last half of the 
nineteenth century. The 'Great Depression' was in fact a period of 
rising real wages and prosperity for the majority of the working 
class, and the conjunction of high wages for the majority with 
poverty for the few emphasised the economic and social distinctions 
between those in regular employment and those in want of such 
employment. For the first time, in the closing decades, a conception 
began to develop of the unemployed as a distinct grouping with 
specific social characteristic~ A certain emphasis and urgency was 
undoubtedly lent to this question by the growth of direct action on 
the part of this grouping, and by the activities of Hyndeman's Social 
Democratic Federation, even though at the level of central government 
these occurrences were occasions for raising issues of public order 
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rather than of the causes of social distress.29 
Butr the concern with casual labour in particular was also' the 
product of other factors. The work of the Statistical Societies had 
developed the notion of 'family budgets' in the context of studies of 
'the condition of the poor' and had increasingly constructed a 
systematic link between lack or irregularity of employment and social 
distress.3° Mayhew's work in particular drew attention to the large 
number of families in London dependent on employment which was, to a 
greater or lesser extent, ~rregular or occasional, contingent upon 
particular times, seasons, fashions and accidents.31 And casual 
labourers were repeatedly discovered to comprise the vast number of 
those applying to the various schemes of relief operated over this 
period. 32 Charles Booth's massive enquiry served to confirm the 
exemplary status of casual labour in the 'social question', and of 
casual labourers as the focus of practices of social administratio~ 
This status was to be retained into the early decades of the 
twentieth century, but in highlighting it, Booth's arguments also 
represent a transformation in the status and function of casual 
labour and in the way in which the problem of the towns was posed. 
In the New Poor Law, the distinction between pauperism and 
poverty was unitary and qualitative. Booth's mode of 
conceptualisation was significantly different.33 He operated with a 
conception of the population as a continuous distribution of 
individuals with varying characteristics. Thus the eight classes 
into which he divided the population of London were indications of 
locations upon a continuum, rather than descriptions of a fixed 
typology. Four classes constituted together the thirty-five percent 
of the population in poverty: classes D, C, Band A. Class D were 
the small regular earners, comprising some 14.5% of the population, 
"the better end of the casual dock and water-side labour". Class C 
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were the intermittant earners (8%), "on them falls with particular 
severi ty the Vleight of recurrent depressions of trade ••• here may 
perhaps be found the most proper field for chari table assistance ll , 
provided, of course, that such assistance Vias condi tional upon the 
thrift of the recipients. Class B were the casual earners, the very 
poor, making up some 11.25%, lithe ideal of such persons is to work 
when they like and play when they like; these it is who are rightly 
called the 'leisure class' among the poor - leisure bounded very 
closely by the pressure of want, but habitual to the extent of second 
nature ll • The lowest class was class A - estimated at 1.25% but, 
"these people are beyond number ll • They were the occasional 
labourers, loafers and semi-criminals, "their life is the life of 
savages, with vicissitudes of extreme hardship and occasional excess 
••• They render no useful service, they create no wealth: more often 
they de s troy it. They degrade whatever they touch, and as 
individuals are perhaps incapable of improvement." What is 
significant about Booth's characterisation of these classes is, first 
of all, the way in which they constituted a continuum along which 
income level, conditions of life and nature of employment were 
amalgamated together and unified through the notion of individual 
character. Hence Booth's 'moralism' was not simply an idiosyncratic 
addendum to an otherwise objective set of social categories, it was 
constitutive of those categories themselves. 
Secondly, what was crucial was the fact that, for Booth, the 
location of individuals upon this continuum was the outcome of an 
interaction between character and environment, an interaction which 
is progressive and cumulative - nature of employment affected income 
which affected condi tions of life which affected character, which 
affected nature of employment and so on - a spiral which could be 
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either virtuous or vicious. And crucially, this spiral acted not 
only wit~in a single generation but across generations.34 The notion 
of demoralisation which had lain behind the earlier strategy of 
social hygiene had had no cumula tive implica tions, demoralisa tion 
being transmitted to children only at the same level as that at which 
it already existed, through the habits which they formed or failed to 
form. It was hence remediable, given improvement in milieu. Booth's 
work, however, is indicative of a relocation of the question of 
pauperism within a space structured by the passage of time, by 
generations, reproduction and change. A shift from the 'tableau of 
pauperism' to the 'cycle of depravation', in which, as we shall see, 
the issue of character was to become crucial.35 
The last twenty ,years of the nineteenth century saw the 
categories of pauperism and poverty placed in a dynamic relation, and 
the evils of town life represented as a process; a theory, that is to 
say, not simply of urban vice but of the progressively deepening 
decay of the quality of the race. The towns, and London in 
particular, were acting as foci for a whole system of deterioration, 
as sinks down whose drains the quality of the population was fast 
disappearing. The stages were clear: immigration from the country to 
the towns ••• gradual deterioration over several generations 
consisting in the weakening of constitution both moral and physical 
casual labour entry to the lowest class of all, the 
unemployables. From pamphleteers like Arnold Vlhite to administrators 
like Llewellyn-Smith and economic theorists like Alfred Harshall, the 
theory of rural immigration and urban deterioration was the principle 
around which the social question was organised.36 First, the towns, 
like magnets, sucked the best blood from the countryside; these rural 
immigrants displaced the weakly urban dweller, forcing the native down 
the spiral in the struggle for existence in the towns; then 
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progressively the effect of town life weakened even the best of rural 
stock: 37 . 
The large towns, and especially London, absorb the very blood 
from all the rest of England; the most enterprising, the most 
highly gifted, those with the highest physique and the strongest 
characters go there to find scope for their abilities. But by 
the time their children and children's children have grown up 
without healthy play, and without fresh air there is little 
trace left of their original vigour ••• only a very small 
proportion of those artisans to whom London owes its pre-
eminence as a centre of highly skilled work come from parents 
who were born there; and there are scarcely any whose 
grandparents were born ther~ 
The resul t was clear - a gradual deterioration progressively 
increased the ranks of the lowest of all classes, that class destined 
to cause the maximum harm to national life, whose individual members 
might be short-lived but the very nature of urban existence was 
constantly providing with increasing numbers of new recruits. 
Of course, the prevalence of 'social darwinism' at the end of 
the nineteenth century has been much discussed. But this easy 
reference can obscure both the condi tions under which such type of 
explanation could appear and function, and the particular 
characteristics of the many different and opposing strategies which 
share a 'darwinian' language and general mode of argument. It is 
certainly true that the strategy which we have just been discussing 
systematically runs together evolutionary and moral discourses, and 
opens up the closed moral category of pauperism to the exigencies of 
time and chance, variation and competition, struggle for survival and 
consequences for the fitness of the popula tion. But what is 
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important here are the specific effects of these arguments - in 
particul,ar the way in which they transformed the status of casual 
labour. Casual labour occupied a crucial place. Booth wrote, of his 
Class B, that it was "not so much one in which men are born and live 
and die, so much as a deposit of those who from mental, moral and 
physical reasons are incapable of better work", and whilst the more 
industrious or capable rise again into Classes C, D or E, those who 
fail to find regular employment sink down into Class A.3 8 Casual 
labour was thus the site, ~ excellence, of competition and the 
struggle for survival. It was also situated in the position of a 
relay, for it operated the critical mediation between the improvable 
and the unimprovable. That is to say between those who, through 
labour and appropriate chari table help could be morally and 
industrially regenerated and move back up through the spiral in a 
reverse direction, and those who could not, who were hopeless, 
worthless and unimproveable - the group that came to be known as the 
residuum. Casual labour was thus a sort of no-man's-land between the 
inside and the outside of civilisation, but the current within it 
pulled almost irresistibly in one direction, spiralling those who 
entered towards unemployability. 
The category of the unemployable thus began to take over from 
that of the pauper as the condensation of all those anti-social forms 
of conduct and vices which threatened good order and public 
tranquilli ty. This category was also productively ambiguous. 
'Unemployable' was a series of forms of conduct, habits, behaviours, 
which were both the corrolary of a certain posi tion in rela tion to 
labour, and the outward and visible signs of an inward stae of 
character. In relation to unemployability, character was both cause 
and effect. Cause to the extent that character was the explanation 
of why certain individuals came to be unemployable; effect to the 
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extent that it was the consequence of dependence upon casual labour, 
through the effects of the casual labour market and the conditions of 
life associated with i~39 
From Booth to Beveridge, the schemes of de-casualisation had as 
their objective the re-establishment by administrative means of the 
boundary between the employable and the unemployable. They sought to 
bring to the former the beneficent and educational discipline of 
regular employment whilst exposing the latter for the harsh but 
necessary remedy their condition demanded: 40 
It is essential to maintain the distinction between those who, 
however irregularly employed, are yet members, though inferior 
members, of the industrial army and those who are mere 
parasites, incapable of performing any useful service whatever. 
And it is equally important to remember that degradation of 
character is directly traceable, not to original sin, but to 
industrial condi tions, so that by al tering the conditions of 
employment it is possible to check, in part at least, the supply 
of 'unemployables'. 
The distinction made here by Beveridge was between membership 
of society and exclusion from it. The employable were to be granted 
full employment, average earnings, civil liberties, and political 
power, whilst the unemployable had to be: 41 
removed from free industry and maintained adequately in public 
institutions, but with the complete and permanent loss of all 
ci tizenship rights... To those, moreover, if any, who may be 
born personally efficient but in excess of the number for whom 
the country can provide, a clear choice will be offered: loss of 
independence by entering a public institution, emigration or 
immediate starvatio~ 
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Th,e residuum of unemployables became, for social 
administrators, the focus of all those forms of vice that infected 
the towns and flourished in the margins of civilisation - vagrancy, 
crime, prosti tution, inebriety - linked around the defective 
character of the individuals concerned. This defect was both 
physical - poor eyesight, bad hearing, small size, scrofula, phthisis 
- and mental - both moral and intellectual faculties being subject to 
deteriora tion. 
There was, however, an important difference between the way in 
which Booth formulated his proposals for labour colonies and the 
formulations of Beveridge. For Booth, the rationale of the removal 
of the casual poor to colonies was that this would do away with the 
demoralising casual labour market, remove a source of social vice, 
and eliminate a competitive pressure upon the more respectable and 
employable poor. 42 Beveridge had added a further imperative - the 
unemployables were to be denied the right to reproduce. Procreation 
had become a central element in the way in which the genesis of the 
social problem was construed. In this shift we can see the signs of 
the reorganisation of the problem of degeneration in a manner 
amenable to a eugenic strategy. In this strategy, ~ conception of 
individual pathology would be linked with a statistical discourse on 
the distribution of human abilities in the population, a biological 
theory of the inheritance of abilities and their transmission across 
generations, a demonstration of the consequences of the reproductive 
levels of different social groups and a socio-political analysis of 
the consequences of the quality or efficiency of the population for 
the well being and success of the nation. 
In the closing decades of the nineteenth century, the problems 
of the great cities began to be posed in a different way. The 
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deterioration of their inhabitants was not now seen as a consequence 
of the effects of conditions of life upon character - profligacy, 
idleness, intemperance and the absence of religious influences 
leading to demoralisation. Rather, these forms of anti-social 
behaviour were seen as the outcome of an inherited unfitnesss. The 
danger to the race was not therefore treatable by ameliorating 
conditions of life - this would only be treating the symptoms. The 
problem was a consequence of the fact that paupers, criminals and 
others of the lower moral type were breeding more rapidly than the 
strong and capable. As White put it:43 
Tainted constitutions, brains charged with subtle mischief, and 
languishing or extinct morality, transmit a terrible inheritance 
of evil to the next generation, there to taint once more a whole 
community. And those who multiply as ephemera are the squalid 
inhabitants of hovels subsisting on degraded and adulterated 
foods; and acquiring their joys from the gratification of lust, 
and the absorbtion in excess of drugged and poisonous forms of 
alchohol. We thus have a practical example of the fact that the 
tendency of the higher civilisation is to multiply from the 
lower and not from the higher specimens of the race. 
The problem, that is to say, was not simply one of demoralisation in 
towns, but a prospect of the degeneration of the race. And the 
solution that was suggested had as its central plank the prevention 
of those with such tainted constitutions from propagating their kind 
at all, by sterilisation and/or permanent segregatio~ 
Whilst in the late 1880s the analysis and solution proposed by 
people like White was marginal and idiosyncratic, by the begining of 
the twentieth century an extensive and forceful social strategy would 
be organised in these terms. In order to understand this shift, in 
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which the mechanism of differential reproduction had begun to replace 
that of the cumulative interaction of constitution and conditions of 
life, let us turn to consider the scientific theory of degeneracy, as 
it was formulated in the mid-nineteenth century, and the conception 
of heredity which it entailed. 
Theoretical degeneracy 
Degeneracy was not merely a term bandied about by critics of social 
and political arrangements in the second half of the nineteenth 
century; it was also a theme which organised much theoretical 
argument in medicine, in anthropology, in criminology and in 
psychological medicine - that is to say arguments concerning the 
nature of pathologies of behaviour, intellect and morals up until the 
early decades of the twentieth century. 
Michel Foucault has suggested that, in the mid-nineteenth 
century, one can observe the "opening up of the great medico-
psychological domain of the 'perversions' which was destined to take 
over from the old moral categories of debauchery and excess." This 
domain was immediately organised in terms of a mechanism of heredity 
and a process of degeneracy, a series composed of perversion-
heredity-degenerescence, in which the theory of degene~escence:44 
explained how a heredity that was burdened with various maladies 
(it made little difference whether these were organic, 
functional or psychical) ended by producing a sexual pervert 
(look into the genealogy of an exhibitionist or a homosexual: 
you will find a hemiplegic ancestor, a phthisic parent, or an 
uncle afflicted with senile dementia); but it went on to explain 
how a sexual perversion resulted in the depletion of one's line 
of descent - rickets in the children, the sterility of future 
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generations. 
Of,course, reference to heredity in the explanation of mental 
pathology was a theme with a long history. It was certainly not 
incompatible with theories of the moral genesis of insanity, but 
within the moral medicine which we discussed in the last chapter the 
pertinence of this reference was, as we have seen, delimited and 
restricted. From about 1820 onwards, this question began to .be posed 
in a new and characteristic way. 
Heredity operated in relation to mental pathology through the 
transmission of a 'constitution'. Constitution was an organic state 
which might be strong or weak. It could predispose an individual to 
certain ills, and this predisposi tion might or might not manifest 
itself depending upon the nature of the 'circumstances' in which 
individuals were reared and lived. By the mid-nineteenth century, 
the idea that mental pathology had a physiological or organic basis, 
an origin in a neuropathic constitution, intimately linked to the 
make-up of the brain and transmissible across generations was well 
established. Thus in 1858 Bucknill and Tuke wrote: 45 
The physiological principle upon which we have to build a system 
of cerebral pathology is, that mental health is dependent upon 
the due nutrition, stimulation, and repose of th~ brain; that 
is, upon the conditions of exhaustion and reparation of its 
nerve substance being maintained in a healthy and regular state; 
and that mental disease results from the interruption or 
disturbance of these condi tions. 
Thus changes in speech, emotion, intellect or conduct were now 
considered to be consequential upon organic changes of the brai~ 
It was not that the inventories of causes of insanity which we 
discussed in the last chapter disappeared. Rather, they were 
reworked into a new distribution, according to a division between 
predisposing and exciting causes. Inherited weaknesses, lesions or 
malfunctions in the brain could act as predisposing causes of 
insanity. Disorders of the blood, of the liver, intoxication and so 
forth could ei ther directly cause insani ty, through producing 
al terations in the brain, or weaken the brain and henceforth act as 
predisposing causes. Moral depravity, indulgence, excess, 
intemperance or extremes of emotion could be predisposing causes if 
they were present in a parent at the time of conception or in the 
mother \'Ihilst the individual was in utero or suckling - in these 
cases they could have their effects through acting on the 
constitution of the growing child. Similarly bad management when the 
child was young might be a predisposing cause, by affecting the 
development of the brain or nervous system. And all the moral 
excesses familiar from earlier arguments could now be redeployed as 
exciting causes, which could provoke the onset of insanity. Thus 
although the notion of constitution was deployed in the texts of this 
period to contest theories of insanity as consisting of an 
exclusively ~oral disturbance, it nonetheless allowed the 
preservation of the linkage between madness and immorality. 
Discussions of the emergence of this constitutionalist medical 
psychology point to Gall and Spurzheim's phrenology in the period 
from about 1800 to 1820, promoted in England by George Combe, which 
conceived of mental faculties in terms of localised brain functions. 
They also indicate the rise of pathological anatomy and the use of 
post-mortem examinations of br5lins, tissues and blood vessels in 
those who died insane, and also the development of neurophysiology -
especially the work of Carpenter. 46 But perhaps it is useful also to 
draw attention to a shift which occurred at a rather different level. 
The conception of constitution which was central to this mode of 
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conceptualisation was of an organised and systematised nature within 
each individual which mediated between experience and behaviour. In 
the texts of this period, the notion of constitution was deployed in 
contesting the empiricist and experiential moral theories of the 
origins of insani ty traced from Locke and Condillac. Constitution 
pre-dated and shaped experience, it was the locus of effects of 
heredity across generations and of circumstances - morality or 
immorali ty, temperance or inebriety and so forth - vii thin the life 
history of any individual~ Such a concept was dependent upon the 
transforma tion of the object of a science of biology at the end of 
the eighteenth century: living beings were now conceived of in terms 
of their systematic organisation, and it was this systematic 
relationship amongst organs and functions which was defini,tive of 
life and which was doomed to die. The view of living bodies as 
consisting in a dynamic internal organisation was necessary for the 
development of a conception of a constitution which could be normal 
or abnormal, and which had consequences which could be conveyed 
through heredi ty. For if organisms functioned according to a plan, 
and if each generation in its turn was fabrica ted according to the 
plan transmitted to it, was re-produced, then deficiencies, 
variations, malformations in this plan could lead to a variety of 
pathological consequences in the offspring. Here too it is possible 
to locate the conventional acceptance within nineteenth century 
biology of the action of the environment upon heredity - the 
inheritance of acquired characteristics. The plan of organisation 
could not adapt in and of itself; transformations in it were 
consequent upon the circumstances of organisms, which produced 
modifications which were then transmitted to future generations. As 
Jacob puts it, "the plastici ty of living structures and the 
flexibili ty of their mechanisms allow the organism, not to insert 
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itself into the surrounding world, but on the contrary to insert this 
world gradually into its heredity". 47 
This underpinned the theory of heredi ty which was conventional 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and v[hich remained in 
essence unchallenged until the beginning of the twentieth century. 
Charles Rosenberg, in his study of heredity and social thought in 
nineteenth century America, has identified four important elements of 
this theory.48 Firstly that acquired characteristics could be 
inherited, so that the events of an individual's life, inscribed upon 
their consti tution, could be transmi tted to their offspring. 
Secondly that heredity was an extended process, beginning with 
conception and ending only with weaning. Not only the constitution 
of the parents but also their condition at the moment of conception 
(inebriety, anxiety ... ) could have a crucial impact upon the child so 
conceived, as could events which occurred to the mother during 
pregnancy or whilst suckling the child. These were transmitted to 
the child via the blood of the mother, or through her milk, and again 
were permanently installed in the child's constitution despite being 
only temporarily present in the parent. Thirdly, what was inherited 
was not a specific condition or attribute but a predisposition, a 
tendency. Thus pathology was not passed down in the form of discrete 
or uni tary quali ties, but in the form of a 'dia thesis' which, given 
the presence of certain exci ting causes, could develop into one or 
other specific form of pathology. Fourthly, less significant for the 
present discussion, that the sexes played distinct roles in heredity, 
the mother contributing temperament, internal viscera, stamina and 
vitality; the father, intellect and musculature. Until the last 
decade of the nineteenth century, and despite the theories of both 
Galton and Weissmann, this form of explanation held sway. It was not 
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until some twenty years after the publication of vleissmann's 
arguments that the distinction between innate and acquired; so 
na tural to us today, began to establ ish i tsel f in theoretical, let 
alone popular, discourse. 
But there is a third aspect to the fundamental transformation 
in biological thought which occurred in the early nineteenth century, 
which permitted the reformulation of the theory of heredity in a 
manner which was to have profound social consequences. The idea of 
organisation as the object of a science of biology was intimately 
linked to that of history. During the eighteenth century, and thus, 
of course, long before Darwin, time began to introduce itself into 
the living world. Firstly in the notion of cataclysm, notably 
developed by Buffon. Later, in the writings of Bonnet and Robinet, 
the conception of a single chain of order, of progression, a 
translation of all living things from the simple towards the complex. 
With Lamarck, however, it was organisation as a whole which became 
subject to progressive transformation and which had the capacity to 
transform itself. All living beings could now be linked into a 
single history describing their generation one from another. Time 
became one of the main operative factors in the living world but, for 
Lamarck, the mode of its operation was teleological ~ earlier meant 
simpler and simpler meant less perfect. Thus one had a continuum of 
beings from less to more perfect, and hence the possibility of living 
beings being more or less advanced along it - time had inscribed 
itself wi thin the very structure of creatures. Variations in that 
structure could thus be represented as regressions down this 
continuum, variations destroying perfection, organisa tion and 
complexity. It was the combination of a notion of organisation, a 
theory of heredity and an axis of temporality which made a theory of 
degeneracy possible. 49 
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It was first of all in France that such a theory was 
formulated, in the wri tings of Lucas, Moreau de Tours and, 
principally, Morel. 50 In this work, this notion of heredity - the 
transmission of a consU tutional predisposi tion vlhich could express 
itself in a range of conditions from scrofula to melancholia; the 
linkage of generations in a single field of time and perfection - was 
articulated into a systematic theory of degradation or 
degenerescence. Let us focus on Morel. 
Morel defined degenerations as deviations from normal human 
type which were transmissible by heredi ty and whi ch deteriorated 
progressively towards extinctio~ There were six crucial elements of 
a theory of degeneration: 
First, the heterogeneity of causation. According to Morel, 
degenerations could be caused by (a) intoxication (malaria, alcohol, 
opium, soil conducive to cretinism, epidemics, food poisoning), (b) 
the social milieu, (c) pathological temperament, (d) moral sickness, 
(e) inborn or acquired damage, (f) heredity. 
Second, the fact that once acquired, and however acquired, the 
condition was hereditarily transmitted. 
Third, the unification of all pathologies as deviations, and of 
all deviations as degeneracies - anxiety, alcoholism, idiocy, mania, 
melancholia were all forms of degeneracy. 
Fourth, the unity of the individual as an organism, all parts of 
whose structure and functioning expressed the degeneracy. Thus 
degeneration was not confined to one particular behaviour or 
function; one could observe the degree of degeneracy alike in all 
aspects of the individual - head shape, facial features, body make-
up, comportment, voice - all these both manifested degeneracy and 
were stigmata of degeneracy. This latter was a fact of considerable 
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diagnostic importanc~ 
Fifth, the absence of constraint over the form in which 
degeneracy was expressed in anyone generation by its form in the 
preceding generation - mania in one generation could be cretinism in 
the next and so fort~ 
Sixth, the fact, modifying the last pOint, that since 
degeneration was subject to the law of progressivity, it would tend, 
across generations, to the extinction of the degenerate line. The 
first generation in a degenerate family history might thus perhaps 
show simple nervousness, the second might show neurosis, the third 
psychosis, the fourth idiocy, wi th no fifth genera tion being 
conceived. 
By the second hal f of the nineteenth century, therefore there 
was a firm scientific founda tion for the conception of degeneracy 
that was deployed in social and political debate. It was backed by a 
set of accepted theoretical arguments and was linked to an 
established body of empirical evidence and clinical observation. The 
notion of degeneracy gave the issue of hereditary predisposi tions a 
new social pertinence. In the first half of the nineteenth century, 
the links between mental pathology and social pathology were 
contingent and residual. Burrows, for example, in -1828, accepted 
that an hereditary predisposition could manifest itself almost 
interchangeably in a range of pathologies, but did not suggest any 
systematic link between these pathologies and the social problems of 
pauperism, criminality or vice. 51 Bucknill and Tuke, thirty years 
later, accepted the notion of an heredity which might be manifested 
in intemperance or excited by it, but the immorality of the behaviour 
per se was pertinent only for its diagnostic or aetiological 
utility.52 Similarly, Duncan and Hillard discussed the question of 
pauper idiots, but wi thout any suggestion that the one aspect was 
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linked to the other, or that a congenital disposition to idiocy had 
any significance in relation to pauperism.53 
But from about 1860 onwards, degeneracy began to provide the 
means of posing a whole range of questions concerning social and 
mental pathology. The spiral of urban deterioration, and the inter-
relations of character and conditions of life, began to be conceived 
in terms of the ways in which the former was an effect of, and the 
latter had consequences for, an heritable constitution. For although 
degeneracy arguments maintained, indeed required, the view that 
acquired characteristics could be inherited, the priority of heredity 
over circumstances was absolute. Whilst writers disagreed over the 
inevitability with which an inherited degenerate constitution would 
express i tsel f, and hence over the importance of careful early 
diagnosis and nurture of those suspected of carrying the taint, there 
was no doubt that the neuropathic constitution, once established, 
could not be overruled by environment, but only provoked or 
exacerbated to a greater or lesser extent. Heredity, the 
constitution which is inherited, now began to be seen as 
circumscribing the possible effects of circumstances or education -
these could develop or not develop aspects of constitution, but could 
not produce results outside the boundaries set by heredity. 
Further, degeneration itself owed its cumulative character to a 
number of features, two of which are especially significant. The 
first was the undoubted tendency of those wi th a neuropathic 
consti tution to intermarry. Whilst authors tended to demonstrate 
this empirically, through the presentation of family histories, 
rather than to explain it theoretically, its consequences were very 
clear: that in each subsequent genera tion the degree of inheri ted 
taint was increased due to the contributions of degenerate heredity 
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from both mother and fathe~ This was a fact which was destined to 
have impQrtant social implications. 
The second reason for the cumulative nature of degeneracy lay 
in the consequences of a degenerate or neuropathic constitution for 
the conduct of the neuropath's life, and the fact that the influence 
of life circumstances upon consti tution was in one direction only. 
Since neuropaths would undoubtedly be led into various unsavoury and 
immoral forms of life, and since the influence of experience could 
only be to increase, never to reduce, the degree of hereditary taint, 
the inheritance of acquired characteristics would necessarily lead 
down the spiral path of degeneration. The moral faults of 
individuals, even when they produced no immediate damage to others -
lone alcoholism or, in particular, masturbation - were no longer 
simply 'solitary vices' which merely influenced the moral status of 
the individual concerned. They had the gravest consequences for the 
remainder of his or her life and for the lives of future generations. 
Degeneracy was thus a principle which could operate both upon an 
individual's life history and across generations, and these two 
factors were reciprocally linked and mutually reinforcing. The 
translation of moral condemnation from the domain of ethics to that 
of science was thus not a distortion or corrupt;i.on of such a 
theoretical discourse - it was constitutive of it. 
It is important to draw attention to one final aspect of these 
arguments about degeneracy. The notion that the behaviour, speech, 
appearance and comportment of the body form a unified field of 
expression of a degenerate consti tu tion was the condi tion for the 
reverse movement which would be of such importance within this form 
of explanation. Here, these visible elements became the identifiable 
stigmata in which degeneracy was marked clearly on the body of its 
victim, and which those versed in the language of the body could 
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utilise in their diagnoses. Hence the significance of the appea~ance 
of the body, not only in the criminal anthropology of Lombroso, but 
also in all those illustrations of different degenerate types which 
were liberally and dolefully distributed through the textbooks of the 
day, each with its pathetic caption: an elderly feLlale in whom 
lascivious ideas predominate constituting the variety Monomania with 
love, Or nymphomania; a man in a state of Imbecility: he received a 
good education but indulgence in solitary vice brought on a state of 
general imbecility; an~ so forth. The need for a test of 
intelligence would arise, in part, from a questioning of this 
possibility of reading internal states from outward appearances. 
The linked conceptions of an inherited constitution and a process of 
degeneracy were significant in social and political arguments in a 
number of ways. Firstly, a whole range of anti-social behaviours 
were now linked up as different expressions of a pathological organic 
state. The possibility that criminal behaviour might be the outcome 
of a diseased mind, rather that of an act of will, was the focus of 
major controversy.54 More important for our current concerns was the 
way in which the relationship between all these forms of immoral 
conduct from vice and debauchery, through indigence and crime, to 
idiocy and insanity was re-posed: they could now form the object of 
a unified system of explanatio~ 
In France there was a general acceptance of fully developed 
degeneracy theories of progressive decline in the medical psychology 
of the late nineteenth century, especially as represented in the work 
of Magnan.55 According to Ellenberger "there came a point where 
almost all diagnostic certificates in French mental hospitals began 
with the words ~enerescence mentale, avec ~ (mental 
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degeneration, with ••• ) upon "'Thich the lilain symptoms were listed.,,56 
In Engla~d the posi tion was more complex, but it is certainly true 
that hereditarian and organicist theories of mental pathology were 
dominant in the last decades of the nineteenth century, and that the 
therapeutic optimism associated with moral treatment was overturned. 
Henry Maudsley, the most notable English proponent of the theory of 
degeneracy, limited the effects of environment to those of causing 
organic damage to the brain or nervous system, although allowing that 
these could sometimes occur at conception, during gestation, or in 
the early years when the system was delicate and susceptible. But in 
as many as three cases out of four, insani ty was the product of an 
inheri ted constitutional predisposition, whose effects could not be 
escaped although they might be mitigated by the inculcation of 
correct moral habits and the avoidance of all those forms of excess 
which might occasion the onset of insanity.57 
However, a second aspect of degeneracy theories is even more 
significant for the present discussion. It is certainly true that 
degeneracy introduced the dimension of temporality into problems of 
mental and social pathology. Pa thological consti tutions were 
inherited, they might show themselves in anyone of a number of 
disorders of body, mind or conduct(epilepsy, neuralgia, eccentricity, 
intemperance, scrofula, phthisis, diabetes and so on) and, for all 
the reasons discussed above, there was a cumulative worsening of the 
condition from generation to generation. But the crucial point was 
that the family history ended in sterility - degeneracy ~ self 
limi ting. Thus l~audsley argued that, wi th the individual wi th an 
insane temperament, "hereditary predisposition has assumed the 
character of deterioration of race", and that: 58 
the individual represents the beginning of a degeneracy which 
••• will go on increasing from generation to generation and end 
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finally in the extreme degeneration of idiocy. With the 
occurrence of idiocy there is happily the extinction of the 
degenerate variety, for with it come impotence and sterility. 
The theory of degeneracy, as it developed from Morel to Maudsley, 
ensured that no deleterious evolutionary consequences could flow from 
progressive deterioration - indeed the whole process could be 
concei ved as a beneficial way of el iminating unheal thy variations. 
Thus whilst degeneration was cumul~tive along any particular line, it 
had no significant effects in the long term on the make up of the 
popula tion as a whol e, for the consequence of the passage of 
generations was to prevent breeding from the degenerate variety. 
At the end of the nineteenth century, there was a radical shift 
in the way in which the link between constitution, reproduction and 
inheritance was posed. This reversed the argument concerning 
breeding and degeneracy, claiming that those with pathological 
cons ti tu tions reproduced at a greater rate that others. Hence it 
also reversed the link between family histories and population 
characteristics - we see not the elimination of the degenerate 
variety but its proliferation. In the science of eugenics, first 
formulated by Francis Galton, a new set of connections were made 
between individual character and its heredi tary determinants, the 
ills of modern existence and a set of proposals for government 
regulation of the populatio~ 
Hence it is an oversimplification to analyse the events we have 
been discussing in terms of 'social darwinism' and/or its consonance 
with the interests and aspirations of a certain class or professional 
group. Not only did arguments draw upon elements which pre-dated and 
were independent of Darwin's writings, they also combined these 
elements with aspects of the theory of evolution in different ways 
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and with different consequences. To understand the way in which the 
social question was posed at the end of the nineteenth century, it is 
necessary to be more precise. The psychology of the individual was 
born in a new way of conceptualising the population and its 
variations, and a new way of evaluating the consequences of 
hereditary transreission across generations. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
HEREDITY VERSUS ENVIRONMENT 
In the earlier stages of civilisation natural selection and 
competition caused those who were strongest and most vigorous to 
leave the largest progeny behind them. It is to this cause, 
more than any other, that the progress of human life, as of all 
other forms of life, i~ largely due ••• [But] there are 
increasing reasons for fearing, that while the progress of 
medical science and sanitation are saving from death a 
continually increasing number of the children of those who are 
feeble physically and mentally, those who are strong are tending 
to defer their marriages and in other ways to limit the number 
of children whom they leave behind ... Considering the causes 
that determine the supply of vigour, we must affirm with Mr. 
Galton that if the doctrine were to be acted on generally by the 
upper part of the nation including the great body of the more 
intelligent and capable artisans, but not the lowest classes, it 
would cause the race to decay. 
Alfred Marshall, 1890 1 
The eugenic strategy in which a psychology of the individual, and a 
specifically psychological conception of individual pathology, took 
shape at the end of the nineteenth century entailed a transformation 
in the conception of population which operated in both social and 
medical theories of degeneratio~ This transformation enabled a new 
systematisation of the linkage between the capacities of individuals 
and the quality and fate of populations. Such an inflection of 
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arguments concerp~ng degeneracy was made possible by a reformulation 
of conceptions of population, varia tion and norm, a reformula tion 
which the writings of Francis Galton demonstrate most clearly. It is 
thus no accident of biography or c~eer, or idiosyncracy of political 
belief, that enabled Galton to provide the grounding for the socio-
political strategy of eugenics. Let us turn to examine his texts. 
Population and norm 
Eugenics is the science of improving stock, which is by no means 
confined to judicious mating, but which, especially in the case 
of man, takes cognisance of all influences that tend in however 
remote a degree to give the more suitable races or strains of 
blood a better chance of prevailing speedily over the less 
suitable than they otherwise would have had. 
Francis Galton, 18832 
Galton made no secret of the implications of his study of the family 
trees of four hundred eminent men when his Hereditary Genius was 
first published in 1869. By the time of its second edition, in 1892, 
the programmatic aspirations of the text were absolutely explicit: 3 
the improvement of the natural gifts of future generations of 
the human race is largely, though indirectly, unqer our control. 
We may not be able to originate, but we can guide. The 
processes of evolution are in constant and spontaneous activity, 
some pushing towards the bad, some towards the good. Our part 
is to watch for opportunities to intervene by checking the 
former and giving free play to the latter... It is _ earnestly 
hoped that inquiries will be increasingly directed into 
historical facts, with a view of estimating the possible effects 
of reasonable political action in the future, in gradually 
raising the present miserably low standard of the human race to 
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one in which the Utopias in the dreamland of philanthropists may 
become practical possibilitie~ 
What Darwin revealed of the blind forces that guided the 
evolution of man from the ape need not be a sign of despair or 
resignation in the face of the inexorable laws of nature - on the 
contrary, in recognising these laws we could become their masters. 
It was in this vein, for instance, that Galton opened his InQuiries 
into Human Faculty and its, pevelopment: 4 
My general object has been to take note of the varied hereditary 
faculties of different men, and of the great differences in 
different families and races, to learn how far history may have 
shown the practicability of supplanting inefficient human stock 
by better strains, and to consider whether it might not be our 
duty to do so by such efforts as may be reasonable, thus 
exerting ourself to further the ends of evolution more rapidly 
and with less distress than if events were left to their own 
course. 
The possibility of directing evolution by means of scientific 
knowledge lay in Darw in's reformula tion of the rela tions be tween 
indi vidual variation, inter-generational transm:i,ssion and the 
characteristics of populations. This linked the hereditary 
transmission of variable characteristics, the laws of variation 
within a population and the effects of selective reproductive 
advantage. It was this combination which gave a new political 
salience to the question of individual differences, and allowed the 
reintegration of existing conceptions of pa thological individuals 
into a systematic account of the nature and importance of the 
distribution of varieties and degrees of pathology within the 
popula tion. The darwinian theory of evolution established the 
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theoretical centrality of reproduction upon \olhich eugenics was to 
depend for its politics. It allowed Galton to reformulate the 
heredi tarian theory which underpinned degeneracy arguments. There 
was now no need to propose the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics, with the indeterminacy which it introduced, in order 
to give a poli tical per tinence to the inheri tance of consti tu tion. 
This is because, for Galton, what degenerated was not individuals or 
family lines but the population as 1!. whole. Social danger was no 
longer conceived in terms of the progressive degeneration of a 
lineage. Such degeneration was idiosyncratic and variable; it led to 
the extinction of that line, and hence the elimination of the social 
danger it posed, without the necessity of administrative 
intervention. From Galton onwards it was rather the quality of the 
popula tion as a whole which was threatened by the reproduction of 
those with defective constitutions. The individual degenerate now 
achieved his or her social and political significance from the point 
of view of the population of individuals with varying characteristics 
of which they formed a part. This enabled Galton to argue for the 
threat posed by individuals, without being concerned with the effects 
of life history upon that which is passed to progeny, for the 
degeneration of a population could occur simply as a consequence of 
the inheri tance of cons ti tu tion and the different! al reproductive 
rates correlated with different constitutions. 
Eugenics operated wi th a conception of the population which was 
statistical in both its original and its modern senses. Francois 
Jacob has pointed out that: 5 
Even though Darwin did not use statistical analysis, he has a 
statistical conception of populations. Firstly, because 
variations only express the fluctuations of distributions 
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inherent in every system; secondly, because selection acts only 
by slowly altering population equilibria through the random 
interaction of individuals and their environment. 
Gal ton's arguments depended upon the possibili ty of analysing the 
evolution of populations in terms of the laws governing large 
number~ Central terms of these analyses were those of population 
and norm. Population was a bounded field within which a multiplicity 
of individual elements were regulated according to a law which was 
nei ther biological nor cultural but mathematical. Thus Gal ton wrote 
"The science of heredi ty is concerned wi th fra terni ties and large 
Populations rather than with individuals, and must treat them as 
uni ts.,,6 The possibility of grasping the characteristics of such a 
population was provided by the concept of norm. Norm was that 
central point which, in virtue of the probability of deviations from 
it and their magnitude, allowed the statistical conceptualisation of 
populations in terms of the regular distribution of variations. The 
concept of the norm thus made possible the formulation of the law of 
frequency of error, of which Galton wrote "I know of scarcely 
anything so apt to impress the imagination as the wonderful form of 
cosmic order expressed by the 'Law of Frequency of Error'... The 
huger the mob and the greater the apparent anarchy, tpe more perfect 
its sway.,,7 Let me examine each of these terms in a little more 
detail. 
Population 
The most radical transformation of the biological attitude 
wrought by Darwin was to focus attention, not on the individual 
organisms, but on large populations.8 
Both Darwin and Wallace attribute their conception of population to 
Malthus's 1798 Essay on the Principle of Population, yet it is well 
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known that the implications which they drew from it radically 
transformed the Mal thusian schema. The model which Mal thus proposed 
depended upon an opposi tion be tween the grow th of a popula tion and 
the limits of the environment. The population was a unitary object 
for Hal thus, loca ted upon a geographical terrain which imposes 
environmental constraints as a conserva tive force - Mal thus having 
written the Essay partly against Godwin and Condorcet and the 
philosophers of progress.9 The characteristics of the population did 
not form a central object of concern for Malthusj hence his weakness 
in Gal ton's eyes was precisely his failure to take account of the 
effects of population limi ta tion upon variation and selection of 
characteristics across generations. 10 It is this question which 
became crucial in the writings of Darwin and Wallace. They 
introduced the conception of a systematic relationship between 
particular environmental limits and species characteristics. Hence 
speciation and change became possible, given only the possibility of 
variations which conferred selective reproductive advantage upon 
their bearers, and the conservation of these variations in the 
offspring through some unspecified mechanism of inheritance. Three 
points concerning this new conception of population are relevant for 
our analysis. 
Firstly, the new notion of species: 11 
I look at the term species, as one arbitrarily given for the 
sake of convenience to a set of individuals closely resembling 
each other ••• 
In the classical morphology of Cuvier, species were a fixed type, 
defined according to a given and invariable set of characteristics. 
\Hthin such a fixed classification, in which both the nature of, and 
the relations between species were established once and for all, 
209 
variations between individuals of the same species had no pertinence; 
. 
they were either 'nothing' or were accorded only the status of 
defect s. After Darwin, species were consti tuted not in the 
resemblances of individuals to an invariable type, but in terms of 
the organic relations which existed between individuals within a 
popula tion. A species, for Darwin, was a differentiated uni ty of 
interbreeding individuals. This population of individuals was no 
longer merely an expression, more or less perfect, of an essential 
type; its characteristics were nothing over and above the sum of its 
individual parts. The transformations which might occur in 
populations and species were thus intelligible within the same set of 
concepts as those used to characterise the population itself in its 
stability - they required no invocation of special processes or 
events. Differentiation was now merely the extended product of 
internal variability, fixed not ~ priori but in space and time. 
Wi thin this mode of conceptualisa tion therefore, Darwin had 
established the possibility of a systematic relationship between 
population, variation and individualisatio~ 
Secondly, and following on from this, a new pertinence was 
accorded to the constraints of environment in relation to these 
variations amongst individuals in a populatio~ Variations conferred 
upon individuals different degrees of 'fitness' for particular 
environmental conditions, and these had consequences in terms of the 
survival and reproductive abilities of those individuals: 12 
as more individuals are produced than can possibly survive, 
there must in every case be a struggle for existence, either one 
individual with another of the same species, or with the 
individuals of another species, or with the physical conditions 
of life. It is the doctrine of Malthus applied with manifold 
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force to the whole animal and vegetable kingdom ••• 
Darwin's. defini tion of species established a conceptual space where 
the boundaries of population were determined functionally, and within 
which that population was necessarily internally differentiated. 
Populations were under constant pressure of competition for survival 
and for reproduction - the survival of a species over time depended 
upon its ability to maintain an adequate rate of reproduction in the 
conditions which obtained, and those conditions included other 
species with which it was,in competition. But, additionally, the 
characteristics of the species which did survive depended upon the 
differential reproductive success of its different members and the 
particular combination of variable characteristics which they 
manifested and passed to their offspring. 
Two important issues were thus opened up for investigation, 
which concerned processes whose actions were simultaneous and 
complementary. On the one hand, there were the effects of variation 
internal to a population upon the characteristics of the population 
as a whole in future generations. On the other hand, there were the 
consequences of the make-up of the population upon its external 
relations with those other populations with which it came into 
competi tion. Population thus came to signify an organic uni ty of 
constituent individuals each of which contributed to the average 
characteristics of the whole, and the mean around which it varied. 
Population was not merely the sum of its parts but the effect of the 
differential nature and relations of its members. Not a type and its 
realisations but a unity of differentiated individuals. 
Thus a new significance was given to the individual within this 
conception of the population: 13 
individual differences are highly important for us, as they 
afford materials for natural selection to accumulate ••• 
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The new bi 01 ogi cal at t en ti on w hi ch Darw in foc,used upon the 
population, far from eliminating the question of the individual from 
the domain of evolutionary theory, precisely created the individual 
in its variability as a salient object for such a theory. The 
relationship between populations and individuals was an integral one 
- variation only happened in individuals, it had evolutionary effects 
only through populations: individual variation thus achieved its 
importance from the point of view Qf the population. Darwin's 
conception of normal an'd inevitable small variations between 
individuals entailed a notion of the grouping of such variations 
around a population average - it was the loca tion of this average 
which was shifted by the differential reproductive advantages which 
variation might produce. The relation between individual variation 
and population averages allowed the possibility of an evolutionary 
schema being constructed in terms of population statistics; it was 
precisely upon this possibility that Gal ton's eugenic strategy would 
operate. 
The whole theory of evolution is based on the laws of large 
numbers. 14 
It was in his InQuiries into Human Faculty that Galton began to 
construct the alliance between individual variation and population 
characteristics that provided the possibility for a rigorous 
systematisation of a theory of the distribution of human abilities. 
"The object of statistical science", he wrote, "is to discover 
methods of condensing information concerning large groups of allied 
facts into brief and compendious expressions suitable for discussio~ 
The possibili ty of doing this is based on the constancy and 
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continuity with which objects of the same species vary".15 If we 
were to be able to exercise control over the apparently random, yet 
evolutionarily crucial, processes of individual variation within a 
species, we had first to be able to grasp them, to conceptualise them 
in order to be able to operate upon them. Fortunately, since the 
time of Quetelet, it had been known that certain statistical 
propositions could bring variability within the grasp of scientific 
laws. And, Galton argued, the laws of chance applied to variability 
both outside and within the human sphere. 16 It is these laws which 
Galton proposed to develop and adapt to the purposes of analysis of 
evolution. 
For Gal ton, the conception of species which Darwin developed 
shared the same properties as other species. "A species may be 
defined as a group of objects whose individual differences are wholly 
due to different com bina tions of the same set of minute causes, no 
one of which is so powerful to b~ able by itself to make any sensible 
difference in the result".17 We see here, incidentally, that it was 
Gal ton's statistics rather than his biology or his desire to remain 
loyal to Darwin that produced his allegiance, and that of his 
followers, to biometrics rather than Mendelianism. Within any 
species, whilst variations for any individual may be random, the 
incidence of variation in a population is systematic, and may be 
plotted as a smooth curve - the ogive, or 'normal curve'. Thus 
chance becomes adequate to knowledge, amenable to the formulation of 
a scientific law: 18 
We can lay down the ogive of any quality, physical or mental, 
whenever we are capable of judging which of any two members of 
the group we are engaged upon has the larger amount of that 
quality ••• There is no bodily or mental attribute of any race of 
individuals that cannot be so dealt with, whether our judgment 
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in comparing them be guided by common-sense observation or by 
actual measurement, which cannot be gripped and consolidated 
into an ogive with a smooth outline, and thence forward be 
treated in discussion as a single object. 
If this thesis of continui ty and regularity delivered up the 
variable object of population to the regularity of scientific 
knowledge, it was the norm - the average amount of a quality - which 
allowed the formulation of ,the laws of this variation, and hence the 
organisation of all the features of human ability within a single 
conceptual space. For the relationship between average and deviation 
was the foundation of the theory of normal distribution and the basis 
of the power of the normal curve: 19 
An average is but a solitary fact, whereas if a single other 
fact be added to it, an entire Normal Scheme, which nearly 
corresponds to the observed one, starts potentially into 
existence. 
It is this normal curve which would provide eugenic discourse with 
one of the crucial theoretical conditions of possibility for its 
strategy, and which would be central for the emergence of a science 
of mental measurement. It was the norm which allowed, that 'gripping' 
of the population in thought which Galton desired, and hence the 
formula tion of a systema tic rela tionship between the four terms -
population, norm, individual, deviation - which regulated the 
theoretical field of eugenics. From its inception this argument 
derived norms of psychological functioning not from an investigation 
of its object - the human mind and its laws of functioning - but from 
a question of differrentiation - the measuring of degrees of 
variation. And variation, like normativity itself, was conceived not 
in psychological but in statistical terms - or rather, the terms of 
214 
psychological analysis of variation in populations were derived !rom 
statistical principles concerning the laws of variation in large 
numbers. The psychology of the individual was formed through this 
linkage between norms of different orders, but, as we shall see, such 
a mode of conceptualisation inscribed· the limits of such a psychology 
at the very heart of its conceptual system 
This conceptual structure enabled a reformulation of both the 
social and the psychological theories of degeneracy, wi thin a 
strategy in which the question of individual constitution was linked 
to that of social worth and the consequences of differential 
reproduction. Not so much a new question, as a new way of posing the 
question of degeneracy. 
Genealogy 
If Gal ton could regard his statistical discoveries as having 
programmatic consequences, this was because they were immediately 
deployed within a field of social analysis whose organisation pre-
dated them, and with which we are already familiar: that of ability 
and nobility, of ancestry and lineage, of stock and constitution. In 
the third chapter of Heredi tary Genius Gal ton was perfectly clear 
concerning his objective: to produce a classification of individuals 
in terms of their differential possession of intellectual capacity. 
Having considered briefly such varied evidence as the attainment of 
mathematical honours at Cambridge, the memory of Lord Macauley and 
Seguin's experience with idiots, he concluded: 20 
The range of powers between - I will not say the highest 
Caucasian and the lowest savage - but between the greatest and 
least of English intellects, is enormous. There is a continuity 
of natural ability reaching from one knows not what height and 
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descending to one can hardly say what depth. I propose in this 
chaRter to range men according to their natural abilities, 
putting them into classes separated by equal degrees of merit, 
and to show the relative number of individuals included in the 
several classes. Perhaps some person may be inclined to make an 
offhand guess that the number of men included in the several 
classes would be pretty equal. If he thinks so, I can assure 
him he is most egregiously mistaken. 
The method I shall employ for discovering all this is an 
application of the very curious theoretical law of 'deviation 
from the average'. 
Not between two populations, but within a single population there 
were huge differences in the degree to which individuals possessed 
intellectual ability - the majority falling into the classes near to 
the norm, fewer and fewer into the classes further from this average, 
both above it and below it. In other words, intellectual ability was 
distributed according to the laws of the normal scheme and could be 
analysed in terms of its statistical principles. Now this 
observation may well be "a fact calculated to considerably enlarge 
our ideas of the enormous differences of intellectual ability between 
man and man", but its consequences appear somewhat more limited than 
Galton's grandiose introduction might have led us to expect. 21 
However, in two further operations the possibility would be 
established for this 'fact' to be inserted at the very heart of 
contemporary deba te on the 'social question' - first the rigorous 
formula tion of the relation be tween ability and heredi ty, and the 
second the unification of ability as both the expression of a 
biological origin and the clearest index of social worth. 
The principal task of Hereditary Genius was to show that the 
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distribution and inheritance of intellectual ability followed the 
same laws as any other continuously varying ability - intellectual 
ability'was transmitted and distributed according to the law of 
ancestral heredity. This law was Galton's formulation in 
mathematical terms of the darwinian. thesis of continuous variation 
and blending inheri tance.22 For Darwin and Gal ton, as we have seen, 
a population was a group of interbreeding individuals whose 
characteristics varied by small degrees; the character of any 
offspring was a result of the blending of the characters of its 
parents. Galton demonstrated, on the basis of these premises, that a 
child would receive one hal f of its nature from the parental 
genera tion, one quarter from the grandparents and so on, the 
contribution of each generation decreasing in geometric ratio. 22 
Continuous variation and blending of inheri tance were, for Gal ton, 
necessary if the nature and effects of inheritance were to be 
graspable through statistics. And the law of ancestral heredity was 
to define the opposition between biometricians and Mendelians in the 
first decade of the twentieth century. Pearson, who mathematically 
refined the law, regarded it as one of equivalent status to those 
formulated by Newton: 23 
If Darwinian evolution be natural selection combined with 
heredity, then the law must prove almost as epoch making to the 
biologist as the law of gravitation to the astronomer. 
But despi te Pearson's acrimonious opposi tion to the Mendelians, the 
law, for him, was purely mathematical - as a positivist Pearson 
refused to refer it to any ontological foundation. But Galton, 
despite some equivocation, did provide such an ontological status for 
the law, a grounding in a biological notion of 'stock'. 
Gal ton had used the term 'stirp' for his earliest conception of 
a reproductively transmitted biological stock which was expressed in 
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all the characteristics of the individual and which remained 
unaffected by environmental influences during the life of the 
organism. Darwin, in common with the hereditary theories we have 
already examined, did not rule out 'Lamarck' type' explanations of 
the effects of use and disuse and on the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics, despite the fact that he accorded the major source 
of variation to the combinations effected during the process of 
reproduction. Indeed, as the evidence against the theory of natural 
selection mounted, Darwin attributed a greater role to such 
influences, and his particulate theory of pangenesis expressly 
allowed for them through the transmission of somatic information via 
particles to the germ cells.24 
Galton also advocated a particulate form of inheritance, but 
argued that the particles were laid down in the ovum immediately 
after fertilisation, and were thus unaffected by circumstances that 
befell the organism during its life.25 However in another respect 
Galton remained much closer to prevailing theories than Darwin. 
Where Darwin was concerned wi th the inheri tance of discrete 
characteristics, Galton was concerned with the inheritance of stock -
a term allied to the familiar notion of constitution. Stock-
familiar to both breeders of horses and readers of Debretts -
referred not to this or that characteristic, but to the general 
guali ty of a particular line of descent. Thus Gal ton, by forging a 
linkage between stock, ancestral heredity and the normal distribution 
of intellectual abilities, effected a kind of transformation of 
quality into quantit~ 
In this transformation, the quantity of intellectual ability 
was both expression and index of the quali ty of all the facul ties, 
both mental and physical, the surest sign of the state of 
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constitution, indeed the measure of vital energy itself: 26 
Ene~gy is the capacity for labour. It is consistent with all 
the robust virtues, and makes a large practice of them possible. 
It is the measure of fullness of life; the more energy, the more 
abundance of it; no energy at all is death; idiots are feeble 
and listless... Energy is an attribute of the higher races, 
being favoured beyond all other qualities by natural 
selectio~.. In any scheme of eugenics, energy is the most 
important quality to f,avour; it is, as we have seen, the basis 
of living action, and it is eminently transmissible. 
Thus good stock was allied with vigour, and became the 
principle object of both natural and artificial selectio~ It is at 
this point that we can see the link back with the question of 
degeneracy as we have already analysed it - one which concerned the 
flourishing in the heart of our great cities of individuals of 
degenerate stock, whose conducts, habits and abilities all manifested 
that weakness of vital energy which was the sure sign of a degenerate 
constitution: 27 
It cannot be doubted that town life is harmful to the town 
populatio~ •• The proportion of weakly and misshapen individuals 
is not to be estimated by those whom we meet on the streets. We 
should parade before our mind's eye the inmates of the lunatic, 
idiot and pauper asylums, the prisoners and patients in 
hospitals, the sufferers at home, the crippled, and the 
congeni tally blind ••• 
For Galton too these wretched figures - lunatics, paupers, 
idiots, criminals, the sick - form a unified group in that their 
different conditions are merely variant forms of expression of a 
common cause - a degenerate constitution: 28 
219 
It is perfectly distressing to me to witness the draggled, 
drudged, mean look of the mass of individuals, especially of the 
women, that one meets in the streets of London and other purely 
English towns. The conditions of their life seem too hard for 
their constitution, and to be cruship~ them into degeneracy. 
But despite the implications of Galton's formulation in these quotes, 
the strategy which eugenics proposed in relation to degeneracy was 
neither that indicated b~ the analysis which saw degeneracy as 
acquired through the condi tions of urban eXistence, nor that which 
saw it as the consequence of the cumulative deterioration of 
constitution down a line of descent. It shared with the older 
formulations the notion of degeneracy in terms of a single 
constitutional essence, differentially expressed, transmissible 
across generations. But it located this within a rigorous conception 
of population, and its central shift was the reformulation of the 
role of reproduction. What degenerated for Galton was not so much 
an individual or a line, but a population, in terms of the capacities 
of the individuals who made it up and their distribution around a 
norm. And what was thus the cause of alarm was the differential 
reproductive success of individuals with different capacities, 
different quality of stock. Eugenic politics would operate on the 
insight so lucidly expressed by Arnold White in 1886: 29 
Criminals and pauperised classes with low cerebral 
development renew their race more rapidly than those of 
higher nervous natures. statesmen stand idly by ••• Dynasties of 
criminals and paupers hand down from generation to generation 
hereditary unfitness for the arts of progress and all that 
brings greatness to a nation, and engage themselves in a warring 
against all forms of moral order ••• 
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It is at this point that the strategic link between a certain 
practice of social administration and a certain conception of human 
abilities became possible. Galton's Huxley Lecture to the 
Anthropological Institute, delivered in October 1901, will provide us 
with a model for the systematic relationship between notions of 
population, variation and norm, conceptions of human heredity and the 
problem of urban degeneracy which constituted the eugenic strategy.30 
Recall the way in which Charles Booth distributed the 
population into classes. Galton began his lecture by suggesting that 
this distribution, and the numbers in each class, followed precisely 
the pattern which would be predicted by the Normal Law of Frequency. 
He then demonstrated that by ordering these findings around the norm 
and applying the law of probable error, what he termed 'civic worth' 
could be seen to conform to the distribution expected of any other 
inheri ted trai t. 'Civic worth' could thus be seen to be a further 
way in which an hereditable stock or constitution expressed itself, 
and so the inheri tance of such a trai t could be understood in terms 
of the theory of blending inheritance and the law of ancestral 
heredi ty. Once the si tua tion was thus clarified, the appropriate 
conclusions became self-evident. 
The improvement of human stock, in terms of civic worth, was 
possible, because the laws according to which it was distributed in 
the population and inherited across generations were understood. 
Conscious control must therefore be directed, first of all, to 
improving and encouraging the rate of breeding of the best stock, 
through the award of diplomas of civic worth entitling the holders to 
special privileges, through patronage by noble families, through 
provision of cheap houses and so forth. For "The possibility of 
improving the race of a nation depends on the power of increasing the 
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productivity of the best stock".31 But it was not only measures of 
this kind, 'positive eugenics', that were called for; so too was 
'negative eugenics' to prevent the breeding of the lowest classes -
Boot~s classes A and B:32 
Hany vlho are familiar with the habits of these people do not 
hesitate to say that it would be an economy and a great benefit 
to the country if all habitual criminals were resolutely 
segregated under merciful surveillance and peremptorily denied 
opportunities for producing offspring. It would abolish a 
source of suffering and misery to a future generation, and would 
cause no suffering in this. 
The relation between population, variation and norm thus 
allowed Gal ton to link heredi ty and degeneracy in a rigorous 
statistical relationship, mapping a distribution formed through an 
alliance between economics and morality onto a distribution 
constructed according to the natural laws of large numbers. It is 
thus not surprising that Galton, in 1907, was able to deliver a 
lecture entitled "Probability, the foundation of eugenics" in which 
the first half was devoted to a calculation of the degrees of 
mischief which were associated with classes of person~ afflicted with 
specific degrees of degeneracy, in order to examine the justification 
for taking drastic action against their propagation; the second half 
to an exposi tion of the means of sta tistical computa tion of 
variability, medians, standard deviations, binomial series, indices 
of correlation and normal curves.33 For the eugenicist strategy 
depended upon the use of the terms of population, norm, deviation and 
distribution, as a kind of relay between a theory of population 
statistics and a practice of population regulation. At one and the 
same time, eugenics elaborated a theory of po pula tion varia tion, a 
222 
means of its calculation and a programme for the utilisation of this 
knowledge within a systematic technology of social administration. 
Thus Galton vIas able to conclude his Huxley Lecture with the 
confidence of a man who has grasped a t las t the key to a poli tical 
arithmetic: 34 
The faculties of future generations will be distributed 
according to the laws of heredity, whose statistical effects are 
no longer vague, for they are measured and expressed in 
formulae. We cannot doubt the existence of a great power ready 
to hand and capable of being directed with vast benefit as soon 
as we shall have learnt to understand and apply it. 
Gal ton's eugenic programme was, of course, merely an ideal schema, 
and one that, to all accounts, was ill-received for some three 
decades after its initial formulation. 35 Despite its homology with 
the contemporary concern with urban degeneration it might have 
remained merely an idiosyncratic diversion were it not for a 
displacement in the formation of the social question which was, for 
perhaps two decades, to bring to the fore the questions of efficiency 
and deficiency, to focus social concern upon the dangers posed to 
society by mental deficiency and to allow the formation of the 
discourse of individual psychology around the question of mental 
measurement. It is to these questions that we will now turn. 
Efficiency and deficiency 
Social historians agree that eugenics took off as a political 
doctrine in the first decade of the twentieth century. Its 
terminology was utilised in the formulation of political arguments on 
a range of issues and from a varie ty of poli tical posi tions; it was 
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given an institutional form in the emergence of societies; journals 
and research laboratories; many leading politicians .and 
intellectuals, especially radicals and socialists, were associated 
with eugenics in various capacities.36 There has indeed in the 
secondary literature been a tendency to overestimate the degree of 
uni ty which this eugenic language implied, to succumb to the 
fascination of the rhetoric and the proliferation of the texts, and 
to find it difficult to explain the limited impact which the 
'eugenics movement' had on the policies of government during this 
period. As we have already seen, the tendency of much of this 
analysis has been to scrutinise the backgrounds of those invol ved, 
in order to reveal behind their beliefs and statements the cognitive 
interests which motivated them and the social interests which lay 
behind them.37 Our concern in the present study is rather different 
- it is not with eugenics per se but with the social and theoretical 
condi tions which made the eugenic strategy both possible and 
significant. The way 'the social problem' was constructed allowed 
the contestation between this eugenic strategy and others, in respect 
both to this problem and to the consequences thereof. Of particular 
importance was the way in which the issue of differential rates of 
reproduction among different sections of the population came to be 
posed; the way in which this was the occasion for the collection and 
analysis of statistics as to rates of reproduction and the rival 
interpretations of this evidence; the way in which this was linked to 
the prioritising of a set of questions concerning the consequence of 
differential rates of reproduction for the health and well being of 
the population. For it was in this configuration that the problem 
which we shall address in the next chapter took shape - the problem 
of mental deficiency around which individual psychology is formed. 
Let me begin by returning again to the question of population, 
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or rather to the way in v/hich a conception of population figures in 
political argument. We have already seen that 'population' can 
become an obj ect of poli tical concern and governmental policy in a 
number of distinct ways, and with different consequences. In debates 
over questions of population in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, the central point at issue concerned the link bewen the 
size of the population and the weal th and power of the state)8 In 
the seventeenth century, the principal theme was that the state 
should be concerned about the size of the population, and encourage 
growth in numbers which would inevitably increase its wealth. Thus 
Child wrote that "whatever leads to the depopulating of a country 
leads to the impoverishment of it", and that "most nations in the 
civilised parts of the world are more or less rich or poor according 
to the paucity or plenty of their people, and not the sterility or 
fruitfulness of their land".39 It was this link between population 
and wealth which placed demography at the heart of the political 
arithmetic of Oraunt, Petty, Davenant and King.40 In the eighteenth 
century the question began to be posed as to whether a limit existed 
beyond which further increases in the size of the population would 
create misery. Thus Turgot argued that a point was reached where "the 
employer, since he always has his choice of a great number of working 
men, will choose that one who will work most cheaply", with the 
result that "the wages of the worker are limited to that which is 
necessary to procure his subsistence".41 And Mal thus, as has been 
discussed, posed the question in a similar way when he formulated the 
principle of natural limits in terms of the contradiction between a 
geometrical increase in population size and an arithmetical increase 
in food supply.42 
At the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the 
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reformulations which we have discussed in previous sections of this 
chapter ;stabilised into a transformed mode of conceptualising the 
problem of population. Where the old problematic of population had 
as its object the maintenance of a certain equilibrium in the 
relations between states, in the debates which we are discussing a 
link was forged between population and competition between states, in 
terms of the dynamic changes in these relations. And secondly, as has 
already been shown, whilst the old problematic concerned population 
as a homogeneity, we now see questions emerging concerning the 
variability of the population and the consequences of this. Thus the 
problem of population was reformulated in terms which constructed a 
different connection between external relations between states and 
the internal organisation of states. In the discourse of 
'imperialism' this connection was posed in a darwinian vocabulary, 
although the use of terms such as 'struggle for existence' and 
'survival of the fittest' was within a conceptual schema and form of 
argument which owed little to the theory of natural selection. 
Fitness was utilised as a single category or dimension, allowing the 
envisaging of something like a linear scale upon which nations and 
individuals might be ranked, and the term in which fitness was 
conceived was that of efficiency. 
A recent study of this period by Searle has argued that a 
single term structured a field of debate on diverse questions of 
government, industry, social organisation and individual welfare: the 
term efficiency.43 Whilst Searle's account suffers on account of his 
tendency to treat efficiency in a unitary fashion, it is possible to 
accept the prevalence of the term in political argument without such 
a commitment to the singularity of its presence or pertinence. 
Efficiency should be seen not as a ca tegory of explana tion imposed 
from outside, as a hidden principle governing many discourses nor as 
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a single concept utilised in many domains in a consistent manner. It 
. 
functioned in rather a different way. It conferred a kind of 
regularity on the discourses of this period not because of the 
coherence of its meaning but precisely because of the variabili ty 
which it permitted. Its ability to function metaphorically in a 
range of distinct formulations served as a principle of integration 
at the same time as its diverse significations permitted the 
organisa tion of controversy. In the present context what is 
. pertinent to draw out is the sense in which efficiency can be seen as 
indexing a particular reformulation of concern with the population. 
Those who advocated a policy of imperialism, from polemicists 
like Whi te, throu·gh eugenicists like Pearson, to Fabians like Shaw 
and Tariff Reformers like Chamberlain, tended to write of the major 
form of international conflict in terms of a struggle between a 
number of great states. 44 This was a struggle for survival, a 
dynamic process of competi tion for scarce resources, in which the 
fittest would survive and the weakest would go to the wall. The use 
of the darwinian terminology covers considerable conceptual and 
political dispute between these positions. But the point which I 
wish to make here is that this mode of argument occurred not simply 
in the field of speculative political philosophy, as, say, in the 
wri tings of Spencer, but as a functioning element in the forms of 
political calculation engaged in by political organisations and 
social forces. 45 In this type of argument a crucial relation was 
forged between success in the imperialist struggle abroad and 
continuing and expanding prosperity at home. This was so in Lenin's 
analysis of the connection between imperialism and the corruption of 
sections of the working class; it was true of the w ri tings of the 
Austro-Marxists like Renner and Hilferding; it was true too of 
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Chamberlain's speeches throughout England on the question of tariff 
reform.4~ Imperialism was conceived in terms which are alr~ady 
familiar to us from our earlier discussion: a double relation 
articulated upon the nation, which was a bounded entity with a 
certain character engaged in an external struggle whose outcome was 
determined by its internal features. 
Internal fitness determined the outcome of external 
competition; internal fitness was a matter of efficiency. Efficiency 
of individuals, efficiency of business, efficiency of the armed 
forces, efficiency of administration and government, efficiency of 
the nation as a whole. If Britain had declined as a world power, 
this could now be understood in terms of the relative inefficiency of 
her industrial and social arrangements, and of her population, in 
rela tion to her competi tors. As Searle points out, the opposi tion 
between Britain and Germany played an important role in these 
deba tes. Bri taints commi tment to government by amateurs and 
gentlemen, its tradition of personal liberty, its leisurely forms of 
industrial organisation supported by decades of prosperity, had led 
to slackess and idleness in business, in the military, in the civil 
service, in the organisation of welfare. In Germany one had the 
efficiency of Bismarckian state socialism, the sy~tem of social 
insurance, the highly organised education system with its links with 
industry, the German model army and the German techniques for dealing 
wi th the 'social question,.47 
But crucial for our purposes was a debate which concerned a 
different and direct competition between states and one in which the 
relative unfitness of Britain had been clearly demonstrated. The 
debacle of the British performance in the Boer war provided a prime 
example of the dependence of external success upon the internal 
efficiency of the nation. Arnold 'VI hi te's account was quite typical. 
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"Br'i tai n", he wrote, "has received a warning to reorganise her 
education, her system of Imperial Defence and the administration of 
her public affairs".48 And in particular, for White as for many 
others, one fact stood out above the others from the events which 
produced this warning - the resulting revelations about the appalling 
physical status of the recruits: 49 
In the Manchester district 11,000 men offered themselves for war 
service between the attack of hostilities in October 1899 and 
July 1900. Of this number 8,000 were found to be physically 
unfit to carry a rifle and stand the fatigue of discipline. Of 
the 3,000 who were accepted only 1,200 attained the moderate 
standard of the muscular power and chest measurement required by 
the military authorities. In other words, two out of every 
three men willing to bear arms in the l1anchester district are 
virtually invalids. 
Now this 'fact' had a range of possible significances depending 
upon the strategy within which it was deployed. For eugenicists, it 
was both the occasion for the insertion of eugenic arguments within a 
vociferous public deba te, and the demonstra tion of the theses tha t 
they had long argued. Within this discourse, where the alliance 
between population, variation, heredi ty and degeneracy was already 
established, this 'fact' was further evidence of the deterioration of 
the national stock. It was not merely a problem of the physical 
state of large numbers of the population, but was indicative of 
everything else of vlhich that state was an example and an index. The 
decline of national stock was a process which led to the flourishing 
of criminality, pauperism, alcoholism, prostitution, unemployability, 
lunacy - all those forms of conduct which were merely distinct 
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expressions of a common cause. And for eugenics, the origin of this 
decline had to be sought not in the environmental consequences of 
urban life, not in the transmission of acquired condi tions by 
inberi tance, but in the rela tive frequency of reprodu ction i tsel f. 
Hence the attention lavished upon the question of the birth-rate. 
All the major European states suffered a decline in their 
birth-rate in the last half of the nineteenth century. Calculations 
based upon census data revealed that Britain's decline had not only 
been greater than that of.any other nation except France, but its 
recovery had also been slower. The shift in the relations between 
population size and national wellbeing, which has just been remarked 
upon, is demonstrated by the way in which the figures were set up and 
utilised. With few exceptions, the debate over the decline did not 
hark back to the theme of the link between population size and 
wealth, but centred upon the distribution of this decline within the 
popula tion, its efects upon the make up of that popula tion and the 
consequences of these effects. For, as the evidence was organised to 
reveal, this decline in the birth-rate was not evenly distributed 
across the population: whilst the birth-rate of the lower classes was 
remaining stable, that of the middle classes was reducing rapidly. 
The causes adduced for this phenomenon are of interest in their 
own right. They were not merely the rise of feminism and the 
movement for women's emancipation, which was causing women of the 
middle classes to abandon their proper role as childbearers and 
homemakers. Nor simply the desire of women to enter employment nor 
the willingness of the well-off to put selfish interests and standard 
of living above their patriotic duty to bear children. There was 
also a whole medical discourse upon the deleterious effects of 
education upon female fertility, especially at the time of puberty, 
or during menstruation, when it diverted sorely needed bodily energy 
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to the mind and permanently reduced fecundity.50 
However, more relevant for our purposes are the consequences 
which were argued to flovl from such a differential reduction in 
birth-rat~ The thesis that the transformation of a species was the 
consequence of differential reproductive advantage clearly could be 
applied to si tua tions where this advantage accrued by other means 
than the natural selection of random variations. If those who 
limited their birth-rate were the well-off, the prudent, the thrifty, 
the educated, then it followed that the improvident, the poor, the 
ill-educated would effectively have a reproductive advantage. And if 
the characteristics of these two groups expressed the relative 
superiority or inferiority of an heritable stock, then the nature of 
the shift in the overall characteristics of the population would be 
obvious to anyone who took the trouble to think about it. Indeed 
Galton had already drawn attention to precisely this point when 
discussing the effects which would follow if Malthus' exhortation to 
limit population by delaying the age of marriage were acted upon. 
For Galton this would only exacerbate the danger already faced by the 
higher civilisations - that they tend to multiply from the lower and 
not the higher specimens of the race.51 
But while in 1883 Galton's arguments had appeared idiosyncratic 
and his concerns were unheeded, in the political debates two decades 
later their salience was clear, and the evidence for their truth was 
not difficult to obtain. Karl Pearson, who had been arguing this 
position for over a decade, had regularly drawn attention to their 
pertinence in the opening years of the new century. Thus, for 
example, in 1904 he wrote: 52 
We are ceasing as a nation to breed intelligence as we did fifty 
to a hundred years ago. The mentally better stock in the nation 
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is not reproducing itself at the same rate as it did of old; the 
les8 able, and the less energetic are more fertile than the 
better stocks. No scheme of wider or more thorough education 
will bring up, in the scale of intelligence, hereditary weakness 
to the level of hereditary strength. The only remedy, if one be 
possible at all, is to alter the relative fertility of the good 
and bad stocks in the community. 
The linkage between stock, fertility, energy and intelligence was 
here being discussed by Pearson in an article in Biometrika, the 
house journal of the biometricians, who now had an institutional base 
in the Department of Applied Mathematics at University College, 
London, of which Pearson was Professor. Aided by funds from the 
Worshipful Company of Drapers, the Biometric Laboratory was engagea 
in carrying out research which would put these reflections on the 
differential birth- rate on an unequivocally scientific basis.53 
David Heron, Pearson's research assistant, working from the 
Biometric Laboratory and utilising the techniques of correlational 
analysis recently developed by Pearson, was able to use census data 
in order to determine the degree to which the reduced fertility of 
English wives was associated with social status or social problems as 
indica ted by district of residence. 
expected, were nontheless alarming;54 
Heron's resul ts, though 
As far as the present investigation goes it demonstrates I think 
conclusively that for the London districts there is a very close 
relationship between undesirable social status and a high birth 
rat~.. Nor is the higher birth rate of the undesirable elements 
compensated by the higher death rate ••• The relationship between 
inferior status and high birth rate has practically doubled 
during the last fifty years, and it is clear that in London at 
least the reduction in the size of families has begun at the 
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wrong end of the social scale and is increasing in the wrong 
way. I have brought forward evidence enough· to show that the 
birth rate of the abler and more capable stocks is decreasing 
relatively to the mentally and physically feebler stocks. 
Thus research confirmed what theory had predicted - the lowest 
twenty-five percent of the adult stock was producing fifty percent of 
the next generation. 
But not only was tainted and degenerate stock given 
reproductive advantage by the limi ta tion of fertili ty by the more 
advanced and developed sections of the population; this advantage was 
further consolidated by the suspension of natural selection within 
the population itself. The familiar critique of charity and 
philanthropy - that it encouraged precisely that state of pauperism 
that it wished to eliminate - was reformulated in the eugenic 
strategy. Medical developments, hygienist schemes of sanitary 
improvement, indiscriminate handing out of doles and so forth, had 
suspended natural selection wi thin the population and allowed the 
flourishing of a mass of carriers of weakened and tainted stock in 
the heart of the great cities. Feeble constitutions made them easy 
prey for such diseases as tuberculosis, scrofula anq. phthisis; low 
levels of morality made them prone to promiscuity, inebriety and all 
forms of criminality; they were unable or unwilling to engage in 
productive employment or even to carry arms for their country. A 
drag on Britain's commercial efficiency in peacetime, a threat to her 
survival in war, they dragged down the average fitness of the British 
race and put her at a disadvantage in the international struggle for 
survival where the law of natural selection still held sway. If 
charity and philanthropy had so changed the ethical views of the 
British people that they could not tolerate a return to the primitive 
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and natural forms which automatically eliminated the unfit, then this 
process must be taken under conscious and rational control. The 
pauper class must be prevented from reproducing their kind, by 
segrega tion or sterilisa tion; the good stock must be encouraged to 
breed. Only thus could the wholesale decline of the British race be 
prevented. 55 
Thus the spiral of urban degeneracy was redrawn in heredi tary 
terms and the concept of unemployability re-organised around a notion 
of degenerate stock. This did not transform the crucial point of 
intervention, which remained between the employable and the 
unemployable. Nor did it transform the objective of intervention, 
which remained that of attaching the improvable to the social order 
and segregating the residuum. But what was crucial was the 
unravelling of the confused play of causes and effects which had 
characterised the nineteenth century writings on degeneracy. In the 
earlier discussions, as we have seen, degenerate character functioned 
as both cause and effect of the occupation of a particular milieu. 
Condi tions of living were immediately ethical both in their nature 
and in their consequences, and there was thus no contradiction 
between the formulation of proposals for reform of milieu and the 
advocacy of detention colonies for unemployables. The modern 
opposi tion between heredi tarianists and environmentalists cannot be 
utilised as a grid for the analysis of such strategies. But what one 
can see in the formalisation and spread of eugenics is the 
crystallisation of the strategic differentiation and contestation 
between those who deployed a form of explanation based upon heredity, 
and advocated a strategy of reproductive control based upon it, and 
those who, freed from the theme of the inheritance of acquired 
characteristics, produced arguments, explanations, and strategies of 
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social reform, which centred upon the environment, conceived in 
something like its modern form. 
The eugenic strategy played a triple role in the questions 
which concern the present study. Firstly, as we shall see in the 
next chapter, it provided the conditions which allowed the question 
of mental deficiency, of feeble-mindedness, to take the form it did, 
and to offer to psychological discourse a particular object around 
which it would begin to regularise and institutionalise itself as a 
practice. Secondly it provided the forms of explanation within which 
the authors and agents who were the pioneers of individual psychology 
operated. Karl Pearson, Charles Spearman, Cyril Burt were all 
eugenicists, as were such leaders in the theory and practice 
concerning the mentally deficient as Alfred Tredgold and Ellen 
Pinsent. But it would be a mistake to regard this as an outcome of 
individual biographies, of prejudices or intentions or of class or 
sectional interests. It was rather the outcome of the mode of 
conceptualisation entailed within eugenics, which allowed the posing 
of a problem of mental efficiency and deficiency in a way which made 
individual psychology possible. And thirdly, the eugenic strategy 
was one of the protagonists in the struggles over shape, direction, 
objectives and mechanisms of social policy, within which the 
discourse and practice of individual psychology would be installed. 
But it is important to recognise that however prolific the eugenic 
texts, however fascinating in their naive rhetoric, the events which 
followed were in no way a realisation of the eugenic strategy. 
Eugenics established the field of problems concerning the hereditary 
transmission of stock and human abilities as the domain for a 
psychology of the individual. At the same time, as we have seen, it 
freed the domain 'environment' - its nature, effects and reform - for 
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elaboration within an opposing strategy. This was a strategy of 
social hygiene which found its principal spokesmen in the doct'ors, 
and which utilised as evidence the results of a tradition of social 
investigation concerning the interaction of environment and heal tho 
Rowntree's survey Poverty had argued that the condition of the Boer 
War recruits at York, Leeds and Sheffield was the effect of the 
falling of their living standards below the minimum necessary to 
maintain physical efficiency.56 To point to Rowntree's work in this 
respect is not to concur w,i th the accoun t provided in histories of 
sociology which, while condemming Booth for the admixture of morality 
and science in his investigations, hails Rowntree as the pioneer of 
objective social research. 57 Rowntree's early texts were just as 
'moralistic' as Booth's, al though this 'moralism' had a different 
point of insertion. For example, in the estimation of total poverty 
based on house-to-house visits, households were considered in poverty 
where the investigator was informed by neighbours that the father or 
mother was a heavy drinker, or where the appearance of the children 
or the home concurred wi th the investigator's conception of wha t a 
poor home looked like. 58 And additionally, Rowntree's use of the 
language of efficiency allowed the text regularly to link problems 
concerning physical fitness with all those other social problems of 
'inefficiency' which I have already discussed. 
Indeed, the point is that the social hygienist argument at this 
time could be deployed in relation to the very same problems as the 
eugenicist argument. Thus Rowntree, to keep to the same example, 
argued in 1914 for the same centrality of casual labour in the 
process of racial decline, the production of a class of incompetents 
who drag down wages, depress the standard of life and must be 
eliminated from the industrial field. And RO'VTntree concurred with 
eugenicists, and with the proposals of Booth and Beveridge, that 
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segrega tion in labour colonies was the only solution for a,dul t 
unemPloyables.59 But crucial is the way in which the problem of the 
production of unemployables was set up. Unemployables could be made 
from the evil influence of drink, gambling and so forth on those who 
had a fair start in life. They were al so produced from the 
hopelessness and lack of respect engendered by the effects of an 
unwholesome environment upon children, or from inadequate nutrition, 
which led to ill-health and low physical efficiency. Thus the 
strategy proposed was one of preventative medical scrutiny and 
environmental reform. 
It is hardly surprising, then, that the most enthusiastic 
spokesmen for this medicalising strategy should have been the 
doctors. In a leading article of 1903 the British Medical Journal 
demanded an enquiry into the physical deterioration of the 
population. Referring to Booth as well as to Rowntree they argued 
that if the stunting effects of work upon children were combined with 
lack of sunshine, outdoor exercise and fresh air, and if family 
earnings were insufficient for the maintenance of physical 
efficiency, it was "easily conceivable that the British race will 
deteriorate".60 While the eugenicist strategy proposed segregation 
and sterilisation of those recalcitrant elements destined by their 
inherited constitution to pose a threat to a civilised and efficient 
social order, this medical strategy gave these operations only a 
limi ted tactical role. Prevention, in this strategy, took a 
different form. It depended upon environmental reform coupled with 
hygienic and medical education of parents, and the education and 
medical inspection of children. Appropriate norms of child rearing 
and nutritional standards were to be diffused into the home through 
an alliance between medicine and mothers, utilising the school as the 
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place where universal and compulsory medical screening, diagnosis and 
determin~tion of appropriate forms of treatment could occur. If 'this 
neo-hygienist strategy is reminiscent of the earlier schemes of the 
social hygienists, it nonetheless differed from it in that the 
medicine involved is now one of the clinic rather than of epidemics, 
and because of the privileged role now assigned to the school-child-
home linkage in its tactics. 
The report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Physical 
Deterioration, set up under pressure to investigate this question of 
deterioration and its prevention, eschewed the eugenicist strategy 
and adopted instead the neo-hygienist model. Unfitness, it 
discovered, was not due to degenerate stock but to environmental 
conditions, lack of income, hygiene and, education and hence of proper 
nourishment. Eliminate these and unfitness too would disappear.61 
There is... every reason to anticipate RAPID amelioration of 
physique so soon as improvement occurs in external conditions, 
particularly as regards food, clothing, over-crowding, 
cleanliness, drunkenness and the spread of common practical 
knowledge of home management. 
This strategy involved the breaking down of the opaque masses of 
the poor into visi ble uni ts, and action upon the efficiency of the 
population at the level of the household through its transformation 
into a technical machine for the rearing of healthy children. Such 
children would be clean, adequately clothed, fed according to medical 
norms and taught to exchew habits - excessive consumption of 
alchohol, sexual excess and promiscuity and so forth - which were now 
regarded as being not only morally undesirable but also damaging to 
health and constitution. The objective: to produce a population 
simultaneously physically, morally and mentally efficient. The 
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mechanism: the reform of individuals by means of the link between the 
home and the school and the relay of the child. The hi therto 
inaccessible corners of social life in the cities were to be opened 
up to sight and to reform through the insti tu tion of the school and 
the agency of the child. 
Universal and compulsory education had the function both of 
revealing and of helping to resolve the problem of the appalling 
standards of physical and moral health of the population. Reveal~ng 
it because, for the first time, all the children of the entire 
population were brought into contact with those who could recognise 
lack of physical and moral wellbeing when they saw it, and who saw it 
with alarming frequency. But also helping solve it because, through 
the school, it could be diagnosed and remedial measures put into 
opera tion. 62 As we shall see in a later chapter, this is precisely 
the point where the problem formed which was the occasion for the 
development of a technology of mental measurement and a psychological 
appara tus to administer it. And it was the opposi tion between the 
neo-hygienist strategy and the eugenic strategy which de! ined the 
first struggle within which individual psychology was engaged. 
The eugenic and the neo-hygienist strategy appear to be in 
opposi tion. The former proposed segregation" the latter 
socialisation, the attachment back to the social order of those 
groupings who were marginal to society because they had escaped its 
norms. Eugenics appeared to operate in terms of a rigid policing of 
the boundary between those in society and those who threatened it; 
medicine operated by attempting to integrate the disaffected through 
education and the inculcation of norms. But this opposition was by 
no means an absolute one: not only could these strategies be combined 
into a single schema of administration, but such a schema illustrates 
exactly the key point at which an individual psychology was to try to 
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establish itself. For what became central were techniques of 
individuation and assessment which would enable a rational 
distribution of individuals amongst a variety of social institutions 
and practices specialised to deal with them according to their 
personal characteristics, problems and difficulties in order to 
produce the most efficient and productive population. 
Nothing illustrates the ideal form of this combination of 
eugenics and neo-hygienist environmentalism more clearly than the 
programmes of the Fabians', in particular Sidney and Beatrice Webb. 
When Sidney Webb was asked to lecture to the Eugenics Society on the 
Minority Report which was submitted by the Royal Commission on the 
Poor Laws and the Relief of Distress in 1909, he outlined its policy 
in six pOints: 63 
(1) Deliberately altering the social environment so as to render 
impossible (or at least more difficult) the present prolific 
life below the National Minimum, or the continuance at large of 
persons who are either unable or unwilling to come up to the 
National Minimum Standard of Life; 
(2) "Searching out" every person in default irrespective of his 
destitution or his application for relief; 
(3) Medical and other inspection of all infants, school 
children, sick or mentally defective persons, and all who 
otherwise need public help, so as to discover the unfit, as well 
as to remedy their defects; 
(4) Segregation, permanent or temporary, of many defective 
persons now at large; 
(5) Enforcement of the responsibilities of parenthood at a high 
standard, and hence discourgement of marriage among those unable 
or umdlling to fulfill them; and 
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(6) Taking care that no one sincerely desirous of fulfilling his 
social responsibilities shall, by lack of opportunity, be 
prevented from dOing so. 
Whilst Webb assured his audience that the Report was 
constructed "on strictly eugenic principles", what it demonstrates 
rather is a specific and delimited utilisation of a eugenic strategy. 
What is entailed is a rigorous discrimination between the 
socialisable and the residuum, the former being subjected to a regime 
of environmental improvement, medicalised scrutiny and education; the 
latter being subject to segregatory treatment. 
The fulcrum of this schema was the social apparatus which was 
to provide the technical means for establishing this rational 
distribution of individuals. It is on this note tha t the Minori ty 
Report began.64 It condemned the Poor Laws for their use of the 
General Mixed Workhouse, with its promiscuous intermingling of the 
sick, the paupers, the feeble-minded, such that any scientific 
tretment of the inmates was impossible. While eugenicists saw in the 
inhabitants of the workhouse only the different manifestations of a 
single degeneracy of stock, the central operation in the scheme which 
the Minority Report proposed was discrimination and classification -
differential diagnosis and differential treatment. Firstly and most 
crucially, the differentiation between the able-bodied and the non 
able-bodied. It was to medicine that this scheme looked for its 
proposals for the non able-bodied, for the strategy it proposed was 
one not of relief but of treatment. Drawing upon the proposals for 
school inspection made by the Interdepartmental Committee of 1904, a 
series of further discriminations was proposed. Each non able-bodied 
pauper was to be inspected, classified, distributed to the 
appropriate authority for specialised treatment: pauper children to 
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the new Local Authorities, lunatics to the Asylum Committees, the 
sick to Health Committees, the feeble-minded to a new committee which 
would ensure their segregation in conditions where breeding was not 
possible. The Report accepted that this strategy entailed the 
creation of a group of public officials with sweeping powers of 
detention over those who fell below the minimum standards of mental 
and physical fitness recognised by society: this was the necessary 
price of protection for the communi ty, and the decisions were, of 
course, to be taken on pur~ly scientific grounds. 
To substitute treatment for relief in a total programme 
for rationalisation of social administration implied that attention 
could no longer be confined to the traditional objects of policy. 
But whilst in respect of the non able-bodied there was an established 
body of knowledge to draw upon "in the prevention and trea tment of 
Able-bodied Destitution and Distress from Unemployment, we are, at 
the beginning of the twentieth century, in a position somewhat 
similar to that in which the prevention and treatment of sickness 
stood at the opening of the nineteenth century. We still have to 
work out by actual practice the appropriate technique.,,65 In 
relation to unemployment, the technical device adopted by the 
Minori ty Report was the Labour Exchange. Draw ing. on Beveridge's 
proposals, it advocated the utilisation of this mechanism for the 
rationalisation of the labour market and the elimination of futile 
drifting and wastage in periods be teen work. Coupled with 
decasualisa tion, the Labour Exchange would transform the market for 
employment into one whose workings were ordered and visible. But it 
would not only enable those genuinely seeking work to find it; more 
importantly it enabled those not genuinely seeking work to be 
identified. The Report quotes Beveridge: 66 
decasualisation will reconstruct the whole conditions of life in 
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the lower ranks of industry, sifting out for remedial treatment 
a certain number of 'unemployables' and forcing up the level of 
all the rest. It will replace the casual class - always on the 
verge of distress, always without reserves for an emergency - by 
a class for whom the words foresight, organisation and thrift 
may represent not a mockery but a reality. 
Decasualisation and the Labour Exchange: together they were to allow 
the elimination of random s,traying around the countryside: 67 
So long as the workman in search of a job has to wander, it is 
impossible to distinguish between him and the Professional 
Vagrant... With a National Labour Exchange organised in all 
towns there will' cease to be any excuse for wandering in search 
of work... If this were done it would be possible to make all 
the minor offences of Vagrancy ••• occasions for instant and 
invariable commitment by the Justices to one or other of the 
reformatory detention colonies which must form an integral part 
of the system of provisio~ 
The Report here took up the theme of internal colonies, deployed in a 
variety of strategies during this period, not simply for compulsory 
detention and reformation but also for the solution to urban poverty 
and overcrowding and the revi tali sa tion of the economy through the 
bringing into cultivation of abandoned or under-utilised agricultural 
land.68 But for present purposes, this aspect is of less importance 
than another. 
Labour Exchanges were significant not only because they allowed 
labour to be exchanged but also because, like the schools in relation 
to children, they provided a si te for the production of know ledge, 
the extraction of information and the application of diagnosis and 
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treatment. In relation to unemployment, they allowed the various 
forms of, lack of employment to be analysed and documented, causes 
sought and treatments deployed. But before the treatment must come 
the diagnosis. Unemployment may operate on the population as a whole 
and resul t from a generalised condi tion of the market, but it 
nonetheless operated by selecting out individual~ The question had 
to be posed: why these individuals and not others?:69 
The first thing to be done is to "test" them, using the word in 
its proper sense ••• [whatever the general causes of 
unemployment] it is inevitable that the particular individuals 
who, in that crisis, find themselves the neglected of all 
employees should be capable of improvement either physical or 
mental. Which of us, indeed, is not capable of improvement by 
careful testing and training ••• ? The National Authority dealing 
with the Able-bodied requires, therefore, what we might almost 
term a Human Sorting House, where each man's faculties would be 
tested to see what could be made of him; and a series of 
Training Establishments, to one or other of which the 
heterogeneous residuum of Unemployed would be assigned. 
Again we can see the particular combination of a concern for 
the wellbeing of the population as a whole and the pertinence of the 
characteristics of the individuals who make it up. Individualise, 
discriminate, test, train, reform according to appropriate social 
norms and release the previously unemployed back into the community. 
These individuals would now be trained to the highest lev~ls of 
physical and mental efficiency to which they could be raised, and 
would have become accustomed to the salutory discipline imposed by a 
regime which would be the double of employment but rather more severe 
and hence still in keeping with the principle of less eligibility. 
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We can see how this schema makes individualised assessment the key 
moment in a strategy which has as its objective not the permanent 
segregation of a group of individuals carrying degenerate stock who 
must be prevented from reproducing their kind, but the 
resocialisation and productive utilisation of a previously 
unproductive dead weight on the population. 
In the strategy put forward in the Minority Report, social 
intervention was discontin~ous, prohibitory and ex post facto; it was 
the penalty for neglecting one's obligations to society:70 
So long as he commits no crime, and neglects none of his social 
obligations - so long as he does not fail to get lodging, food 
'and clothing for himself and his family - so long as his 
children are not found lacking medical attendance when ill, or 
underfed at school - so long, indeed, as neither he nor his 
family ask nor require any form of Public Assistance, he will be 
free to live as he likes. But directly any of these things 
happen, it will be a condition that the husband and father, if 
certified as Able-bodied, shall be in attendance at the Training 
Establishment to which he is assigned. If he is recalcitrant, 
he will be judicially committed to a Detention Colony. 
The Minority Report thus demonstrates the productive possibilities of 
a combination of eugenicist and neo-hygienist strategies, and the key 
role within such a combination which was accorded to the 
individualisa tion, diagnosis and classifica tion of those who came 
into contact with the agencies of the state, be this via the school 
or the Labour Exchange. It was within such a schema that a 
psychology of the individual would find its objects and its point of 
insertion in the first decades of the twentieth century. It sought 
to become a new clinical instance with respect to pathologies of 
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intellect and the disorders of behaviour to which they led. And it 
engaged in a struggle with doctors and neo-hygienists to establish 
individual psychology as an independent, non-medical, diagnostic and 
therapeutic expertise. 
As is well known, the scheme of social legislation undertaken 
by the Liberal Governments of 1906 and 1914 implemented neither the 
proposals of the Minority nor of the Majority Report of the Royal 
Commission on the Poor Laws. In the insurance based strategies for 
social regulation which began to be formulated in during this period, 
socialisation was not something to be enforced as a penalty for 
resisting social norms, something operative ex post facto and relying 
on individualisation and classification. On the contrary, insurance 
was, in its ideal form, general, universal, compulsory and 
preventive. It entailed a radical restructuring of the relations 
between government and population, opening a direct contractual 
relation between each and every individual and the state, a relation 
of mutual obligation in which both parties had their rights and their 
duties, and which, though technical in its form, was moral in its 
intentions and consequences. But in respect of one particular class 
of 'unemployables', the Webb's schema proved no dead letter. This 
was in relation to a category of degenerates who came to occupy a 
very special place within the social and political arguments of the 
early twentieth century, and who came to be termed the feeble-minded. 
It was these feeble-minded persons - their diagnOSiS, classification, 
administration and treatment - who provided individual psychology 
with its first objects and targets. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE nmIVIDUAL 
Like so many advances in theoretical science, the annexation of 
this new field [of individual psychology] may be traced to the 
pressure of practical needs. The psychology of education, of 
industry, and of war, the study of the criminal, the defective 
and the insane, all depend for their development upon a sound 
analysis of individual differences; and the investigation of the 
more practical problems has already begun to pay back its debt, 
by furnishing fresh data of the utmost value to the mother 
science. And so at last we have seen the birth of the youngest 
member in the list of sciences - the psychology of the 
individual ••• It aims at almost mathematical precision, and 
proposes nothing less than the measurement of mental powers. 
Cyril Burt, 1927 1 
When Cyril Burt became "the first official psychologist in the world" 
in 1913, his principal task was the examination of elementary school 
children who had been nominated for admission to s~hools for the 
mentally defective. 2 It was in relation to the assessment of the 
mental powers of individuals, in particular the ascertainment of the 
degrees of mental defectiveness or feeble-mindedness which 
individuals manifested, that psychology made its first inroads into 
the practices of administration and began to establish itself as a 
functioning social practice. And the psychology that established 
itself in this way characterised itself as the psychology of the 
individual. This chapter examines the formation of the psychology of 
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the individual as ascientific discourse, its objects and modes of 
concept~alisation, its organisation as a practice and the social 
deployment of its agents, explanations and claims to truth. 
Speaking in Edinburgh in 1927, on the subject of the 
measurement of mental capacities, Cyril Burt began by reflecting on 
the conditions of emergence of the scientific pychology of which he 
was a spokesman. He identified two major transformations - that in 
the nineteenth century wherein psychology changed its method to that 
of systematic observation~. and research, and that in the twentieth 
century wherein psychology changed its subject from man-in-general to 
a concern with individual differences.3 For Burt, the scientific 
psychology of the twentie th century cons ti tu ted itself around the 
question of the individual and its differentiation. It was on this 
subject that Alfred Binet and his pupil, Victor Henri, elaborated in 
their programmatic text of 1896, 'La psychologie individuelle' - a 
text implicated in the very transformation upon which Burt was 
reflecting. "The aim of individual psychology," they began, "is to 
study different psychic processes in man and, in studying them, to 
pay attention to the individual differences in them ••• Individual 
psychology ••• studies the properties of psychic processes that vary 
from individual to individual - it has to determi~e the various 
properties and then study how much and in what respect they vary with 
the individual".4 The psychology of the individual, for Binet, thus 
formed itself around the twin operations of measurement and 
differentiation - its object was specifiable only to the extent that 
it was constituted as both measurable and differentiable. The object 
that was constituted for and through this psychology, which was both 
its object and its target, was the psychological individual itself: 5 
We must search with the present knowledge and methods at hand 
for a series of tests to apply to an individual in order to 
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distinguish him from others and to enable us to deduce general 
conclusions relative to certain of his habits and facul ties ••• 
The studies of individual psychology are one of 
psychology's most important practical applications since their 
aim is knowledge of the individual, and tqey must be examined 
and directed toward the goal we would affirm. There are, it 
seems, four principal routes to be pursued: the study of races, 
the study of children, the study of patients and the study of 
criminals. 
Perhaps it was because the mental defective was such an apt 
combination of these four routes in one - part race, part child, part 
patient, part criminal - that it would be around a question of mental 
defect that the individual psychology of the first decades of the 
twentieth century would begin to organise itself. As a knowledge, as 
a technique and as a complex of agents and agencies, the first 
objective of the psychology of the individual was to be the mental 
defective, or rather, the 'feeble-minded'. 
The discovery or the reeble-minded 
Of the gravity of the present state of things there is no doubt. 
The mass of facts that we have collected, the statements of our 
witnesses, and our own personal visits and investigations compel 
the conclusion that there are numbers of mentally defective 
persons whose training is neglected, over whom no sufficient 
control is exercised, and whose wayward and irresponsible lives 
are productive of crime and misery, of much injury and mischief 
to themselves and to others, and of much continuous expenditure 
wasteful to the community and to individual families. 
Royal Commission on the Care and 
Control of the Feeble-minded, 19086 
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It is tempting to regard the public debate over the feeble-minded, 
the setting up of the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the 
Feeble-Minded consequent upon it, and the passage of the Mental 
Deficiency Act 1913, as the one success of the eugenicist strategy. 
Vie have seen in the last chapter that the transformations of social 
policy which occurred in the early twentieth century can not be 
usefully understood as a realisation of such a eugenicist strategy, 
al though eugenic arguments played a defini te though circumscribed 
part in the debates which led up to them. But the feeble-minded 
were, of course, fundamental targets of eugenics - not merely one 
category of problems amongst others, but having a matrix role in 
establishing the relations between all the different types of social 
problem. From Galton onwards, variations in human intellectual 
powers were necessarily linked with variations in industriousness, 
moral and civic worth and so forth. Any individual's share of each 
of these was a consequence of the possession of a certain quantity of 
variable, constitutional and heritable vital energy. An individual's 
intellect was thus an index of the general quality of stock. 
For the eugenicists in the debates at the turn of the century, 
mental defectives progressively became the archetypal 'representatives 
of the deterioration of the race. In them were conjoined all those 
behaviours in which degenerate stock might manifest itself: 
immorality, criminality, indigence, inebriety, vagrancy, 
unemployability and, crucially, prostitution and promiscuity. Mental 
deficiency was well known to run in families, and hence here at least 
it was beyond dispute that degeneracy was transmitted through 
heredity. The mental defective was unsocialisable, congenitally 
incapable of receiving the moralising influences of civilised life, 
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and hence the fact of defectiveness could explain all those 
behaviol\rs whi ch cons ti tu ted degeneracy. And, crucially,' the 
reproductive activities of the mentally defective posed a major 
threat. For the defective was impervious to the imprecations of 
morality and the curb on promiscuous sexuality which conscience and 
responsibility produced. And the old link between idiocy, animality 
and profligate sexual couplings took on a new significance when 
redeployed in a discourse convinced of the malign consequences of 
differential fertility. ~he mental defective, indiscriminately 
propagating degenerate stock and incapable of voluntary limitation of 
reproductive functions was a justification for the eugenic proposals 
of compulsory permanent segregation and/or sterilisation.7 
It is certainly the case that these eugenic arguments had a 
place and a function in the events which we are about to diSCUSS, but 
an investigation of the terms of the Commission's discussion and 
recommendations, and the nature of the Act, demonstrates that these 
were no simple actualisation of the eugenic position. It would be 
misleading to conceive of what was involved here in terms of a single 
campaign which obtained a hold on the real through its insertion into 
a 'moral panic' concerning racial degeneracy, or as the success of 
the 'moral entrepreneurship' of the eugenicists. 8 Thi~ would make it 
impossible to understand the terrain upon which the early 
psychological discussions of the measurement of mental ability 
operated, the configuration into which the first test of intelligence 
was inserted, and the fact that the key professional agents involved 
were neither psychologists nor eugenicists but doctors. 
Eugenics constituted mental defectives as a threat, both 
immediate in terms of the social problems with which they were 
associated, and long term, in relation to the decline of the qual~ty 
of the population resulting from their high rate of reproduction. 
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But the mental defective had already entered social and political 
arguments in at least three other ways - as a challenge to 
philanthropy and science, as a burden upon the nation and those 
producing its wealth, and as an obstacle to the smooth operation of a 
universal system of education. It is necessary for us to trace 
briefly the characteristics of these different arguments and the 
strategies to which they were linked. 
No general problem of idiocy existed before the nineteenth century.9 
Different practices and different discourses varied in the 
significance accorded to the term 'idiot', and in the status and 
consequences of idiocy. Legislation very early made a distinction 
between the idiot, or natural fool, and the lunatic, with regard to 
property righ ts over their estates. Thus in 1325 the King's 
prerogative was affirmed in the statute ~ praerogativa regis as: 10 
To protect the lands of idiots and take the profits of 
them and provide for their necessities, and to render the 
lands on death to their rightful heirs; and 
2 To provide for the safe keeping of the lands of lunatics 
so that the lands may be restored to them on 
recovery or to their representatives on their death. 
But while this distinction between lunatics as curable, potentially 
able to regain their normal faculties, and idiots as incurable, bound 
to suffer for life, crosscut many arguments, the law was only 
concerned with such questions to the extent that they involved rights 
over property. In theological discussions the significance accorded 
to idiocy was very different. Were fools equal to others in the 
sight of God? Were they closer to God because through them the truth 
could clearly shine? Were they a punishment inflicted upon families 
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for their wrongdoing? Were they the result of sin, or sexual 
intercourse wi th the devil? Were they a test by God o·f m'an's 
hum ani ty and compassion (as God is to man, so man is to fool)? For 
those involved with administering the Poor Law and other social 
institutions, from the eighteenth century onwards, idiots were merely 
one element amongst those filling the poor houses, work houses, gaols 
and lunatic asylums on account of their inability or unwillingness to 
enter productive employment or abide by the requirements of the law. 
Which of these institutiops idiots ended up in depended upon the 
contingent events which might bring them into contact with parish or 
other authorities. As far as medicine was concerned, as we have seen 
in Chapter Three, the incurability of idiocy made it unfavourable and 
uninteresting material both for eighteenth century medical practice 
and for the emerging moral treatment of the nineteenth century. 
Al though there were deba tes over aetiology or over diagnosis, once 
the classification of idiocy had been established this was equivalent 
to an affirmation of intractability to medicine. 
When in the mid-nineteenth century idiots became a possible and 
distinct object for reformatory education it was, as we have seen, 
within a philanthropic strategy which sought to rescue and improve a 
previously neglected class of unfortunates. This new target for 
philanthropy did not come about through disputing the medical 
judgment concerning the incurability of the idiot. As we saw in 
Chapter Three, Itard set out to train the 'Wild Boy of Aveyron' with 
the conviction that he was not an idiot, and that his condition was a 
consequence of his life outside human SOCiety. But Seguin believed 
that the Wild Boy had been an idiot, and took the results of of 
Itard's labours to show that idiots, whilst not being curable, were 
nonetheless improvable, trainable, educable. The first asylum in 
England specifically for idiots was founded in 1847 in Highgate, 
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Londo~ Its brochure proclaimed the discovery that had provided its 
inspiration: "We have laboured under the appalling convic tion that 
idiocy is without remedy, and therefore we have left it without help. 
It may now be proclaimed, not as opinion but as a fact, a delightful 
fact, that THE IDIOT MAY BE EDUCATED".11 
It was as a new object for philanthropy that the idiot first 
became a discrete and specific target for social reform in England. 
For Seguin's philanthropic discovery was not isolated; the conditions 
which made it possible and allowed for its social deployment also 
obtained elsewhere. Within a few years of his work Saegert in 
Germany and Guggenbuhl in SWitzerland, apparently independently, 
discovered that idiots were educable. And in America, Sidney Howe 
led a campaign for the public education of idiots from the 1840's 
onwards.12 Reports of the work of Seguin are said to have provided 
the inspiration for the first English asylum in Highgate. In the 
decade which followed, a number of similar institutions for the 
education of idiots opened in England. The Highgate Asylum moved to 
new premises to become the famous Earlswood asylum and was 
complemented by institutions at Star Cross and Knowle. From about 
four hundred inmates of idiot asylums in England in 1864, the number 
rather more than doubled in the next decades. Texts of the period 
extol the order, calm, obedience, diligence and cheerfulness which 
characterised these institutions, their improving effects upon bodi~y 
and mental discipline, the very fulfilment of Seguin's programme of 
physiological educatio~ 13 
But only some three percent of the estimated 29,542 idiot 
inmates of institutions in 1881 were in such asylums. 14 The 
remainder were still intermingled with criminals, lunatics, indigents 
and others in workhouses, lunatic asylums and prisons. For these 
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specialised idiot asylums were directed towards the improvable idiot, 
they cha~ged for their inmates, and they explicitly excluded paupers. 
And it was these pauper idiots who were to be the focus of a second 
discourse on idiocy which emerged towards the end of the nineteenth 
century, a discourse for which the idiot was not so much a challenge 
for a scientific and philanthropic pedagogy, as a burden on the 
nation and its families and an exacerbation of social problems. 
It was the Charity Organisation Society which was the locus for 
the organisation and promotion of the need for State action to 
counter the burden of the idiot. Despite its general strategy of 
self help, of individualised case-work methods linked to the moral 
reformation of the poor and hence the suppression of mendicancy, the 
Society argued that the case of the idiot warranted action by the 
State in respect to a whole class of persons who were presently 
exacerbating social problems in a number of different ways. Firstly, 
idiots were a large and increasing drain on the poor rates. The 
Lunatic Asylums Act of 1853 required that the Justices of each county 
provide an asylum "for the pauper lunatics thereof", where the word 
"lunatic" included every person of unsound mind and "every person 
being an idiot." The Act did not prevent the provision for these 
idiots in separate institutions, but it was only in L,ondon that such 
separate provision was made. The Metropolitan Poor Act 1867 created 
a Metropolitan Asylums Board in London with the power to transfer 
idiots and imbeciles from the Metropoli tan workhouses and luna tic 
asylums to the Caterham, Leavesden and Hampstead Idiot Asylums, and 
after 1875 a further separation was made, between children and 
adul ts, with the building of the Darenth training schools near 
Dartford. 16 
When the Chari ty Organisa tion Society's Special Committee on 
the Education and Care of Idiots, Imbeciles and Harmless Lunatics 
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(set up at the instigation of Sir Charles Trevelyan) reported in 
1877, it estimated that there were 49,041 individuals in these 
categories. 17 Basing its figures on census returns, it reckoned that 
35,963 of these in England and Wales were chargeable to the poor 
rates, but only a very small proportion of these, around ten 
perecent, were in receipt of specialised treatment. The bulk of the 
remainder were promiscuously intermingled in the public workhouses, 
in lunatic asylums and in prisons, a burden on the rates, yet 
receiving nothing which might improve them as a consequence of this 
financial obligation. Yet, whilst only a small proportion of these 
might be made self-supporting, a further large proportion might be 
trained to do some useful work, and "the habits of the remainder can 
be improved so as to make their lives happier to themselves and less 
burdensome to others".18 
The recommendations of the Report urged special treatment for 
idiots, imbeciles and harmless lunatics and the application to them 
of the special means of training based upon education of the senses. 
But the Charity Organisation Society was not inspired by that 
philanthropy which had caused Seguin some forty years earlier to 
single out the similarly intermingled improvable idiots for 
specialised reformatory treatment. What motivated the strategy put 
forward by the Charity Organisation Society was not philanthropy but 
economy. The idiot was an economic burden in four ways. Firstly, 
the present cost to the rates was in no way justified by the 
reformatory effects of the instutionalisation which was provided; 
indeed institutionalisation exacerbated the dependence of the idiot 
rather than ameliorating it. Secondly, and linked, the present 
situation ran counter to the principles of political economy, for 
idiots so treated represented a waste of useful labour and a drain on 
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economic resources, whereas, under appropriate management, they could 
not onl~ provide for their own support, but also contribute to 
industry and agricul ture. This would have the additional advantage 
of allowing the idiot to benefit mentally and morally from the 
industrial principle. Thirdly, those idiots at present outside 
insti tutions were continually open to ill-use and exploi ta tion by 
corrupt and criminal elements, further exacerbating the demoralising 
milieu which was the very source of the social problem which so much 
money and effort was being expended to eradicate. And fourthly, 
idiots placed an entail upon their families, disadvantaging them, an 
extra burden in their struggle for existence which might easily force 
them down towards mendicancy and the workhouse. Sir Charles 
Trevelyan put it thus, when he presented the Report to the Local 
Government Board: 19 
The majority of our working-class families have a hard struggle 
for existence in which every member of the family old enough to 
be put to work is a participant. The exceptional burden which 
an idiot child entails upon such a family, and the impossibility 
of their providing for him at home the care and training which 
he ought to receive, establish a strong claim for assistance 
from public funds. Without this the whole family may be 
pauperised, and the imbecile member, besides being doomed to a 
life of misery, may become a permanent source of expense which 
might have been avoided had he received proper instruction when 
young. 
Indeed these arguments might appear to have been politically 
successful. The Idiots Act of 1866 passed uncontroversially through 
parliament. It distinguished idiots and imbeciles from lunatiCS, and 
it laid down condi tions for their admission to and discharge from 
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asylums, and for their registration and inspectio~ But to take this 
for a sUQcess would be to fall into the trap of confusing the pa~sage 
of a law with the construction of an effective apparatus. Not only 
was very little of the separate provision allowed for in the Act ever 
established, but the Lunacy Act of 1890, which was to consolidate the 
various enactments wi th regard to lunacy over the last half of the 
ninetenth century, failed to make any such distinction, merely 
saying, in Section 341, "'Lunatic' means an idiot or person of 
unsound mind".20 
The question of mental defect would have to be reformulated 
before it could move, as a specific problem, to the centre of the 
debate over the social questio~ This reformulation revolved around 
the category not of idiocy or imbecility, but of feeble-mindedness. 
The idiot, from Pinel through Esquirol and Seguin to the Charity 
Organisation Society, was visible. The mark of idiocy was impressed 
upon the surfaces of the body, in physical signs and external 
stigmata. Idiots might pose a problem of economy, a problem of 
order, a problem of philanthropy, pedagogy or treatment but they did 
not pose a problem of detection except in a few, rare, doubtful 
cases.21 As the category of feeble-mindedness began to solidify, a 
transi tional state was introduced between the n,ormal and the 
pathological. The defective mind began to lose its immediate links 
with the defective body; the surface of the body gradually began to 
lose its ability adequately to represent its truth and inner nature. 
Idiocy was no longer readable on sight, through the interpretation of 
visible bodily signs. In the category of feeble-mindedness, idiocy 
was progressively hidden from view, hidden in order ~ be discovered. 
It was the consequences of this shift, rather than a simple 'eugenic 
panic', which provided the conditions for the widespread social 
concern which led to the Royal Commission on the Feeble-Minded and 
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the Mental Deficiency Act 1913. And it was this too which provided 
the pertinence for a technique of measurement of intellectual powers, 
and for a psychology of individual differences. 
The place of the idiot in the discourse of degeneracy has 
already been alluded to. The medical texts of the second half of the 
nineteenth century analysed idiocy in these terms. Willis had 
already suggested, in the seventeenth century, that parental 
intemperance, indigence or vice might lead to the production of idiot 
children. 22 Howe's inflUential text On the Causes of IdiocY, 
published in 1848, similarly argued that idiot children were produced 
as a result of intemperance, masturbation, ill-health, fright and so 
forth in the parents, in combination with a general inherited 
disposition to idiocy.23 And Ireland, a Superintendant of a Scottish 
idiot asylum, repeated the familiar configuration of inherited 
predisposition, itself perhaps acquired as a result of unhealtuy or 
vicious influences, manifesting itself in the appearance of insanity, 
imbecility or epilepsy among family members. 24 Ireland, in 1877, 
paraded before his readers the figures of the ten types of idiocy, 
marked by their syphilitic teeth, misshapen palates, malformed or 
incorrectly proportioned heads, irregular limbs - each combination of 
stigmata expressing some particular organic defect, usually a brain 
lesion. But Ireland already felt the need to justify this analysis 
and approach to diagnosis against another, which tried to base itself 
not upon brain lesions and stigmata but a belief that the deficit 
remaining almost entirely in the mind, a "want or hebetude of 
intellect".25 
What was involved in the formation of the category of feeble-
mindedness was first of all a different mode of connection amongst 
the elements which went to make up idiocy as a functioning social 
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reality. This different mode of connection involved a different form 
of diagn,osis, and crucially one which had a different surfac'e of 
emergence. In the category of the feeble-minded there was a 
connection, not between brain lesions and visible stigmata, but 
be tween a di sordered or defective mind and undesirable behaviours. 
It was through the interpretation of behaviours that the detection of 
the feeble-minded would eventually proceed. This was because it was 
in defects and problems of behaviour that feeble-mindedness inhered. 
And this problem of deficiencies in behaviours, most especially in 
those behaviours demanded of a subject of pedagogy, emerged not in 
the prisons, the asylums or the workhouses - though it had 
consequences for all of these - but in the schools. 
The discovery of the feeble-minded allowed a transformation in 
the relation between the idiot and the normal from discontinuity to 
continuity. There was a shift from a table or typology, in which a 
number of qualitatively distinct categories were ranged alongside one 
another in a fixed relationship, to a configuration in which all 
individuals could be placed on a continuum from the highest of 
intellects to the most stupid of idiots. This involved a contested 
transformation of the space in which this variability inhered, from 
the brain, the obj ect of the discourse of medicine ,and the domain 
proper to medical adjudication, 'to the mind, to a question of mental 
powers and a domain to which psychology sought to stake its claim. 
Of course, questions of education had been bound up with 
general social programmatics of reform and moralisa tion since at 
least the late eighteenth century.26 But the institution in the 
1870's of a system of universal education which was both free and 
compulsory created a generalised field for the inspection and 
evaluation of conducts, capacities and behaviours. It created a site 
within which that evaluation could occur, a common standard of 
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evaluation, a set of norms and expectations tied to the functioning 
of the techniques of pedagogy in the schools, and a group of agents 
whose daily activities depended upon the ability of individual 
children to display appropriate capaci ties and conducts. The 
technology of education required certain attributes in those who were 
to be its subjects, and the schools were filled with crowds of 
children who, for a whole variety of reasons, could not support the 
interpellation which was addressed to them. It was, first of all, a 
problem of the senses. The 'blind, the deaf, the dumb - those figures 
who had already occupied such a privileged place in sensationalist 
philosophy - now presented a problem of a different order, for their 
physical disabilities made them unable to receive the sensory input 
upon which pedagogy relied. 27 But there were also rapidly found to 
be children who, while apparently fully provided with their 
complement of senses, appeared unable to learn the lessons of the 
school.28 The Royal Commission on the Elementary Education Acts 
requested the Royal Commission on the Blind, Deaf and Dumb to 
consider the treatment of these children in detail, and it was to 
this class of children that their Report of 1889 referred as 
'educational imbeciles', or, more simply, the feeble-minded.29 
The term 'feeble-minded' gradually came, in England, to 
designate those who, whilst not committable to an asylum under the 
various lunacy laws, were nonetheless sufficiently weak-minded to be 
incapable of receiving the benefits of socialisation in general, and 
education in particular.3D Thus the Defective and Epileptic Children 
Committee of the Education Department reported in 1898 that: 31 
From the normal child down to the lowest idiot, there are 
degrees of deficiency of mental power; and it is only a 
difference of degree which distinguishes the feeble-minaed 
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children referred to in our enquiry, on the one side from the 
backward children who are found in every school and, on the' 
other side, from the children who are too deficient to receive 
proper benefit from any teaching which the School Authorities 
can give... Though the difference in mental powers is one of 
degree only, the difference of treatment which is required is 
such as to make these children, for practical purposes, a 
distinct class. 
This Committee adopted the term 'feeble-minded' from the Royal 
Commission on the Blind, Deaf and Dumb and from the Poor Law Schools 
Committee, which had expressed its concern in 1896 that so many of 
its children were of the feeble-minded class.32 Gradually a link was 
established between feeble-mindedness and pauperism, though not, in 
the first instance, in terms of arguments about progressive 
degeneration or eugenics. Rather, the problem was the excessive 
number of children in the pauper class who required special 
educational provision, the cost of this provision, the consequences 
of not providing it, and the means of establishing who needed it. 
The estimation of numbers seemed at first to present no 
problems, at least not to the trained eye. The Charity Organisation 
Society, aided by funds from the British Association and the British 
Medical Association, set up a committee in 1890 to arrange a series 
of school inspections with a view to discovering what proportion of 
pupils in different areas suffered from physical, mental and moral 
defects)3 Dr Francis Warner, who carried out the investigations, 
was Professor of Anatomy and Physiology in the Royal College of 
Surgeons. He had published his "Method of examining children in 
schools as to their development and brain condition" in the British 
Medical Journal of 1888. 34 This was a technique of reading from 
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physical stigmata and bodily comportment back to underlying 
pathologies of the brain. Children exhibited themselves to' the 
doctor, who observed "(a) the form, proportion and texture of the 
visible parts of the body; and (b) the signs of action in the central 
nervous system, as seen in the muscles producing movements or 
attitudes or balances of nerve-muscular accuracy".35 This was a 
procedure which Warner considered to be both practicable in terms of 
time and reliable in terms of scientific accuracy. On the basis of 
this method, Warner cons~dered that some fifteen percent of the 
50,000 schoolchildren whom he surveyed were defective in some respect 
- dull, defective in nutrition or "'/ith nervous defects - and about 
one percent were feeble-minded.36 
And the weight of numbers was demonstrated in a more 
practically compelling sense. For large numbers of children 
accumulated in the 'Standard 0' classes, apparently incapable of 
reaching the standards laid down in the Board of Education's code. 
The London School Board had begun to group such children in special 
schools in 1891, following the advice of the Royal Commission on the 
Blind, Deaf and Dumb. When legislation authorised special grants for 
provision for blind and deaf children in 1893, they urgently 
requested larger grants for these feeble-minded children as well, in 
the light of the increasing cost of such schools.37 
There could be no doubt that here were a class of persons who 
were not legally committable to asylums yet were a constant drain on 
the resources of the school boards, the poor law authorities and the 
State. A group which did not constitute the same sort of burden as 
the idiot and the imbecile, for they were able, to some extent, to 
mingle with normal society. Yet precisely this exacerbated the 
problem because, though this was not immediately obvious, their moral 
senses had not been awakened either by parental, religious or 
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educational influences, and hence they were in constant dang~r of 
exploitation by others and lived a life of considerable unhappiness 
to themselves. Three quesions were constantly posed within the 
growing debate on the feeble-minded in the last decade of the 
nineteenth century. How were these feeble-minded children to be 
detected; how could they be socialised to awaken their moral 
sensibilities and to make them resistant to the temptations of vice 
and crime; what was to become of them when they were no longer of 
school age? It was these questions that the Defective and Epileptic 
Children Committee of the Education Department was set up to 
consider. 
The Committee was particularly concerned with the first 
question. What means of identification of this class of children 
requiring special treatment were to be utilised, and who were the 
appropriate agents to utilise these means? The witnesses to the 
Committee were principally doctors and the criteria which they 
advocated were constructed in terms of the familiar combinations of 
physical stigmata. The Committee agreed wih Warner, Beach, 
Shuttleworth and Harris that, like idiocy and imbecili ty, feeble-
mindedness was inscribed upon the surface of the bOdy:38 
Feeble-minded children are, in the great majority of cases, 
marked by physical defect or defects discernable to the trained 
observer... The most conspicuous of such defects are 
irregularity in general bodily conformation, malformation of the 
head, the palate, tongue, lips, teeth and ears, defective power 
of motion or control in almost any of the different forms of 
muscular action, as shown in balance, attitude and movement, and 
defects in some one or more of the sensory functions, besides 
the ordinary varieties of deformity and ill healt~ 
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Yet the knowledge required for such a reading was becoming 
increasi.ngly esoteric. Signs were becoming deceptive to' the 
untrained eye, significant only in their combinations and when 
supplemented by life histories and information about family 
background, even requiring on occasions examination of the 
intellectual powers of the child directly by means of assessing their 
performance on a task involving reading or numbers. So specialised 
had this knowledge become that Beach estimated that there were no 
more than six doctors in England capable of discriminating between 
feeble-mindedness and imbecility,39 and even amongst the witnesses to 
the Committee there was no agreement on criteri~ Whilst the 
Committee recommended legislation, the Permanent Secretary had to 
admit, during the drafting of the Bill, that none of the Committee's 
witnesses had been able to "offer any verbal definition of that 
degree of want of intelligence which was to constitute a defective 
child". 40 
The Committee had to reconcile an impossible contradiction. 
They were required by their terms of reference to advise on the means 
of discriminating between idiots, imbeciles, feeble-minded and normal 
children. The only professional agents with a claim to competence in 
what remained, after all, a medical problem of ment.al defect were 
doctors. Teachers had no claims to rival medicine as the 
adjudicative instance; psychology did not yet exist as a body of 
agents with a claim to social expertise. Yet the discovery of 
feeble-mindedness owed nothing to medicine. The problem emerged in 
the practices of the school and the classroom, which required certain 
definite norms of conduct including the capacities to obey the 
disciplinary demands of pedagogy and to fulfil the expectations as to 
the tasks of learning which that pedagogy prescribed. In the case of 
feeble-minded children, then, it was education which had produced the 
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problem and necessitated the solution: the construction of a 
specialised apparatus for their training and hence a specialised set 
of know ledges and techniques for the diagnosis and allocation of 
feeble-minded individuals. Hence the Committee was forced to adopt 
educa tional cri teria. Normal children were those capabl e of 
benefiting from normal schools; feeble-minded children were those 
capable of benefiting from special schools, idiots and imbeciies were 
those incapable of benefiting from schools at all. It was these 
criteria which were embodied in the permissive Elementary Education 
(Defective and Epileptic Children) Act of 1899, which gave local 
authorities the power to create special schools and classes for those 
children, who, not being either imbeciles or merely backward or dull, 
were "by reason of mental defect, incapable of receiving proper 
benefi t from the instruction in ordinary schools".41 Educational 
criteria and medical agents: this set the scene for a problem which 
would take over a decade to solve, and established the terrrain for a 
lengthy battle between doctors and psychologists which is not yet 
fully resolved. 
Ascertaining the problem. 
By 1903, special schools for the feeble-minded had been 
established in London and fifty other authorities and, as the act of 
discrimination became more frequent, the means of discrimination 
became more crucial and more problema tic. Gradually the pertinence 
of classification by means of visible signs began to be called into 
doubt as the relation between such signs and the behaviours which 
were the pedagogic and disciplinary occasion for diagnosis became 
more obscure. For the teachers and educators, who were given the 
task of nominating children for examination by medical officers, were 
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unversed in the esoteric reading of stigmata. They were concerned 
with the· category of feeble-mindedness only as a means of explaining 
a diverse range of obstructive or undesirable behaviours as 
consequences of an intelligible and unified cause. Teachers very 
early on began to develop their own techniques, based upon criteria 
directly relating to the exigencies of pedagogy, and 
straightforwardly in terms of behaviours and competences.42 Schuol 
medical officers were faced wi th the problem of reconciling their 
diagnostic privilege, which they owed to their status as medically 
qualified agents, wi th their insti tu tional role. This concerned a 
problem where clinical judgment was to function as an assessment not 
of organic malfunction but of social adaptation. They similarly 
began to utilise a range of means of evaluation in which externally 
visible physical signs played only a subsidiary part.43 
Feeble-mindedness thus gradually came to be constructed in 
terms of a direct link between mental powers and behaviours, a link 
in which the body was no longer able to have a pivotal role as the 
surface upon which interpretation was to be exercised. It was in an 
almost identical situation, in France, that Alfred Binet was called 
upon to advise upon modes of ascertainment of mentally defective 
children. A psychological notion of intelligence and the means of 
assessing it would have the possibility of fulfilling the 
insti tutional and administrative role which preceded it and which 
established the parameters within which it could operate. But before 
considering Binet's discovery, it is necessary to say a little more 
about the conjuncture into which his test was inserted in England. 
In the debate we have just been examining, it was only at this 
point, after the formation of the problem of the feeble-minded within 
qui te different strategic configurations, that the eugenicist 
arguments could come into play. Wi th the discovery of the feeble-
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minded, with the link between feeble-mindedness and pauperism, with 
the emergence of a conception of human powers as varying along a 
continuum, this class gradually became the ideal object, which 
regulated eugenic discourse. And in this discourse the feeble-minded 
were not constituted as a challence to philanthropy, as an economic 
burden, or as an obstacle to the smooth operation of socialising 
education, but as the evidence and the motive force in an hereditary 
cycle of urban degeneration and national deterioration, through the 
means of differential rates of reproduction. The National 
Association for the Care of the Feeble-minded, established in 1896, 
was the key organising locus for this strategy, redeploying in the 
context of a eugenic argument concerning the feeble-minded those 
familiar pleas for the limitation of the reproduction of degenerates 
- whether by sterilisation or by permanent segregation. Mary Dendy, 
one of the major mobilising individuals wi thin this strategy, made 
this clear in her reflections of 1920: 44 
These notes are based on the assumption that the children to be 
cared for are to be detained for the whole of their lives... It 
was determined from the beginning that only permanent care could 
be really efficacious in stemming the great evil of feebleness 
of mind in our country. The idea at first met with much 
opposi tion ••• 
And as early as 1903 Ellen Pinsent, the other stal wart of the 
National Association, argued in the Lancet for a "thorough and 
complete scheme of state intervention" for the feeble-minaed.45 For 
Pinsent, the evidence of the schools was re-utilised in this more 
general strategy with regard to the feeble of mind. Having once 
discovered the numbers of such children and developed institutional 
provision for them, were they to be released into society at the end 
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of compulsory schooling? Surely what was required were "perm~nent 
industrial colonies or permanent custodial homes to which children 
who were unfit to face life on their own responsibility could be 
transferred" after leaving school, for in this way "they would never 
be allowed the liberty which they can only misuse to their own 
degradation and to the degradation of the society in which they 
live". And if this entailed an exceptional degree of State 
restriction upon personal liberty, it was only doing sooner what 
would otherwise be done later when they ended up in the gaols or the 
workhouse. 46 
It is certainly true that the National Association took upon 
itself the role of pressurising and of publicising the need for rapid 
and firm measures to curb the threat posed by the feeble-minded. But 
the setting up of the Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the 
Feeble-Minded in 1904, despite its title, seemed to have had less to 
do with any eugenic concern about the degeneration of the race than 
with considerations prioritised in the 'economic' strategy discussed 
earlier. However after the Report of the Royal Commission was 
published in 1908, the National Association, in conjunction with the 
Eugenics Education Society, founded in 1907, engaged in a large-scale 
exercise of propaganda and pressure to ensure the enactment of its 
recommendations. A flood of books and pamphlets was produced by 
eugenicists on the threat of the feeble-minded and a joint committee 
of the two organisations was established, headed by the Archbishops 
of Canterbury and York, and including many bishops, clergy, doctors 
and members of the aristocracy, to campaign for the passage of the 
Mental Deficiency Bill which would translate the recommendations of 
the Royal Commission into legislation.47 As the joint committee put 
it in one of its pamphlets, immediate action was necessary:48 
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BECAUSE at the date of the Report of the Royal Commission, there 
wer~ 270,000 mentally defective people in England and Wales,' of 
whom 149,000 are uncertified. There is for them no recogn1sed 
and generally no possible means of control, although they are 
totally incapable of managing themselves or their affairs ••• 
BECAUSE in consequence of the neglect to recognise and treat 
their condition, the mentally defective become criminals and are 
sent to prison; they become drunkards and fill the 
reformatories; they become paupers and pass into the workhouses. 
BECAUSE they are frequently producing children, many of whom 
inherit their mental defect, and nearly all of whom become the 
paupers, criminals and unemployables of the next generation. 
And in 1908 Alfred Tredgold published the first edition of what 
was probably the first theoretical text on mental deficiency from 
within this new configuration. His Mental Deficiency (Amentia) was 
to become the standard text on the subject, going through eleven 
editions, the most recent being published in 1970.49 Tredgold was a 
member of the Royal Commission, Consulting Physician to the National 
Association for the Care of the Feeble-Minded, later Member of the 
Board of Education Mental Deficiency Committee and the Ministry of 
Health Committee on Sterilisation (the Brock Committee) of 1932-1933. 
Summarising the recommendations of the Royal Commission in 1910 he 
wrote: 50 
The whole tendency of recent enquiries is to show that the 
feeble-minded are not an isolated class, but they are merely one 
phase and manifestation of a deeply ingrained degeneracy. They 
are kith and kin of the epileptic, the insane and mentally 
unstable, the criminal, the chronic pauper and the unemployable 
classes, and I am convinced that the great majority of the 
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dependent classes existing today owe their lack of moral, mental 
and,physical fibre to the fact that they are blood relations of 
the feeble-minded and are tainted with their degeneracy. 
By 1913 when the Mental Deficiency Act was passed, the 
eugenicist strategy might apper to have won a notable victory. 
Indeed opposition to the Bill, led by Josiah Wedgwood and Handel 
Booth, appeared to have limited itself to defensive support of a 
posi tion which was already anachronistic. For this opposition, the 
proper limits of State action excluded the forms of social regulation 
which administrative control of the feeble-minded implied: individual 
restriction could be justified not on the grounds of what a person 
was but only on the grounds of what they had done. Only when crimes 
had been committed, and, through the action of the judicial instance 
subject to the safeguards of due process, had the State the right to 
deprive someone of their liberty.51 
Certainly the Report, and the Act which followed, departed 
fundamentally from such an ideal. Whilst the criminal justice system 
and the processes of adjudication and sentence have always given some 
consideration to the nature of the individual who had committed the 
illegal act, with the entry of psychological criteria into the field 
of law there was a generalised shift in the object o~ judgment away 
from the crime and towards the criminal. But in the majority of 
cases, and with the exception, as we shall see later, of children, it 
was still a definite and demonstrable breach of law which was the 
occasion for adjudication. With the Mental Deficiency Act, this 
constraint was laid to rest - no act had to have been committed to 
allow the State to authorise restriction of certain individuals. Not 
what one does, but lihQ one is and what one might do or what might be 
done to one, or wha t one's progeny might do because of this hidden 
nature - this was what was adjudicated upo~ And this adjudication 
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was done prophylactically, outside the legal process al tnough 
sanctioned by it. It was carried out by agents other than the 
judiciary, subject to none of the procedures of due proces~ What 
was significant about the mechanisms set in place by the Mental 
Deficiency Act of 1903 was not that they were the realisation of a 
eugenic strategy, but that they effected this shift in the object, 
grounds, limits and mechanics of adjudicatio~ 
And indeed the Report and the Act did not constitute a eugenic 
schema. Rather there was a stabilisation of the various strategies 
concerning the feeble-mided, previously outlined, into complementary 
axes of a single programme. Within this programme, and the 
technology to which it gave rise, the feeble-minded became 
simultaneously the object of a theoretical knowledge and the target 
of an administrative apparatus. And, as we have seen, this 
object/target was not the drooling idiot with syphilitic teeth and 
degenerate ears, but a problem both more direct - concerning the 
details of behaviours, speech, calculation in relation to the 
exigencies of a disciplinary pedagogy - and more remote - having its 
origin not in a defect of brain marked on the body but in an 
invisible pathology of intellect. 
The principles which the Commissioners outlined as their guides 
in preparing the Report may be used to map the terrain upon which a 
psychology of measurement and differentiation would operate for the 
next twenty years: 52 
persons who cannot take part in the struggle of life owing to 
mental defect should be afforded by the state such special 
protection as may be suited to their needs. 
Life was a struggle in which the feeble-minded sank to the bottom. 
They filled our prisons, clogged our schools, burdened our Poor Law 
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Institutions, occupied our homes for inebriates. And what was worse, 
they acc~mulated in our slums out of contact with any institution of 
the state and open to exploitation by other~ Thus these derectives 
were a burden economically, a concern morally and a threat socially. 
It was not only that they constituted a problem for society, but also 
that the defective himself, deprived of the benefits of socialisation 
and moralisation, lived a life of misery and degradation, unable to 
aid himself and cruelly used by others. 
The obligatory opening of a contract between the State and the 
defective could thus be presented as a benefit to both parties; thus 
the discourse which developed on the defective constantly stressed 
the increase in the happiness of the defective himself which would 
resul t from enforcing upon him the benefi ts of segrega tion. Hence 
State intervention, though motivated in part by considerations of 
finance, in part by considerations of order, could nonetheless 
congratulate itself on its philanthropic intent: 53 
the protection of the mentally defective perso~.. should be 
continued so long as it is necessary for his own good. This we 
consider desirable, not only in his own interest but also in the 
interest of the community. It follows that the State should 
have authority to segregate and detain mentally d~fective 
persons under proper conditions and limitations... This... is an 
extension to the whole class of the mentally defective or 
advantages now given to lunatics and idiots only. 
The Commission certainly did not find it hard to reconcile the 
varied elements of its programme. It managed without difficulty to 
articulate the hereditary transmission of defect and the necessity of 
preventing procreation wi th the benefi ts of training both for the 
defective and for society, and the need for and advantages of 
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economy. After reviewing the arguments for hereditary and 
environ~ental causation in the main body of the Report~ it 
concluded: 55 
(1) That both on grounds of fact and of theory there is the 
highest degree of probability that 'feeble-minded ness' is 
usually spontaneous in origin - that is not due to influences 
acting on the parent - and tends strongly to be inherited. 
(2) That, especially in view of the evidence concerning 
fertility, the prevent~on of mentally defective persons from 
becoming parents would tend largly to diminish the number of 
such persons in the populatio~ 
(3) That the evidence for these conclusions strongly supports 
measures, which on other grounds are of primary importance, for 
placing mentally defective persons, men and women, in 
institutions where they will be employed and detained, and in 
this way, and in other ways, kept under effective supervision so 
long as may be necessary. 
Even though the behaviours characteristic of feeble-minaedness 
were most common amongst those brought up in the slums, this did not 
militate against the hereditarian hypothesis. The Commission 
appeared to accept !redgold's position, as, for example, he expressed 
it in his book: 55 
My own enquiries have convinced me that in the great majority of 
these slum cases there is a pronounced morbid inheritance, and 
that their environment is not the cause, but the result of that 
heredity. The neuropath is one who is at an economic 
disadvantage in the struggle for existence. He frequently finds 
it difficult to hold his place, and he is often possessed of 
careless, improvident, and intemperate propensities, which cause 
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him to fritter away the money he does earn. He is on the down 
grade. No wonder, then, that he drifts to the slums. 
Feeble-mindedness had become a question of an hereditarily 
transmitted attribute, to be controlled by measures of regulated 
segregation which would alleviate the problem in the short run by 
removing defectives from the social milieu in which they might cause 
danger, and curb it in the long term through the limi ta tion on 
fertility which it imposed. 
But central to thii new configuration was not so much this 
analysis, and the quasi-eugenic policy which stemmed from it, but the 
new object of judgment which was produced. For the Commission was 
very clear that "the mental condition of the persons, and neither 
their poverty nor their crime, is the real ground of their claim for 
help from the State."56 No doubt the state had intervened in the 
lives of its subjects on the grounds of their conduct before, 
referring this conduct to mental pathologies and sometimes employing 
a measure of compulsion - insanity and idiocy are cases in point. 
But the case here was rather different, since it was not as if those 
who would be designa ted feeble-minded were being arraigned on the 
basis of some natural incapacity to exist without support. Not only 
was this incapacity specific - in the case of children, what counted 
as incapacity was set by an educational norm and the pedagogic 
expectations which flowed from it - but the incapacity itself was, in 
a peculiar sense, beside the point. The behaviours in which feeble-
mindedness was evident were, in large measure, important as a 
justification for intervention only insofar as they were indices of a 
transmissible, multipliable defect. And it was with regard to this 
origin of behaviours, rather than the behaviours themselves, that the 
stra tegy was devised. No t poverty (which had i tsel f only recently 
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become a ground for legitimate governmental action) nor crime (which 
had long,been so) but mental condition; what an individual was in the 
depths of his soul (or rather, at this point, his intellecv) had 
become a new object of judgment and of legi timate and compulsory 
social action. 
The possibility of an extra-legal judicial instance had 
emerged, a medico-psychological instance capable of judging not what 
you do but what you are - or rather caught in a dilemma in that, 
whilst the attempt is to judge what you are, the only sign of this is 
what you do. For feeble-mindedness was a psychological state which 
was knowable only on the basis of the social behaviours which it 
induced. As Tredgold put it in his book: 57 
the condition is a psychological one, although the criterion is 
social, and we may accordingly define amentia as a state of 
restricted potentiality for, or arrest of, cerebral development, 
in consequence of which the person affected is incapable at 
maturity of so adapting himself to his environment or to the 
requirements of the community as to maintain existence 
independent of external support. 
Two linked propositions were entailed. What was at stake was a 
failure of adaptation; what underlay this failure, and, hence what had 
become a legitimate object of scrutiny and intervention in its Qlill. 
right, was a mental condition. As the Report put it, feeble-minded 
criminals, inebriates, paupers, children of school age "are not so 
much prisoners, or inebriates, or paupers, or school children as 
persons who are mentally deficien~,,58 
How was one to deal with individuals as persons who were 
mentally deficient? What was necessary first of all was a definition 
and classification of the degrees of deficien~, since it was on this 
basis tha t action must proceed. The Commission, in a spiri t 
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reminiscent of the Ideologues, proposed to divide persons of unsound 
mind into nine classes "subject to be dealt with", within which 
mental defectives were distributed among four. Idiots, imbeciLes and 
feeble-minded were classified according to a rising scale of social 
competence; 'moral imbeciles' were a discrepant class - persons who 
from an early age displayed some mental defect, coupled with strong 
vicious or criminal propensities on which punishment has little or no 
deterrent effect. Like the Minority Report of the Royal Commission 
on the Poor Laws, which warmly endorsed these proposals, 
classification and distribution were to provide the keys for the re-
establishment of a regulated and orderly social regime, and 
scientific social administration was to operate through the affixing 
of unambiguous labels to previously floating groups of persons, thus 
allow ing their appropria te loca tion wi thin a range of specialised 
forms of social provision: 59 
We desire to promote the establishment of such institutions as 
are necessary for the classes which the different words of our 
classification represent; and we would prevent the sending of 
patients who, though differing in the extent of their 
defectiveness, are called by one name, to institutions 
unsuitable for them, as much as we would avoid the sending of 
such patients to suitable institutions under unsuitable names ••• 
Thus, the utility of a satisfactory nomenclature is largely 
administrative ••• Instead, therefore, of imbeciles, for 
instance, being treated in expensive establishments, they would 
be provided for economically as requiring little beyond 
employment, maintenance, shelter and control. And in 
consequence of a change of this kind, consistent alike with 
better nomenclature and more exact certification, institutions 
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and homes might to a larger extent be specialised; and asylums 
migtJ,t become hospitals to a much greater extent than they are at 
present, thereby fulfilling an infinitely greater service to 
science and to admini s tra ti on. 
Scientific knowledge and efficient administration were thus to 
feed off one another and each would repay its debt to the other by 
enhancing its objectives. Despite the endless debates over 
definitions which accompanied the passage of the 1913 Act, this 
schema, though limited t'o the four classes of defectives, was 
realised in a way which was to be denied to the programme put forward 
by the Webbs. And when distribution became dependent upon 
classifica tion, the question of diagnosis, of ascertainment, 
obviously was the fulcrum of the whole system: 60 
if the mentally defective are to be properly considered and 
protected as such, it is necessary to ascertain who they are and 
where they are, and to bring them into relation with the local 
authority. 
Ascertainment required for its operation a knowledge and 
technique to enable individuals to be properly evaluated, and a class 
of agents and system of administration to carry out, the job. This 
complex of agents, agencies, apparatuses and techniques which the 
Report's proposals entailed, was, in its ideal form, to spread out 
from a central point to the farthest reaches of the social body, 
bringing each individual into contact with the authorities, and 
simultaneously instituting a judgment as to their true nature. The 
1913 Mental Deficiency Act called into being just such a complex and 
hierarchical structure of detection, ascertainment, supervision, 
distribution and institutional confinement which had the mental 
defective as its subjec~ A special mental deficiency committee in 
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each local authority area was to provide for the ascertainment of 
persons subject to be dealt with under the Act, was to provide 
sui table insti tutions, was to maintain the defectives it place<1 
therein, to provide for the conveyancing of defectives to and from 
such institutions, and was to appoint officers to supervise the care 
of defectives in the community. This whole structure was to be under 
the watchful eye of a central body named (in terms which would 
gladden the heart of a radical sociologist) the Board of Control.61 
As far as adul ts were concerned, the reaction of local 
authorities continually failed to live up to the desires of the 
Board. New institutions were slow to be built; the war intervened to 
direct energies and resources elsewhere; many local authorities 
failed to take their duties sufficiently seriously. According to 
Jones, by 1920, only 10,129 defectives had been ascertained, whilst 
the Board considered the true figure to be in the region of 3.55 per 
thousand of the population. By 1927, the number of defectives 
ascertained had risen to over 60,000; however, despite the urgency 
and necessity of immediate and permanent institutionalisation, many 
of these were being supervised in the community, and only 5,301 
places in institutional accommodation were being provided by local 
authori ties. 62 The Central Association for the Care of the Mental 
Defective (formed out of the National Association for the Care of the 
Feeble-Minded in 1914, and called, after 1923, the Central 
Association for Mental Welfare) continued to press for more adequate 
provision, in the pages of its journal Studies in Mental Inefficiency 
(called Mental Welfare after 1925). But by this time, as we shall 
see later in this study, the terms of the debate had shifted: with 
the emergence of the problem of welfare, indicated in the changes in 
name just referred to, the mental defective would no longer be the 
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key point of intersection of a knowledge of in9ividua~s and the 
administration and production of well governed populations. 
But whilst for adults the problem of the mental defectives 
could be avoided at the administrative level, for children the case 
was rather different. For adul ts, ascertainment required the 
construction of a new and specialised apparatus; but children, since 
the 1870's, had been brought into daily contact with the authorities. 
And the place of this daily meeting was, of course, the school. The 
Elementary Education (Defective and Epileptic Children) Act of 1914 
replaced the permissive Act of 1899 with one which imposed a set of 
duties on local education authorities, introducing into the school 
system a copy of the structure of detectio-n, ascertainment, 
supervision, distribution and institutionalisation laid out,in the 
Mental Deficiency Act of 1914. The question of the means available 
for ascertaiment had now become an urgent one. As Tredgold remarked 
in a new chapter on Mental Tests and Case Taking, which he introduced 
into the 1914 edition of his book, the result of this legislation was 
to increase the incidence of cases of the milder degrees of 
deficiency which the physician was called upon to judge:63 
consequently the diagnosis of mental defect will come to occupy 
a very important place in medical practice ••• the, legal position 
of the mentally defective now renders it extremely advisable 
that such examination should be systematic and carefully 
recorded... [although mental tests are still in their infancy] 
there can be no doubt that the science is one which has a great 
future before it in the elucidation of the problem of mental 
development and the practical work of educatio~.. mental tests, 
if properly understood and applied, have a distinct value which 
it is impossible to over-rate. They supply us with definLte 
information regarding defect and abnormalities of working which, 
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when rightly interpreted, are of the utmost assistance to 
diagnosis, and they will be the means of carrying us on from 
that imperfect knowledge of the defective mind with which we 
have hitherto been compelled to be satisfied to a more precise 
and scientific knowledge of the subject. 
A technique of mental measurement had become necessary. Let us 
consider the conceptual conditions which made it possible. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
MEASURIMG AlID ASCERTAIMIMG 
In this chapter we trace the trajectory which led to the formation of' 
a test of intelligence and its deployment in a practice of 
ascertainment. We examine the struggle of individual psychology to 
constitute itself as an autonomous clinical instance around the 
problem of the ascertainme,I}t of mentally defective children. And we 
consider how it was that the psycho-eugenic strategy was defeated, 
and its role severely delimited, by an opposing neo-hygienist 
strategy promoted by doctors. 
Measuraaent and discrimination 
the object of the quantitative experiment is to measure... What 
we do is to carry out a long series of observations under the 
simplest and most general introspective conditions. Then we 
gather up the results of these observations in mathematical 
shorthand, and express them numerically by a single Value. The 
questions asked of consciousness are, in the last. anarysis, two 
only: 'Present or absent?' and 'Same or different?' 
Edward Titchener, 1901-5 1 
From Gustav Fechner's psychophysics to Edward Titchener's textbook of 
experimental psychology, psychological measurement operated upon the 
model of the experiment. It concerned a space bounded by the 
stimulus, the sensation and the reaction; its object was the 
formulation of the general laws of experience. To be adequate to the 
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task of classification, measurement would have to leave the closed 
space of 'the body and the artificial territory of the laboratory. It 
would have to relinquish the quest for indexical measures in search 
of distributional rankings. It would have to concern itself not with 
the law s of the relation be tween body and soul but with the 
classifications of the behaviours and abilities of individuals with 
respect to social norms. And it would have as its objec~ not the 
formulation of general laws of consciousness, of that which is common 
to all humans, but differences amongst individuals witnin a 
population. Only then would a psychology of measurement be able to 
establish itself in the space which had opened up for it in the 
apparatus of social administration. 
Gustav Fechner published the Elemente der Psychophysik in 
Leipzig in 1860.2 Psychophysics was formed at the intersection of 
two sorts of questions. Firstly, what was the relationship between 
matter and mind, between body and soul? And secondly, if every 
science must proceed by establishing the laws which express 
quantitative relations between objects, was mind adequate to a 
scientific knowledge, could the soul be measured? Psychophysics 
operated within this space, and its laws and measurements thus 
concerned a domain internal to the subj ects it studied. It was to 
be, in Fechner's words, "the exact theory of the functionally 
dependent relations of body and soul, or, more generally, of the 
material and the mental, of the physical and the physiological 
worlds.,,3 The quantitative relations which psychophysics sought to 
determine were thus those between the stimulus and the sensation, and 
the laws which concerned it were the general laws govern~ng this 
relation. 
This too was the space in which Wundt's analysis of the 
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elements of consciousness operated, and which the measurements he 
carried out in his psychological laboratory at Leipzig conceined. 
Break down experience into its constituent elements through 
introspection; relate these elements to the measured stimuli that 
evoke them under stated condi tions; measure the quanti ta ti ve 
relation between stimulus and experience; develop the general laws 
of these relations and of the combination of the elements into 
complex unities. Hence Wundt measured the senses, especially those 
of vision and hearing. ae measured reaction time: the period 
spanning the stimulation of the sense, its presence in consciousness 
(perception), its identification, appropriation and synthesis by the 
subject (apperception) and the reaction (an act of will). He 
measured the smallest noticeable difference between stimuli. And- he 
measured associations between words. But all his measurements and 
analyses operated within this space bounded by the stimulus, the 
experience and the reaction. Thus Wundt was forced to make an 
absolute separation between the sphere of objects, problems and 
concepts proper to experimental psychology and those proper to the 
social field, which must be the concern of the qui te discrete 
knowledge of VolkpsycholOgie.4 
It was not, of course, that the question ,of individual 
differences was not thinkable in these terms. Indeed Galton himself 
had made observations on differences in sensitivity and 
discriminatory ability and tried to relate these to differences in 
intellectual ability:5 
The trials I have as yet made on the sensitivity of different 
persons confirms the reasonable expectation that it would on the 
whole be highest among the intellectually ablest ••• The 
discriminative faculty of idiots is curiously low; they hardly 
distinguish between hot and cold and their sense of pain is so 
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obtuse that some of the more idiotic seem hardly to know what it 
is. 
And both Galton and James Sully, from the mid 1880's onwards, 
had urged that large-scale surveys be carried out on physical, 
sensory and mental differences, especially in children, and had 
suggested that such surveys might provide information of use to 
educa tion. Keir, reviewing the history of the Child Guidance 
Movement, to which these proposals were related and which we will 
discuss in more detail later, summarises Galton and Sully's reasons 
thus: "we need more accurate information (i) about the average or 
normal characteristics of children at successive stages of life, (ii) 
about the approximate number of cases needing special attention, 
special treatment, or special types of school, and (iii) about 
changes in mental and educational level from year to year or from one 
generation to the next."6 Some of the ways in which evidence from 
such surveys was deployed in relation to mental deficiency have 
already been discussed. But as important was the development of 
detailed knowledge about individual children, and the development of 
methods of assessment of their abilities and qualities. 
The British Child Study Association was establisped by Sully in 
1893 with the support of teachers and educationalists: 7 
One of its primary objects was "to urge the importance of making 
a scientific study of individual children by psychological, 
sociological and anthropometric methods." For this purpose, it 
was stated, "we believe it of first importance to develop 
methods for the direct assessment of intellectual, emotional and 
moral qualities, instead of relying on indirect inferences from 
physical characteristics"; "it is essential to study the normal 
as well as the abnormal, paying special attention to the 
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investigation of the commoner causes of minor deviations among 
normal children, as well as to the diagnosis of the rarer 
abnormal or pathological types." 
But it was precisely these 'direct' methods which proved so difficult 
to conceptualise. This is evidenced by the assessments which were 
carried out in the laboratories of Galton and Sully themselves. 
Galton opened what he then termed an 'anthropometric laboratory' in 
1884, as part of the International Health Exhibition.8 Parents were 
charged a nominal fee for their children to have their 'powers' 
measured and recorded on an individual case history sheet. This was 
a sort of contractual arrangement, made directly between scientist 
and parents, in which the latter, in return for allowing their 
progeny to become objects of scientific knowledge, obtained 
informtion as to their abilities or warnings as to faults which might 
be put right. But this direct exchange was to be short lived. 
In 1896, three years after his appointment as Professor of Mind 
and Logic at Uni versi ty College, London, Sully opened w hat was the 
first exclusively psychological laboratory in England. He had 
William McDougall first as his assistant, then as Director of the 
Laboratory from 1899 to 1907, when McDougall resigned to allow 
Spearman to take up this posi tion. Gal ton and Sully both saw this 
laboratory as a prototype of a form of institution which could be set 
up throughout the country. This institution was to operate in 
connec tion wi th the schools; hence its difference from the direct 
relationship with parents which Galton's first laboratory offered. 
The family - child - school - psychologist configuration was a very 
productive one, and we will discuss it further in a later chapter. 
But here let us concentrate on what went on in the University College 
Laboratory. Here too, parents were cut out of the relation, or 
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rather were present only as mediated through the school and the 
child. Teachers were to bring to the laboratory their problem 
children, those pupils who were proving 'difficul t', and there they 
would be examined and experimented upon by the laboratory's 
psychologists. 
We can see again here that peculiar arrangement which we 
encountered in Chapter Three. In a sense, all those subjects of 
investigation in the psychological laboratory were little wild 
children, Victor's siblings. And these children, like Victor, were 
caught up in a process which simultaneously sought to extract 
knowledge from them - to make them answer up as to the nature of 
their mental processes - and to make them the objects of reform - in 
that this knowledge was to be turned,to account in technical 
operations to change, develop or reconstruct these processes. The 
happenings in the laboratory were observed by students of psychology 
or education, so children made their own contribution to the 
furtherance of pedagogy, even if not their own. But in return, 
teachers received a report on the mental and physical characteristics 
of the child with suggestions as to treatment which might be 
appropriate for the reformation of undesirable aspects. 9 
The relations established between psychologist~ and teachers, 
independent of doctors or at least at an oblique angle to them, would 
be very important for the attempt to construct a relatively 
autonomous practice of 'clinical' psychology. This was to be a 
psychological knowledge and technique which organised itself around 
its subjects as cases, and utilised its knowledge within a technique 
of the cure, but which was organised independently of the clinical 
knowledge, practice and techniques of medicine. But despite the 
possibilities of these relations, and despite their role within the 
training of teachers, psychological methods of assessment were unable 
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to leave the laboratory before being radically transformed. To see 
why, let us look again at psychological conceptions of intelligence 
and its measurement. 
For the psychology of individual differences to be able to 
affix itself to the institutional demand for the assessment of 
individuals, a shift would have to occur away from the rationale 
which guided psychophysics, a shift of both the object and the form 
of calculation. The move was, first of all, from the investigatory 
rationale of the experiment to the adjudicatory rationale of the 
test. The term 'test' was first introduced into psychological 
discourse rather unassumingly in a paper written by James Cattell and 
published in Mind in 1890. He still employed it in the context of 
the laboratory:10 
Psychology cannot attain the certainty and exactness of the 
physical sciences, unless it rests on a foundation of experiment 
and measurement. A step in this direction could be made by 
applying a series of mental tests and measurements to a large 
number of individuals. The results would be of considerable 
scientific value in discovering the consistency of mental 
processes, their interdependence, and their variation under 
differing conditions. 
So the idea was that you measured individual attributes on a 
range of different tests, and you measured a lot of different 
individuals, and thus you could not only establish inaividual 
differences but also see how these were ranged in the population, and 
how any individual fitted within that range. We can see how the 
object of the application of measurement has changed from 
psychophysics. Measurement does not examine the capacities of a 
number of individuals with a view to establishing some general law 
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true for all, but focuses upon the particular combination of 
functions in each specific individual in relation to their 
distribution and variation across the population, with a view to 
establishing the parameters of individual differences. At this point 
we are close to the modern notion of a psychological test, but there 
is still some distance to go. 
Whilst the technique of the experiment focused upon the 
individual only to the extent that he could supply data which would 
allow the formulation of general laws, in the pract.ice of the test, 
measurements were made of individuals with a view to pronouncing a 
judgment upon them in comparison to some other individua~ or the 
general population of individuals. The displacement of the object of 
measurement marked by the emergence of the test allowed two 
complementary alliances to be formed. Firstly, an alliance wi th 
statistical techniques which allowed the mathematical analysis of 
variations between individuals in a population. Secondly, an 
alliance with technical operations of classification and distribution 
of individuals on the basis of their relations with other individuals 
in the population. But it was the demands of administration rather 
than the hesitancies of science which forced the combination of these 
two alliances, and hence revealed the true utility of the test. This 
came about because of two challenges which were posed to the 
psychological conception of intelligence and its measurement. On the 
one hand, a challenge which consisted in the nomination of medicine 
as the adjudicative instance in the assessment of the feeble-minded. 
And on the other hand, a challenge contained in the development and 
utilisation of the Binet test as the means for this assessment. 
If individual psychology in England was initially unable to 
fulfil its task as the knowledge competent to pronounce on questions 
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of intellectual ability, this was, paradoxically, at least partly 
because of the eugenic strategy in which it was caught up for its 
first two decades. Why was this an obstacle? It was an obstacle 
because individual psychology sought to adjust its techniques of 
measurement not simply to the externally variable conducts and 
abili ties of individuals assessed, but also to some common, 
underlying, heri table and hence biological substrate of these 
behaviours and abilities. With admirable rigour, it continually 
sought to reconcile the e~igencies of social judgments of abilities 
with the faculties of the sensory apparatus as measured by the 
technical devices of psychophysics. Hence the schema of tests which 
Cattell proposed differed but little from those utilised by Galton in 
his anthropometric laboratory. They ranged from bodily measures such 
as dynamometer pressure, through such classical psychophysiological 
measures as least noticeable weight difference, to "purely mental 
measures" such as the number of letters remembered at one hearing.11 
This was still a long way from the "direct" measures of assessment 
desired by the Bri tish Child Study Associa tion, or, rather, it was 
caught in a particular conception of what a "direct" measure must 
look like. 
Between the senses, which it was necessary and legi timate to 
measure, and behaviours, upon which it was necessary to adjudicate, 
only statistical devices exist to commensurate the incommensurable. 
When Cattell's paper was published in 1890, it was followed by some 
remarks by Francis Galto~ Galton expressed great interest in 
Cattell's proposals, but considered that they would only achieve 
their goal of differentiating individuals if the measures made by 
Cattell were correlated with "an independent estimate of the man's 
powers", for example "mobile, eager, energetiC, well shapt:::d ••• ".12 
It was towards the problem posed by these remarks that Spearman's 
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famous paper of 1904 on "'General intelligence" objectiyely· 
determined and measured' was directed. Spearman recognised that all 
previous attempts at psychological measurement had failed in this 
res pect: they had been unable to show any rela tionship be tween the 
measures they obtained and the abilities of individuals in their 
ordinary life. Indeed, they had even failed to demonstrate any 
relationship between the values on the different measures used for 
anyone individual. And these criticisms applied not only to 
measurements of simple sensory properties, but also to Binet's 
attempts to measure complex mental functions. 13 Spearman's well 
known solution, using complex correlational techniques, was to 
propose a two factor theory of intelligence, comprising a central and 
fundamental function of general intelligence, which acted in common 
with specific intelligences to produce the abilities which 
individuals demonstrated in particular tasks. 
Spearman obtained measures of his samples of Harrovian 
schoolboys with regard to their discriminatory abilities on weight, 
sound and vision, and employed a development of the statistical 
methods of Beauvais, Galton and Pearson in order to correlate these 
measures with independently obtained rankings of these children in 
order of intelligenc~ This enabled him to forge statistically the 
link between these sensory abilities and the pertinent behaviours, in 
the manner that has been utilised throughout the whole subsequent 
history of psychological tests of intelligence. The independent 
rankings of intelligence were obtained from the order in which the 
children were placed by their school results, by their teacher, by a 
fellow schoolboy and by the Rector's wife (who, Spearman regretted, 
could only provide an incomplete list) The circularity of this 
procedure, its assumption of the forms of differentiation and of a 
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unilinear distribution of individuals in the population according to 
mental powers which it claimed to demonstrate - all these are by' now 
familiar criticisms and ones which are not pertinent for our purposes 
here. What concerns us are the consequences which followed from the 
fact that Spearman considered his statistical manoeuvres to have 
demonstrated that "the common and essential element in the 
Intelligence wholly coincides with the common and essential element 
in the sensory functions." 14 
Two things had happeped here which allowed this discourse on 
intelligence to be sieuated within a eugenicist strategy. Firstly, 
the measurement of intelligence had become a question of 
differentia ting beween individuals in terms of the posi tion which 
they occupied in a linear series. This linear series was a measure 
of some characteristic which could be regarded as having a continuous 
distribution with a pattern which followed the normal curvt:. 
Intelligence thus unified could be treated according to the 
statistics of large populations, in which individual scores received 
their pertinence from the perspective of the population and their 
relation to its norms. And second, intelligence could be conceived 
in terms of the links beween the outward and visible effects 
(behaviours, performances) and an internal and biQlogical cause 
(sensory functions). It was thus entirely consistent that Burt's 
attempt to extend and develop Spearman's work, in his investigation 
of the intelligence of Oxford schoolchildren from schools of 
differing qualities should have been undertaken at the instigation of 
William McDougall, who could then celebrate the results a few years 
later in a paper entitled 'Psychology in the service of eugenics': 15 
we must regard [Spearman's and Burt's finding] as one of the 
greatest importance for eugenics; for we have discovered a 
measurable factor which is involved in, and is an important 
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factor or condition of proficiency in, many mental operations; a 
factor which is possessed in very different degrees by different 
individuals. 
McDougall chaired a sub-committee of the Anthropological 
Section of the British Association which was set up to consider the 
gathering of psychological measurements as a part of a scheme for a 
comprehensive survey of the population which had been proposed in 
1905. 16 The drive to meas.ure was undoubtedly produced within the 
debates over physical and psychological deterioration which have 
already been discussed. This was true also of the recommendation 
made by the Board of Education in 1907 for 'anthropometric 
observation of children in schools' which, according to Hearnshaw, 
greatly facilitated Burt, Flugel and English - whom McDougall 
recruited to assist him with construction and standardisation or 
tests - gaining access to school-children fOr testing, in Oxford and 
later in Liverpool and elsewhere. In this great labour of 
quantification of attributes, a new kind of knowledge of the 
population was being constituted, not simply of its gross 
characteristics and crises - births, deaths, marriages, illnesses -
but also of its mOre quotidian aspects. As we have s~en it was by no 
means simply, or even principally, in a eugenic strategy that such 
information functioned. But in the case of the English elaboration 
of a psychology of intelligence, eugenics certainly did establish the 
field from which the problem was posed. 
As has already been pointed out, the importance for eugenics of 
establishing something like a factor of general intelligence was the 
demonstration of a biological, variable, heritable basis for mental 
characteristics. Spearman recognised this, and explicitly allied his 
conception of general intelligence with Gal ton's earlier notion of a 
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variable and heritable vital energy, which underlay and made possible 
labour and all the robust virtues. 17 Burt stressed a similar theme 
when h~ argued in relation to general intelligence: 18 
we may eventually seek the psycho-physical basis, underlying 
this capacity, in a particular characteristic of general neural 
constitution; the accentuation of such a neural characteristic 
would then produce the type of mind known as intelligent, while 
its biological inheritance would form the condition of the 
transmissibility of the mental trait. 
But al though this psychophysiological basis was not yet 
spe ci f iabl e, the de mons tr a ti on of the innateness of general 
intelligence, once tha t has been given a precise defini tion, could 
serve the same function: 19 
Once devised, once demonstrated to measure a general innate 
endowment, as distinguished from special knowledge and special 
dexterities, that is to say from post-natal acquisi~ion, SUCh 
tests will find yet a third direction for experimental 
investigation, namely the enquiry how far the capacity thus 
measured varies with Age, with Education, with Parentage and 
with Social Rank; and this further application of. the methods of 
the 'tests' would provide at once an illustration of their 
practical importance and a corroboration of their theoretical 
validity. 
Burt's claim to have demonstrated the innateness of general 
intelligence has recently been subjected to much cri tical comment, 
and much publicity has been given to the 'scandal' of his fabrication 
and judicious adjustment of his data. 20 These are not questions 
which concern us here. What is at issue is not a sol~tary and 
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regrettable aberration, but the formation of a regular and systematic 
explanatory structure in the eugenics-intelligence couple, which made 
the claims of certain arguments so strong as to require rather little 
in the way of justificatory evidence. This, for example, is how 
Hearnshaw formalises the argument which Burt puts forward in his 
article of 1909 for the innateness of intelligence: 21 
Bishops are brighter than butchers (obviously). 
2 The sons of bishops are better at dotting and other 
similar tests th,an the sons of butchers. 
3 These tests correlate highly with intelligence as judged 
by teachers. 
4 These tests do not depend on prior experience and 
performance does not improve with practice, or on 
retesting after 18 months: therefore they must measure 
innate capaci ty. 
5 The class differences cannot be accounted for by 
environmental deprivation, since the butchers could afford 
to pay 9d per week in school fees. 
6 Therefore, we may conclude that the superior proficiency 
and intelligence of the bishops' boys is inborn. 
(Population: N=43j 30 lower middle classj 13 upp~r 
class) • 
This argument may indeed be guilty of the sin of petitio principii 
but we can see that it was not merely a case of faulty reasoning: the 
premises which contain its conclusions are fundamental elements of 
eugenic discourse. The postulation of a uni tary function of 
intelligence, biologically based and innate, eminently inheritable, a 
common basis to all the attributes and qualities of the individual, 
was merely a reworking of themes which had been familiar since tne 
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publication of Hereditary Genius. It was not surpris1ng therefore 
that Burt explici tly returned at the end of his article to the very 
terms of Galton's eugenic reutilisation of Booth: 22 
we seem to have proved marked inheritability in the case of a 
mental character of the highest "civic worth". 
Parental intelligence, therefore, may be inherited, 
individual intelligence measured, and general intelligence 
analysed; and they can be analysed, measured and inherited to a 
degree which few psych910gists have legitimately ventured to 
maintain. 
So a method of assessment appeared to have been devised which 
would allow the discrimination and ascertainment required by the 
demands of administration. And underpinning this technique was tne 
link which Galton had forged at the moment of conception of the 
psychology of the individual, and which, indeed, established the very 
possibility of its existence. This was the link between statistical 
norms of population variation and social norms of conformity to 
required standards of conduct. Individual psychology would seek to 
diagnose social pathology in terms of deviation from statistica~ 
norms. Its conception of normal and abnormal mental functioning 
would be constructed from the point of view of a theory of 
populations, averages and correlations, not from a conception of the 
psyche itself. And similarly, methods of assessment would selec~ 
their contents on the grounds of their abili ty to reproduce 
statistically a pre-determined social categorisation and distribution 
- items being included only if they permitted a distinction between 
indi viduals which accorded with that already made on educa tiona~, 
moral or judicial grounds. The psychology of the individual was 
destined from the outset to construct its theoretical objec~ in terms 
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of norms of statistics and social adaptation rather than in terms of 
the norm~tivity of psychic functioning. No wonder it was to become 
not so much a clinical as an administrative practice. 
Yet despite the link it forged between social requirements and 
psychological assessments, despite its certainty of the possibility 
of assessing intelligence through the measurement of sensory 
functions, and despite the corollary that psychologists possessed the 
rights and capacities to adjudicate in cases of suspected pathology 
of the intellect, these claims fell on deaf ears as far as 
administrative procedures for diagnosing the feeble-minded were 
concerned. Not that diagnoses were not being carried out. But the 
procedures were not being operated by those versed in psychology but 
by doctors, and the technical device utilised was not based upon the 
assessment of elementary sensory and motor functions and their 
statistical treatment but was a test of a very different type. 
We can trace this clearly if we examine successive Reports of 
the Chief Medical Officer of the Board of Education. By 1909 tne 
question of the diagnosis of feeble-minded schoolchildren was already 
causing problems to School Medical Officers. The Chief Medica~ 
Officer included in his report a schedule for the examination of 
children in respect to this difficulty. This included not only tests 
of motor ability, sensory responses, emotional balance and will-
power, but also "tests of intelligence" involving the descrip'Gion of 
pictures, counting ability, handwriting tests and so forth. Now the 
form of argument within which all this was posed was not eugenic; it 
was that adopted in the Report of the Royal Commission discussed 
earlier. The Chief Medical Officer urged School Medical Officers on 
with the assurance that the task of ascertainment was vital in order 
to allow the feeble-minded to contribute to their own support, to 
save them from harsh treatment on the streets, to prevent them 
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becoming drunkards, criminals and prostitutes and from giving birth 
to children who would certainly grow up to be a burden on the 
community. 23 
In the Report of 1910, a further familiar theme was deployed. 
The Chief Medical Officer advocated an organisa tion for the 
ascertainment and allocation of feeble-minded children in terms 
familiar from the Minority Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor 
Laws, when he remarked that "the Day Special School is an 
indispensable agency both as an 'observational centre' and a 'sorting 
house''', a place where children could be tested, classified and 
distributed to the appropriate place amongst a range of specialised 
agencies. 24 The Report concluded with a plea for: 
(a) more accurate and useful classification, including the 
differentiation of the educable from the ineducable and the 
appropriate grouping of the children according to the nature of 
the education from which they may be expected to profit; 
(b) a more practical, manual and industrial training ... 
(c) more effective and vigilant after care ••• ; and 
(d) power to establish and assist residential institutions for 
providing custodial care for all ineducable feeble-minaed 
children ••• 
It was within this familiar strategy of classification, 
distribution, socialisation or segregation that, in the Report for 
1911, the "psychological and educational tests associated with the 
name of Binet" were introduced for the first time into the 
recommended schema of tests.25 It was now not so much the physical 
examina tion, though this still occurred,. nor any of the other 
assessments, but intelligence which had become the fulcrum of 
adjudication, and intelligence had become what the Binet and Simon 
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test measured: 26 
in assessing the intelligence, however, which is, broadly 
speaking, the chief criterion for differentiation of the normal 
child from the feeble-minded, the mental tests designed by Binet 
and Simon are recommended. 
When the passage of the Mental Deficiency Act stabilised the 
administrative structure in the form it would maintain for many 
years, the Bine t test s retained their central pl ace in a versa tile 
apparatus for the production and utilisation of scientific knowledge 
of intelligence and its pathologies;27 
The passage of the Mental Deficiency Bill into law cannot fail 
to give a great impetus to the study, diagnosis, classification, 
educational treatment and care of children suffering from mental 
defect... It is for [Local Education] Authorities and their 
Medical Officers to lay deep and broad foundations for the new 
work of grappling with feeble-mindedness in the State ••• [The 
compulsory ascertainment and notification of mentally defective 
children] is the essential first step in a scientific and 
national effort to eradicate the evils of feeble-mindedness. 
And the Chief Medical Officer reincluded his assessment schedule in 
the Report, and stressed that "In association with this schedule 
should be used the Binet-Simon method of testing the intellec~ual age 
of the child".28 For the purposes of the administration of children 
on the grounds of intellectual ability, the mental age calculated 
from these scales had become synonymous with intelligence. Why 
should the Binet-Simon tests have succeeded in the hands of the 
doctors, while the psychologists and their measures failed to occupy 
the space they considered theirs by right? To resolve this question, 
let us consider briefly the formulation of these tests in France. 
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Like Galton, Binet from the outset considered the study of individual 
differences to be central to the construction of a scientific 
psychology. But unlike Galton, he eschewed any attempt to forge 
direct links between elementary sensations and individual abilities. 
Whilst the postulation of such links was, as we have seen, 
fundamental to any eugenic argument, Binet was not so constrained and 
moved directly towards the measurement of compl ex cogn~ ti ve 
functions. 29 This object'of measurement immediately dictated a 
different form of measurement from that appropriate to the elementary 
sensory functions. Binet's measurements sought to bear upon 
psychological facul ties directly, though measurement of these 
faculties still required a comparison between various accessible 
indices of mental functions on the one hand and independent 
assessment of the rela tive abili ties of individuals on the other. 
The indices of mental functions that Binet used were partly physical 
and an thropometric: cephalometric studies, graphology, indeed any 
measure of this type which could provide a measurable range of 
differences between individuals. However, whilst such measures were 
compatible with those utilised by the British eugenicists, Binet's 
measures of mental functions were not. These included'assessments of 
mental images, 
and so forth)O 
of imagination, of attention, of aesthetic sentiment 
But after ten years of work on this project, little 
had been achieved in the way of any straigh tforw ard means of 
assessing individual differences in intellectual ability. Claparede, 
reporting on this work as presented by Henri at the First German 
Congress for Experimental Psychology in Giesbach, stated: 31 
The experiments made since [the 1895 programme] in the schools 
have shown that it is premature to look for tests permitting a 
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diagnosis during a very limited time (one or two hours), and 
tha~, much to the contrary, it is necessary to study individual 
psychology without limiting the time - especially by studying 
outstanding personalities. 
Sustained research had led to the failure of attempts to arrive 
at a brief measure for assessing individual differences in 
intellectual ability. Binet and his co-workers recommended instead 
lengthy and systematic investigations of particular individuals. 
There seemed therefore, to be a division between the exigencies which 
administration imposed and the methods dictated by a serious 
scientific attempt to establish a theory of intelligence, produce the 
means of assessing it, and allow discrimination between individuals 
on the basis of such an assessment. Yet just thirteen months later 
the first metric scale of intelligence, consisting of only thirty 
items, was published in L'Annee Psychologigue.32 How can this sudden 
transformation from failure to success be understood? Was it perhaps 
a sudden upsurge of creative genius which was responsible for this 
remarkable leap forward in scientific techniques for the 
psychological assessment of intelligence? On the contrary, what 
happened first of all was a consequence of a shift in the way in 
which the question of intelligence was posed. Beaunais commented 
upon this when he first announced the invention of the test, reading 
a paper by Binet and Henri at the First International Congress of 
Psychology in Rome: 33 
The two authors of the present note have especially preoccupied 
themselves with methods that could be used to make the 
distinction between normal and abnormal childre~.. methods that 
will permit a clinician to separate the subjects of inferior 
intelligence into categories verifiable by all; and second, that 
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will permit commissions who decide on the admission of children 
into special schools to make an exact distributio~ 
The condition for the formation of the test of intelligence was 
the prioritisation of the question of discriminating between the 
normal and the abnormal over the attempt to ground a measure of 
intelligence in psychological conceptions of mental facultie~ And 
the prioritisation of this question was forced in France by the 
impo si tion of universal and compulsory schooling. For in France, 
just as much as in England; this move filled schools with numbers of 
recalcitrant children who were ill suited to the rigours and 
disciplines of the school, and unable to fill the role of subject in 
the pedagogic technology of the normal classroom. The leading 
strategy in France with regard to the feeble-minded was a 
philanthropic one, and Binet was a central figure within it. As a 
key member of the Society for the Psychological Study of the Child, 
Binet was involved in the demand that government must fulfil its 
legal responsibilities by extending the benefits of education to all 
children. Not just pity but duty and social justice meant that this 
must include the mentally defective.34 
In 1904 the Ministry of Public Instruchon appointed a 
Ministerial Commission for the Abnormal, the French equivalent of the 
Committee on Defective and Epileptic Childre~ Binet and three other 
members of the Society for the Psychological Study of the Child were 
among its members. The Commission was not successful in its 
principal task, which was to discover the number of abnormal children 
in France. The problems of defini tion and diagnosis produced such 
variation between the verdicts of the teachers who were doing the 
classifying that the information which was obtained provided no basis 
for useful conclusions. Nonetheless the Commission, which confined 
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its activities to administrative and pedagogic questions, did 
recommend the use of a "medico-pedagogic examination" in the 
diagnosis of abnormality, but "could offer no criteria for methods to 
be used, observations to be taken, questions to be posed, or tests to 
be originated."35 Binet and Simon thus turned their attention to 
this practical task; not the theoretical problem of devising a means 
of measuring intelligence in terms of the distinct faculties of the 
mind, but the practical task of devising a means of classifying 
individuals into one or other of a very limited number of categories. 
Wolf, in her biography of Binet, comments "soon afterwards came that 
flash of understanding that allowed him to see that an effective test 
must be oriented to 'tasks of behaviour' rather than to so-called 
facul ties. n36 It was not the theoretical distinction of intellecT. 
into its different aspects and parts which was involved here, but the 
ranking of individuals as a whole in relation to their fellows 
according to the actual abili ties and behaviours which they 
manifested in their everyday activities and which were pertinent to 
their educational progress. 
Binet was not isolated in this recognition. The study of 
complex mental functions through the notion of faculties is more 
amenable to a reintegration into the direct assessment of behaviours 
than is the eugenically organised insistence upon biologically given 
sensory functions. So it was not a case of a unique concatenat~on of 
events which, when synthesised by an investigator of brilliance and 
creativity, allowed a definitive break with an old paradigm. It was 
the strategic intersection at which Binet was located, the 
intersection of a particular conception of the psyche and a specific 
administrative demand, which made possible the shift to the unilinear 
assessment of behaviours in terms of a single and simple numerical 
measure. The work of Blin and Damaye, for example, presented in 
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L'Anee psychologique in 1908, utilised a simple questionnaire to 
childre~ using a range of tasks - reading, writing, arithmetic, 
general knowledge questions and so forth, and provided their results 
in terms of a single number on a scale from zero to one hundred, with 
suggestions as to which scores indicated particular levels of 
retardation.37 Damaye wrote of this procedure: 38 
The different faculties are thus no longer studied separately, 
in an experimental dissociation, we can even say dissection, but 
instead in their observable behaviours and according to popular 
and varied notions ••• The method appears to us to have a 
completely clinical character. 
Binet's scale replaced the apparent arbitrariness of the Blin-
Damaye procedure in many respects; perhaps the most significant being 
the role which age was allowed to play in the ranking of individuals. 
The comparison of idiots with young children in their abilities and 
behaviours was, of course, not new, but Binet reworked this in a way 
which was made possible by the existence of the institutions for 
which his procedures were designed. The observation of large numbers 
of children of similar ages in schools, and of large numbers of 
defectives in institutions, allowed the formulation of a double 
relation - firstly, despite individual variations, norms of 
performance could be established for children at particular ages, and 
second, defective children of particular ages could be seen to bear a 
striking resemblance to normal children some years younger. Whilst 
Binet refused to commit himself to an explanation. of mental defect as 
an arrest of normal development, in pragmatic terms he recognised 
that the combination of these two arguments could lead to a 
classification of children in terms of a single measure - mental 
level - which, when compared with their chronological age, would give 
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a simple indication of the degree of their defect. The virtue of 
such a criterion was all the greater in that it related directly to 
the field of problems into which it was inserted: the norms and 
expectations of the schools as to the performance of children of 
different ages in the classroom. 
This was the crucial shift marked by the invention of the 
Binet-Simon scale - from measurement of faculties operating within a 
space internal to the subject, to the examination of behaviours in 
which measurement was conce'rned wi th the subject as a whole, and from 
the point of view of his or her ability to perform in relation to 
social norms. Behaviour was the link between the measurement of 
subjects and the administration of individuals; it was the common 
point upon which they are articulated. Yet in this alliance, 
intelligence, as that which the test measured, had initially a rather 
precarious status, a role limited to that of practical utility. 
Binet recognised at the outset that the problem to which his test of 
intelligence was an answer was not that with which he had struggled 
for so long. He did not believe that what he was measuring as 
intelligence in this new device was what he had been attempting to 
measure in his detailed studies of his two daughters and in his 
extensive observations and experiments upon children. Thus in ~ 
Enfants anormeaux Binet and Simon stressed the utility of the test as 
an administra tive device; they subti tied the text "a guide for the 
admission of retarded children into special classes."39 They 
constantly emphasised the limitations of the test: its criteria were 
not theoretical but educational; it was to serve only as a first 
means for the teacher to use in singling out children who might be 
mentally backward for further detailed investigation by a number of 
experts; the test itself was only a guide and was never definitive. 
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Yet at the same time as recognising these limitations - the test was 
merely ~ tool of administration - the authors were constantly 
beguiled into wishing to establish its claim to be something more. 
The test held a potent promise in its ability to transform previously 
unmanageable attributes into assessable, calculable quantities. 
The first extension was from the pathological to the normal. 
What was originally a device for diagnosing the defective became a 
device for hierarchising the normal. The reference which the 
condensation of behaviours into a single number appeared to make to a 
hidden quali ty of the individual, together wi th the norms of 
development which provided the standard of assessment of deficiency, 
made it easy for the test to be extended beyond its initial point of 
emergence. By 1 go 8 the test had changed its ti tle - from, "new 
methods for the diagnosis of the intellectual level of the abnormal" 
to "the development of intelligence among childre~,,40 Mental 
deficiency, hidden within the psychological domain, beyond 
recogni tion by visible signs, physical stigmata or anthropometric 
indices, had provided the route for the formation of a psychological 
conception of intelligence and a technique of assessing it 
appropriate to every child. The abnormal had provided individual 
psychology's route to a knowledge of normality, a means to assess the 
truth of the potential of every child. It was in relation to the 
question of the abnormal that a psychology of individual differences 
was established, and that a psychological conception of the normal 
was itself fixed and defined. Indeed Binet and Simon showed this 
ambition when they presented the test in its first crude form: 41 
When the work only sketched out here becomes definitive, it will 
permit the solution of many current questions, since it is no 
less a matter than the measurement of intelligence •.• permitting 
comparisons not only according to age, but also according to 
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sex; social conditions, race, intellectual status ... and normal 
and criminal anthropology. 
Despite the apparent virtues of the Binet-Simon test, its 
brevi ty, the simplici ty of the· calcula tions it entailed, the 
convenience of the result it provided, its direct orientation to 
pertinent educational norms of behaviour and performance, it made a 
very limited impact in France on its first publicatio~ This was so 
even wi th the Ministerial Commission for the Abnormal. However, 
according to Wolf, its utility was immediately recognised elsewhere. 
She quotes, for example, from an article of 1907 by Decroly, Director 
of a Brussels institute for the retarded, and his assistant Degand: 42 
Despite some faults and flaws, we are persuaded that these tests 
can already render service in making classifications of pupilS 
for a school or classes in special training... Thus we advocate 
their immediate use from the beginning of the school year to 
reduce trials that are harmful to both students and their 
teachers. 
And indeed, after the 1908 revision of the scales was published there 
was li ttle doubt that the test, now oriented to assessing the 
intelligence of all children, would come to define ,conceptions of 
intelligence and the means of measuring it for many decades -
revised, restandardised, extended and modified but in its essence 
unchanged. The production of a simple numerical result was one 
advantage; another was that: 43 
it runs its course according to an unvarying plan, it takes 
express account of age, and it assesses the responses by 
comparing them to a norm that is a real and living average. 
By 1909 Binet was explicit about the central feature of his 
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test, the fundamental reason why it could occupy the place it did in 
the struQture of educational administration - that what it meas'ured 
was adaptation: 44 
We predict a new method for measuring the phenomena of 
consciousness; instead of measuring their intensity, which has 
been the vain and foolish ambition of the psychophysicists, we 
shall measure the useful effects of acts of adaptation, and the 
value of the difficulties overcome by them; there is here a 
measure that is not ar~thmetical, but one that permits a lineal 
seriation, a hierarchy of acts and of different individuals 
judged according to their effectiveness. 
A measure of adaptation which allowed the serial ranking or 
individuals according to the effectiveness of the adaptations to 
norms which they demonstrated - could there be a clearer 
characterisa tion of the psychological conception and measure of 
intelligence which had now formed? Only one last hesitation remained 
- Binet's unwillingness or inability to combine together the elements 
of chronological age and mental level into a single figure. This 
would allow a characterisation of intelligence in terms which provide 
for comparisons between as well as within age bands, for the summing 
up of the mental powers of an individual in a single figure which 
would tell those who wanted to know all they needed to know about 
them. 
Although William stern expressed some of the same anxiet~es as 
Binet when he published his paper advocating the combination of 
mental age and chronological age into a single mental quotient, the 
recognition of the potential of this figure by far outweighed these 
hesitations: 45 
Now mental age must not, of course, be thought of as an 
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absolutely unequivocal determination of a subject's 
int~lligence, but only as a very rough quantitative 
characterisation of its value, without any implication as to 
qualitative differences, because one and the same mental age can 
be figured from the most varied sorts of distribution of passed 
and failed tests. But this very thing appears to constitute an 
advantage, rather than a disadvantage of the concept of mental 
age, for it gives expression to a fundamental psychological 
fact... there never is .. a real phenomenological equivalence 
between the intelligence of two persons: what we do have is 
rather a teleological equivalence - when measured in terms of 
the single function of all intelligence, namely, adaptation to 
new requirements... The full significance of [mental age] is 
disclosed only when we consider it in relation to other 
circumstances ••• Doubtless the most significant is the relation 
of mental age to the actual chronological.9&§. of the subject, 
for, as already said, a certain mental level goes normally with 
a certain age, so that the relation of mental to chronological 
age indicates the amount of discrepancy between the intelligence 
present and that required (in the sense of a norm to be 
expected), and in this way affords an expression for the degree 
of the child's intellectual endowment. 
Perhaps it is true, as the familiar criticism goes, that with the 
invention of the Intelligence Quotient, intelligence has become no 
more than 'what intelligence tests measure'. But one must also 
recognise that with the concept of IQ what has happened is that 
social norms and expectations are internalised both within the theory 
of intelligence and the technique of its assessment. The test is not 
merely suited to the administrative demands placed upon it because of 
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the cultural bias of the test items, or the dependence of performance 
upon experience, but because of its ability to produce a single 
numerical measure of an individual's adaptation to social 
requirements. The virtue of the Binet-Simon test was its tacit 
recognition that for individual psychology to enter the spac~ where 
it could become an effective and functioning social knowledge, it 
would have to concern itself less with the laws of an internally 
organised mental domain than with the laws of the adaptation of the 
subject to social and pedagogic exigencies, and with the techniques 
of administration of individuals in respect to the alignment or non-
alignment of the registers of the mental and the pedagogic. 
It was for these reasons that it was the Binet-Simon test which 
first provided the technical means of discrimination and 
ascertainment of feeble-minded children in England. And no doubt the 
opposition of the English eugenic psychologists to this techuique was 
in part responsible for their failure to obtain the position of 
adjudicating agency in respect to these questions. For, as we havtl 
seen, despite the non-medical nature of the criteria which were being 
used for ascertainment, and despite the self-proclaimed 
'psychological' basis of the Binet-Simon test, it was doctors who 
controlled the procedures for administration of mental deficiency. 
As Pa tricia Potts has pointed out "From 1890, when Dr W R Smi th was 
appointed as medical officer to the London School Board, unt~l 1975, 
when the DES circular 2/75 transferred the final say to the 
educational psychologists, doctors certified children as unfit to 
remain in ordinary school.,,46 But nonetheless, it was within this 
administrative framework that a psychology of the individual first 
developed and was socially deployed, and that psychologists began to 
establish themselves as an autonomous professional instance. The 
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conditions of possibility for the emergence of individual psychology 
had now been established. 
Psychologists agains~ doctors 
Even as late as 1920 the psychiatric examinations carried out by 
the school medical officer were generally limited to measuring 
the size of the skull and inspecting the child for 'stigmata of 
degeneracy', 'cranial abnormalities', 'nerve signs', 'symptoms 
of malnutrition or other chronic deficiencies' ••• Treatment was 
mainly physical; and, when that failed, the only remedy was held 
to be segregation. Mental symptoms, mental causes, and 
psychological or social methods of treatment were dismissed as 
the speculative fancies of the layman. ••• by 1912 there were 
strong appeals from teachers and educationalists, urging that, 
except in the grosser cases, the selection of the defective 
children should no longer be left entirely to the medical 
officers. 
Gertrude Keir, 195247 
The doctors certainly came out on top in the first struggles over the 
pathologies thrown up by the school. This was not simply a question 
of their intransigence, their influence in high places or their 
superior status. 48 The school was not an accidental gain for 
medicine; from the start of compulsory and universal schooling 
doctors conceived of the school as a site which was as much medical 
as pedagogic. With the introduction of a universal system of 
education, a transformation could occur in the preventative and 
hygienist medical strategy which had been operative during the 
nineteenth century. The heyday of the social hygiene movement was 
probably in the mid-nineteenth century; by the end of the century the 
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medical language of contagious atmospheres of vice and disease, and 
the concommi tant programmes of sani tisa tion of social space, had 
ceased to provide the terms for political arguments over 'the social 
question'. The new preventative medicine which could organise around 
the school was a medicine of the clinic rather than the epidemic, a 
medicine of cases rather than spaces. 
The first Annual Report of the Chief Medical Officer of the 
Board of Education put it thus: 49 
Preventative medicine;:. has become an appropriate medium for 
the solution of the problems of hygiene in relation to the 
education of the child ••• the centre of gravity of our public 
health system is passing, in some degree, from the environment 
to the individual and from problems of outward sanitation to 
problems of personal hygiene. 
What the school allowed was a generalisation of the clinica..L 
experience to a whole class of individuals. A new site had emerged, 
alongside the hospital, a site which allowed the same sort of 
individualisation, comparison, statisticalisation and so forth, but 
now not in respect of those few who had, for some reason or other, 
come to medicine for treatment, but to all those ~ho, simply by 
virtue of being a certain age, became subject to medical 
investigation. Thus, in neo-hygienism, an individualised clinical 
medicine could serve a generalised, social-hygienic functio~ 
From the start, the School Medical Service, under the eye of 
George Newman who was the Chief Medical Officer at the Board or 
Education from 1907 to 1935, operated within this neo-hygienist 
strategy. The earliest interest of medicine in education had, 
however, been of a rather different order. It concerned the 
potentially deleterious effects of education in schools upon the 
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health of the child. Reading in poor light or with bad print c,Ould 
damage eyesight, sitting at cramped desks for long hours at crucial 
periods of growth could produce physical deformities, damage could be 
done by the 'mental over-pressure' which existed in the elementary 
schools of London. 50 When Dr W R Smith was appointed as Medical 
Officer to the London School Board in 1890, it was along these lines 
that his duties lay. He was to advise on those aspects or the school 
which might affect the health of the child - ventilation, lighting, 
sanitation and so forth. 51 · 
But three years later, when James Kerr was appointed in 
Bradford, the neo-hygienist strategy had already begun to form. 52 It 
began to be recognised that the school could act as a mechanism to 
provide data on the health of all children in the population, and 
that this data could be of great value when processed, tabulated, and 
analysed in various ways. And, at the same time, the school was a 
site where individual diagnostic techniques could be applied to all 
children, and around which an integrated system of treatment could be 
organised. Doctors began to campaign for the social recognition of 
this medical function of the school. In 1896, the Society for the 
Promotion of Hygiene in School Life was formed - Warner, Shuttleworth 
and Langdon Down were key members. And already, the nascent 
individual psychologists recognised the danger that this medica~ 
strategy was to pose to them: Sully, when requested to co-operate, 
declined and strove to maintain the separate existence of the Child 
Study Society.53 But the movement of doctors was growing and 
international, and achieved further publicity in two InternationaL 
Conferences on School Hygiene, the first at Nuremberg in 1904, the 
second in London some four years later. 
Neo-hygienism was the dominant strategy within the debate over 
321 
national deterioration, as it took shape in the first decade of the 
twentietb century. It posed its explanations principally in terms of 
the deleterious effects upon health and physique of poor environment, 
bad food, poor personal hygiene and wasteful and ignorant habits of 
household management. The eugenicist argument in terms of an 
hereditarily transmissible defect manifested in pathologies of 
intellect and calling for a campaign of segregation or sterilisation, 
though active, was limited and subordinate within this debate. What 
was called for, in the main, was a programme of reform of habits of 
cleanliness, feeding, personal and household regimens; this would, if 
successful, improve health and reverse the deterioration of the 
national health and physique. Neo-hygienism found its ideal locus in 
the ~chool. Within it the question of mental defect and feeble-
mindedness occupied a relatively minor position - it was simply one 
element in a complex of symptoms recognisable by a trained medicaL 
gaze. Problems of intellect always needed to be understood wi thin 
the context of the general physical condition, health and cleanliness 
of the child and did not occupy any autonomous or exemplary place in 
relation to them. 
From the Committee of Defective and Epileptic Children to the 
Inter-Departmental Committee on Physical Deterioratio.n, the success 
of neo-hygienism accounted for the proposals which were put forward 
and the authoritative role which was accorded to doctors. The Inter-
Departmental Committee's recommendations on schoolchildren were all 
in this vein: schools should be established for children whose ill-
health made them temporarily unsuited to normal schools; every school 
authority should have the duty to make medical inspections of 
schoolchildren; authorities should be compelled to provide school 
meals for underfed children.54 While the Government balked at 
introduCing the radical interventionist legislation which sucn 
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recommendations enjoined, the Committee on Hedical Inspection and 
Feeding of Children which reported in 1905 did nothing to provide any 
alternative, and indeed made the case more radical by implying that 
even medical inspection left untouched the question of the treatment 
of the conditions it revealed.55 The Education (Provision of Heals) 
Act 1906 contained a clause which compelled local authorities to 
provide for the medical inspection of children. Thus the Schuol 
Hedical Service came into existence, wi th Newman as head of a new 
Hedical Branch of the Board of Educatio~ 
Within this neo-hygienist strategy, the long-standing political 
concern with the popul ation had been inflected once again. It was 
now not a simple rna tter of numbers, of ra tes of birth and dea th, of 
major diseases, of differential rates of reproduction in the 
different classes. It was a matter of fine, and almost indelicate, 
detail. Heigh t, weight, eyesight, hearing, vermin and lice, 
ringworm, washing habits and cleanliness of clothing - all were 
painstakingly investigated, recorded and analyse~ The school was 
the surface upon which all the petty details of the lives of 
individuals could emerge as a domain of problems and objects for 
social reformation. 56 
The tactics of reform were two-pronged. Firstly, there were 
those directed at the child itsel~ The provision of school meals to 
the underfed was clearly aimed at direct and immediate improvement in 
heal th, and at long-term improvement in physique and fitness. But 
doctors were more involved in direct cl inical intervention -
diagnosis of a range of conditions from notifiable diseases, through 
sensory deficiencies of one type of another, to lice or general lack 
of cleanliness, each to be accompanied by recommendations for 
treatment. Newman was at the forefront of those who wished the 
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clinical method of diagnosis in the school to be linked to an 
indigeno~s clinical machinery for treatment. This would avoid' the 
vagaries of parental action or lethargy, or the problems of family 
doctor or hospital, intervening between these two indissociable 
aspects of olinioal medioine. Whilst these olinios were slow to get 
established, the movement soon gathered momentum. The first school 
clinic was opened in Bradford in 1908, and by 1935, when Newman 
retired, over 2,000 had been established throughout England and 
Wales. 57 
But if this all sounds very much like individualised medicine, 
differing only in its universal application to all subjects within a 
given age range, the aspirations of the neo-hygienist strategy went 
far beyond this. For the second tactical prong was one which sought 
to utilise the clinical scrutiny of the child in a oampaign for 
upgrading the hygiene and morals of the home and the space of 
personal existence outside the doctor-child encounter. Newman was 
quite clear on this, in his rebuttal of those who might think that to 
set up such a medical system was to relieve parents of important 
duties and hence to encourage irresponsibility:58 
One of the objects of the new legisltion is to stimulate a sense 
of duty in matters affecting health in the homes ~f the people, 
to enlist the best services and interests of the parents and to 
educate a sense of responsibility for the personal hygiene of 
their childre~.. It is in the home, in fact, that both the seed 
and the fruit of public health are found. 
This is what gave this neo-hygienist strategy a potency and 
flexibility far beyond anything which psycho-eugenics could provide, 
with its impoverished tactic of asoertainment of intellecLual 
I?athology and segregation of those falling a certain way below the 
norm. For neo-hygienism, the school was the fulcrum of a mechanism 
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which could be both universal and individualised, which enlisted the 
child ana family themselves in the reformation of all the previously 
petty and personal matters of quotidian existence - neck scrubbing, 
teeth cleaning, head washing and so forth. The mechanism allowed for 
the generalised insertion into the home, not only of moral principles 
and maxims concerning the virtues of cleanliness and so forth, but of 
the detailed behavioural techniques and modes of personal and 
household management in which they consisted.59 It ailowed for the 
monitoring of those tran~formations which did occur in the home 
through the continued scrutiny of the child who became, as it were, 
the symptom of the state of play in the personal domain. The school 
thus occupied a crucial position within a more general strategy of 
public heal tho It is therefore not surprising tha t the work of the 
School Medical Officer was to be closely associated with that of the 
Medical Officer of Heal th, so much so that in two thirds of 
authorities the same individual fulfilled both rOles.60 
This configuration thus allowed school hygiene, and the 
pa thologies thrown up by the school, to be linked wi th, on the one 
hand, home hygiene, management and morals and, on the other hand, 
wi th the heal th condi tions of the communi ty - notifiable and non-
notifiable diseases, external sanitation and so forth.' By the end of 
the first decade of the twentieth century this was no longer merely 
an ideal programme; it was a formidable apparatus, legally enforced, 
wi th School Medical Officers in every authori ty, wi th every 
schoolchild compulsorily inspected, with the whole enterprise 
supported by public funds, exploiting the existing conceptual and 
technical resources of clinical medicine, and linked in to the 
statutorily established system of public healt~ 
It was not merely professional jealousy, then, which accounts 
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for the opposition of doctors to the involvement of teachers or 
others il1 this apparatus, nor was it merely professional status w'hich 
accounts for the success of this desire for exclusivity. It was a 
function of the way in which the strategy was set up, and the way in 
which it was to operate. From the Defective and EpiLeptic Children 
Committee in the 1890's to the debates over who should supervise 
Special Schools in the 1930's, doctors and teachers were at logger-
heads, and doctors always won. Shuttleworth, Beach, Harris and 
others, in their evidence to the Committee, all stressed that only a 
doctor was capable of diagnosing defects, because this involved 
understanding the particular difficulties which a child was showing 
in the school wi thin a spectrum of illnesses and physical defects 
which may have been causing them. This required an adjudication 
between one diagnosis and another, an adjudication which could only 
be made on the basis of a clinical training from which teachers had 
not benefi ted. 61 Evidence to the Royal Commission on the Care and 
Control of the Feeble-Minded revealed a similar posi tion; as 
Sutherland and Sharp point out, in every case the doctors considered 
themselves to be the only diagnostically competent agents, and in 
every case of ascertainment discussed it was the doctors who had 
indeed made the final decision.62 
Legislation too enshrined the dominant role of medicine. From 
the Elementary Education (Defective and Epileptic Children) Act 1899, 
through the 1907 provisions for inspection of schoolchildren, to the 
Mental Deficiency Act 1913 and the Elementary Education (Defective 
and Epileptic Children) Act 1914 to the Education Acts of 1921 and 
1944, it was always a medical officer of the local authority who was 
vested with the duty and power of ascertainment. And Newman, again, 
was clear on this point - while, of course, an important part was 
played by teachers in making the 1907 legislation work, he deprecatea 
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any attempt to "overburden" them as a result - particularly with any 
part of the work bordering upon the responsibili ties of the school 
doctor. 63 
It was in this conflict between doctors and teachers, and in 
the clear subservience of the latter to the former which was 
established, that the possibility lay for the formation of an 
oppositional alliance. Psychologists and teachers combined around 
the question of ascertainment in respect to the educational problems 
involved in feeble-mindedness in an attempt to isolate a non-medical 
space of diagnosis, decision and school allocation. For, as will 
have already become clear, the English psychologists of the 
individual had failed in their claims to occupy this spac~ and to 
adjudicate on the pathologies of the intellect which the school 
revealed. From 1905 onwards, the psychologists, from within their 
psycho-eugenic strategy, were vociferous in their criticisms of the 
use of the Binet test for the measurement of intelligence and the 
diagnosis of feeble-mindedness. The test, they claimed, was not 
based on any rigorous definition or theory of intelligence; it failed 
to link its measures to identifiable sensory or other variations in 
function; the measures it gave were unreliable and pragmatic; it was 
dangerous for those unversed in psychological knowledge and 
procedures to use this test as a mechanical device for identifying 
defect.64 But however well founded the cri ticisms, it was, as we 
have seen, the Binet-Simon test which was deployed with regularity 
from about 1910 onwards in the ascertainment of feeble-mindedness by 
school doctors. 
Psychologists' historical accounts of this perioa make 
interesting reading. They tend to represent it as a struggle between 
psychological enlightenment and the outmoded and barbarous methods 
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and beliefs of the doctors. Doctors, it is claimed, relied almost 
entirely. upon stigmata and physical signs in the ascertainment of 
feeble-mindedness, and even utilised such absurd diagnostic 
procedures as the measurement of skulls. This is because they were 
under the sway of an organicist illusion - that all mental disorders 
were brain disorders - and they therefore explained educational 
backwardness in terms of cerebral inadequacy or specific brain 
lesions, of latent epilepsy or chorea, of inadequacies in the 
quality, quantity or distribution of the blood. They were, it would 
appear, implacable opponents of "the new-fangled scheme of 
intelligence tests~65 
In fact the evidence suggests something rather different. The 
schedules utilised for the inspection of children referred to School 
Medical Officers on suspicion of mental defect certainly do refer to 
stigmata, but these occupy a relatively minor part of the 
exam ina tion. At least one third of the schedule which Newman 
included in his Report of 1909 concerns general history and family 
background, and one third is specifically devoted to 'psychological' 
questions: reactions of motor mechanisms, reactions to sensory 
stimulation, emotional conditions, 'tests of intelligence' and will-
power.66 And very soon the Binet-Simon tests were included wi thin 
this schedule.67 So it was not the lack of attention to familial or 
psychological intellectual matters which differentiated the neo-
hygienist modes of ascertainment from those advocated by the psycho-
eugenicists. The distinction was rather in the privilege which was 
accorded to the question of intellectual defect and the modes of 
conceptualising it in relation to pathology more generally. 
For the psycho-eugenicists, the fundamental purpose of testing 
was to identify those who were intellectually defective and so should 
be subject to some measure of segregation, permanent if possible and 
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certainly involving curtailment of reproduction; those not wi thin 
this defective group were to be allowed to proceed unfettered. But 
for neo-hygienism, intellectual defect did not have this privilege as 
both the key index of defective stock and the sign of a potential 
threat of degeneration. Not, of course, that once a diagnosis of 
feeble-mindedness had been made, doctors were hesitant about 
advocating permanent institutionalisation and limitation of 
reproduction - though they disputed amongst themselves about the 
relative virtues of segregation and sterilisation.68 But they 
refused to regard the diagnosis of feeble-mindedness as the central 
rationale for inspection, or the test of intelligence as the key 
diagnostic instrument. Mental defect was only one condition of 
concern amongst many, and insti tutionalisa tion was only one option 
within a range of possible tactics and a rather unproductive one at 
that, in that it failed to reach the home environment which was a 
major target of reform. To the extent that the Binet-Simon test took 
its place among the various investigations which doctors used, it was 
just one amongst many; the assessed mental level in and of itself 
never dictated a decision. This needed to be integrated with other 
symptoms of ill health and processed through the expertise of a 
clinician before any course of action could be chosen.' 
Hence the doctors' opposition to the introduction of 
psychologists into this apparatus of ascertainment was posed in the 
same terms as their opposi tion to ascertainment by teachers. 
Psychologists were not trained in clinical methods and were not able 
to situate the intellectual defects which they might observe within 
the complex of other signs and symptoms of illness which might be 
present. Sutherland and Sharp quote the following comment from a 
Medical Officer in 1912, which is worth citing at length, so clearly 
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does it encapsulate this argument: 69 
It ,is proposed that ••• the diagnosis required by the Act is' 
really, if not nominally, to be entrusted to an officer who is 
without medical qualifications. A psychologist who is not an 
expert in medical diagnosis would be sure to over-look diseased 
conditions which a qualified medical man would discover and 
hence, in my opinion, the proposed course introduces a grave 
element of danger ••• Any new psychological methods which have 
been proposed in the last decade have received full notice and 
experimental tests in connection with special school work, so 
far as they are applicable, and the specialised defects owe 
their description to the medical officers working among the 
mental defectives in schools and colonies in this and other 
countries. The psychologist is thus already employed, but a new 
principle is introduced by the proposal to employ for diagnosis 
of mental defect one who has not a training in medical methods 
and in nervous and mental disorders. 
This comment was made during the discussions which did indeed 
lead to the appointment of a psychologist, Cyril Burt, to the London 
County Council, to be involved in the diagnosis of children with 
mental defect. But it would be misleading to see Burt's appointment 
as evidence of the success of the psycho-eugenic arguments over the 
neo-hygienists' prioritisation of the clinical gaze of medicine. The 
appointment of a psychologist was, rather, a tactical compromise 
between a number of competing positions. There certainly were 
psychologically trained educationalists - mainly school inspectors 
trained on Sully's textbooks and often veterans of the Psychological 
Labora tory of Uni versi ty College - who sough t to break the hold of 
medicine over the diagnosis of intellectual pathology. But there 
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were also teachers and administrators concerned with the consequences 
of medicl?-l diagnosis. School Hedical Officers were thought to be too 
liberal in their ascertainments, considering that every backward 
child would benefit from the small classes and individual teaching 
methods of the special schools. Teachers objected to what they saw 
as an over-extension of medicine into properly pedagogic matters. 
Finance committees objected to the expense involved. Parents 
objected to the stigma which allocation to a special school attached 
to their children. And Burt's role was to mediate between these 
pressures, and to act as a check upon excessive ascertainment. It 
was certainly not a sign of the acceptance of the arguments which he 
and others had been producing; it was rather that the field of 
oppositions between doctors, teachers and administrators had opened a 
space into which individual psychology could be inserted.70 
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The limits or psycho eugenics 
Although -Burt's part-time appointment did lead to the opening of what 
he termed a 'Psychological Clinic', which would examine and report on 
individual children referred by teachers and doctors, there was no 
question of any general displacement of medicine as the authorised 
diagnostic instance in cases of intellectual pa thology. The 
aspirations of the psychology of the individual to an autonomous 
clinical role for psychology were not to be realised within this 
configura tion around menti3.l defect and its ascertainment. In the 
question of ascertainment, the role which psychologists were to play 
was precisely that stated by the Hedical Officer quoted earlier; not 
to become the professional agency of diagnosis, but to provide the 
technical meahs of investigation of intelligence. And this was not 
to involve a displacement of the Binet-Simon test, but a lengtny work 
of inflection and reformulation of the test to bring it into line 
with the theoretical demands of psycho-eugenics. 
In 1914, Burt devoted a two-part article to a criticism of the 
Binet test, probably written at just the same time as his appointment 
to the London County Council. Whilst he redeployed the familiar 
criticisms, he nonetheless could not fail to recognise the conflict 
between the force of these objections to the test and the practical 
role which the test had already obtained. He began by posino the 
question as if it were an open one, al though at the same time 
covertly stressing psychology's claim over medicine: 71 
In the practical sphere, psychological tests have recently 
acquired an especial value as our only reliable means of 
diagnosing mental deficiency... The task of ascertaining what 
children suffer from such inborn mental defects has, by an Act 
of Parliament now about to come into force, been made 
compulsory. Upon these grounds we are faced with an urgent 
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questio~ What scheme of tests, suited for either theoretical 
or practical purposes, is now available? 
But, of course, he was forced to recognise that the pracvical 
si tua tion, after the recommendation of the Chief Medical Officer in 
1913, was that the Binet test threatened to eclipse all other 
methods, in particular the psycho-eugenic devices which were based on 
correlational, rather than age-scale principles. Burt was trenchant 
in his enumeration of the limitations of the Binet test: its lack of 
theoretical clari ty; the heterogenei ty of the tests; the fact that 
test construction should come after the analysis of intelligence into 
its general and specific capacities; the dependence of the test upon 
acquired rather than innate characteristics, especially language; the 
need for correlational studies to eliminate the influence of the 
environment; the problem that to claim a relationship of intelligence 
to age implies a uniform and unilinear growth of intelligence and 
that the attempt to unify differences in intelligence along a single 
dimension cannot account for the heterogeneity of mental defect. On 
the basis of this catalogue of criticisms, which may come as a 
surprise to those today who unknowingly recycle the same complaints 
against the work of Burt himself, he concluded:72 
Except for practical and popular purposes, then, Binet's 
intention of measuring native intelligence in terms of mental 
years seems impracticable. It is like measuring stature with an 
elastic rod, warped in two or three places along its length, and 
telescoped in upon itself at the upper end. 
However, Burt was astute enough to recognise that, by now, 
replacement of the test was not possible. He adopted a more subtle 
and insidious plan of revision and standardisation, using the 
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cl assical correlational techniques of psycho-eugenics, in order to 
shift the Binet test into line with the biological, psychological and 
statistical requirements of the eugenic strategy. Burt's work at the 
London County Council was largely an attempt to realise this plan. 
And, by 1920, the task had by and large been accomplished: the 
synonymity of intelligence with what the test measured, but now 
backed by a theory of intelligence as a normally dist'ributed, innate, 
heritable, general cognitive capacity. The influential Report of the 
Consul ta ti ve Commi t tee on Psychological Tests of Educable Capacity 
and their Possible Use in the Public System of Education exemplifies 
this new synthesi~ 
The Committee, which was chaired by Haddow, had Ballard, Myers 
and Spearman amongst its members; its Report was mainly written by 
Burt. The Report was clear about the advantage of mental tests: 73 
they provided a method of comparing children in respect of their 
inborn capacity and thus of selecting the best candidates for 
higher instruction, and sifting out defectives and dull children 
for treatment by special educational methods. 
And, in addi tion, tests minimised environmental conditions, were a 
basis for the prediction of educational capacities, provided an 
objective standard of judgment, took account of age" and required 
less time for administration than other forms of examine. tion. Not 
only did the test possess all the advantages which Burt had claimed 
it lacked ten years earlier, but they now reached to that very core 
which was the target of Psycho-eugenics:74 
What tests of intelligence measure, therefore, is inborn, all 
round, intellectual abilit~ 
It is not surprising that Burt was now able to accord the test the 
very ability and function which he had denied and criticised for so 
long. At the beginning of his now classic Mental and Scholastic 
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Tests, in which his revised and standardised Binet-Simon tests were 
first published, he wrote: 75 
No appeal is more often addressed to the psychologist than the 
demand for a mental footrule. Teachers, inspectors, school 
medical officers, care committee visitors, the officers of the 
juvenile criminal courts, all have long felt the need for some 
such instrument ••• 
And in the revamped, standardised intelligence test, individual 
psychology had establishe'd the congrui ty be tween social norms and 
statistical norms which was fundamental to it theoretical existence, 
its classificatory tactics, and its strategic aspirations. 
The 1920's saw a flood of literature on tests and testing, new 
standardisations, surveys and experiments, guides for the use of the 
tests in diagnosis. 76 Though the tests were modified, re-
standardised, new content introduced and old items dropped, the 
technique of the test, and the conception of what it was that it 
measured, was to remain virtually unchallenged for some forty years. 
Phillip Ballard was, perhaps, being only slightly over-rhetorical 
when he wrote in 1920:77 
Binet's crowning glory is, not that he got together a medley of 
heterogeneous tests for the detection of the feeble-minded, but 
that he invented a scale. In this he resembles Saul, the Son of 
Kish, who set out to look for asses and found a kingdom. 
The tests were, indeed, the gateway to the psychological 
kingdom, but they themselves were not sufficient to found individual 
psychology's claim to provide an alternative theory, method and 
practice to medicine. They did not succeed in staking out a field in 
which individual psychology could become a clinical and diagnostic 
instance in its own right, with its own vocabulary of pathologies, 
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forms of explanation and modes of treatment. The psychology of 
ability constrained itself too much, its role was never more than the 
provision of the techniques and instruments which would form a part, 
but only a part, of the assessment of degrees of mental defect. 
Of course, testing had functions beyond the field of mental defect, 
for the field of application of the instrument in the eyes of the 
English psycho-eugenicists was always across the whole span of human 
abili ty. The two other pr'incipal fields of applica tion of testing 
were in vocational guidance and in selection for secondary educatio~ 
In respect of the former, undertaken by C S Myers at the National 
Institute of Industrial Psychology, Burt again was active, as part-
time head of the Vocational Section.78 The main work on group tests 
of intelligence was carried out by Godfrey Thomson.79 Gillian 
Sutherland estimates that seventy out of one hundred and forty-six 
local authorities used group tests of intelligence for the purposes 
of selection at some point between 1919 and 1940, most commonly the 
Moray House tests which Thomson devised. 80 Interestingly, Sutherland 
notes that the alliance which psychologists and teachers had forged 
over the question of ascertainment of intellectual defect for 
individual children did not apply in respect of these group tests. 
Teachers frequently opposed the introduction of these devices, a 
resistance to psychological techniques at a local level which 
Sutherland attributes to a number of factors. There was, she argues, 
a heritage in which 'measurement' was associated wi th the detested 
system of 'payment-by-resul ts'. The National Union of Teachers had 
waged a lengthy struggle to emancipate pedagogy from these externally 
imposed forms of judgment, and the introduction of group testing 
raised again the suspicion that the results of such mass examinations 
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would be used not simply to evaluate pupils, but also to assess the 
quali ty ,of the schooling they were being given. In addi tion, 
teachers themselves claimed the right and the expertise to aSSeSS the 
performance of pupils, and the importation of techniques from another 
discipline threatened this aspect of their still precarious social 
and intellectual authori ty, as well as removing much valued 
discretionary powers. Sutherland argues that, as a result of factor~ 
like these, many local authori ties and teachers, though they might 
have experimented with the ~ests, relied instead upon the tradi~iona~ 
methods of interview and examination. 81 
Much has been written on the future of tests of intelligence in 
selection and streaming after the installation of the tripartite 
system of education in the Education Act of 1944.82 But however 
successful individual psychology was in providing the technology of 
measurement and allocation, this was not equivalent to the 
establishment of an autonomous field of judgment and operation in 
respect of mental pathologies. In the late 1920s and the 1930s, 
psychology was to try again around a different set of problems. 
These did not prioritise the intellectual variabilities and dericits 
of individuals, and thus the task of distributing individuals to 
appropriate institutions on the grounds of intellectu~l leve~. They 
concerned the registering and adjustment of problems of character and 
temperament, of will and emotions. There were a number of elements 
involved here. 
Firstly, by the 1920s, the centrality accorded to the problem 
of mental deficiency in social and poli tical argument was on the 
wane. Not that legislative activity ceased. The Wood Committee was 
set up jointly by the Board of Education and the Board of Control in 
1924, particularly to examine the confusion which had been created in 
the earlier Acts over the division of powers between different 
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authori ties in provision for defectives, especially for children. 
Before it reported, the Mental Deficiency Act 1927 had tinkered 
slightly wi th the Act of 1913, to allow for cases where illness or 
injury produced mental defect during childhood or adolescence rather 
than at birth. It also stressed the duty of local authorities to 
ascertain and supervise defectives, but reduced the emphasis upon 
segregation in favour of supervision outside institutions.83 
When the Wood Committee finally reported, in 1929, it attempted 
to reconcile two apparent conflicts. 84 There was the conflict 
between the posi tion which demanded segrega tion of defectives and 
that which accepted the possibility of non-institutional supervisiun 
as an alternative. And there was the problem that the growing 
emphasis on environmental and social factors in the product~on of 
mental deficiency conflicted with the commitment of the expert 
members of the Committee, who included Tredgold, Burt and Pinsent, to 
the notion of inherited and irremediable defect calling for 
compul sory curtail ment of reproduction. Follow ing Tredgold' s 
classification, the Wood Committee distinguished between primary and 
secondary amentia. The latter was non-heritable, individually 
caused, through illness or injury, and ameliorable through some form 
of intervention. The former, however, was the real problem. Primary 
amentia was the last stage of inheri tance of the degeneracy of the 
subnormal group. Far from being a tiny minority, this subnormal 
group cons ti tuted the lowest ten th of the popula tion - the insane, 
the paupers, the criminals, the alcoholics, the prostitutes and the 
unemployables. Here the Commi ttee rehearsed the familiar eugenic 
argument - the group must be prevented from propagating its own kind 
and dragging down the rest of the communi tYi segrega tion or 
sterilisation were the only methods possible. This was not a case, 
338 
by and large, for legislation, but for a more systematic, vigorous 
and effeptive administration of the present legislation. It'was 
vital that the work of ascertainment of mental defect, so often 
carried out in a hurried and partial way by school doctors looking 
only for the physical signs of deficiency, should be made more 
rigorous, and that the criteria used in ascertainment should not be 
physical or educational but be those of social inefficiency. Only 
then would the 'social problem group' be identified for compulsory 
and certain treatment. 85 
Li t tle appears to have resul ted from this resta tement of the 
psycho-eugenic programme in such stark terms, except for the 
establishment of yet another Committee. The Wood Committee 
equivocated, largely on practical grounds, on the question of 
legalising sterilisation for defectives; the Brock Committee, set up 
by the Board of Control to consider this quesion, reported in 1934. 
Its eugenic premise was made explicit in its terms of reference: 86 
To examine and report on the information available regarding the 
hereditary transmission and other causes of mental disorder and 
deficiency; to consider the value of sterilisation as a 
preventative measure having regard to its physical, 
psychological and social effects and the experience of 
legislation in other countries •.• 
Whilst hedging their bets on the question of causation in any 
individual case, the Committee was clear that mental disorder and 
defect was transmissible in the majority of cases, and that, when it 
was heredi tary, it was 1 inked to the famil iar forms of degeneracy 
from insani ty to epilepsy. They also concluded tha t mental defect 
was more frequent in the lower stratum of society, where inneri ted 
conditions played a large part in the conditions of the social 
problem group: that "relatively small section of the community the 
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families of which show a high incidence of chronic pauper~sm, 
physical disease, infantile mortality, neglect of children, habitual 
crime, mental disease and mental defect."87 
The Brock Committee recommended that sterilisation should be 
legalised, though on a voluntary basis and subject. to legal 
safeguards. And they concluded with what was perhaps the last 
official plea for a eugenic strategy, and therefore worth quoting at 
length: 88 
we were impressed by the dead weight of social inefficiency and 
individual misery which is entailed by the existence in our 
midst of over a quarter of a million mental defectives and of a 
far larger number of persons who without being certifiably 
defective are mentally subnormal. This mass of defectives and 
subnormals is being steadily recruited and is probably growing. 
Certainly nothing is being done to diminish it beyond the 
segregation of a portion of those more obviously unfitted for 
community life. In the second place, we were increasingly 
impressed by the injustice of refusing to those who have good 
grounds for believing that they may transmit mental defect or 
disorder and who are in every way unfitted for parenthood the 
only effective means of escaping from a burden which they have 
every reason to dread... Without some measure of sterilisation 
these unhappy people will be doomed from birth to misery and 
defect. We can see neither logic nor justice in denying these 
people what is in effect a therapeutic measure. 
But their recommendations were never turned into legislation, 
and their plea already sounded outmoded. Certainly the events in 
Nazi Germany sounded the death knell for the claim of such a eugenic 
strategy to respectability. But it is worth asking why it was that 
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the psycho-eugenic programme had such a limited impact over the whole 
of its active life in the first thirty years of ~he twentieth 
century, despite the influence of its promoters, the vigour of its 
'publicity, the apparently propitious time of its launching and its 
substantial theoretical back-up. No doubt one could put this down to 
na tural revul sion, and the tem pta tion of hindsight is to feel that 
such a scheme was never compatible with our native notions of justice 
and humani ty. Yet such an anachronistic judgment fails to account 
for the fact that the proponents of the eugenic schema saw themselves 
as humane and enlightened, and the opposition to them was seldom 
posed in these moralistic terms. Certainly the opposition from the 
medical neo-hygienists who were installed in key positions by 
legislation was crucial. But what was it about this neo-hygienist 
strategy which allowed it to function and extend itself whilst the 
eugenic strategy ran into a cul-de-sac? An explanation in terms of 
the superior status of the medical profession seems to assume what it 
sets out to demonstrate, and ignores the fact that whilst neo-
hygienism was certainly a medical strategy, many doctors supported 
psycho-eugenics from positions of power and influence - Tredgold was 
a key example. And the eugenicists played such a central role in the 
official enquiries we have just discussed, yet still to no avail. 
One answer can be constructed in terms of bourgeois liberties 
and individual rights - the argument that the economic and political 
systems of bourgeois democracies depend upon the existence of 
individuals equipped with personal rights. The degree of curtailment 
of such rights necessary for the effective implementation of a full 
scale programme of negative eugenics, involving everytning from 
compulsory segregation,and sterilisation at one extreme to the 
licensing of marriage and procreation at the other would be 
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incompatible with such a fundamental doctrine. But even so, fairly 
radical !lleasures of compulsion and intervention were proposed' and 
implemented at the turn of the century, and such an argument would 
find it hard to explain why even the limited eugenic proposals in 
respect to mental deficiency obtained so tenuous a hold on reallty. 
The argument proposed in the present study is rather different. 
What eugenics entails is a direct coercive intervention into the 
sphere of personal existence, an intervention which operates by, 
first of all, ascertainin~ who is pathological, and how many such 
individuals there are, and secondly by removing and isolating these 
dangerous elements to prevent their number increasing still further. 
This strategy works by an attempt to subtract, as it were, the 
pathological from the normal: it is negative and deductive. It 
leaves the 'normal' untouched, and where it does intervene into 
families to remove individuals its objective is to prevent sucn 
families from functioning, or rather malfunctioning, spawning more 
defective progeny and acting as a focus of illness, vice and defect. 
The identification of pathology is thus the occasion for disabling 
the family. But we have already seen that the neo-hygienist strategy 
is both wider in scope and more flexible in application than this. 
It certainly has disablement and segregation as one of , the weapons in 
its armoury. But it does not limit itself to the neutralisation of 
this pathological minority; it aims rather to utilise its clinica.l 
expertise in a preventative way, through moralising, training, 
reforming those who fall within the range of the normal. To injecv 
new norms of health and household management into the home through 
the instrument of the child. To make the family take onto itself the 
responsi bili ty for its own hygiene - not merely to urge this as a 
moral or religious duty, or for the sake of propriety, but to produce 
it at the level of the detailed techniques of washing, body 
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maintenance, habits of eating and defecating and so forth. And it is 
also a strategy more compatible with the doctrine of personal 
autonomy and individual liberty, for what are urged as duties and 
responsibilities will also have to be accepted by family members as 
their own desires. 
It is along these lines of development that social POllCy 
proceeded during the 1920s. A strategy of this type was adopted and 
generalised. It entailed not ascertainment and segregation of the 
socially inefficient but' 'the promotion of family welfare, the 
production of beneficial behaviours, habi ts and wishes wi thin the 
'private' space of the family, aided by a growing number of 
professionals with expertise in these areas which could be called 
upon. It was here that a new space opened for the operation of 
psychological agents, techniques and theories in the period after the 
First World War. This space formed in the network of relations 
between the school, the family and the juvenile court. The new 
objects which were produced here were not the mental defectives but 
children with disorders of temperament, emotion and behaviour, 
maladjusted or delinquent children. Around them was created a new 
insti tutional form - the Child Guidance Clinic - and a new psycho-
social s tra tegy. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
HYGIENE AND WELFARE 
Medicine in the nineteenth century construed its social concerns in 
terms of the effects of unhealthy circumstances upon vulnerable human 
bodies. It conceived and promoted grand schemes of environmental 
reform in this light - reforms of housing conditions, clean air, 
purification of water and food, efficient sewage disposal and so 
forth. This way of conceptualising the genesis and prevention of 
disease, based upon a medicine of social spaces and miasmatic 
communication, provided the nineteenth century with the means to 
understand many other social ills, such as vice and delinquency, in 
terms of the spread of contagion through an unheal thy moral 
atmosphere. In the first two decades of the twentieth century this 
strategy was displaced by another, which focussed not on the 
environment but on the individual, not on external reforms but on 
family habits, not on the prevention of disease but on the promotion 
of health and welfare, through hygiene at the leve~ of personal 
conduct. Neo-hygienism was the strategy within which a range of new 
measures concerning infant mortali ty were developed. It also 
provided the terms in which many other social problems were 
conceived, ,and the rationale for the proliferating acti vi ties of 
'welfare work' which began to fill out the space between social 
expectations and personal existence. 
It also provided a new way of thinking about problems of mental 
pathology. This sought to break down the stigma surrounding 'lunacy' 
and 'madness' in order to facilitate early and preventive treatment 
of such conditions, and hence reduce the amount of crime, immorality 
and social inefficiency which they gave rise to. The movement for 
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mental hygiene and mental welfare forged a new link between childhood 
pathology and socially undesirable conduct, one that did not 
prioritise ascertainment and segregation but care through early 
treatment and prophylaxis through the promotion of good mental health 
practices in the home. It now appeared that minor mental 
disturbances of childhood, if left untreated, could lead to major 
social troubles; that these disturbances could be produced or 
prevented by certain sorts of relations within the family; and that 
they could be cured by early treatment. This conception linked to 
another, developing around the juvenile court, which regarded 
youthful delinquency as an expression of mental pathology rather than 
of evil intent. Here, too, a continuity was proposed between 
criminal and non-criminal disorders of childhood. This second line 
of argument also priori tised early intervention into families and 
reformatory treatment of children in order to prevent future 
criminality and promote social efficiency. 
In these events, a new field of problems emerged, with the 
maladjusted schoolchild and the delinquent juvenile as its central 
figures. Around these children, a new insti tu tional si t;e was 
developed - the child guidance clinic - which individual psychology 
would try to make its ow n. But its success was partial; it was not 
the psychology of the normal distribution curve and the standardised 
test which provided the expertise in this domain, but a 'new 
psychology'. This proposed a different way of conceptualising the 
genesis of disorders of conduct, different techniques of diagnosis 
and reform, and a different conception of the nature of the family 
and the means and objectives of intervention. It was this 'new 
psychology', rather than the psychology of the individual, which 
would eventually allow the emergence of a non-medica! instance of 
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diagnosis and therapy. These events, which are the sUbject. of the 
final three chapters of this study, thus laid the foundations for the 
'psycho-social' strategy which reached its heyday after the Second 
World War. 
The hygienic mother and child 
The centre of gravity of preventive medicine has in rec~nt years 
shown a tendency to move, in some degree, from the environment 
to the person - not that the environment is unimportant, but 
that in highly civilised States the individual has now become 
relatively more important... Recent advances ••• have shown the 
growing inportance of the individual - of his heredity, 
upbringing, habits, and physical training, his rest and work, 
his hours of labour, and his innate and acquired powers of 
resistance to disease. In order to secure a healthy nation we 
must first obtain healthy individuals. This is the reason why -
almost imperceptibly - we are moving from external conditions to 
personal characteristics, from the study of the environment to 
the study of the mother, the child, and the adult; or, in other 
words, to the problems of maternity, of child welfare, and of 
insurance against ill health of the individual. 
George Newman, 19141 
Neo-hygienism transformed the field of public health through the 
individualisation of preventive medicine. Public healtn was no 
longer a matter of the relationship between passive and receptive 
bodies and an environment which might or might not be pathogenic -
entailing action at the level of clean air, pure water, sufficient 
and sui table food, sa tisfactory housing and improved domestic 
sanitation, though these remained important. It was now also a 
matter of health as a positive value, as something to be achieved at 
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the level of family regime and individual habits. Health was to be 
regulated at the level of personal conduc~ Hence, as Newman put it 
in 1919 "the relationship between morality and preventive medicine is 
intimate and profound.,,2 
The principle terms of this strategy were hygiene and welfare. 
The hygienic management of one's bodily functions, of one's habits, 
of one's personal environment, of one's encounters with others. The 
welfare of those whose health depended upon the hygienic conduct of 
others. A whole range of social problems appeared in terms 01' 
hygiene and welfare, the lack of them, the need to promote them. Of 
particular significance were the decline in the birth-rate in the 
early decades of the twentieth century, the loss of life in the First 
World War, and the further decline in births in the twenties and 
thirties. Around these issues the old concern with infant mortality 
and the conservation and promotion of the health of the population in 
general, and children in particular, was re-awakened, but it was now 
construed in neo-hygeinist terms. 3 At the level of the school the 
danger was tackled through changes in school design, recommendations 
that classes be held in the open-air, and in campaigns for open-air 
infant and nursery schools where infants could be tended, washed and 
fed, and exposed to the beneficial effects of fresh air. 4 The 
strategy was provided with a pedagogic back-up through the argument 
that physical health was not only of value in itself, but was also a 
condi tion of intellectual heal tho Special open-air schools were 
started for 'delicate children' where fresh air, healthy exercise and 
personal hygiene were to strengthen those who were debilitated 
through the lack of them. This regime was also prescribed for those 
wi th incipient pulmonary tuberculosis, and those who were nervous, 
excitable or otherwise unable to attend ordinary schools with the 
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required regularity.5 The attack on venereal disease was similarly 
conducted through a campaign for social hygiene.6 
The techniques of the neo-hygienist strategy were pioneered in 
the attack on tuberculosis, involving the development of dispensary 
based mechanisms of inspection, diagnosis and observation, 
information and education, coupled with the designation of specific 
si tes for specialised treatment and the alloca tion of pa tients to 
them.7 However most pertinent for our current concerns was the 
central focus of neo-hygienism upon the family. This is because when 
the psycho-social strategy displaced neo-hygienism it was through a 
shift in the conception of the family and the objectives of social 
intervention into family life. For neo-hygienism, the family was an 
apparatus for the physical care and hygienic management 'of the child 
and for its moral and social educa tion - in short, for its welfare. 
The object was not merely the conservation of children, but the 
production of physically efficient bodies and socially productive 
habits. The means was the training of mothers in diet - with the 
provision of both guidance as to nutrition and dietary supplements if 
necessary - the inculcation of the habits of cleanliness and the 
techniques for achieving it, the promotion of maternal efficiency in 
so far as the requirements of a healthy child were concerned, and the 
constitution of the mother as the individual responsible for the 
proper management of the home. Children were to be regularly 
scrutinised, not simply for the purposes of diagnosis of illness and 
remedial action, but also to pick up signs of family malfunctionir~. 
Steps could then be set in hand for the remedy of such malfunction; 
where it proved intractable the child was to be removed and relouated 
in a substitute family. School medical inspection and school meals, 
discussed in the last chapter, formed one prong of this family 
strategy. The infant and child welfare movement formed another. It 
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is pertinent to consider this movement in order to map out the 
essential features of neo-hygienism in the period immediately before 
and after the First World War. 
The many conferences, reports and publications concerning inf~nt 
mortality in the early decades of the twentieth century saw the high 
numbers of infant deaths as both indicative of the low physica~ 
efficiency of the population and as a particular squandering of a 
resource which the nation required both for its defence and for its 
industry.8 vlhilst deaths in the first month of life were largely a 
consequence of the unfitness of the infant itself, and thus both 
difficult to prevent and eugenic in their consequences, deaths 
subseq uently were the resul t of infectious disease, poor diet and 
lack of hygiene. These were themselves the result of failures of 
motherhood and were to be prevented through the construction of an 
elabora te apparatus of scrutiny and rectification. Hence the 
occasion and objective of intervention was the child, but the 
instrument was the mother. 
The strategy initially involved the bringing of all new-born 
infants into the field of inspection, enabling the mothers to be 
reached through through their babies. It entailed a number of 
elements: promotion of the use of trained and salaried midwives; 
compulsory notification of births; employment of health visitors to 
visit the homes of all new-born babies whose birth had been notified; 
setting up infant welfare centres, 'Baby Welcomes' and schools for 
mothers to which new mothers could be directed for the inspection of 
children and for the instruction of mothers; provision of milk and 
food for necessitous mothers and infants; establishing day nurseries 
where appropriate levels of hygiene could be maintained and the 
354 
progress of children could be moni tored. Voluntary organisa tions 
prolifer-ated - the National Association for Prevention of Infant 
Mortality and the Promotion of Welfare of Children under Schuol Age, 
the Association of Infant Consul ta tions and Schools for Mothers, and 
many more at national and local levels, By 1916 there were over 160 
branches of voluntary organisations and 35 local authorities running 
infant welfare centres, backed by the urgings of the Local Gov~rnment 
Board and the Chief Medical Officer of the Board of Education. And in 
1918, the Ma terni ty and Child \~ el fare Act required each loca.L 
authority to set up a maternal and child welfare committee, and 
empowered them to provide the other functions for which som~ central 
funding was to be made available.9 
The target of this strategy of scrutiny and instruction was the 
working class mother. Whilst some reckoned the middle class mother 
was equally ignorant, but that her superior standard of living 
ameliorated the malign consequences, no similar countervailing 
influences existed for the mother of the working class. As Newman 
put it: "the principle operating influence is the ignorance of the 
mother and ~ remedy is ~ education of the mother".10 For "it is 
not external environment which primarily affects the infant mortality 
and produces that prematurity, pneumonia, atrophy, and much of that 
diarrhoea which occur in infant life. These things are procured by 
some evil conditions in the habits and homes of the people which are, 
after all, the vitals of the nation.,,11 Indeed the main cause of 
infant mortality was diarrhoea, which resulted from contamination in 
the home, dirty feeding bottles and dummies and other removable evils 
which were to be counteracted by raising maternal efficiency, 
persuading mothers of their maternal duties and educating them in the 
ways of carrying them out. There were three main channels through 
which influence could be brought by the State to secure the physical 
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efficiency of children: through the promotion of healthy mothe~hood 
by attention to the physical condition of the mother; through the 
promotion of healthy infancy, by instructing and trainlng the mother 
in how to bring up her child after i tIs birth, and providing 
assistance when she was not able to care for it efficiently; through 
the promotion of heal thy childhood, by means of systematic medical 
supervision and education in hygiene during school life. 12 
Mothers-to-be could be educated in the schools - the Board of 
Education first issued its Memorandum on the Teaching of Infant Care 
and Management in the Public Elementary Schools in 1910. This 
advocated instruction of schoolgirls in the domestic arts of proper 
feeding, tem perance, housekeeping, infant care and the dangers of 
domestic dirt. But more immediately, the Schools for Mothers, Baby 
Welcomes and Infant Welfare Centres combined individual scrutiny of 
babies and advice on management - in Infant Consul ta tions - wi th 
classes and instructions designed to convey information, instil 
responsibility and encourage pride in the home and family. Since 
attendance at such centres was voluntary, and unlikely therefore to 
reach those most in need of intervention, the centre was also 
utilised as the base from which a more comprehensive scrutiny could 
be undertaken. To each centre were attached health visi~ors, who 
would visit all homes where births were notified, classify them 
according to the efficiency of the mother, repeat visits as often as 
necessary (ranging from once a month or more for the bad homes to not 
at all for the better class homes).13 Thus if inefficient mothers 
could not be persuaded to attend the centres, instruction would 
nevertheless reach into the heart of the home itsel~ 
McCleary gives some idea of the scale of this exercise. At the 
end of 1933, 2,938 health visitors were employed by local 
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authorities, 2,546 by voluntary associations. Together they 
undertoo.k 505,674 visits to expectant mothers that year, of which 
179,682 were first visits; 3,316,903 visits to children under one 
year of age, of which 570,830 were first visits; and 4,437,300 visits 
to children between the ages of one and five. 14 
Middle class mothers, exempted from such a strategy, were 
moralised through child care manuals, the blandishments of exp~rts on 
motherhood and of the manufacturers of baby products. 15 Feminist 
organisations espoused the new doctrines of motherhood, emphasis~~ 
the need to protect the 'mothers of the race', and therefore also to 
eliminate, through ante-natal care, the dangers associated with 
childbirth. But it was the working class family that was the central 
focus of neo-hygienism. Let us recapi tul ate the elements of this 
strategy. 
Neo-hygienism sought to link two princip~l sites. Firstly, a 
site in which whole classes of individuals might be inspected. These 
inspections had a number of functions. They would pick up 
pathologies. They would analyse and organise the knowledge of 
populations so produced. They were linked into treatment, ei ther 
undertaking it directly, or directing and moni toring treatment in 
home or school, or acting as a means of classification and 
distribution of pathological individuals to specialised treatment 
insti tutions - hospi tals, special schools, sani toria or whatever. 
The clinic was the principal place for performing these functions. 
In the clinic, condi tions could be documented and recordea, norms 
could be established and individuals classified in relation to them, 
specific diseases or departures from norms of functioning could be 
identified, and certain signs could be read - lice, dirty necks, 
unclean teeth and so forth - which were important not so much in 
themselves but because they were symptoms of something else - poor 
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hygiene in the home. 
The home was the crucial site of prophylaxis. The prophylacLic 
site was where ill health could be prevented, and, crucially, where 
conduct which would produce good health could be promoted through the 
insertion of norms of hygiene. This could, to some extent, take 
place in the treatment institutions themselves, through the 
instruction of pathological individuals in appropriate modes of 
behaviour. It could take place in the schools through the 
utilisation of appropriate lessons and the inculcation of appropriate 
habits. But the home was the object ~ excellence of the neo-
hygienist strategy. For it was here that pathological conditions 
could operate or be prevented as a consequence of hygienic management 
by mothers. And it was here that welfare could be promoted through 
the adoption of a correct dietary regime, and correc~ techuiques of 
washing, cleaning, clothing, as well as the avoidance or suppression 
of such harmful habits as coughing, spitting and sneezing. 
Inspection and prevention had to be linked in order tha t the 
detection of a sign in the clinic could lead to a rect,ification in 
the home, or in order that the development of these signs of 
pathology might be prevented by anticipatory action. The linkage 
could be effected in three principle ways: through the' child; through 
the mother or through various welfare agents. It is worth discussi~ 
each in turn, for when the psycho-social strategy displaces neo-
hygienism it entails a transformation in the way each is conceived. 
The child was, of course, the stake in the whole business. 
What was the child for neo-hygienism? The answer must be in terms of 
the body. A body which conformed to normal standards of development 
in terms of height, weight, muscular co-ordination and so forth. A 
body unmarked by caries, rickets or incipient tuberculosis. A body 
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uninfested by lice, and free from the condi tions in which such 
infestat~ons might flouris~ A body, therefore, which conducted its 
personal habits in a hygienic fashion. But a hygienic regime of the 
body did not limit its aspirations to the production of fodder fit 
enough for the d~mands of the battlefield or the factory. For the 
moralisation of the everyday which was entailed in the promotion of 
hygiene and welfare had effects more directly moral as well. The 
habits and conducts of the body which were to promote its physical 
welfare were also moral, in the traditional religious sense of rules 
of right conduct and in the nineteenth century sense of pertaining to 
the space of character. To promote physical welfare, the child was 
to be trained up in cleanliness, regular habits, avoidance of excess 
and intemperance and so forth. In this sense, the promotion of the 
'mental hygiene of the mother and child was an essential element of 
the strategy. Neo-hygienism sought to instil personal 
responsibili ty for one's own health into this moral space - hygiene 
and welfare entailed the active co-operation of individuals in the 
promotion of their own bodily efficiency. 
The role of the child was active in another sense as well. 
Inspected in the school clinic or moralised in the school curriculum, 
the older child could carry back to the home approp~iate norms of 
conduct in matters such as personal cleanliness and the management of 
various bodily functions. However, these norms were to be effeuted 
principally through the agency of the mother, who was the key to the 
technical possibility of neo-hygienism. The neo-hygienist mother was 
not so much an individual as the embodiment of the home itself. As 
Newman put it in his report for 1914, "The environment of the infant 
is its mother".16 Her role was to actualise the instructions of the 
pedagogues of home and child management in the regime of the home 
itself. She was, that is to say, a mere assemblage of habits - bad 
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budgeting to be turned into good, an indifference to household dirt 
to be transformed into a campaign against it, the use of feeding 
bottles and dirty dummies to be replaced preferably by the breast, 
but if not at least by instruments and contents duly boiled, diluted, 
delivered according to instructions. True, these habi ts were, as it 
were, integrated wi thin and a product of character - ignorance and 
fecklessness to be turned into conscientiousness and responsibility. 
The efficient mother was one who conducted the tasks of welfare in an 
hygienic manner - and that was virtually all there was to it. It was 
true, as well, that these interventions into the family were 
accompanied by the construction of what is often termed an 'ideology 
of motherhood' - which stressed the duties and responsibili ties of 
motherhood at the same time as according it an elevated status -
woman's proper place was in the home, but motherhood was a craft, and 
domestic management a science, a skill which should be learnt, 
respected, rewarded. Mothers should take pride in being mothers, but 
the good mother's pride was in the accomplishment of tasks which, in 
themselves, carried no requirement of affect. The space of 
maternality was exhausted by the parameters of the hygienic duties 
assigned to the mother. 
In this respect it is worth pointing out that if women were the 
particular targets of the neo-hygienist doctrines of motherhood, this 
was, in large part, merely because neo-hygienism believed that the 
nurturers of children were nearly always women. Of course women were 
particularly well suited for the task of providing for the welfare of 
babies, in virtue of the hygienic advantages of breast-feeding over 
artificial feeding, the minimisation of the risKs of infection and 
the maximisation of the chances of the infant obtaining an adequate 
diet. But there was an important sense in which the relationship 
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between women and motherhood was almost contingent - a consequence of 
the fact, that it happened to be the case that women looked after 
infants and children during the period crucial for their hygienic 
development. Perhaps Hibbert Hill put it most clearly, writing in 
the American context: 17 
For the first 5,000 days of the years of life of each 
generation, the race is fed, dressed, undressed, washed, combed, 
cuddled, kissed, praised, blamed, led, driven, coaxed, taught, 
spanked, bossed and otherwise "brought up" by women - women 
mothers at home, women teachers at school. It is chiefly during 
this time of tutelage and supervision by women that children 
receive their infections; it is during this time that the race 
runs its gauntlet, dances its little dance with death - and pays 
ten billions for i~ 
The welfare of families 
In neo-hygienism, the space between the family and the clinic was 
traced out by the operations of welfare work. Welfare workers 
established paths of interchange between the domestic, conjugal and 
child-rearing arrangements of working class families and the school, 
infant welfare clinic, hospital or other site of, inspection or 
treatment. The emergence of a psycho-social strategy was conditional 
upon the existence of such a network of welfare, but it entailed its 
transformatio~ In order to understand this transformation, it is 
thus first necessary to characterise the operation of welfare. 
During the inter-war period there was an impressive 
proliferation of social devices concerned to promote and regulate 
health, hygiene and welfare. The social devices were dispersed and 
based upon specific problems - in the field of public health, 
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education, the welfare of children, the penal system and so forth. 
Around these issues aggregated a heterogeneous series of agents, some 
employed by statutory agencies, some voluntary but attached to 
committees established by statute, some working for private charities 
or in other voluntary organisations. Professional organisations of 
these different branches of welfare work began to be set up, journals 
and books were published in great numbers. It was precisely the co-
operation between different types of agency, between the voluntary 
workers and statutory agents, between self-help and social provision, 
that was seen by authors of the time as both the strength and 
weakness of a 'new philanthropy' that was regarded as 
characteristically Bri tish. 18 Yet des pi te all this activi ty, 
contemporary histories and accounts of social work pass over this 
period discreetly, regarding it as something of a hiatus between the 
individualised case-work of the nineteenth century - conceived of as 
the 'origin' or 'precursor' of modern techniques - and the burgeOning 
of a professional, statutory apparatus of social work after the 
Second World War. Why should this be? The reason lies in the 
discrepancy between the psycho-social familialism that characterised 
post-war social work and the rationale and strategy of the social 
apparatuses of the inter-war period. 
Eileen Younghusband's investigation of employment of social 
workers, conducted at the end of the Second World War, allows us to 
make some sort of inventory of the social field. 19 If one disl'egards 
those schemes which had been established in war-time, one finds the 
following at the end of the inter-war period. There were health 
visitors, of course, who have already been referred to. There were 
almoners attached to hospitals. There were child-care workers 
attached to residential institutions of one sort or another -
approved schools and hostels, remand homes, orphanages run by 
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voluntary societies (Doctor Barnardo's, National Children's Home and 
Orphanage, Church of England Waifs and strays Society and other 
orphanages and homes run by religious orders). There were child care 
workers involved in visiting homes "in which a child is living 
because something has gone Vlrong, whether the 'something' be a need 
for dental treatment or criminal neglect of the child by his 
parents".20 There were adoption officers working with courts Vlith 
regard to the adoption of children for whom a local authority or 
voluntary society is acting as guardian ad litem. There were 
welfare and after-care officers visiting homes of those discharged 
from approved schools. There were care committees, concerned with 
follow-up work in connection with the school medical service and with 
children in need of clothes or school meals, with a paid organiser 
directing the activities of voluntary workers engaged in home 
visiting and liaising between home, school and clinic. 
We also find moral welfare workers, often employed by the 
church, part paid by local authorities, who dealt with children 
living in conditions of moral danger or who had been the subject of 
sexual assaults. Juvenile Employment Officers were involved in 
vocational guidance ofyoung unemployed juveniles, and in finding them 
employment. SchoOl Attendance Officers were responsible for visiting 
the homes of children absent from school for any length of time, for 
undertaking enquiries for juvenile courts, supervising boarded out 
children committed to local education authorities as Fit Persons and 
undertaking duties under the Adoption of Children Act, 1926. Special 
Enquiry Officers performed similar tasks but were attached to the 
juvenile courts. And there were workers involved in settlements and 
wardens of community centres. 
There were family case workers - most notably from the Charity 
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Organisation Society, but also from a range of other organisations 
including those formed for specific purposes such as the care of' the 
handicapped, the single 'fallen' or ex-service personnel. 
Characteristic of all such case work organisations was that relief 
was provided to certain classes of persons based upon individual 
investigation and assessment of need, and with a view to promoting 
the self-reliance of those individuals rather than merely providing 
indiscrimina te chari ty or small doles. There were voluntary 
associations for domicilliary assistance and welfare to the blind, to 
whom local authorities had devolved their responsibilities under the 
Blind Persons Act 1920, and others, with no statutory links, for the 
deaf and cripples. 
There, were probation officers, responsible to the local 
probation committees of the courts of summary jurisdiction in England 
and Wales, or, in the Metrop~litan area, to the Home Office via the 
London Probation Service. Probation officers dealt with cases such 
as children brought before the courts as beyond the care and control 
of their parents and subject to supervision, children given a 
probation order for a minor offence, adults in similar Circumstances, 
matrimonial problems and elderly persons charged, for example, with 
indecent exposure. There were Discharged Prisoners, Aid Societies. 
Finally there were a few 'mental welfare' workers and psychiatric 
social workers employed by mental hospitals, by local authorities, by 
voluntary associations and by child guidance clinics and responsible 
for obtaining family histories, home visiting, after-care, 
domicilliary supervision of mental defectives in their homes or 
boarded out. We shall return to these in due course, for it is here 
that we will find the beginnings of a psycho-social alliance. 
This social field was clearly heterogeneous in a number of 
respects. Firstly in respect of the formal status of the agents and 
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agencies concerned - statutory, voluntary and so forth. Secondly in 
terms of the mode of designation of their objects - a specific 
problem, a category of individuals defined by age or status, an 
institution or whatever. Thirdly in terms of the specification of 
their field of action - an individual prisoner living alone, a child 
in a residential institution, a family. But despite this 
heterogenei ty, the na ture and rationale of wel fare work had a 
considerable consistency. We can see this clearly if we consider 
what some of these welfare workers actually did. 
We may begin wi th the almoner. Almoners were first appointed in 
1895. They had been suggested by Charles Loch of the Charity 
Organisation Society, in order to relieve strains on voluntary 
hospi tals due to the abuse of out-pa tient departments and medical 
charity. Their role was to scrutinise hospital patients, assess home 
conditions and financial resources in order to ascertain those who 
were the proper responsi bili ty of the Poor Law Au thori ties and the 
level of contributions which eligible patients should make towards 
hospital maintenance. The Hospital Almoners Association was formed 
in 1903; there were fifty members by 1919 and 343 in 1939.21 As well 
as working in voluntary and municipal hospitals, by the thirties 
almoners were also employed by Public Health Departments and attached 
to clinics for tuberculosis and venereal disease. The role of the 
almoner was to act as a kind of relay be tween the pa tient and the 
medical site, be it hospital or clinic, the various professional 
groupings, public authorities and social agencies, statutory or 
voluntarYj22 
The almoner supplies knowledge of the patient's circumstances, 
social as well as economic, both as a guide to what he can be 
expected to pay and for purposes necessary to treatment for the 
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use of the hospital staff; she serves as a link with all outside 
agencies - State, municipal or voluntary which may be utilised 
for the benefit of the patient. 
If one asks what the almoners did over and above this 
knowledge-relay function, one gets a fair idea of what the role of 
welfare workers in this period was. It entailed the giving of 
friendly and sympathetic information especially as to available 
benefits, facilitating attendance and continuance at hospital or 
clinic, diffusing instruction as to home management, cleanliness and 
hygiene, budgeting, debt and problems with obtaining suitable 
employment. 
And as for the health visitor, her role was pretty much the 
same: to advise on the proper care, nurture and management of 
children under five including the promotion of cleanliness. Her 
tasks were clear from the regulations for training issued by the 
Board of Education in 1919. Courses were to cover: theoretical and 
practical instruction in elementary physiology; artisan cooking and 
household management; hygiene; infectious and communicable diseases; 
maternity; infant and child welfare; elementary economics and social 
problems. 23 Addi tionally, as Macadam say s, the task of the heal th 
visitor, like other welfare workers, was to act as a liaison officer 
rather than a practi tioner: the complexi ty of modern society had 
apparently called into being a new type of service - 'social work' or 
'social administration' in order to establish rational linkages 
between different services.24 
If we turn to examine the activities of Care Committee workers, 
we find a ra ther similar picture. George Newman advoca ted in his 
report for 1909 that such committees be established in each area to 
provide a crucial link between school, clinic and home. He described 
their duties thus: 
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To follow up the work of medical inspection, endeavouring to 
secure appropriate treatment for each child by encouragement and 
educa tion of parents and, in sui tabl e cases, prov ision of the 
means of treatment; 
To endeavour to bring about in special cases permanent 
improvement in the condition of the home by regular visits of a 
friendly character; 
To co-operate with the local education authority over meals 
for necessitous children; 
To interest themselves in the employment of children about to 
leave school; 
To participate in care and after-care in special schools, 
especially those for the physically and mentally defective; 
To help inculcate in mothers the idea of the prevention of 
diseases among children by lectures or practical education work 
in the home. 25 
The welfare worker was thus a pedagogue and go-between, one 
who carried information, acted as a relay between different agencies, 
and served to inject norms of care and management into the home. 
'Welfare' construed the family as a mechanism for the construction of 
physical health and sober habits, for the provision of clothing, food 
and shelter for family members. Hence welfare workers provided 
advice and evaluation in respect of finance, employment, housing, 
hygiene, diet, education, clothing, budgeting, the requirements of 
different family members - mothercraft, household management. And 
welfare agencies were the means of linking the family with the other 
specialised agencies invol ved in these issues - medical, housing, 
relief, school, court and so forth. At issue was the physical 
conservation and maintainance of the population at high levels of 
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efficiency, able to do its duty in industry or in war. 
When the neo-hygienist strategy was displaced, a shift occured 
in the object, techniques and rationale of intervention into the 
family. The conditions for this shift were laid in the debates and 
concerns which emerged in the 1920s around a rather different 
question - that of disorders of behaviour as they manifested 
themsel ves in delinquency and misconduct. Here a new conception of 
the family, the child and the means and objects of intervention would 
take shape. Eileen Younghusband describes this as a move from 
·welfare to social work.26 She argues that this shift predominantly 
occurred after the Second World War, and the usual argument of 
histories of social work is that it was only after the Second World 
War that the individualised case work methods pioneered by the 
Charity Organisation Society were reactivated and generalised. This 
is variously put down to the 1948 Childrens Act; to the criticism of 
the consequences of separation of children from their families put 
forward in the Report of the Curtis Committee, in the writings of 
Bowlby and Anna Freud; and to the belated recognition of the input of 
psychoanalysis. 27 
It is certainly true that the psycho-social strategy found it 
difficult to get itself off the ground in the inter war years, but it 
is worth considering why this was, if we are to understand the 
particular form and limits of such success as it did have. The 
blockages on its development came from a number of sources. The 
deepening economic depression made it increasingly difficult to 
maintain the linkage between character and unemployment, and hence 
between character and distress. Even the Charity Organisation 
Society had to accept the necessi ty for 'out relief' and the fact 
that many cases of distress had as their sole cause the absence of 
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employment consequent upon conditions of trade. 28 The particular 
betes-noires of the proponents of individualised case work were the 
'socialist' insurance based schemes which were being established for 
sickness, unemployment and old-age pensions. These effected a 
separation between the register of financial provision and that of 
personalised case-work wi th needy individuals and families, thus 
sidestepping the principle that relief should be condi tional upon 
scrutiny and having the objective of establishing self reliance.29 
Of course, the development of the schemes of unemployment 
benefit throughout the twenties was accompanied by debates over 
means-testing and scroungers, and the necessity and significance of a 
'genuinely seeking work' test.3° But the s cru tiny that was carried 
out pertained, initially at least, only to willingness to enter paid 
employment and the nature and arrangements of the family unit were 
pertinent only in so far as they affected the financial status of the 
claimant. Relief was either given unconditionally or refused - there 
was no intermediary state of attempted individual reformation, 
al though, towards the end of the inter war period, officers 
administering unemployment benefit were increasingly urged to assess 
willingness to enter employment in terms of "the state of the 
appl icant 's mind".31 
The mode of analysis and intervention espoused by the 
proponents of case-w ork, with its em phasi s u po n indi v id ual 
responsibility and individual reformation, found itself very much on 
the defensive. For the middle class with a conscience, social 
service rather than scientific philanthropy was the order of the day. 
Social service located social evils not in the individual but in the 
structure of society itself, particularly in the unequal distribution 
of wealth. To work with the poor, in the Settlements or elsewhere, 
was an expression of citizenship, in which all parties enjoyed social 
rights and equality of status. It gave those who would make policy 
first-hand experience of working class life. It helped to break down 
class barriers and to spread education and cultural values. And it 
involved the educated and the working class together in the project 
of constructing a better society)2 
In the 1930s the notion of social service gave way to another 
v.-tich i3tpessed the need for collective planning and management of all 
Espects of social and political life and the expansion of the social 
services - a middle way betv!een c8.pi talism and socialism. Political 
and Economic Planning (PEP), founded in 1931, stressed the need for 
efficiency and modernisation and centralised planning in its report 
on the social and health services and other issues.33 The Next Five 
Years Group in the book it published in 1935, proposed an Economic 
General Staff, a National Development Board, public investment in 
housing and electrification, town and country planning, the location 
of industry in distressed areas, and the co-ordination of the social 
services to achieve a National Minimum.3 4 Two areas are of special 
significance here, for they produced a relative decline in the 
prominence of neo-hygienism. Doctors and nutri tionists began to 
stress the relationship between income, poverty, diet and health, as 
opposed to concentrating upon the part played by individual, family 
and maternal hygienic management.35 And Eleanor Rathbone, a leading 
light of the Next Five Years Group, gained further support for the 
campaign for the endowment of motherhood. 
This campaign had its origins following the end of the First 
World War and crystallised in Rathbone's The Disinherited Family of 
1924.36 It stressed the deleterious effects of the existing wage 
system on family and home life, especially on working class mothers 
and their children who were suffering severe undernourishment and 
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poor health as wages were unrelated to the needs of families. In the 
thirties, this campaign was linked in to a growing concern wi th' the 
decline in the birth rate. Again the neo-hygienist strategy slipped 
from prominence as it began to be argued that, accompanying the fall 
in infant mortality which had been achieved in the twenties, there 
had been a reduction in the birth-rate from 28.3 per 1,000 in 1901-5 
to 15.3 per 1,000 in 1931-5. Popula tion proj ections predicted the 
'tw iligh t of parenthood '.37 Economists and others adopted 'under 
populationist' posi tions <!-nd discussed the damaging effects of low 
population on empire and industry, and the consequences for the age 
structure of the population - with a growing number of old people 
supported by a declining number of producers. 
But more worrying were the consequences of differential decline, 
wi th the greatest reduction in births and family size amongst the 
well-to-do and professional cl asses. Whilst the earlier nega ti ve 
eugenicist response to this was certainly present - with calls for 
compulsory sterilisation of defectives and so forth - as we saw in a 
previous chapter, this achi eved li t tIe success. The campaigns for 
birth control promoted especially by Mary Stopes and the Society for 
Constructive Birth Control and Racial Progress, and later by the 
National Birth Control Association, were no rrore SUCCE!SSful.38 Their 
arguments tended to be positive rather than negative, stressing birth 
control as a means of securing the health of mothers and babies 
through the spacing of births, as well as its use to prevent the 
diseased and defective from procreating. Whilst Stopes advocated 
birth control as a means of advocating racial improvement and 
1 imi ting the working cl ass-birth rate, these arguments had li t tle 
effect on government policies in this period. The old eugenic 
oppostion between the virtues of action at the level of procreation 
and the limitations of action at the level of environment had begun 
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to break dow n. A new 'positive eugenics' became active which 
combined the call for family allowances with the arguments that the 
provision of a basic minimum of food, clothing, shelter, medical care 
and ma terni ty services would increase the welfare of f.amilies and 
children generally, encourage the thrifty artisans and professional 
classes to have more children, and provide an antidote to those forms 
of disorderly living which promoted excessive and dysgenic breeding. 
Universalism of provision no longer produced the fear of promotion of 
reckless breeding amongst poor and degenerate stock and its 
consequences. 
The new strategies of planning, insurance, allowances and so 
forth were thus not linked to a system of individual scrutiny and 
reforma tion. They turned problems of health and welfare into 
technical questions of types and levels of allowances and benefits, 
generalised provisions of services, and their consequences at the 
level of the popula tion. But the effect of all this was not wholly 
antithetical to the. emergence of a psycho-social strategy. For in 
effecting a separation between the register of financial provision 
and that of personal case-work, they freed the level of personal and 
familial malfunctioning for its elaboration wi thin a discourse and 
practice in which material difficulties were symptoms of a problem 
rather than the problem itself. It was here that the new social work 
would form, initially through the application of th; L€\'i J.c:.r.t,t;2e,e of 
hygiene and welfare to problems posed by disorders not of bodily 
function but of conduct. 
The hygiene and welfare of the mind 
[The] common feature [of that derangement of conduct which is 
the symptom of mental illness] is the inability to maintain his 
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social equilibrium ••• [But] insanity is, after all, only a 
disease like other diseases •.• a mind deranged can be 
ministered to no less effectively than a body deranged The 
keynote of the past has been detection; the keynote of the 
futllre should be prevention and treatment... The problem of 
insanity is essentially a public health problem to be dealt with 
on modern public health lines. 
Royal Commission on Lunacy and 
Mental Disorder, 1926 39 
Neo-hygienism sought to promote health as a social value to be 
maximised and as a personal responsibility to be fulfilled. When 
such a strategy was applied to mental pathology in the period 
following the First World War, it had consequences for conceptions of 
madness and the social responses appropriate to it. New tactics for 
the social regulation of disorders of conduct were constructed within 
a strategy of mental hygiene and mental welfare. And the new 
problems of childhood, which individual psychology would attempt to 
address, were shaped within this strategy. 
From the first Report issued by the Board of Control after the 
First World War, through the Report of the Royal Commission on Lunacy 
and Mental Disorder of 1926, to the Report of the Feversham Committee 
on the Voluntary Mental Heal th Services published in 1939, mental 
hygiene and mental welfare set the terms of analysis and proposals.40 
The link was maintained between mental disturbances and criminality, 
immorality, unproductiveness and so forth - forms of conduct unified 
as 'socially inefficient'. But this link was reconstructed in terms 
of the new preventive and hygienic medicine of public health. Mental 
hygiene and mental welfare were construed as attributes of the 
population to be maximised, and mental illness as a source of 
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inefficiency to be minimised, in order that 80ciety cCllld function at 
i ts Li~'hest efficiency. 
Crucially, it was argued that major mental distu1'l)a~c€s were 
preventible by early recognition and treatment of all the minor 
troubles from which they grew, and by promotion of correct habits of 
mental hygiene in the family. One certainly needed medical 
investigation of persons who were clearly socially inefficient, such 
as those who had broken the law, to see if their conduct was a 
consequence of mental pathology and therefore required treatment. 
But one needed to extend the field of surveillance in order to pick 
up minor troubles before they developed into major ones. This could 
be done by linking up, co-ordinating and educating the various 
statutory and voluntary agencies Who might come into contact wi th 
such individuals. It also required the development of new sites of 
treatments; of measures to encourage individuals to scrutinise their 
own mental state, and that of family and friends, for signs of minor 
trouble; and the development of the obliga tions and opportuni ties 
for those with mental disturbances to have voluntary treatment. 
Mental wel fare was to be a new obj ecti ve of social regulation. It 
was also to be a family responsibility and a personal value. 
A number of interlinking arguments were put forward, all of 
which had the object of removing constraints and hinderances upon the 
early recogni tion of disturbances of the mind, with a view to 
promoting early intervention and remedial action. Two related 
problems were seen to be standing in the way of the promotion of 
mental welfare. The first was the stigma surrounding lunacy. The 
second was the disjuncture between the nature of provision for 
disorders of physical function and those of mental function. Not 
only did the elaborate legal measures surrounding admission to a 
lunatic asylum, the association with the Poor Law and so on, serve to 
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prevent ill individuals obtaining early help, they also made it 
difficult for doctors to provide it. The 1890 Lunacy Act had allowed 
asylums to take only certified patients, and certification could only 
be accomplished with the direct involvement of the legal authorities 
- Justices of the Peace. This, it was argued, prevented early 
treatment of mild cases, discouraged doctors from utilising asylums, 
and turned asylums into places of incarceration for those considered 
beyond hope. 
The key move in the' new strategy of mental hygiene was to 
establish the continuity of disorders of mind and body, and hence to 
try to extend to the former the new preventive and therapeutic 
techniques which had worked so well for the latter. "Lunacy" was a 
particular form of illness and not a condition which should be 
separated off, stigmatised, feared. It should be treated in 
institutions which had as their model not the prison but the general 
hospital, for they were places for the treatment of a type of 
disease. In any event, it was argued, the separation between the 
mental and the physical was misleading - all mental disturbances no 
doubt had physical concommitants, physical disorders had mental 
concommitants, and in many cases it was a matter of judgment which 
predominated. So lunacy should be termed mental illness - a disease 
whose symptoms were mainly derangements of conduct ra ther than of 
physical function. And asylums should be mental hospitals -
hospitals specialising in the treatment of certain kinds of disease. 
This would not only be a correct recogni tion of the nature of 
the disorder, but it would also facilitate mental welfare by removing 
the stigma associated with the old terminology, which had discouraged 
individuals from seeking assistance. The fears concerning the 
liberty of the subject which had underlain the legalism of the 1890 
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provisions were clearly no longer appropriate; what was involved 
raised n~ more problems of liberty and its infringement than did' the 
measures which were routinely taken in the treatment of disorders of 
physical functio~ The whole legalistic paraphenalia which required 
certifica tion before treatment was an anachronism \'lhich 2.cted as a 
drag on the promotion of mental heal tho Trea tment should be 
available on an in-patient basis without certification in public 
hospitals. 
But further, clinic-based facilities for out-patient treatment 
of those wi th mild disorders should be set up as a means of 
preventing the development of mental illness by the treatment of 
those with incipient insanity; general hospitals should themselves 
participate in this activity which did, after al,l, aimply represent 
one of their specialisms. To these clinics, people would come 
voluntarily, once educated in the recognition of the early signs of 
mental illness, free of fear as to stigma or incurabili ty; taking 
responsibility for their own mental health. These clinics would also 
act as the bases for a more extensive system; they would be centres 
into which individuals would be directed, and from which other mental 
welfare activi ties would radia teo Welfare w orkers, statutory and 
voluntary, and other agencies, once properly aware of the links 
between mental illness and social inefficiency, would direct 
individuals to the clinics for assessment and treatment. The new 
mental medicine would radiate out of its institutional sites and 
begin to act also upon the circumstances and conditions of the lives 
of patients, ex-patients and potential patients. There was to be 
mental after-care, there was to be work with out-patients, there was 
to be enquiry into the home circumstances and lives of patients, and 
there was to be general public educa tion as to the habi ts likely to 
promote hygiene of the. To this end there should be co-ordination of 
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the various statutory and voluntary bodies concerned with different 
aspects of the problem in order to promote a coherent and exhaustive 
programme of mental wel fare. 
The new strategy did not remain merely at the, level of 
recommenda tions. It was instantiated in the construction and 
objectives of the Maudsley Hospital. The building of this hospital 
was completed in 1915 by the London County Council, with an initial 
gift from Henry Maudsley which included the conditions that the 
hospital should deal exclusively with early and acute cases, have an 
out-patients department, and teach and research on psychiatry in the 
context of medici ne. The E: tl~a tegy underpinned the use made by the 
London County Council, from 1919, of the Mental After-Care 
Association, to carry out early-care and after-care work. It was 
what led to the change of name and tactics of the Central Association 
for the Care of the Mental Defective, which became the Central 
Association for Mental Welfare in 1923, and changed the title of its 
journal from Studies II Mental Inefficiency to Mental Welfare in 
1925. When the Royal Commission on Lunacy and Mental Disorder was 
set up in 1924, it appears that it was principally intended to allay 
public anxiety over safeguards, administration and conditions of 
detention in lunatic asylums. But the recommendations which it made 
were in line with the strategy of mental hygiene; they were put into 
legislation in the Local Government Act 1929, which gave local 
authori ties a wider responsibility for providing lunacy and mental 
deficiency services, and in the Mental Treatment Act 1930. This Act 
renamed asylums 'mental hospitals' and lunatics became, in most 
cases, simply 'persons of unsound mind'. It allowed the reception of 
patients into in-patient treatment on their voluntary applicatio~ 
And it authorised local authorities to make provision for the 
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establishment of psychiatric out-patient clinics at general or mental 
hospital~, and to make arrangements for after-care. Soon after' the 
outbreak of war, effect was given to the recommendation of the 
Feversham Committee, to set up a National Council for Mental Health 
to co-ordinate the voluntary societies, and to work in partnership 
wi th the statutory authori ties, in the fields of after-care, work 
with mental defectives, early treatments and children's troubles with 
the law and at school. 
The strategy of mental hygiene also underpinned the 
establishment of the provisions which we will discuss in more detail 
in the next chapter - private psychiatric out-patient clinics such as 
the Tavistock Square Clinic founded in 1920, the Child Guidance 
CounCil, set up in 1927, and the Mental Health Course, for, training 
psychia tric social workers to be based in the new clinical sites, 
which started at the London School of Economics in 1929. And it was 
this strategy which the National Council for Mental Hygiene sought to 
co-ordinate and promote in the inter-war years. 
The National Council was founded in 1922 and included an array 
of prestigious names amongst the membership of its various 
committees. 41 The ability of the strategy of mental hygiene to 
provide a new framework for debates concerning mental, disturbance is 
exemplified in the fact that the active members ranged from 
psychoanalysts, through individual and industrial psychologists, to 
organiCist psychiatrists, doctors, magistrates and welfare workers. 
The prestige of such an enterprise is indicated by the proportic~ cf 
these who were, or would be, knighted or otherwise honourE.Q b:y the 
Crown. The Council sought to promote the study and effective 
treatment of mental disorder with a view to its prevention, to 
introduce the routine medico-psychological examination of persons 
charged with crime and to investigate the role of mental disease or 
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defect in other forms of socially undesirable behaviour. But it also 
sought to promote positive measures for the development of mental 
health,to educate in the factors producing good mental health and to 
remove all barriers which made early treatment of ~EctAl disease more 
difficul t - including the the stigma around 'lunacy' and the legal 
constraints which inhibited those in need from seeki~ help. It 
particularly worked for the establishment of out-patient facilities. 
Its rationale for all this was straightforward - major disorders 
had precursors in minor disturbances, early treatment of the latter 
would reduce the incidence of the former. Thus an Appendix to the 
Annual Report for 1927-8 sought to draw attention to the inadequacy 
of provision for those suffering from 'Minor Mental Maladies' or 
'nerves', that is: "emotional or mental instability characterised by 
such insidious and apparently trivial symptoms as deprs8sion, 
anxiety, impaired powers of ini tiative and concentration, loss of 
interest, irritability, self-distrust, sleeplessness, 
hypersensitiveness, shyness and seclusive tendencies, hysterical 
manifestations - the latter especially in the young -~~d other 
symptoms of a like nature.,,42 These apparently trivial symptoms were 
insidious not on their own account but in wha t they pointed to and 
would lead to - they were often the early stages of much more severe 
disorders. But fortunately new methods had demonstrated that 
treatment, if carried out early enough, had a good chance of success; 
hence it was vital to encourage all measures to increase the 
availability and likelihood of early treatment. 
Nowhere was it more important to recognise these issues than in 
relation to the disturbances of childhood. Here were the earliest 
signs of future trouble manifested; here were the chances of averting 
such problems greatest. And here, in childhood, in the school, was 
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the oppportunity for a universalised scrutiny of conduct with a view 
to ident.ifying problem cases. It is in this light that we' can 
understand the emergence of the new objects around which the psycho-
social strategy would form - the maladjust~d Bchcclchild and the 
del inquent jvvenile. 
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The maladjusted schoolchild and the delin~uH,t juvenile 
What made the maladjusted schoolchild and the delinquent juvenile 
possible objects for a psycho--social Btr2.tESY \o.as the way in which 
they were linked. Starting soon after the end of the First World War 
a regular connection in argument began to be made between children 
who showed disorders of behaviour at school and children who would 
later end up before the courts. The disturbed schoolchild would 
become the juvenile delinquent, the juvenile delinquent was, or had 
been, <:-1.1no a disturbed schoolchild. If this was the case then the 
detection and treatment of disturbances of behaviour in the school 
had a significance beyond itself, in its preventive and prophylactic 
function. The school could now be seen as a generalised site of 
scrutiny and intervention with regard to problems not of physical 
health and deterioration, not of intellectual defect and 
degeneration, but of all sorts of social inefficiency resulting from 
mental illness. If it was the case that what ended as major 
disorders in the moral sphere - disregard of the law and criminal 
behaviour - began as minor disturbances in the moral sphere -
anything from excessive emotionality to minor transgressions such as 
lying - then the school had as important a function in crime 
prevention as it did in the promotion of physical health and the 
recognition of mental defect. 
This new class of problem child emerged hesitantly at first but 
then with growing consistency and systematicity alongside classes of 
problems associated with physical or sensory handicap, ill health or 
weakened physical consti tution. Initially designated nervous, 
neuropathic or unstable, this class of children came to be referred 
to as 'mal-adjusted'. One can trace this emergence from the 
successive reports of the Chief Medical Officer of the Board of 
Education. In 1920, the Chief Hedical Officer drew attention to the 
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neuropathic child, who could be found throughout the educational 
system but wi thoutany special form of treatment being available. 
Neuropathic children might be normal or even super-normal in school 
progress, but their behaviour was "marked by certain psychological 
characteristics, a tendency to quarrel, to make violent friendships, 
to engender bitter dislikes, to attend unduly to [their] bodily 
functions, to night terrors, to unreasonable fears, grief, abnormal 
introspection and self-examination, and to separation from family and 
friends.,,43 Whilst these behaviours were often accompanied by minor 
physical symptoms, the condition was a psychical one and school life 
itself, as well as sympathy and relief from strain, might bring about 
recovery. However more support to education was required from the 
medical psychologists, to determine "(i) How far are we in possession 
of all the psychological phenomena associated with abnormal 
childhood? (ii) To what extent are these phenomena associated with 
pathological conditions arising in the sense organs, the nerve paths 
or the cerebral cortex? (iii) What is the relation of these 
conditions to heredity, environment and maternal nurture~3 
By 1927, it was the specific link with delinquency which was 
priori tised. Apparently Healy's work with delinquents in the USA 
had "revealed how long and complicated, in many cases, was the 
history behind the delinquent act, and attention was drawn to 
abnormal traits in behaviour generally as they showed themselves in 
childhood".44 The Chief Medical Officer pointed out the limited 
resources available in England for dealing with such children, 
resources which would ideally, it appears, be used to set up a 'child 
guidance clinic'. The conception of a child guidance clinic, as 
promoted by the Child Guidance Council, and as established in a 
number of places in the mid nineteen twenties, rapidly set the terms 
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in which the educational issues posed by 'unstable' and 'difficult' 
children,were to be posed and organised. The difficult child'was 
conceptualised, more and more, as 'mal-adjusted'. In the words of 
the Child Guidance Council, quoted by the Chief Hedical Officer in 
his report for 1928, this was a child "whose conduct in school and 
home reveals a lack of harmony and stability leading to delinquency 
or nervousness". 45 We shall return to the Child Guidance Council in 
the next chapter. As far as the Chief Hedical Officer was concerned, 
the child guidance clinic w,as to play the role with regard to mental 
hygiene that the School Hedical Service filled with regard to 
physical hygiene. If the latter sought to ascertain and treat early 
and slight departures from the normal in order to prevent them 
becoming major defects, the primary duty of the child guidance clinic 
was "the ascertainment, study and correction of minor abnormalities, 
which if left to themselves, may eventually lead up to gross 
abberations of conduct, delinquency and crime".46 
By the time of the Report for 1930, the Child Guidance Clinic 
was given a section on its own, within which were subsumed two 
princip~l classes of problem - the mentally retarded child and the 
mal-adjusted child. The priority once accorded to the former was now 
slipping towards the latter. And it was the link }'lhich had been 
established with gross disorders - especially crime - and hence the 
role of the school as a site for scrutiny and preventive intervention 
with respect to them, which gave the issue of 'mal-adjustment' its 
particular saliance: 47 
Conditions which lead to the reformatory, the prison, the 
hospital or the asylum may haye been developing during school 
life and ... accordingly manifestations of persistent 
abnormflli ties in behaviour or of "mal-adjustment" in children 
demand the close attention of the school medical officer. 
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1 ess on account of the di sruptio!! \of hi ch th cy C< .. r.~ t.i ~.l'L u .. tc 1...1.\:-
normal activities of the school, than because of the sign which they 
fortunately gave of the imminence of future disorder. Abnormal 
behaviour, antisocial conduct, neuroses, eccentricities, making 
friendships too easily or not at all, quarrelling or being withdrawn, 
grieving or fearing too much or too little - all these departures 
from the norm could be linked together as 'mal-adjustments' and as 
predictors of troubles t~ come. If this linkage was thinkable 
largely through the conceptions of mental hygiene discussed earlier, 
and owed something to the work of psychologists like Burt, the 
studies of various school medical officers, and the importation of 
the American programmes of Healy and others, it also had conditions 
within the penal system itself, most particularly within the Juvenile 
Courts. 
It is, no doubt, true that there was a long established connection 
between criminal forms of juvenile conduct and other aberrant conduct 
which was not in themselves criminal but might lead to criminality if 
left unchecked. It is commonly accepted that the conception of 
juvenile delinquency began to emerge in the mid~ninet~enth century.48 
In the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century, the criminal 
child was treated in the same way as an adul t, subject to the same 
processes of trial and the same punishment on conviction, graded by 
offence and preceden~49 Magistrates did exercise discretion in the 
commutation of capital sentences to imprisonment or transportation 
for children, but they did so for adults as well. 
The only exception concerned the principle of doli capax. When 
a child was proceeded against at law it was considered to be merely a 
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juridical subject, that is, the subject of an act deemed to have 
transgressed a given law. To be the juridical subject of such an 
act, however, it was necessary to be competent to bear the rights and 
responsibilities of such a subject. A juridical subject must be able 
to distinguish right from wrong and hence form a guil ty intention. 
There was thus a strict analogy at law between children below the 
'age of discretion', madmen and natural fools, to the extent that 
they were all incapable of forming such an intention, and hence could 
not be found guilty of a criminal offence. Whilst the judgments in 
English law up to the beginning of the nineteenth century were 
inconSistent, from Blackstone onwards the arguments of jurists tended 
to stabilise.50 Children below the age of seven were automatically 
deemed incapax;, over fourteen they were deemed capax unless proved 
insane. Between seven and fourteen, the prosecution had to 
demonstrate the existence of discretio~ Of this period, Blackstone 
wrote: 51 
By the law, as it now stands, and has stood at least since the 
time of Edward the Third, the capacity of doing ill, or 
contracting guilt, is not so much measured by years and days, as 
by the strength of the delinquent's understanding. 
Russell, in 1819, stated that the prima facie presumption 
between fourteen years and seven diminished with the advance of the 
offender's years. If evidence of malice could be shown, this would 
"supply age" and "if it appear to the Court and jury that the 
offender is doli capax, and could discern between good and evil, he 
may be convicted and suffer death", although the sentence of death 
would often be remitted and the child pardoned with conditions, for 
example, of entry into His Majesty's Sea Service.52 Whilst under the 
Code Napoleon in France it would appear that it was customary to seek 
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expert opinion on the state of develop~ent of the discriminative 
facul tie.s of infants, in England, the matter was left to the judge 
and jury to decide on the basis of such factors as malice, revenge, 
craft, cunning, other evidence of a mischievous discretion and the 
extent to which punishment was a necessary deterrent for a 
particularly heinous crime which children were both capable of and 
tempted to com mi t. 5 3 
As execution and transportation gave way to imprisonment in the 
early nineteenth century, c?ildren were intermingled with adults in 
the prisons. Reform took as its theme mass corruption; children and 
other juveniles did not appear as a separate class, and 'the prison 
reforms of 1823 introduced a classification not by age but by nature 
and seriousness of offence. The opening of Newgate in 1842 marked a 
shift in the aims, objects and techniques of punishment. 54 
Punishment now sought to transform the convicted individual through 
the detailed regulation of time, space, visibility and activity, in 
an eXercise in which the imprisoned person was constantly subject to 
a normalising judgment - the evaluation of behaviour in relation to 
norms of conduct and techniques of rectification. The reformatory 
prison was individualising - it focused not upon the act or even upon 
the offender, but upon the delinquent as a perso~ality, and it 
directed its action and evaluation to that moral space of character 
which organised action and was liable to reforma tion. Hence this 
type of prison entailed the assessment and distribution of offenders 
to the types of regime most appropriate for their reformation. 
Prisons now began to be indicted for the specific effects which they 
had upon the young: they were not reformed but 'hardened to prison 
life'; imprisonment scarred them with a stigma which made respectable 
employment more difficult to obtain and forced them back into crime; 
detention was too short for reformation but long enough to remove the 
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fear of prison; in addi tion, state maintenance of children in jail 
acted as a premium upon parental irresponsibility. 
The moralising philanthropy of the mid-nineteenth century, 
singled out young actual and potential criminals as a special class. 
With the rise of the statistical societies, the setting up of a 
regular police force, the division of large towns into police 
districts, and the gathering and publication of figures on the 
quantity and distribution of crime, it began to be argued that 
juvenile crime in particular was on the increase. 55 Moral 
topographers sought to link this to the moral and physical milieu, 
conceptualising criminality on the model of the causes and spread of 
epidemic diseases. Thus William Beaver Neale, wri ting in 1840 of 
Manchester, argued that there existed a class of juvenile delinquents 
concentrated in a particular area where moral and physical contagion, 
encouraged by parental irresponsibility and neglect, led children to 
delinquency, petty theft, and ultimately a life of organised crime.56 
And Mary Carpenter argued that crime diffused na subtle, unseen but 
sure poison in the moral atmosphere of the neighbourhood, dangerous 
as is deadly miasma to the physcial heal th. n57 The child was seen 
as a complex of learned habits which were contracted from the 
examples given in the home, from bad company, and from experience of 
vice and corruption in the streets.58 
Reformers in the last half of the nineteenth century 
established a separation and relation between two classes of 
children. On the one hand there were those who were already 
'dangerous' - who had committed an offence of some sort and who, if 
left in the immoral atmosphere of the rookeries and dens of vice 
would spend their adult lives as paupers, prostitutes or felons. On 
the other hand, there were the children in danger, 'perishing' as 
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Mary Carpenter terms them - without homes, in bad company, neglected 
by their ,parents or lacking discipline in the home. Despite the fact 
that they had not yet committed a crime, they were incipient 
criminals; further exposure to moral contagion would demoralise them 
still further, and make criminals of them for life. A series of Acts 
over this period, beginning wi th the Reformatory Schools Act, 1854 
and the Industrial Schools Act, 1857, empowered magistrates to commit 
such children to Reformatory and Industrial Schools respectively. 
The schools were voluntary ~ut were given legal powers to contain and 
control, subject to certification and inspection. They were based 
upon institutions already in existence. Reformatories were modelled 
on the agricul tural colony established at Met tray, France in 1839; 
industrial schools on the so-called 'ragged schools'. By 1894, 
17,000 children were in industrial schools - not simply vagrants, 
those who frequented the company of thieves, without settled abode or 
having no visible means of subsistence, but also those deemed 'in 
need of care and protection' and 'beyond parental control'; a further 
4,800 were in reformatories. In each of these types of school the 
principles were the same. The children were to be resocialised in 
substitute family and cottage based systems, away from their old 
haunts where their old habits could be be broken down,and new habits 
of honesty, discipline and industriousness could be inculcated 
through the application of a sort of moral treatment. 
At one level, the famous Children Act, 1908 represented merely 
a continuation and extension of this strategy.59 It further 
attenuated the relations between the prison and the juvenile. It 
maintained the distinction between Industrial and Reformatory schools 
and the separate circumstances under which magistrates could commit 
children to each. It applied to children the provisions of the 
Probation of Offenders Act 1907, allowing the court to discharge an 
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offender who voluntarily entered into recognisance to be of good 
behaviour, and allowing this to be subject to certain conditions, 
including that the offender be under the supervision of a probation 
officer for a specified period. This probation officer was to visit 
or receive reports from the person under supervision at reasonable 
intervals, to see that he observe the conditions of his recognisance, 
to report to the court as to his behaviour, and to advise, assist and 
befriend him and, where necessary, endeavour to find him suitable 
employment. The Children Act also consolidated the various pieces of 
legisla tion concerned wi th infant life protection - inspection of 
people other than parents looking after infants, laws on neglecl., 
cruel ty and sexual or economically prohibi ted use of children, and 
their access to alcohol and tobacco. And the establishment of 
Juvenile Courts was a further move to separate delinquent or 
neglected children from the taint of the adult criminal justice 
system. But in consolidating the legislative provision around 
children, in establishing a discrete si te of adjudication and 
disposal in the Juvenile Courts, the 1908 Act provided the conditions 
for a shift in the way in which regulation of children and families 
would occur. 
Throughout the nineteenth century, social regulation of the 
family had entailed a discontinuity between the promotion of morality 
in the household itself and the coecive action of the penal-legal 
apparatus. The former was undertaken by private philanthropic 
activity, having as its concern a perceived breakdown in the moral 
order of the ci ties, and seeing the family as a potential means of 
action upon those deficiencies of character manifested in 
prostitution, intemperance, vice, indigence, adult and juvenile 
crime, and pauperism. Leading activists in this field were those 
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bourgeoise women who had themselves been so recently inculcated with 
all the virtues of domesticity. Homen from the various volun'tary 
charitable organisations, 'missioners' attached to the courts and 
sanitary organisations, housing reformers associated with the name of 
Octavia Hill and others sought to construct the family as a 
moralising apparatus. The poor were to be encouraged to marry, not 
because of an affront to Christian morality, but as a means of 
producing responsibility. Marriage was to control and restrain the 
moral and financial prof~igacy of men and women, and household 
economy was to be enjoined as a moral duty. The mother was to become 
the agent of moralisation - attracted from the streets and the gin 
palaces into a domestic unit, her role supported and valorised. The 
adul t male was to be attributed responsibility for financial 
provision, thus promoting prudence and dicouraging him from indulging 
in gambling, drinking, brawling and all sorts of vice and crime. The 
child was to be inculcated wi th the habits of industry, self-
reliance, discipline and temperance, its behaviour was to be watched, 
checked and monitored through the agency of its mother. The object 
was to promote a pri va te, domestica ted uni t which would be sel f-
reliant and so organised as to 'automatically' prod-uce in its 
members the responsibility to care for themselves rather than placing 
burdens upon the state.60 
But there was a disjuncture between this philanthropic 
moralisation of the family and the element of compulsion provided by 
the machinery of government. Initially, in the Reformatory and 
Industrial Schools Acts, it was only when the child had been found by 
a court to be in moral danger itself, or a danger to others, that the 
voluntary activities of moral familialism were provided with a 
coercive back-up. The child could be removed from its family and 
placed in an institution for its moral reformation.61 As concern 
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began to focus on the consequences of the decline of the birth-rate, 
it became posible for a new problem to emerge for government by law. 
This concerned the deaths of children in foundling homes or being 
reared for gain - on account of the squandering of national resources 
which was involved. Measures of compulsory regulation of children 
outside their families were initiated in the Infant Life Protection 
Act of 1872. Much of the argument concerning these measures focussed 
upon the issue of the rights of the state to intervene into matters 
of parental duty, the consequences both for the freedom of the 
individual and for the sense of responsibili ty which parents fel t 
towards their children. And the same arguments were used in the 
debates which finally led to the passage of the first Act allowing 
compulsory intervention into the details of the upbringing of 
children in the 'natural' home itself - the Prevention of Cruelty to 
Children Act of 1889.62 However these compulsory measures discreet 
and dispersed, families only coming to light as the result of 
investigation by the voluntary organisations, or through contact with 
relief agencies or the police. And the role of the state was limited 
to negative intervention in cases of intractable failure. This 
involved the removal of the child and the disabling of the family 
unit, which was the 'natural', but not unique, locus for the 
preservation of life and the inCUlcation of morality. Its essential 
functions could be reproduced elsewhere - in a substitute family or 
reformatory institution~3 
With the new configuration around the Juvenile Court, there was 
no longer a disjuncture between coercion and moralisation, or between 
different measures concerning different aspects of the troubles of 
children. The magistrates in the Juvenile Courts now received before 
them children who, by virtue of their separation from others 
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appearing in the courts, and the common procedures and provisions 
applying'to them, could be seen as a single group which extended all 
the way from those neglected or in need of care and protection on the 
one hand to those who had committed serious crimes on the other - a 
continuous dimension of unfortuna te children. And the magistrates 
had before them an analagous dimension of disposals, ranging from 
unconditional release, through release on condition of accepting 
supervision from a probation officer whilst living at home, through 
to removal into an institution. The Juvenile Courts thus established 
the linkage between familial scrutiny and moralisation on the one 
hand and the penal system on the other which remains until today; 
Far from restricting the incidence of penality in relation to 
juveniles, this provides a coercive back-up to a range of 'voluntary' 
interventions into the lives of families and children - a back-up 
which is necessary for those interventions to operate. 
In the 1920s, the arguments put forward by magistrates, 
probation officers, the Home Office Children's Branch and the Reports 
of various committees of enquiry were remarkable for their 
consistency. The terms of their analysis were enshrined in the 
Children and Young Persons Act, 1933. Let us enumerate the principle 
elements. Firstly it was argued that probation with supervision was 
the first choice with respect to children coming before the Juvenile 
Courts and institutionalisation was only a last resort. When 
probation had become available it resulted in a sharp decline of the 
numbers of children committed to Reformatory or Industrial Schools, 
principally on the grounds of its relative cheapness. The use of 
such financial criteria was generally deprecated - if probation was 
to be the choice, it was because it was a more effective preventive 
strategy than committal to an insti tution. Whilst attempting to 
allay the anxieties of the Voluntary Societies and those employed in 
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the homes, who were confronting a dramatic decline in the demand. for 
their services, the reports of this period repeatedly stressed that 
commitment to a home was appropriate only when probation had failed 
or had no chance of success - the option should be maintained as a 
warning to those on probation of the consequences of disobeying their 
conditions, but nonetheless a check on juvenile delinquency was best 
effected by supervision 'in the open' rather than reformation in 
isolation from the home environment.64 
Next it was argued that the distinction made by legislation 
between the neglected child and the delinquent child was an 
artificial one. It was merely a matter of chance whether a child 
came before the court as a wanderer or a thief, and hence the 
distinction in the ways in which they could be dealt with, between 
Reformatory and Industrial Schools, made no sense: "The tendency to 
commit offences is only an outcome of the conditions of neglect and 
there is li t tle room for discrimina tion ei ther in the character of 
the young person concerned or in the appropriate method of 
treatment.,,65 In each case the particular behaviour involved was not 
the issue - the act, whether it be crime, vagrancy or truancy, was 
not so much a problem as a symptom. The magistrates looked to the 
psychologists of the individual to provide the conceptual back-up for 
this position. William Clarke Hall for example, made liberal use of 
the work of Goring, Burt and in particular Maurice Hamblin Smith: 66 
Too much importance must not be attached to the nature of the 
offences committed by the younger children. It matters little 
whether a boy or girl of twelve is charged with 'found 
wandering', petty larceny or persistant truancy ••• In nearly 
every case the root cause of the trouble is the fact that the 
child is living under such home conditions as have not led to a 
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right upbringing... Under right influences most children respond 
and 'do well ••• The treatment of the young offender is entirely a 
psychological problem. 
As far as magistrates and probation officers were concerned, a 
systematic way of understanding the behaviour of children coming 
before the Juvenile Courts and the appropriate types of treatment for 
them had been produced. The first Report of the Home Office 
Children's Branch was typical in arguing that too much importance 
should not be attached to heredi ty. The majori ty of offences were 
committed by normal children - whatever the offence or reason for the 
child appearing before the court, in nearly every case the root cause 
was that the child was living under such home, conditions as had not 
lead to a right upbringing and, in particular, home conditions which 
had not trained the child to control its impulses. Wha t this 
amounted to was the conclusion that the causal factors of juvenile 
crime could be divided into two. On the one hand there were 
'inherent' causes, to be located in the child itself. Physical 
factors such as chorea, epilepsy, encephalitis, syphillis, defects of 
vision, hearing or speech, tuberculosis, enlarged glands or mental 
defect were sometimes, though rarely, involved. More pertinent was 
what the 1927 Report referrred to as the 'mental equipment' of the 
children - conceived on a neurological model or in terms of the over-
development of the instincts. We w ill consider this way of 
formulating the problem in the next chapter. 
On the other hand there were the 'external' causes - that is to 
say 'environment'. William Clarke Hall was typical in listing these 
in order of importance as: parental neglect, bad housing conditions, 
bad companions, want of rational amusement, defective education, want 
of employment, special temptations and poverty.67 It was these 
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external causes which acted on the congenital characteristics of the 
child to' construct a character of a certain type. Within such an 
analysis, considerable importance was accorded to the home, which was 
conceived of as a space of training, a place where the child would be 
taught or not taught to control his impulses. But the home was just 
one part of the 'envir'onment' which all contributed to the training 
of character; family relations were pertinent only in the lessons 
which they taught the child in duty, respect for property, habits of 
obedience and so forth.,' If crime was a mental symptom of a 
psychological problem, this problem was, therefore, the lack of 
training to control impulses. The psychological domain was thus 
construed as the place where impulses existed and control mechanisms 
could be installed. Treatment was to compensate for the early 
absence of such controls by providing the correct 'influences' which 
would enable the young delinquent to control his impulses. 
These questions of causation and treatment were important 
because of the role which the juvenile court now sought to claim for 
itself. It sought to become an instance which made its decisions 
upon the basis of 'the wei fare of the child', and which decided in 
relation to that objective on an appropriate mode of 'treatment' of 
the children that appeared before it.68 Proponents of this strategy 
referred themselves to the Gladstone Report of 1895. The principles 
of reformation and treatment which it had proposed as the general 
ra tionale of the system of administra tion of justice must, it was 
argued, be applied with even greater force to the young offender 
whose character was still plastic and thus the more readily moulded 
by wise and sympa thetic trea tment. 69 Thus children were not to be 
'tried', 'convicted', 'sentenced' as criminals - "what is needed is 
not the dramatic staging of a trial for a crime, but the provision of 
the best means for ascertaining and remedying evil tendencies" and 
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the question should be "not 'what has the child's past conduct 
deserved in the way of punishment?' but 'what past condi tions have 
led up to this conduct?,"70 Cyril Burt put it thus in an article in 
The question that has to be asked is not - who committed this 
crime? but - why did he do it? Investigation is still 
essential; but the point to be investigated changes. A 
psychological rather than a judicial enquiry is the primary 
need. 
The child was now to be treated not on the basis of what he had done 
but on the basis of who he was - and the psychological jurisdiction 
which the juvenile court sought would allow the new psycho-social 
strategy to get off the ground. 
A treatment rationale for the juvenile court had a number of 
implications. Firstly, individualisation. Although delinquency 
occurred in the mass, it had to be treated in the individual. 
Secondly, diagnosis. For how co~ld treatment be administered without 
a knowledge of the cause of the illness? Magistrates had before them 
a variety of children who for particular reasons required treatment, 
and a range of options for disposal by which that treatment could be 
effected. Not only did magistrates need to be specially trained for 
this task of diagnosis, but they also needed to be supplied with 
information in order to make it. To treat it was necessary to 
understand.72 It is thus that the juvenile court begins to establish 
-
relationships between a number of previously dispersed elements. 
Officers of the local education authority were required to provide 
the courts with information as to the home conditions, school career 
and medical record of the child.7 3 Proba tion officers were, where 
necessary, to make special enquiries into the home and family 
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background. Children were to be remanded in special remand homes, 
where the probation officers could visit them in order to get to know 
the character and tendencies of children who might eventually be 
placed under their care. And in these homes the children could be 
systematically observed and thoroughly examined as a matter of 
routine before being brought to the court for a decision. The 
routine psychological examination of children had been urged not only 
by Hall and Burt, but by Sir Robert Armstrong Jones, Dr Hamilton-
Pearson, Dr MacNamara, Margery Fry, the People's League of Heal th, 
the National Council for Mental Hygiene, the Juvenile Organisa tions 
Committee and the Home Office Departmental Committee. 74 William 
Clarke-Hall had introduced it into his court very early on, Burt and 
Shrubsall had examined children in the London County Council area 
when requested by the courts, and the Tavistock Clinic had 
established a tradition of giving free advice to the Shoreditch 
Court. The Home Office Departmental Committee made a special point 
of this - arguing that children from well-to-do families who were 
delinquent at school or elsewhere were examined by specialists, yet 
those children who appeared before the courts were often suffering 
from the same causes and it was not right that the mental aspect be 
ignored in the treatment of their case.75 
Around the children in danger and the dangerous children, around the 
juvenile court, a new strategy had thus taken shape. It was one in 
which the court would act to bring into relationship previously 
dispersed practices of investigation and regulation of childhood 
behaviour, family life and transgressions of the law. The 
criminality of children had become the symptom of a psychological 
problem, minor disturbances of behaviour had become precursors of 
later criminality, each sort of problem had its origin in defects 
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within the home. The role of the agencies of social regulation in 
respect of these problems was not one of punishment but of treatment, 
and trea tmen t req ui red know ledge not of the child had done, but of 
who the child was. Wha twas it in his life, in his personali ty, in 
his consti tution, in his experiences in the domestic domain, which 
had caused this par ticular bit of aberrant conduct? The alloca tion 
of the child amongst a range of possible disposal options required 
the court to be provided with information of two types. Information 
as to the child itself to be provided by a psychology of the clinic. 
Information as to the home circumstances to be provided by welfare 
work. Psychologists and welfare workers together were to provide the 
court with the information it required in order to understand the 
child sufficiently to make its diagnosis and decide upon its 
treatment. And later a new psychology and a revamped welfare work 
together would act in relation to this treatment as well. For the 
new technique of probation allowed the child to be maintained in the 
home under supervision - a superv ision which had as its obj ect the 
elimination of all those malign influences which led to the disorder 
of conduct, and the substitution of beneficial ones. The supervision 
was voluntary, but default entailed the activation of compulsory 
measures to remove the child and place it in an insti tution. The 
compulsory measures had an effect which was both psychological and 
practical. On the one hand they were a warning to the child and its 
family as to the consequences of disobedience - breaching the terms 
of the recognisance or failing to satisfy the probation officer as to 
their reformatory zeal. On the other hand, when removal to an 
institution did occur, that institution could substitute for the 
family by providing the right environment for the child to learn to 
control its own impulses. 
Through its alliance with the juvenil e cour t, individual 
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psychology had begun to establish its rights to adjudicat~ on 
behavioural disorders, at least insofar as it could provide the 
specialised knowledge upon which such decisions relied. It had 
extended the sphere of its influence through the actions of the 
probation officer. And it had simultaneously established a number of 
localised and specialised sites for its activities - in remand homes, 
in the approved schools themselves, but also, and increasingly over 
the 1930s, in a place separate from either but servicing both - the 
child guidance clinic. 76 These changes provided some of the most 
important conditions for a transformation in the conception of the 
family, the psyche, and the modes of intervention into it. They 
provided condi tions for the forma tion of a psycho-social s tra tegy 
which would take off after the Second World War. But it was not the 
psychology of the individual which was to be the agent or the 
beneficiary of this new strategy. This was in large part, a 
consequence of the way of conceptualising normali ty and pathology 
which had constituted it since the publication of Francis Galton's 
Hereditary Genius in 1869. It is to the ways in which psychology 
conceptualised the psyche, its normality and abnormality, in the 
1920s and 1930s that we now tur~ 
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CHAPTER NINE 
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FAMILY 
The practices of investigation, diagnosis and reformation of 
maladjusted and delinquent children which developed in the 1920s and 
1930s, entailed a new conception of the family, the type of problems 
which it engendered, and the nature and objectives of intervention 
into it. The family was a relational field, a field of dynamic 
interchanges between husbands and wives, mothers and fathers, parents 
and children, brothers and sisters. And the relations between family 
members did not so much concern heal th and habits as feelings and 
emotions: love and guilt, dependency and jealousy, beliefs and 
fantasies. A child's own family, its 'natural' family, was, in most 
circumstances, a uniquely appropriate emotional economy for its 
normal healthy emotional development - this economy was particularly 
difficult to replicate in an institution or elsewhere. But families 
did go wrong, and when they went wrong this engendered problems in 
the child. The way in which families went wrong was not through 
having bad habits or inculcating bad habits or failing to inculcate 
good ones. They went wrong at the level of their emotional economy. 
And when children showed problems of behaviour - nerves, 
maladjustment, delinquency - these were symptoms of this disturbance 
of family relationships. They were symptoms that disturbed family 
relations had produced a disturbed child by producing a disturbed 
psyche. 
The psychological space had now become a kind of internal 
representation of the relational space of the family. Rectification 
hence required something different from the instruction of family 
members or disturbed children in correct habits and moral ways of 
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conduct. It was similarly no longer appropriate, except as a ,last 
resort, to remove the child from his natural family and to place him 
in a 'home', which lacked the very elements with which the problem 
was bound up - mothers, fathers, love and so forth. First the nature 
of the familial disturbance had to be divined from the disturbance of 
emotion or conduct in the child - a process of interpretation. Then 
the abnormal emotional relations had to be normalised - a process of 
therapy. The objective of intervention was to preserve the family, 
to get its emotional economy running along the right lines through 
acting on the inner feelings of family members. 
A number of distinct and opposing theoretical options were 
possible within this general mode of conceptualising the disturbances 
of childhood. These combined elements in different ways, and with 
different consequences. This chapter describes the formation of this 
new framework and the theories that made it up. In the final chapter 
we consider the practical deployment of these theories in the Child 
Guidance Clinic and the new psycho-social strategy. 
The disturbances of childhood 
Nervous, neuropathic, neurotic, maladjusted, delinquent children - it 
was around these,as they emerged in the schools and in the Juvenile 
Courts, that the psycho-social strategy began to take shape in the 
inter-war years. How were these disturbances of childhood 
conceptualised? 
As far as the medicine, psychiatry and medical psychology of 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were concerned, mental 
disturbances of childhood were not a distinct object of concern. 1 
Early nineteenth century texts did recognise disorders of the mind in 
infancy and childhood, but throughout the nineteenth century, they 
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were accorded a somewhat ambiguous status. On the one hand, the 
child had a kind of immunity from insanity, on account of its under-
development, simplici ty and freedom from stress. Thus Underwood 
argued, in 1797, that infants were in the happy state of being little 
affected by the passions of the mind. 2 Similarly Spurzheim, in 1817, 
wrote "It may be asked whether children suffer mania .and insani ty" 
and Burrows, in 1828, stated "as a general maxim insanity cannot 
occur before the approach of puberty.,,3 Where children did suffer 
insanity it was of simple form. Browne argued, in 1860, that 
although insanity did occur in infancy it was rare, because infancy 
was not exposed to many of the predisposing and exciting causes which 
operated at other periods of life, because fewer facul ties had 
developed and therefore fewer faculties were likely to be assaulted 
by disease, and because the delicacy of the infant brain made it 
likely that morbid changes would lead to death. 4 And Albutt, in 
1892, similarly argued that one saw in children only simple and 
primary forms of the more complex and derivative forms of insanity in 
adults, and even that only infrequently. "The insanity of children 
cannot have a large quantity of reflection; the delusions of children 
cannot have much elaboration; ••• the child's insanity must be an 
insanity of the senses, of the simpler impressions, and of the 
instincts, that is of the lower and more early organised centres.,,5 
When Maudsley discussed the question in 1879, he put it in terms of 
the theory of degeneracy discussed in a previous chapter. Insani ty 
rarely occurred in savages or young children, and when it did, it 
took few and simple forms. This was because before one had moral 
degenera tion one had first to be hum anised and civil ised - mental 
organisation must precede mental disorganisation and children and 
savages were wanting in both.6 
It was this theme that lead to the other side of the issue of 
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childhood insanity. For the in utero period and that of infanc~ and 
childhood did have a significance in relation to the constitution and 
its destiny. The child might inherit a particular constitution from 
its parents which could be sound or already enfeebled. Influences at 
conception or during pregnancy might affect this constitution. And 
management during infancy and childhood could have an effect which 
might be permanent not only as far as the character of the adult was 
concerned but also on the constitution handed down to future 
generations. Parkinson pointed out in 1807 that infants were born 
with particular dispositions which might be ameliorated or 
exacerbated by techniques of infant management by parents or wet-
nurses, especially poor feeding or excessive indulgences. Thus 
"Generally does the poor little sufferer pay with his life the 
purchase of his early indulgences; or, at best, escapes with an 
enfeebled constitution, presenting a constant memorial to his parents 
- the temper of i!. child is formed i.n infancy.1I7 And when Buchan 
discussed the issue in 1809, he did so in terms of the familiar 
spiral of interaction between experiences and constitution: "Family 
consti tutions are as capable of improvement as family estates; and 
the libertine who impairs the one does greater injury to his 
posteri ty than the prodigal who squanders away the other."8 
Browne posed his discussion in 1860 almost entirely in these 
terms, arguing that illness in the mother, or injury while the child 
is in utero, can produce insani ty, as can the longings, desires or 
habits of the pregnant mother. A tendency to epilepsy could be 
produced in a child whose pregnant mother was shocked by the sight of 
a person in an epileptic fit. A child could inherit a drunkard-like 
walk from the acquired habit of the mother. Further: 9 
The life-long timidity and susceptibility of James VI were 
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traceable to the murder of Rizzio, in the presence of his 
pregnant mother. The philosopher Hobbes ascribed his acute 
nervous susceptibility to the fear of a foreign invasion, 
entertained by his mother during his utero gestation. The 
imbecility of a child, mentioned by Bird, was caused by the 
melancholia of its mother whilst pregnant. 
And in general, those who had led an immoral life, " who have 
perpetrated self-abuse, who have given themselves up to 
licentiousness, lust and passion, to the vice of intemperance, to the 
pleasures of the table, or to any nervous excitement in excess," 
would not only suffer themselves, but would "entail upon their 
progeny numerous and grievous ills - none more numerous and grievous 
than psychological disorders.,,10 
Maudsley represented the most extensive theoretical statement 
of this posi tion, but also the beginnings of its regularisa tion in 
terms of the distinction and relation between an inherited 
neuropa thic germ plasm and experience during the life of the 
organism. One had therefore to take into account the initial 
combination of germ elements; the influence of the mental and bodily 
states of one or both parents before and at the time of propagation; 
the influence upon the child's constitution exerted fbr good or ill 
by the mental and bodily state of the mother during gestation; and 
the influences brought to bear upon the child during the first year 
of growth and development of its susceptible nervous system. But 
whilst possibly as many as three out of every four cases of insanity 
showed an heredi tary predisposi tion to degeneracy, heredi tary 
insanity tended to declare itself after puberty because it was at 
that time that the mind became active - prior to puberty it was the 
physical diseases which declared their hereditary presence, because 
that was the time when the body was developing. 11 
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As the opposition between heredity and environment firmed up in 
the first decade of the twentieth century, and the belief in the 
loca tion of insanity in a damaged or underdeveloped nervous system 
and brain became dominant, this became the authoritative mode of 
posing the issue of the relationship between childhood and insanity. 
Childrens' disturbances of mind ~ ~ became marginal, rarely 
warranting a specific mention in text or index. Influences on the 
aetiology of mental disturbance spanned generations through heredity. 
This inherited tendency of the nervous system was laid down at 
conception and resulted in a brain insufficiently equipped with nerve 
cells or association fibres. After conception the nervous system 
might be subject to damage from direct or indirect stress. Direct 
stress entailed injury, toxins or lack of nutrition to the brai~ In 
the category of indirect stress were reworked all the moral causes of 
insanity familiar from the earlier texts - anxiety, worry, 
misdirected education, financial concerns, intemperance, sexual 
excess, religious fanaticism and so forth - now operating on the 
brain through the medium of bodily processes such as impuri ties in 
the blood or exhaustion of nervous energy.12 Whilst mental disorder 
could occur at any period of life, it rarely manifested itself in 
childhood due to the absence of such indirect stresses, but when it 
did so it required no special analysis. Only one issue led to 
childhood having any particular significance. If indirect stress 
could provoke the onse t of actual insani ty in those wi th an 
heredi tary predisposi tion, careful management in infancy and 
childhood might produce a character and habits which would minimise 
the risk of such stress. Again here one can observe the reworking of 
the nostrums elaborated within moral medicine within the new 
conception of the nature and aetiology of insanity. Thus Cole argued 
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tha t those with such an heredi tary di sposi tion often manifested a 
restless and explosive nervous system in sleeplessness, excitability, 
night terrors and ill temper, and that careful control of diet, 
avoidance of s tim ula tion, training in 0 bedience, proper habi ts of 
thought, feeling and behaviour, self-denial, avoidance of food fads, 
tobacco, alcohol and religious fanaticism would have a preventive 
effect. 
It was such a conception of the innate organic foundations 
of these childhood disturbances that led Henderson and Gillespie, in 
1927, to assimilate these problems not to insanity but to mental 
defect. The system of classification which they utilised in the 
first edition of their standard Textbook of Psychiatry was based upon 
Adolf Meyer's conception of 'reaction types', and the text paid 
specific attention to childhood only within the section concerning 
mental defect. Here Henderson and Gillespie included a discussion of 
what they termed 'emotional defect': 14 
Under this heading we include persons who have been from 
childhood or early youth habitually abnormal in their emotional 
reactions and in their general behaviour but who do not reach, 
except perhaps episodically, a degree of abnormality amounting 
to certifiable insanity and who show no demonstra'ble 
intellectual defect. 
Emotional defect, they argued, was a kind of mental defect, and the 
emotionally unstable was one -of its commonest types. This condition 
manifested itself in temper tantrums as a child, being bullied and 
unhappy at school, rapidly changing emotions and inability to sustain 
efforts. Emotionally defective children indulged in kleptomania, 
pyromania and pathological lying, grew up with poor judgment, were 
improvident financially and liable to alcoholism. Such children made 
up a considerable proportion of delinquents and moral imbeciles and, 
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claimed Henderson and Gillespie, since the condi tion was in~orn, 
treatment held out few hopes. They did not lay much emphasis upon 
the utility of inculcation of correct moral habits to avoid the 
precipitation of disorder. Training was important, but such 
emotionally defective persons would often have to be placed under 
institutional care. 
But by the time of their third edition in 1932, something 
appeared to have changed which had thrown into question this 
hereditarian and organiclst pessimism and delineated the mental 
disturbances of childhood as a specific object of psychiatric theory 
and therapeutic practice. The separate chapter which they introduced 
on the psychiatry of childhood was announced in the preface as a 
consequence of "the welcome growth of Child Guidance work [which] has 
shown that the topic must now be considered an important part of the 
psychia tric domain".15 It now appeared that many adul t disorders 
were a cumulative result of mental habits which had been acquired and 
ingrained during the years of childhood and adolescence, when the 
plasticity of the child's mind made it so likely that the innumerable 
traumata of childhood would leave an indelible mark - indeed the 
wonder was that so many children grew to be reasonably normal adults 
at all. Disturbances of childhood, they now warned, should only be 
attributed to innate factors when all environmental and personal 
events had been ruled out, and all therapy had failed. The central 
problem was that mental growth involved a painful conflict between 
the natural egotism of the child and the demands of the environment. 
And as well as all the adult problems, childhood now had its own 
specific repertoire of disorders: disorders of personality (timidity, 
obs ti nacy, irri tabili ty, lack of sociabili ty, etc); behaviour 
disorders (truancy, temper tantrums, lying, stealing, cruelty or food 
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fads); habi t disorders (nail bi ting, thumb sucking, incontinence, 
stamm ering); 'glycopenic' di sorders (migraine, insomni a, night 
terrors and so forth). So troubled children called for a detailed 
study by a skilled psychiatrist who could make a diagnosis and effect 
a cure principally by investigation and reformation of the 
environment of school and home but particularly of family 
relationships and the habits and manner of training the childre~ 
But in addition to seeking to establish the rights and 
competence of psychiatry in this new domain, the princip~l theme of 
the chapter was, paradoxically, to argue against the necessity of a 
detailed examination of, or therapy with, the psyche of the child 
itself. Childhood problems were not, they repeatedly insisted, 
located in the depths of the psyche: 16 
When signs of morbidity appear, they arise at the surface of 
contact, so to speak, of the child's environment with his aims 
and desires • 
. In order to understand the form of Henderson and Gillespie's 
argument, and the sudden concern to annexe this previously marginal 
problem to psychiatry, it is necessary to recognise that the 
disturbances of childhood had been individuated and prioritised not 
from within psychiatry but from outside it, and a new clinical site 
had been formed - the Child Guidance Clinic - where the exclusive 
rights of psychiatry over mental disturbances were being challenged 
by a non-psychiatric and therapeutic practice - one which termed 
i tsel f 'the new psychology'. 
Adjustment and maladjustment 
It has been suggested that, in the early years of the twentieth 
century, a new focus of medical psychiatric and neurological debate 
becomes evident in the medical textbooks and professional 
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literature. 17 This new focus was the neuroses: types of mental 
disturbance which did not themselves amount to insani ty, but were 
nonetheless severe enough to disrupt normal functioning. What is 
important for our purposes, however, are the places where these new 
problems emerged, and the manner in which they were conceptualised. 
Nervous fatigue, neurasthenia, 'nerves', were not discovered in the 
asylum, and asylum psychiatrists rarely encountered them. They owed 
their discovery to all those places where problems could come to 
notice which seemed to prevent the individual concerned from 
complying with prescribed tasks or social expectations, but without 
completely disabling them. The army, the factory, the school and the 
courtroom - these were the places where the subjects of this new 
theoretical attention emerged: the shell-shocked soldier, the 
fatigued or inefficient worker, the maladjusted schoolchild and the 
delinquent juvenile. As we shall see in a moment, the traumas of war 
provided the impetus for conceptualising these problems in a specific 
way; the problems of industry were the focus of a continuous debate. 
But as we have discussed in the last chapter, the school clinic, the 
Juvenile Court and the mental hygiene movement gave the disturbances 
of childhood a particular significance and urgency. 
It appeared that children with even mild neuroses or nervous 
disorders might develop into insane or criminal adults, and, as a 
corollary, that the likelihood of insanity or delinquency might be 
recognised in the mild disorders of childhood. But these 
disturbances were not merely the the earliest manifestations of the 
presence of an untreatable organic condition. Whilst they would 
almost certainly lead to such severe troubles if left untreated, they 
were trea tabl e. The minor troubles of childhood had became a 
specific object of theoretical concern and therapeutic intervention; 
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scarcely a. text which discussed them, from whatever theoretical 
stance, failed to mention the significance of a correct approach to 
such problems from the point of view of mental hygiene. 
How was the pro bl em thus formed to be conceptuali sed? 
Psychiatry, as we have seen above, sought to retain an analysis in 
terms of the effects of stress upon an inherited neuropathic tendency 
throughout the period of the 1920s. Some paediatricians, notably 
Hector Cameron, did however seek to differentiate the problems of the 
'nervous child' from these organic conditions, and to locate them in 
a psychological sphere. Cameron sought an alliance between doctors 
and well-to-do mothers in promoting mental hygiene by avoiding that 
restlessness, instabili ty and hyper-sensi tivi ty in children which 
passed insensibly 'into neuropa thy in adul t life. 18 The conduct of 
the nervous child, he argued, was a product of suggestion from the 
mother. The child loved attention and hence delighted in the 
distress caused, for example, by refusal to sleep, of food, or to go 
to school. It was thus the parent's pride, nervousness or opposition 
which produced the child's disturbance: "Stripped of all that is not 
essential we see the problem of the management of children reduced to 
the interplay between the adul t mind and the mind of the receptive 
suggestible child."19 And hence "it is through the mother, and by 
means of her conduct alone, that the doctor can influence the conduct 
of the child. "20 
This notion of suggestion was indeed to play a part in the new 
way of conceptualising childhood disturbances, their relations to 
family life, and the means of their prevention. But this was not 
within Cameron's two-dimensional conception of the psyche as simply a 
kind of register of emotional impressions. There was, rather, a much 
more fundamental shift in the conception of the psyche, one in which 
emotions, wishes and actions were linked up in a three-dimensional 
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space organised by flows of instinctual energy. Whilst these 
questions were the subject of acrimonious theoretical and therapeutic 
dispute in the period following the end of the First World War, the 
possibility of these disputes lay in the establishment of a new 
conceptual terrain upon which questions concerning disorders of 
conduct, feelings, and other troubles of the psyche would be posed. 
Before discussing the specific options adopted by different factions, 
the contours of this new terrain may be roughly sketched out. 
Firstly, mild disorders of conduct and emotion, like nerves or 
neurasthenia, were not in themselves caused by or indicative of 
organic defects or damage. Individuals might inherit a constitution 
or a temperament which made them more prone to such disturbances, but 
they were not in themselves organic. They were, that is to say, 
acquired or 'functional'. 
Secondly, these disturbances were the outcome of a dynamic 
interaction between the individual and his or her environment which 
produced a certain sort of character. Character - and this was as 
true for 'normal' as for 'abnormal' individuals - was no longer 
conceived of as a kind of passive register of the moral influences of 
milieu or of the determina tions of brain physiology and neurology. 
The individual was an active agent in its formation, and the product 
was the consequence of the accumulation of action and experience over 
a lifetime. However the earliest years were the most important 
because at this point the individual was most malleable, and at this 
point certain patterns of conduct would be established which would 
set the terms, as it were, of actions and interactions in later life. 
These early interactions were in the family, and hence the family had 
a central role in the production of character, both normal and 
abnormal. 
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Thirdly, the activity of the individual was conceived of in a 
particular way. Conduct was an outcome of mental life, and of the 
directing of some sort of nervous or mental energy along various 
paths. Individuals were endowed with a certain amount of such energy 
which sought discharge along certain channels in order to achieve 
particular ends. These paths had been buil t into the mental 
equipment during the process of evolution, in order to achieve those 
things necessary for the survival of the individual and of the 
species - they made up the instincts. But in human societies, these 
instincts could not express themselves directly, in their primitive 
form. They were channelled, directed, organised into complex 
constellations as a result of the experiences which individuals had 
in their earliest years. The results of this process would normally 
be that the instinctive energy would discharge itself in various 
forms of socially useful activitie~ The instinctive origin of these 
activities, and the channels which energised them by connecting them 
to the primitive instincts, were not present in awareness. They were 
not accessible to the conscious life of the individual. They were, 
that is to say, unconscious. This unconscious part of the mind was 
precisely that. It was not an aspect of physiology or neurology -
though there were undoubtedly physiological and neurological bases 
for these mental processes. But the unconscious was a part of mental 
life and could be described and analysed in terms drawn from the 
study of conscious mental life - wishes, feelings, phantasies and so 
forth - and not from brain physiology. 
Fourthly, the seeking of discharge of instinctive energy in the 
form of action, that is to say willing or conation, was accompanied 
by the experience of feelings and emotions - fear, joy, disgust and 
so forth. And over and above these specific emotions was the 
overriding organisation of the instincts in terms of pleasure and 
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pain, and the tendency of the human organism to turn away from those 
actions or wishes that produced pain and towards those that were 
productive of pleasure. Conduct was a product of character, and the 
forces that constituted character were shaped and channelled by 
experienced pleasure and pain. But often experience was not so 
simple, there was conflict between different and competing impulses 
seeking expression, or the expression of an impulse was not possible 
due to social or environmental constraints. If a solution could not 
be found by directing the energy involved to another and more 
acceptable or possi ble activi ty - sublimation - then it would be 
found by preventing that energy from being expressed at all -
repression. The repressed energy, and the ideas and feelings in 
relation to which it had sought expression, were pushed into 
unconsciousness, forming a repressed complex. Here it remained, 
removing a certain quantity of energy from useful purposes and 
generating all sorts of pathological symptoms as it sought discharge 
or as other feelings, wishes or emotions came into contact with it. 
So whilst the normal product of the experience of individuals over 
their early years, in the environment of their family, was adaptation 
or adjustment - the channelling of instincts in socially appropriate 
and psychically harmonious ways - things could go wrong. Repressions 
or inappropriate complexes could be formed, producing all sorts of 
problems of the emotions and the will - maladaptation or 
maladjustment. When one saw disorders such as hypersensitiveness, 
phobias, night terrors or whatever in childhood, or one came across 
disruptive disorders of conduct at school or truancy, one was seeing 
the results of such maladjustment, and the appropriate response was a 
form of therapy which would uncover and disperse the repressed 
complex, release the energy blocked and bound up, and channel it in 
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socially useful and productive directions. 
If'this was the terrain which was to a large extent accepted by 
all those who opposed organicist psychiatry in this period there 
were, nonetheless, a number of theoretical options open, which 
defined the lines of dispute upon it. One of these options was the 
brand of psychoanalysis which identified itself wholly with the 
theoretical and therapeutic discoveries of Freud in Vienna. 
Psychoanalysis came to England quite early, and proceeded under the 
steadfast and loyal helmsmanship of Ernest Jones. Jones founded the 
London Society of Psychoanalysis in 1913, and this was re-born as the 
British Society for Psychoanalysis in 1919. The London Psycho-
Analytic Clinic, later the Institute of Psychoanalysis, was founded 
in 1924. The principal works of Freud were translated: Studies in 
Hysteria in 1909; Three Contributions to the Sexual Theory in 1910; 
The Interpretation of Dreams in 1913; The Psychopathology of Eyeryday 
~ in 1914 and the Introductory Lectures - under the title A 
General Introduction to Psychoanalysis - in 1920. A small but steady 
stream of people trained and practised as orthodox Freudian analysts, 
and a number of faithful secondary texts were produced by analysts 
and others who accepted the doctrines emanating from Vienna. 21 
Thomas Mitchell, whose own orthodox Freudian' Problems.ill 
Psychopathology was published in 1927, was editor of the British 
Journal of Medical Psychology from its foundation in 1921 through to 
1934. 
Yet the debates in its pages indicate how far Freudian 
psychoanalytic theory was from exclusive occupation of the new 
terrain of psychology. Indeed, over the twenties and thirties, 
classical psychoanalysis as a doctrine of th,e psyche and a clinical 
method was very much on the defensive. 22 It was vilified by small 
heretical factions - those promoting the doctrines of Jung and the 
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Zurich school from the Analytic Psychology Club and by Adlerians who 
founded the Medical Society of Individual Psychology in 1931. Its 
theoretical bases and therapeutic methods were attacked by organicist 
psychiatrists like Alfred Tredgold and Edward Mapother of the 
Maudsley Hospital, and investigated by the British Medical 
Association after a particular scandal in 1925.23 A further line of 
theoretical and practical opposition, and one more significant for 
the present study, came from a group of English doctors and 
psychologists, many engaged in therapeutic work, who, whilst 
recognising the revolutionary discoveries of Freud, sought to 
dispense with certain of the central concepts of his system and 
combine the remainder with theories drawn from other domains. This 
school termed itself 'the new psychology'. In the face of this 
opposition, Freudian psychoanalysis retained its presence in the 
literature and the private consulting room, but largely withdrew from 
the public domain of social and political disputation. 
The 'new psychology' however was not so modest. Its formation 
was contemporary with the incursion of psychoanalytic orthodoxy into 
Britain in the immediate pre-war period. The writings and lectures 
of Bernard Hart and William Brown sought to promote what were 
considered to be the fundamental principles discovered by Freud, 
whilst expressing reservations about certain of his doctrines, and 
effecting a judicious replacement of these elements by others more 
acceptable or at least less scandalous.24 What was accepted was the 
energy model of the psyche, notions of unconsious mental processes 
and unconscious motives, repression, regression, mental conflict and 
complexes. What was discarded, explicitly or tacitly, was the 
conception that libidinal energy, or the 'sex instinct', was the 
organising principle of mental life and conation, together with the 
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associated doctrines of infantile sexuality and the sexual origins 
of the neuroses. 
Whilst the elements of a non-organicist theory of neurotic 
disorders were in place prior to the First World War, it was the 
effects of the war itself which enabled them to be organised into a 
distinct and active body of argument and therapeutic techniques. An 
alarmingly high proportion of the casualties in the first months of 
war were suffering not from obvious physical injury, but from 'shell 
shock' - from 7-10% of officer casualties and from 3-4% of other rank 
casualties by December 1914. The number of such cases over the whole 
war was estimated at 80,000 and in 1921 some 65,000 ex-servicemen 
were still receiving disabili ty pensions for 'shell shock,.25 
Treatment was mostly given near the fighting, and the majority of 
cases were returned to active duty within three weeks, but the more 
serious cases were sent to special hospitals in England - Maghull, 
Nettley, Craiglockhart, and Denmark Hill were the best known. Whilst 
many senior military officers considered 'shell shock' to be only a 
disguise for cowardice, to be minimised by improved morale, good 
officership, and, where necessary, the firing squad, organicist 
physicians such as Mott ini tially considered the condi tion to be a 
consequence of minute cerebral haemorrhages caused by the blast. 
But the doctors and psychologists who were employed in these 
hospitals began to deploy various versions of the therapeutic 
techniques developed in Paris by Janet and in Vienna by Freud, and 
used the apparent success which they achieved as the means to dispute 
organicist theories of the' aetiology of neuroses in general. The war 
neuroses provided the opportunity of extending to these 'minor 
disorders' of the mind the type of practice which had made clinical 
medicine possible, and hence of disputing the medical theories 
themselves. As Hadfield put it: 26 
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The cases presented by war are so simple in their aetiology.and 
the factors which contribute to their production so well-defined 
and uncomplicated in character, compared with those in civilian 
cases, that we have the opportunity of studying them almost 
under laboratory conditions. Moreover, so many of these are 
practically identical in origin and symptoms, that they 
constitute excellent material for testing and compring the 
various methods of treatment. 
But they also appeared to confirm the early doubts and scepticism 
concerning the emphasis on sexuality in Freudian psychoanalysis and 
the excl usi vi ty cl aimed for the analytic method i tsel f. The 
collection of papers edited by Hugh Crichton Miller demonstrate 
clearly the mode of conceptualisation which would come to underpin 
the new psyChology.27 In order to understand these neuroses it was 
necessary to infer the reality of processes which resembled conscious 
mental processes in every way except that the patient could give no 
account of them. These processes were the results of repression: a 
forgetting by the conscious mind (consciously or unconsciously 
effected) of some intolerable or irresolvable mental conflict. But 
it was not necessary to "pervert wholly the meaning of sex or sexual" 
or to see the origins of neuroses in some "very hypothetical 
sexuality of infancy" to understand these repressions. 28 These 
elements were replaced with a theory of mul tiple instincts drawn 
variously from William McDougall's 'hormic' psychology, William 
Trotter's conception of a 'herd instinct' and the concept of 
'sen timents' pu t forward by Alexander Shand, often toge ther with a 
conception of neuroses in terms of dissociation drawn from Janet.29 
Thus, for example, W H R Rivers attributed the war neuroses to a 
repressed conflict between the instinct of self-preservation and the 
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call of duty, and McDougall saw the symptoms of paralysis, muscle 
tremors; headaches, giddiness, lassitude, lack of confidence, 
insomnia and so forth as the consequence of the conflict between the 
repressed energies of the complex and the repressing energies of the 
rest of the personality which could not let this complex into 
consciousness.30 And a range of therapeutic techniques were deployed 
- the choice depending upon the nature of the case - ranging from 
occupational training, through persuasion, suggestion and rational 
re-education to a form of psychotherapy which used hypnosis or free 
association to discover the nuclear incident which had been the 
precipi tating cause of the disorder, to bring to consciousness the 
conflicting feelings and emotions which had accompanied it, to reveal 
'the links between this repressed complex and the symptoms, and hence 
to provide relief and cure by liberating the affect and energy which 
had been blocked and by allowing it to be directed into other 
channels. 31 
In the decade following the end of the First World War, the new 
psychology was elaborated through reprints of Hart's book, and in 
books by Tansley, Rivers, Brown, Hadfield, McDougall, Hugh Crichton 
Miller, Gordon, MacCurdy, Raven and others.3 2 Susan Brierley (who 
was later - as Susan Isaacs - to make a 'return to -Freud' via the 
writings of Melanie Klein) wrote a careful and measured Introduction 
to Psychology in these terms.33 What is significant for our purposes 
is not the degree of subtlety and sophistication with which the 
different authors expounded the new psychology, nor the fine details 
of the differences of emphasis, terminology, and the dispute which 
traversed it. Rather the question we must ask is this: what was it 
that the new psychology made thinkable? The answer is in terms of 
the alignment which it forged between the register of personal 
happiness, that of family relations, and that of social adjustment. 
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This was first of all evidenced in the conceptual effects of 
the rejection of the Freudian notion of a single libidinal energy. 
This was replaced by McDougall's notion of the human organism as 
purposive - mind governing action in the light of experience in order 
to direct it to certain ends. Human behaviour was driven by 
inheri ted instincts. McDougall formulated his famous definition of 
instinct in 1908, and in 1923 re-stated it in only slightly modified 
form, as: 34 
An innate disposition which determines the organism to perceive 
(pay attention to) an object of a certain class and to 
experience in its presence a certain emotional excitement and an 
impulse to action which finds expression in a specific mode of 
behaviour in relation to that object. 
McDougall himself identified twelve such primary instinctual 
dispositions, each of which involved cognition - the mind taking 
cognisance of the object - affect - the specific emotion aroused -
and conation - the mental tendency or set towards appropriate actio~ 
These primary disposi tions were flight, repulsion, curiosi ty, 
pugnacity, (associated with fear, disgust, wonder and anger), self-
assertion and self-abasement (associated with positive and negative 
self-feelings) the sex, parental and gregarious instincts (passio~ 
tenderness and a general heightening of pleasant feeling), feeding, 
construction and acquisitiveness.35 
Not everyone accepted McDougall's views completely. Some 
preferred Shand's terminology, in which emotional dispositions were 
primary and instincts were the innate motor mechanisms through which 
they achieved their ends. Also significant was Shand's argument that 
certain of the emotions which McDougall had considered primary were 
in fact com bina tions of more than one basic emotion, and that over 
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the course of development action became governed by 'sentiments' 
which were complex organisations of different emotional dispositions 
that directed action in particular si tua tions. 36 Others sought to 
displace McDougall's instinct of gregariousness wi th Trotter's more 
powerful 'herd instinct'. This referred to the innate disposition of 
the normal mind automatically to obey suggestions and influences 
arising from the herd or social group, and the unhappiness consequent 
upon being different or separate from the group.37 Whilst these 
distinctions were of considerable significance in the particular 
explanations of pathology and normality produced, they clearly 
operated upon a single conceptual terrai~ 
For present purposes, the significance of this proliferation of 
instincts and the form in which they were specified is this: the 
impulse to social adjustment was conceived of as inscribed in the 
individual at the psychical level. Thus the parenting instinct and 
the emotional disposition of tenderness was, for Tansley, "the great 
psychical bond which binds the mates to one another and their 
children ••• Its biological function is to hold the family together 
for mutual protection - in the first instance probably the mother to 
her children, then the husband to his wife, the father to his 
children, and the wife to her husband.,,38 The natural family was now 
a biological necessity, a social value and a realisation of wish and 
will. And, from its evolutionary origins in the physical safety of 
the group, the herd instinct bound the individual into obligations to 
morality and authority at the level of dispositions and in the 
register of pleasure versus unhappiness - though it also explained 
allegiances to such 'partial herds' as crowds, class, political and 
religious grouPings.39 Unlike the psychoanalytic postulate of a 
single libidinal energy with no given form of satisfaction, instinct 
theory construed individuals as pre-organised towards social 
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adjustment, for psychic energy was such that it sought discharge in 
directions which were advantageous both to the species in terms of 
social adjustment, and to the individual, in terms of the 
sa tisfaction of a wish and the experience of pleasure. And where 
Freud was to write, in 1930, of the unease inherent in civilisation, 
the new psychology was to be a science of social contentment. 
Personal happiness and social adjustment were now two sides of the 
same coin. 
The second, and related, aspect of the new psycpology which was 
significant was the notion of character. In these arguments, 
character was no longer merely an agreggate of acquired habits. 
Under the pressure of experience, ~nherited nervous temperament and 
inna te primary dispositions were organised into sentiments, which 
were themselves organised into an harmonious and integrated system -
character. For the new psychology, the most important experiences 
were those which the child gained in its home and family environment. 
It was here that primary instincts and emotions were channelled and 
connected up into constellations containing cognitive, affective and 
conative processes and attached to appropriate objects or ideas. The 
normal family provided the environment in which these impulses were 
smoothly and harmoniously organised and directed towards the right 
objects, ideas and persons, producing an harmonious and adjusted 
character. Parents did this through encouraging correct habits, 
certainly, but also through their own psychological relations with 
their children, through the processes of suggestion whereby the 
feelings and emotions of the parents towards "actions and objects 
would be incorporated into the suggestible mind of the child. Also 
crucial was the operation of the child's experience upon the 
sentiment of self-regard. For McDougall, this was the master 
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sentiment of the will and that which organised and directed volitio~ 
It was made up of the paired instincts of self-assertion and self-
abasement. By respecting and directing this sentiment of self-
regard, socially adjusted and happy individuals would be produced, 
and the individual's impulse to self-realisation would be fulfilled 
through the formation of abiding sentiments of right habit and good 
conduct. 40 
A psychological rationale had been superadded to the moral 
rationale for the existence and promotion of the family, but 
simultaneously the family that was to be promoted had been limited to 
the natural family, for it had something which was not present in any 
substitutes. The natural wish of men and women was to be husbands 
and wives, parents and home-makers. And 'the natural place to raise a 
child was its ow n family, since here the wish for a child to parent 
and the need of a child for its parents coincided. A new type of 
family history had been made possible, one where the relations 
between the biological, the psychological, the moral and the social 
were not direct - as in degeneracy and eugenics - but indirect. 
Nonetheless, the biological and evolutionary grounding of the 
instincts acted as a reality-justification for the promotion of 
particular familial relations. The social adjustment of the 
individual was at one and the same time a self-realisation - since it 
was towards this that the biological urges were directed - and the 
consequence of a good psychological family. 
The conception of the normal psychological family was thus 
formed from the perspective of pathology. The discoveries of the new 
psychology induced normality from an analysis of abnormality. Susan 
Brierley recognised this clearly, when she wrote: 41 
The study of the abnormal has done much to reveal the inner 
structure of the mind, and the mechanisms by which adjustment to 
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social life is effected. A disease is indeed a kind of natural 
experiment. When a hitch occurs in the process of adjustment of 
the individual to his psychical environment, its workings are 
revealed, - discoveries that might never be made if all went 
smoothly. An intimate and constant relation between normal and 
abnormal psychology is essential. 
If the normal family was characterised in terms of an harmonious and 
adjusted channelling and expression of psychic energy, this was 
because pathology was a consequence of repression. 
Repression was a consequence of an environment where 
dispositions were not channelled, and energy not expressed, but where 
it was blocked and forced into the unconscious. A family could 
provoke or produce conflicts in wishes and emotions, or deny them 
expression, or associate them with shame, guilt or other unpleasant 
feelings. Repression could also be produced by the parents 
expressing their own fears, hopes, anxieties, guilts and 
disapPointments in relation to the child's feelings, wishes or 
actions. The child, who was so suggestible, would incorporate these 
into its psyche, and the displeasure so caused would conflict with 
the pressure of conation and its associated emotions and ideas. This 
conflict would be resolved by forcing the ideas, feelings and wishes 
which had provoked it into the unconscious. A similar process would 
occur if the parents feared the child's independence and positive 
self-regard, playing on its fears and anxieties in order to keep it 
dependent. The repressed complex would not, however, lie silent 
outside cons ciousness. The energy attached to it would find 
distorted expression in dreams, nervous disorders or abnormalities of 
conduct, in compensatory phantasies, projection of the repressed 
conflict onto others, anxiety and so forth. If the normal family was 
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construed in terms of adjustment and happiness, disturbances in the 
psychological relations of the family produced social maladjustment 
and personal unhappiness. As the new psychology began to construe 
the family at the level of emotions and wishes, the possibility 
opened up for emotions and wishes to be inscribed within the field of 
social regulation. 42 
One further point concerning the discrepancy between the new 
psychology and Freudian psychoanalysis is important at this point. 
It concerns the question of reality. For the new psychology, the 
organisation of dispositions into sentiments and character was one 
that was produced in the real, as a resul t of the actual experience 
by the child of its interactions wi th its parents, and the actual -
even if unconscious - feelings, emotions and wishes that the parents 
had in relation to it. It was real problems of this order that were 
the causes of its troubles, neuroses and maladjustments. This 
conception had been established very early on, in work with the 
shell-shocked. Real childhood events had produced a conflict and 
been repressed. Real conflicts in the soldier's life had triggered 
off the trauma. Therapy proceeded by working back to these real 
conflicts, bringing them back into consciousness, releasing the 
energy that had been diverted from the repressed conflicts, and 
channelling it in the direction of adjustment. The reality of 
origins produced the possibility of a normalising therapy.43 
The same was true in the general explanations of the functional 
neuroses elaborated in the new psychology. They arose from a 
conflict generated by the real experiences and events in family life 
which had been coped with by repression. The function of the 
neurosis was to provide a defence against the conflict and to conceal 
that which had been repressed. The function of therapy was to reveal 
to the individual his own unconscious motive and to enable him to 
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cope in consiousness with the conflict that had generated i~ .Thus 
on the one hand therapy could proceed by a kind of abreaction in 
which energy was freed as these real repressed events were reinserted 
into consciousness and simultaneously removed from their troubling 
unconscious existence, and on the other hand norms of family 
rela tions could be constructed, and types of family rela tions 
evaluated, in terms of their likelihood to promote or hinder the 
production of a normal, adjusted psyche. The insistence of the real 
provided the possibility of constructing psychological norms of 
healthy child-rearing and a normalising practice of intervention and 
therapy. 
It was around this question of the real that one focus of 
dispute between psychoanalysis and the new psychology was organised 
in the late twenties and early thirties. For the new psychology, 
phantasy was often harmless childhood daydreaming, giving pleasure 
through the illusion of wishes fulfilled. But sometimes it was 
compensatory, the outcome of conflict, a way of escaping from an 
unpleasant reality. In such cases it would be dispelled by bringing 
the real problems into the open. But as orthodox psychoanalysis 
extended its techniques to the actual analysis of children, rather 
than inducing the psychical relations of childhood from the results 
of adult analysis, the priority of reality over phantasy in the 
mental life of the child was reversed. Hermione Hug-Hellmuth's 
techniques of analysis with children, dating from 1913, were reported 
in English in the International Journal of Psychoanalysis in 1921. 
Melanie Klein's extension and development of these techniques for 
very young children were increasingly the focus of a developing and 
disputatious tendency in British analytical circles. These arguments 
were popularised beyond the field of professional psychoanalysis by 
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the writings of Susan Isaacs based upon her work at the Malting House 
School and, from 1933, as Head of the Department of Child Development 
at the Institute of Education in London. 44 
The details of the disputes over the work of Klein and the 
issues of child analysis need not concern us here. 45 The work of 
Isaacs, however, was widely disseminated through the training of 
infant school teachers to which her department contributed, through 
pamphlets and through her answers to parents' questions in the 
journal Home and School.46 The conclusions which Isaacs drew from 
theory and observation of young children entailed a denegation of the 
real which appeared to rule out the possibility of psychoanalysis 
providing general norms of conduct for parents in order to rear 
healthy and well adjusted children. As she wrote in 1930: "Our real 
behaviour [to children] and the actual conditions we create, are 
always for.i.b.§.m set in the matrix of their own phantasies.,,47 She 
accepted, like the new psychology, that the child's feelings and 
wishes "can only be understood in terms of the child's previous 
responses to his family" and that "it has become clear that this 
primary situation sets the fundamental pattern of his relation to the 
world as a whole, and all other social situations develop from it,,48. 
However, whilst constantly asserting the importance of reality, she 
nonetheless argued: 49 
In considering the origins of later social development in the 
child's relation to his parents, we have to hold in mind not 
only his real external relations with his parents as he knows 
them in the later phases of his own development, and as they are 
in their real behaviour, but even more, his relations to them in 
terms of intra-psychical conflict ••• His actual relation with 
his real parents in the second or third years onwards is largely 
affected by this internal situation, itself built on the 
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earliest and most primitive wishes and phantasies. 
In blurring the line between experience and its psychical 
consequences, as a result of the significance accorded to primitive 
wishes and phantasies within the child itself, these English 
developments of psychoanalysis in the inter-war years years provided 
no easy schema for the mapping of the disorders of childhood onto 
real maladaptive types of family relations. Thus they problematised 
the project of normalising the latter in the service of the former. 
If the emphasis of the new psychology was to resolve a problem 
in the child by action upon the family, in these developments from 
psychoanalysis this balance was reversed. The advice to parents and 
teachers provided by Susan Isaacs is a clear example of this. 50 
Mothers were to be educated about the nature of the child's mind and 
its growth. They were not provided with a set of instructions or 
advice as to conduct, because the meaning of any particular 
si tua tion, action or event to the child could never be specified in 
general, and varied according to individual circumstances and the 
child's mental life. Mothers could, however, be alerted to the 
inevitability of fears, phantasies, jealousies, angers and conflicts 
in the mental life of the young child. They were to recognise these 
as the products of the child's own beliefs and imaginings, not a 
product of real events or persons, but nonetheless more real to the 
child than any external facts. So norms of parental behaviour could 
not be prescribed in specific terms; only the general presumption 
that leaving the child free to express itself in its own way was 
usually preferable to constraint or direction. An understanding, 
liberal, tolerant attitude was to be encouraged to the vicissitudes 
of the mental and emotional growth of the child. The related studies 
of play, symbolism and phantasy in the writings of Griffiths and 
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Lowenfeld, with their emphasis upon the developmental functions of 
these relatively autonomous actions of the child's imagination, and 
the general privileging of the 'point of view of the child', began to 
dissolve the links which had welded together the elements that made 
up the new psychology.51 
At the same time McDougall's hormic psychology was increasingly 
called into question, with each author generating his own inventory 
of instincts, and others beginning to question what it was that held 
together the various aspects of behaviour aggregated as a single 
instinct, apart from the fact that they were all labelled with the 
same name. As the thirties progressed, the conceptual alliances with 
psychology which had constituted the new psychology began to look 
increasingly shaky, and the modes of explanation which it had 
provided were increasingly annexed to medicine and psychiatry. It 
should not be forgotten that the leading figures of the new 
psychology were themselves not psychologists but doctors. In the 
post-war period, it was not psychology but a revamped psychoanalysis 
which would provide the new foundations for a normalising 
therapeutics. This would take as its central concern not so much the 
emotional relations between all family members, as the specific 
relationship between the mother and the child, or rather between the 
child's need to be mothered and the woman's desire to be a mother. 
It is often suggested that the post-war emphasis upon the 
importance of the early mother-child relationship for heal thy 
psychological developments was an ideological legitimation for the 
closure of war-time nursery provision, the removal of women from the 
labour market and their re-domestication. But the arguments 
concerning the damaging effects of separation of babies and young 
children from their mothers ante-date the famous post-war studies of 
children reared in insti tutions, and the requirements of post-war 
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economics. 52 The work of Bowlby, Winnicott and the other celebr.ants 
of maternali ty had its foundation in that which the new psychology 
had made possible. Before the war, Bowlby and Winnicott both cut 
their teeth in the child guidance movement, and maintained many of 
its normalising aspirations, founded now upon an emphasis upon the 
specific importance of the child's first object relations in the 
formation of the ego. For example, Bowlby's famous study of 'Forty-
Four Juvenile Thieves' which claimed to establish the link between 
early separation from the mother, an Affectionless Character, and 
juvenile theft, though not published until 1944, was carried out at 
the London Child Guidance Clinic during the years 1936-1939.53 The 
Child Guidance Clinic was ,the site which made this new theory and 
practice of the genesis of childhood disturbances possible. 
The young delinquent 
If the new psychology was to lead to a clinical role for 
psychological knowledge from the direction of the minor mental 
disturbances of childhood and the perspective of mental hygiene, it 
was to intersect with another path which also prioritised the 
establishment of the psychological clinic. The issue for this second 
line of development was not so much the maladjusted child who would 
present worse problems in the future but the delinquent child and the 
past origins of his conduct. We saw, in the last chapter, the way in 
which this problem was formed in the debates around the juvenile 
court and in the texts of Charles Goring and Maurice Hamblin Smit~ 
But the leading advocate of this tendency, and promotor of the role 
of individual psychology, was, once again, Cyril Burt. 
In the decade following the passage of the Mental Deficiency 
Act 1913, there was a consistent attempt to extend the hereditarian 
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explanations concerning idiocy and feeble-mindedness to the problems 
of delinquency and crime, through the notion of 'moral imbecili ty,.54 
Many psychiatrists, notably Mercier, Tredgold and East, sought to 
uphold the argument that there was indeed a class of defectives who 
suffered from an inherited or congenital defect in their moral 
faculty - without necessarily an accompanying defect of intelligence 
- which was manifested by aberrant conduct in childhood leading to 
delinquency and criminality, and that these children should be dealt 
with in the same way as other defectives, for the condition made them 
unreformable. 55 
It is paradoxical at first sight that Burt, architect of 
psycho-eugenics, shou~d have been at the forefront of the opposition 
to this application of the familiar strategy to a new domain. 
Especially since he had himself, in 1917, described a class of 
unstable persons who were a definite type of mental defective -
defective in character rather than in intellect. 56 But this 
opposition is intelligible on at least two counts. Firstly, as an 
attempt to claim the disturbances of childhood and their relation to 
delinquency as a field of psychological rather than medica.L 
expertise. And secondly, in that these conditions were to be 
attributed to factors other than heredity, to allow psychology a 
space of action beyond that of mere ascertainment of an inborn state 
of affairs - to allow it, that is to say, a role in therapy and 
reformation. 
Burt took as his targets two notions which he reckoned to 
underpin the 'medical' view - the notion of an inbuil t 'moral 
facul ty' and the argument that crime ran in families. 57 There was no 
inborn condition of 'moral blindness', he argued, but rather an 
inherited temperament which was shaped and channelled through family 
life. And family histories, he claimed, showed that the proportion 
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of delinquents "'lith a family history of transgression of moral rules 
was low, and in any event delinquency was more likely to be 
transmi t ted by fam ily life than by inheri tence. At the most, what 
was inherited was a general weakness of constitution but whilst such 
"weaknesses, when excessive, may favour a moral lapse in later life; 
they in no way constitute a fatal and inexorable propulsion to it.,,58 
In his own analyses, Burt began to layout a way of 
conceptualising delinquency and its origins which would lead to a new 
proposal for a clinical status for psychology. This was based upon 
an energy theory of the psyche which had been around since Gal ton, 
but which, under the impetus of the deba tes discussed in the last 
section, was now reworked into a general theory of conduct.59 Burt, 
like others, indeed argued for the importance of early recognition of 
instability during school age in order to reduce the numbers who 
would have to be dealt with later in the hospital, the asylum and the 
jail. But early identification was not in the service of permanent 
segregation but for the ini tiation of reformatory measures.60 The 
problems that the unstable might produce were a consequence of their 
high level of "general emotionality" - analagous to "general 
intelligence". But whether this led to delinquency or to brilliance 
and/or or originality depended not upon the excessive leve~ of 
emotionality itself, but the way it was channelled. Properly 
directed, it could lead to the following of a highly useful and 
productive life, ill-directed, to perversion, morbidity, impulsivity 
and criminality. The problem, that is to say, was neither physical 
nor inborn - it was a psychological problem, with psychological 
causes, that admitted of psychological solutions. It frequently 
arose from conflicts and inconsistent discipline in the home, in 
which the congenital temperament was malformed by the emotions of the 
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family. As Burt put it: 61 
The'natural temperament of the congenitally unstable provides 
the most fertile soil in which the seeds of crime or immorality 
take root. The child delinquent suffers from no ineradicable 
criminal instinct and from no irremediable deprivation of the 
moral sense. He suffers merely from misdirected energy. 
If the family was not channelling energy correctly then the child was 
better off being removed from it and located in a colony, conceived 
of along the lines of a new form of moral treatment. The unstable 
child was to be placed in a free-running, self-disciplining 
community, along the lines of Homer Lane's Little Commonwealth or the 
Hi verside Villages. Here, free from interaction with an unstabl e 
mother, wi thout arbi trary discipline and repression which blocked 
energy rather than channelling it along useful lines, immersed in 
country life with its uniformity and orderly progression of sensuous, 
natural and impersonal interests, the child could truly be 
reformed: 62 
In the worst delinquent there is always a better self ••• if the 
teacher is freed from the task of unpleasant dispenser of 
arbitrary punishment he can readily make himself the confidant 
of each individual child and become, where necessary, like the 
sympathetic psychoanalyst, a sort of sympathetic father 
confessor. 
A number of things have happened here that appear to place 
Burt's arguments on the terrain discussed in the last section. 
Firstly, delinquency and immorality have begun to be conceived of in 
terms of the interaction between some dynamic aspect of the child -
energy - and its environment. Secondly, what the child turns out to 
be is the result of the accumulation of these interactions - a 
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conception of development. Thirdly, these events are conceived of as 
happeni~g in a psychological domain, and what characterises this 
domain is not a matter of intellect but of emotion. Fourthly, what 
structures emotional development are interactions, emotional 
interchanges between family members - the family has thus a crucial 
role in the genesis of instability and delinquency. Fifthly, in that 
these are problems arising in a psychological domain, psychologists 
rather than doctors are the appropriate diagnostic agents. Sixthly, 
whilst doctors conceive of the problems as intractable to reform, 
psychology can both explain their genesis in the life of the 
individual and prescribe a therapeutic regime. 
This was the position that Burt put forward too in a lecture to 
the Chari ty' Organisa tion Society.6 3 The Society had asked Burt to 
address the question of whether social workers could improve their 
efforts by a study of psychology. Burt answered in the negative, if 
this meant the study of the standard textbooks of psychology and 
rela ted laboratory demonstrations and exercises. The majori ty of 
such textbooks were engrossed with the processes of sensa tionj the 
remainder dealt with the general principles of perception, memory and 
association. These had about as much value to the social worker 
handling concrete cases as a knowledge of plant cells had to the 
gardener bedding out begonias. But the psychology of individual 
differences was another matter. Here psychology and social work were 
united in their concern with the nature of mental differences in 
different individuals, the signs by which they might be recognised, 
the causes which produce and remove them. So it was individual 
psychology which was to be "the master science" for all those who 
dealt with individuals and had to take decisions in the light of 
their character and personality.64 
The Young Delinquent, first published in 1925 and going through 
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four editions in the following twenty years, at one level merely 
systematised these arguments and sought to sUbstantiate them by 
reporting the results of a study of some 200 young delinquents and a 
matched group of 400 non-delinquents. It appeared to align 
individual psychology with the new psychology and with the types of 
analysis and practice which it suggested. But at another level, in 
wishing to incorporate these within the theory, methods and expertise 
of individual psychology, it attempted to recast the new psychology 
in terms of the variation of emotional characteristics across a 
population, and hence make it amenable to the statistical techniques, 
scalings and assessment methods which had come to define, at the most 
fundamental level, what could count as a scientific psychology of the 
individual. At this level, the seeds were sown of the failure of 
individual psychology to establish itself as the dominant instance in 
the Child Guidance Clinic. Let us first follow the account of 
delinquency which Burt produced. 
The delinquent act was a symptom, and only an extreme symptom, 
of ordinary childhood naugh tiness. Its causes were fundamentally 
mental. Hence the object of investigation - if these causes were to 
be discovered - and treatment - if they were to be removed - was the 
inner mental life of the delinquent. Certainly physical conditions 
or defects might be involved, but since criminal activity sprang 
ultimately from the mind, these could operate only through the moral 
or emotional reactions which they produced and which might persist, 
even after the physical condition had been cured.65 For crime was a 
product of the inner mental life of the criminal. This mental life 
or mental state was not determined by heredi ty, al though heredi ty 
could produce an individual in which delinquency was more or less 
likely to occur. And the inner life of the individual which was 
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significant in relation to delinquency was not principally that of 
the inteilect. Only a small proportion of delinquents were defective 
in intelligence; others were of dull, normal or even above-normal 
intelligence; intellectual factors were usually accessory rather than 
the main causes of delinquency. They did not furnish the motive for 
the act; they simply removed some of the checks, based on prudent or 
rational insight, which prevented the normal mind from giving way to 
desires whose fundamental source was an inner instinct or impulse. 
The same was true of environmental factors. Ai though such factors 
were crucial in many cases, they could not operate on conduct 
directly, but only through the mediation of the mind. Poverty, for 
example, which had so often been considered a cause of crime could 
not be so in any simple sense, for whilst the majority of delinquents 
might be poor, the majority of the poor were not delinquent. It 
operated therefore, not as an absolute cause but a relative one, it 
was a matter of: "the ratio of available means to irresistible 
desires. ,,66 
It is true that in his discussion of environmental factors, 
Burt was reworking themes familiar from earlier discussions of 
delinq uency and its moral causes in the defective habi ts formed in 
the home and the communi ty. But the transformation effected was 
through the linking of these into a new conception of the moral 
domain, no longer as constituted by learning through association of 
ideas and a calculus of pleasure and pains, but a complex, three 
dimensional realm with its own laws and processes very different from 
those of consciousness, rationality and the intellect. Environmental 
factors could be divided into those outside the home and those inside 
the home. The former - the bad influence of friends and associates, 
unemployment, uncongenial school work, misuse of leisure time - could 
give the opportunity for, or actively promote, the development of bad 
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habits; ?elinquency caused by such conditions was best dealt with by 
the constructive guidance associated wi th proba tion. But of more 
importance were factors within family life: 'defective family 
relationships' such as step-mothers or fathers, illegitimacy or 
whatever; 'vicious homes' where one or both parents was a criminal or 
promiscuous; but most usually 'defective discipline' where the 
parents were too strict, too lax or too inconsistent. 
But whilst at one level the role and nature of the 
environmental conditions were utterly familiar, as was the language 
in which they were described, at another level the mode of their 
action was radically transformed. Unstable and delinquent children 
had prioritised a new domain for psychological concept~alisation -
tha t of temperament and character, now construed in terms of 
instincts and emotions. For environment, like physical conditions or 
intellect, produced disorders of conduct through the consequences 
which it had for temperament or character: "the sum total of all 
those personal qualities of mind which do not constitute, or are not 
pervaded by, intelligencell •67 Like the 'new psychology' which it so 
evidently drew upon, this mode of conceptualisation acted as a 
framework within which the demands of social existence could be 
linked up with the biological and psychological laws of development 
of the psyche, providing an extra-social legi tim a tion for the 
categories of adjustment and maladjustment, and the means by which 
'the normal family' could be construed in times of prescribed norms 
of psychological relationships between husbands and wives or parents 
and children. 
Burt allowed that there were cases in which children were 
'emotionally defective' in the sense in which Henderson and Gillespie 
used the term. But such cases were rare; in most cases delinquents 
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were either temperamentally normal or else temperamentally unstable • 
. 
Instabili ty however was nei ther the cause of delinquency nor 
irremediable, nor a justification for permanent segregatio~ We can 
see here how Burt operated on the same terrain as the new psychology. 
What was inborn was a set of biological instincts, and a level of 
energy which 'fuelled' them. In some cases specific instincts might 
be overdeveloped, producing particula~ types of misconduct: an 
overdeveloped sex instinct was linked to promiscuity; anger to 
violent offences; acquisi ti veness to theft and so forth. But more 
often what was involved was a generally high level of energy which 
sought discharge through all the instinctual channels. Problems 
arose when this energy was misdirected through the family producing 
anti-social habi ts or when it was merely blocked instead of being 
'sublimated' - directed in a socially useful way - when it would find 
itself substitute channels in order to discharge. 
'Environment' thus is reconceived as all those influences which 
might act upon the expression of the instincts. It might allow the 
instincts to discharge themselves in a direct and unchannelled way, 
sui table for the primi ti ve times in which they became part of our 
hereditary endowment, but not for a life in civilisation. It might 
channel the energy in the wrong way, through not building up correct 
habi ts to organise it into socially useful 'sentiments' or through 
organi si ng it in to an ti- so ci al 'se ntiments'. In such cases, 
treatment was most effectively carried out by removal from the home 
environment, into one where the old habits by which the impulses were 
directed could be broken down, and new and constructive ones 
formed. 68 
But also, events might cause the repression of energy and the 
formation of unconscious 'complexes'. This was related not so much 
to actual home conditions as to the peculiar mental life of the 
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child: foolish phantasies stemming from doubts about the love felt by 
parents or rivalries with siblings; conflicts between pairs of 
opposing instincts such as gluttony and fear around the purloining of 
food; conflicts between sexual temptations and social taboos. Here 
something unpleasant is blotted from consciousness, and that which 
has been repressed may return through other channels of discharge -
stealing, violence, running away - in which the substitute act is 
linked to the original temptation through a connection unknown to the 
delinquent. Burt claimed that he had found traces of such repressed 
complexes in 57% of his cases - most often where intelligent persons 
with no obvious reasons or motives of gain had taken to a life of 
crime. Here, none of the usual methods of treatment were 
appropriate; what was needed was "psychoanalysis":69 
The object of psychoanalysis is to loosen the twisted knots in 
which the soul is entangled. The analyst must strive to 
disengage all the implicated motives of the child, unconscious 
as well as conscious, so that both the child and himself may 
become fully aware what hidden bonds encumber him. 
Burt shared the conception of psychoanalysis as a method of 
investiga tion of the real events, feelings and conflicts which had 
been repressed in the formation of character and as a process of 
rational reconstruction of motives and of re-education to bring that 
which was unconscious under conscious control.70 Psychoanalysis was 
a kind of practical re-education of the psyche to free repressed 
energy and to rechannel it along socially acceptable and constructive 
paths. 
At the very beginning of The young DelinQuent, Burt had staked the 
claims of psychology, rather than medicine, for jurisdiction over the 
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behavioural disorders of childhood, on account of their mental 
origin. 'He wrote: 71 
And there is now a definite body of ascertained knowledge, 
tracing mental symptoms to their causes, just as medical 
knowledge tracks down the sources of bodily disorders, and so 
can prescribe for each its proper treatment or appropriate cure. 
The study of the criminal thus becomes a distinct department of 
this new science - a branch of individual psychology; and the 
handling of the juvenile offender is, or should be, a practical 
application of psychological principles. 
And a vital sub-plot of The Young Delinquent was to demonstrate the 
variety of the factors that could produce delinquency, and the need 
for, and efficacy of, psychological analysiS, investigation and 
conceptualistion if one was to understand the complex workings of 
these factors in the mental life of the child. It thus led naturally 
to a reactivation of the demand for a site of operation for this 
psychological expertise, not now in relation to the defective, but to 
the disturbed and the delinquent. Burt put it thus:72 
The delinquent himself must be approached individually, as a 
unique human being, with a peculiar constitution, peculiar 
difficul ties, and peculiar problems of his own. The key-note of 
modern educational thought is individuality ••• if this is needed 
for the normal, how much greater must be the need among the 
abnormal, the neglected, the delinquentl... Whatever authority 
has to grapple with such cases must at all times regard not the 
offence but the offende~ The aim must be not pUnishment, but 
treatment; and the target not isolated actions, but their 
causes. Since the causes seldom float conspicuously upon the 
surface, such authorities must have access to all available 
information, and possess means to make for every case intensive 
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investigations of their own. On each main aspect they must have 
expert help. A social investigator must report upon home 
circumstances; a medical officer must inspect the child for 
physical defects; a psychologist must be at hand to apply mental 
tests, to assess temperamental qualities and to analyse 
unconscious motives. A psychological clinic embodying all these 
different workers studying the same case scientifically, side by 
side, is the most pressing need of all. 
The psychological clinic, for which Burt provided a detailed model in 
an appendix, was intended to install individual psychology as the 
integrating instance in a complex of investigation, adjudication and 
treatment which spanned home, school and court, social work, medicine 
and probation, with options ranging from permanent segregation, 
temporary committal to a reformatory colony, probationary supervision 
in the home, and psychoanalysis. If these aspirations of individual 
psychology were not to be realised, it was nonetheless the case that 
such sites were established, and provided the means by which a form 
of psychological knowledge would underpin a new strategy of 
regulation of children and families. In the final chapter of this 
study, we examine the development of the Child Guidance Clinic and 
the practices associated with it, before considering why the 
psychology of the individual achieved such a limited place within it. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE CLINIC 
The Child Guidance Clinic formed at the intersection of a number of 
different axes. The mental hygiene movement, the Juvenile Court, the 
new psychology, and the psychology of delinq uency all proposed the 
establishment of such sites for early assessment and/or treatment. 
The Child Guidance Clinics which were founded in the 1920s and 1930s 
were formed in the image of the new psychology. This psychology 
entered into an alliance with welfare workers, providing the 
rationale for a new theory and practice of social work. The psycho-
social strategy which took shape entailed a way of conceptualising 
the family, pathology, and the objectives and techniques of 
reformation which was very different from that involved in welfare 
work wi thin neo-hygienism. 
But individual psychology, whose trajectory we have traceu in 
previous chapters, was neither the master science of this strategy 
nor the dominant instance in the clinical site which it had promoted 
for so long. With a few exceptions, the role of psychologists, 
professionally and practically, was subsidiary and limited. It was 
confined to the mundane activities of mental testing, supplying its 
resul ts to others for action in both diagnosis and treatment. 
Psychometrics, not psychotherapy, was the destiny of the psychology 
of the individual. 
This final chapter describes the emergence of the psycho-social 
s tra tegy and the forma tion of a clinical si te for its operations. 
And it considers the reasons for the marginalisation of individual 
psychology, the rela tive failure of its claims for conceptual, 
therapeutic and professional dominance in respect of children's 
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disturbances of emotions, wishes and conduct. 
rhe psychology of the clinic 
The aspirations of psycho-eugenics to a clinical role have already 
been documented. Whilst these ambi tions were largely thwarted, at 
least one local authority had set up a 'psychiatric clinic' by 1913, 
equipped wi th the paraphernalia of anthropometrics, and with the role 
of identifying feeble-minded schoolchildren. 1 But the move to a 
psychology of the clinic really began not in relation to problems of 
the intellect, but problems of nerves. Hospital children's 
departments began to concern themselves with 'nervous' children soon 
after the First World War. Hector Cameron's The Neryous Child, 
discussed earlier, was based upon the problems he had encountered as 
a paediatrician in charge of the Children's Department at Guy's 
Hospital, London.2 However by the early 1920s, a number of separate 
and specialised clinics had been established for the treatment of 
children and adults with what were now being termed 'functional nerve 
disorders' • 
It appears that the first of these was the Medico-PsychologicaL 
Clinic of London, which opened in 1913.3 It was run by Jessie 
Murray, a doctor who had attended Janet's lectures in Paris. The 
publicity material for the clinic used neo-hygienist language, 
describing it as 'a fresh adventure in the field of Preventive 
Medicine, viz., in Mental Hygiene'. It argued that attempts to 
discover and treat the earlier manifestations of disorders of the 
brain and nervous system were of far-reaching significance, as these 
disorders were present in a large proportion of those in prisons, 
reformatories and workhouses as well as those who were recognised as 
insane. And it claimed that modern research had demonstrated the 
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efficacy of new therapeutic measures if they were applied at an early 
stage. Principal amongst these measures was psychoanalysis, and 
apparently it was disputes over the exclusivity of its adherence to 
orthodox Freudian analysis, and its affiliation to the British 
Society of Psychoanalysis, that led to the demise of the Clinic in 
1922. James Glover, its director at the time, went on to become an 
orthodox Freudian analyst; a number of those who had worked and 
trained at the Clinic, however, transferred their allegiance to the 
Tavistock Clinic. 
The Tavistock Square Clinic for the Treatment of Functional 
Nerve Cases was established in 1920 by Hugh Crichton Miller "pioneer 
of the new psychology".4 It was the new psychology which provided 
its practical, theoretical and therapeutic orientation, and the link 
which it established between the psychical, the familial and the 
social was instantiated in the way in which the Tavistock combined 
diagnosis and therapy in the clinic itself with the investigation of 
family relations in the home. Nowhere was this clearer than in its 
work with children. Children were treated from very early on, and in 
1926 the Children's Department was opened under Dr W A Potts. This 
was an affair involving many disciplines. Initially, a doctor would 
examine and interview the children, and a voluntary' social worker 
would investigate home and family conditions. For this latter task 
the Tavistock had the full-time services of Doris Robinson, who was 
amongst the first batch of British social workers to be sent out to 
America for training as a Psychiatric Social Worker. The Clinic 
utilised psychologists, but they were not invol ved in diagnosis or 
therapy, which was strictly a medical matter. Their role was the 
carrying out of psychological tests, and the ascertainment of 
intelligence quotients, the result of which would be fed into the 
diagnostic proces~ In 1928 a psychologist, Constance Simmins, was 
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appointed to the staff, to be joined by other psychological 
assistants in the 1930s, but the role and function of psychology in 
the Tavistock team changed little. 
Children came to the Clinic from a number of sources -
'nervous' children from middle class families unable to afford high 
private fees; maladjusted children having trouble at school; children 
referred from the juvenile courts. In relation to the juvenile 
courts, the Tavistock struck up a very intimate relationship with the 
probation service. It worked closely with the Shoreditch Court, and 
held frequent meetings and training courses in which the doctrines of 
the new psychology were disseminated to the attending probation 
officers. In the late twenties and early thirties Probation, the 
journal of the Na tional Associa tion of Proba tion Officers, became 
virtually a Tavistock house-journal, with contributions from Crichton 
Miller, Hadfield, C L Burns (physician to the Children's Department) 
and others, on topics such as 'The Unconscious Motive of the Juvenile 
Delinquent.' Whilst, to the disappointment of its founder, the 
Tavistock Clinic itself remained unique, and failed in its hope to 
provide the model for similar institutions throughout the country, 
the same was not true of the Children's Department. Its work 
increased and it established links with the psychologically minded 
inspectorate of the London County Council - people like C W Kimmins, 
whose psychological education was through Sully's textbooks and the 
psycholog:k:al laboratory of University College.5 It gave evidence to 
the Home Office Committee on Persistent Offenders and, as a 
consequence, was asked to supply regular advisory attendants at 
children's courts.6 And the pattern which it established was 
generalised through the emergence of Child Guidance Clinics. It is 
to these that we now turn. 
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Like the Medico-Psychological Clinic of London, the Tavistock 
promoted'itself in the language of mental hygiene. This is clea'r in 
the popular books written by Crichton Miller, and in the 
participation of the Tavistock in various special events. 7 For 
example, in 1929, the Tavistock collaborated in a 'Joint Committee of 
the National Council for Mental Hygiene and the Tavistock Square 
Clinic' in organising a conference on mental hygiene held at Central 
Hall, Westminster, and covering sex eduction, the 'personal equation' 
in industry, public heal th work and mental heal th, the workings of 
the juvenile courts and problems of delinquency.8 For the mental 
hygiene movement, the Child Guidance Clinic was both the foremost of 
the measures for early and preventative treatment, and the one which 
was most effectively realised. An appendix in the Annual Report of 
the National Council for Mental Hygiene for 1927/8 welcomed the plans 
by the Child Guidance Council to establish a demonstration clinic 
which would show its potential as the centre of a system of child 
welfare embracing "the nursery, the home, the school, the playground 
and the courts".9 The history of the child guidance movement in 
England is well documented. 1 0 The different accounts make varied 
claims as to priority amongst the various groups and individuals 
involved, usually in the service of the author's attempt to validate 
the claims of one or other profession to control over the child 
guidance service. These rival claims need not concern us here. What 
is more important is the way in which the child guidance movement 
acted to integrate a range of diverse concerns and orientations into 
a coherent framework of argument and practice. 
The Child Guidance Council was set up in 1927, through the 
collaboration of a number of organisations and individuals. Amongst 
those involved were Burt, who was Chairman of the Executive Committee 
", 
and who, as we have seen, had long been an advocate of psychologial 
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cl inics. Dame Evelyn Fox was the Honorary Secretary, represeq.ting 
the involvement of the old National Association for the Care of the 
Feeble-Minded, now reti tled the Central Association for Mental 
Welfare. The National Council for Mental Hygiene represented the 
more general social aspirations of the child guidance movement. The 
links with social work were formalised with the involvement of the 
Institute of Hospital Almoners and the Charity Organisation Society. 
And the concern with delinquency was manifest in the participation of 
the Howard League, which had published articles in 1924 urging the 
setting up of psychological 'laboratories' for the assessment of 
young offenders. 11 
In fact it was this question of delinquency which had provided 
the impetus which the movement needed to get itself off the ground. 
The chronological histories pay much attention to the visi t that a 
magistrate, Mrs St Loe Strachey, paid to the United states of America 
in 1925 and the impression that was made upon her by the child 
guidance work wi th young offenders which she saw. 12 The American 
pattern, in which a team of psychiatrists, psychologists and social 
workers carried out medical, psychiatric, psychological and social 
investigations of individual children had been established by William 
Healy in 1909 when he set up the Chicago Juvenile Psychopathic 
Insti tute. 13 It received widespread publicity with the publication 
of The Individual Delinquent in 1915.14 The model was copied by the 
Boston Psychopathic Hospital, which actually appointed social workers 
to its staff - Healy had made use of other social agencies - and 
which invented the designa tion 'psychiatric social worker' in 1915. 
A private benefaction - the Commonwealth Fund - collaborated with the 
American National Council for Mental Hygiene to set up the first 
American Demonstration Clinic in 1922 - its aim was "to develop the 
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psychiatric study of difficult pre-delinquent and delinquent children 
in schools and juvenile courts, and to develop sound methods of 
treatment based on such study.,,15 
The first English Child Guidance Clinic to open was expllcitly 
modelled on the American pattern. This was the East London Child 
Guidance Cl~nic opened by the Jewish Health Organisation in 1927, 
under Dr Noel Burke and Dr Emanuel Miller. 16 And a year la ter, in 
1928, Margaret Lowenfeld founded the Children's Clinic in West 
London, which renamed itself the Institute of Child Psychology in 
1 931. It was supported by fees, voluntary donations and 
subscriptions, and received children from allover London sent by 
schools, care committees, doctors and societias concerned with the 
welfare of children. The Institute set itself apart from other 
organisations, and felt that its orientation was unique. It argued 
that it was because of some unsuccessful direction of emotion in the 
child itself that environmental influences produced neuroses, social 
and emotional maladaptation, delinquency and criminal tendencies, as 
well as chronic physical ill-health. Lowenfeld's orientation, which 
we have discussed in the last chapter, caused her to consider that 
the treatment should be of the child itself, and was inevitably a 
lengthy business, and that it should consist of' a 'scientific 
adaptation of free play'. This was carried out in the playroom of 
the Institute, where the child would use specially constructed or 
adapted materials to give expression to his conscious and unconscious 
phantasies and where his primi tive impulses would be re-directed 
under the supervision of the Psychological Director. 17 The Institute 
was also a centre for training and research, and the observations 
carried out in it formed the basis for Lowenfeld's book Play in 
Childhood, published in 1935.18 
The specific link with crime and delinquency, which had been so 
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important in the genesis of the Clinic, was ~$titutionalised in the 
Institute for the Scientific Treatment of Delinquency. In 1932, the 
Home Office published a controversial report by Grace Pail thorpe. 
Pail thorpe had investigated the psychology of criminals, and compared 
them with inmates of non-penal institutions. Conceptualising the 
problem in terms derived from the new psychology, she found the 
presence of mental imbalance - mostly stemming, it appeared, from 
something wrong in their families - in a large proportion of cases in 
both types of institution, although she was hampered by the lack of 
adequate means of assessment of character. And she condemned the 
prison for its lack of reformation, because it did not try to 
investigate, diagnose or treat the psychological problems which had 
led to crime. Inspired by Pail thorpe's radical programme for the 
psychologisation of penality, the Institute for the Scientific 
Treatment of Delinquency was established in 1932, and opened its 
clinic in 1937. The Institute, which was directed by Edward Glover, 
sought to apply scientific methods of disgnosis and treatment to 
delinquents. Associated with it, in one capaci ty or another, was 
virtually everyone who had been active in the new psychology, and it 
applied the whole range of psycho-therapies to delinquent individuals 
referred, in the main, from the Juvenile Courts and the proba tion 
officers. Such a psychologisation of crime would have a bright 
future after the Second World War.21 
But the type of clinic which began to spread during the inter-
war period was not an exclusive site for the treatment of 
delinquents, nor based on Lowenfeld's quasi-Kleinian model, nor 
(despi te the fact that financial support came from the Commonweal th 
Fund) on that developed in the United States. It was rather the 
Tavistock model, grounded in the new psychology. The Child Guidance 
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Council opened its first Demonstration Clinic in Islington in 1928 
with Dr William Moodie as its director, and Dr Lucy Fildes as its 
psy chol ogi s t. The range of children referred exemplifies the 
systematisation of the field of childhood pathology which the child 
guidance movement had established; backVlard children referred from 
the schools, delinquents coming from the courts, children referred 
for nervousness, being unmanageable, lying, stammering and so forth. 
Although the London County Council declined to finance the Islington 
Clinic when Commonwealth Fund money ran out in 1933, by that time the 
principle of local education authority clinics had been established, 
by the foundation of a clinic at Birmingham. This was set up as part 
of the Birmingham Education Committee's special school service in 
1932, directed by the Medical Officer for Special Schools with a 
local education authority psychologist and a psychiatric social 
worker on the staff.22 In 1935, when the private funding which had 
made this possible ran ou t, the Board of Educa tion approved local 
education authority funding, thus establishing the principle of state 
maintained clinics. It also empowered local education authorities to 
contribute to voluntary Child Guidance Clinics in respect of services 
provided for children referred by school medical officers. By 1939 
there were 17 clinics wholly maintained and 5 partly maintained by 
local education authorities, in addition to a number of clinics 
established by voluntary bodies or hospitals.23 
The various publications of the Child Guidance Council in the 
period from 1931 to 1939 enable us to make a kind of synopsis of the 
way in which the clinic was supposed to function.24 The clinic would 
receive children across the whole range of pathologies for 
assessment, diagnosis and treatment and from all the institutional 
sites where such children came to notice, especially the courts and 
the schools. In addition to performing treatment itself, it might 
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distribute the child to one or other of available forms of 
specialised agency, or provide reports and advice to other agencies 
of allocatio~ Agents attached to the clinic or working closely with 
it - social workers, psychiatric social workers, probation officers, 
school attendance officers and so forth, could use it as a focus, 
radiating out from it into the environment and the home, moving 
between the sites of assessment, treatment and prophylaxis, beginning 
to sketch out the contours of a psycho-social strategy of regulation. 
At first limited to carrying information, increasingly these social 
workers annexed to themselves a directly therapeutic role, as we 
shall see later. At the level of their organisation therefore, Child 
Guidance Clinics made it possible to apply something like a neo-
hygienic strategy to questions of mental health, with an extension of 
inspection to larger categories of individuals at an earlier point in 
their lives thus allow ing the intervention to represent itself as 
preventive. This was made possible by the increasing scope provided 
by links with schools, courts, social work and other specialised 
agencies, which made it plausible to regard the clinic as the fulcrum 
of a comprehensive programme of mental welfare. The clinic was not 
simply to be a site of diagnosis and treatment, or of the 
organisation of services - it was to be a place for research and 
investigation. It would allow the coordination of the knowledge 
gleaned from work with specific individuals and families in order to 
p~oduce statistical information on the psychological development, 
psychiatric disorders and relationships of individuals, knowledge of 
the links between circumstances, symptoms, treatment and 
consequences. This would therefore provide the conqitions for the 
construction of clinical knowledge of the mental disturbances of 
childhood. It would allow the construction of classifications and of 
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norms, and hence of diagnosis in terms of deviation from normal 
behaviours, characteristics, abili ties or developments. It would 
allow the move from the abnormal to the normal, as experience showed 
the absence of any firm boundaries between normality and pathology. 
It would make clear the links between minor aberrations and major 
disturbances both statistically and developmentally, hence allowing 
one to address within the same framework 'the problem of the normal 
child'. And the clinic i tsel f, with its programme of training by a 
kind of apprenticeship, allowed the consolidation of this new 
knowledge and technique in the act of its transmission. 
The clinics, and the knowledge produced in them, provided the 
basis for a concerted attempt to disseminate the norms for happy 
families and contented children which the new psychology had made 
possible. In radio talks and popular texts, as well as advice to 
teachers and others dealing with children, the same advice was given 
- how to promote adjustment and prevent maladjustment, nervousness, 
night terrors and all the other troubles of childhood by a judicious 
adjustment of family regime. Thus Emanuel Miller edited a book on 
The Growing Child and its Problems, with contributions from child 
guidance experts from the Tavistock and elsewhere, designed to bring 
to the attention of readers "the sorts of mild disor~ers which tell 
us that the child is troubled or maladjusted", to help them 
understand the nature of the early impulses and fantasies which 
inform the child's acts, the ways in which unconscious parental 
atti tudes, feelings and the actions they lead to can provoke 
conflicts and repressions, and the means of bringing these out into 
the open. The book attempted therefore to "sh9w how best to meet 
these difficulties, so that children may enter adult life on a path 
which has been cleared for them by the benevolent insight of those 
who guide them.,,25 
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The Home and Schools Council was a further important elemeQt in 
promoting the new psychology of child management. The Council, a 
federation of parent-teacher associations, published a mothly 
magazine, Parents and Teachers and a series of books under the title 
The Home ~ School Library. These were guidelines for parents, 
teachers, nurses and others to use in studying young children and 
bringing them up. The techniques advised were to promote Confidence, 
Helpfulness, Dependability and Thoroughness, avoid Fear, Cruelty, 
Stubbornness and Jealousy. And, as elsewhere, the main contributors 
were those working in the field of child gUidance.26 
Parents and teachers were now to have to accept the 
responsi bili ty of regula ting not their habi ts or morals, but their 
feelings, wishes and anxieties, if they were not to produce troubled 
and troublesome children. Two sorts of continui ty were now 
established. The first was from generation to generation. If 
parents had problems with their own emotional life, if they had 
repressed conflicts, anxieties and so forth, they would build these 
unconsciously into their at ti tudes and relations to their children, 
and hence provoke and produce those same difficulties in their 
offspring. And there was also a continuity of the normal and 
abnormal, for if families did produce normal children this was 
because they regula ted their emo tional economy correctly. But the 
line ofdlvls\o~ between correct and incorrect emotions was a narrow 
one, and the slight exaggeration of normal feelings and wishes which 
might come from one's own difficulties was sufficient to disturb the 
harmony of the child. It was thus all too easy for major problems to 
develop from minor and normally inconsequential upsets if they were 
not handled correctly. A constant awareness of one's feelings, a 
constant willingness to discuss, to recognise, to evaluate the 
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emotional interchanges of family life was what was required in the 
name of mental hygiene of the individual and society. For the new 
psychology> normali ty was conceived of as no more, or no less, than 
the absence of symptoms, and the lack of unconscious conflict.27 
And the new psychology of the clinic had yet wider social 
. aspira tions. A series of talks on the BBC ins tructed the na tion on 
HQli The Mind Works, including discussions not only of the problems of 
child development, by Emanuel Miller and William Moodie, but also of 
the way in which a knowledge of the mind could help one understand 
the problems of politics, religion and nationalism.28 In this vein 
too were the contributions by Ginsberg, Seligman, Crichton Miller, 
Emanuel Miller and J C Flugel to the volume that Hadfield edited, 
entitled Psychology and Modern Problems.29 
But if such activities were principally directed towards 
politicians, intellectuals and well-to-do families, the Child 
Guidance Clinic offered also a more specific and directed opportunity 
for psychology. This had as its target the working class family, 
whose children so often showed problems at school, and were so likely 
to become delinquent. In the clinic there was the possibility of the 
development and promulgation of a new type of practice in which 
psychology would provide a clinical expertise independent of medicine 
though linked to it - one in which medicine would occupy a subsidiary 
and delimited role. A site had emerged where psychology could become 
an effective social instance, not on its own but in alliance wi th 
non-medical agents - social workers - in a new psycho-social 
strategy. 
The psycho-social strategy 
Margaret Yelloly, in a well researched analysis, has sought to 
demonstrate the limited impact of psychoanalysis on British social 
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work in the thirties, especially in comparison with its influence in 
the United States.30 She argues that even the areas of social work 
most affected by it were eclectic rather than psychoanalytic. These 
were the child guidance movement and the Mental Heal th Course for 
psychiatric social workers, also sponsored by the Commonwealth Fund, 
which started in 1929 at the London School of Economics. Teaching of 
psychology and psychiatry on this course was undertaken by 
individuals who were not themselves analytically trained and who held 
a variety of reservtions about psychoanalysis. Some of those closely 
associated with the course - for example Edward Mapother of the 
Maudsley Hospital, who was involved in the initial discussions, and 
Alfred !redgold, who taught the section on m~ntal subnormality - were 
actively hostile. The leading figures of the child guidance 
movement, such as William Moodie, were at pains to allay the 
anxieties of the education committees, the Ministry of Education and 
the public that they were 'psycho-analysing' those referred to them. 
The psychiatric hospi tals, which, like the Child Guidance Clinics, 
provided fieldwork experience for students on the Mental Health 
Course were also, she argues, virtually untouched by psychoanalysis 
in this period. 
In any event, the numbers of those trained and practising 
psychiatric social work before the Second World War were very small. 
According to Timms, in the decade from 1930 to 1939, 165 people were 
trained on the LSE course, which was unique)1 And Yelloly argues 
that these small numbers were without sUbstantial influence on social 
work more generally. They had a separate professional organisation, 
the Association of Psychiatric Social Workers, and were by and large 
employed in the specialised institutions of clinic and mental 
hospi tal. She ci tes figures to show that of the 86 members of the 
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Association of Psychiatric Social Workers employed in Bri tain in 
1936, 55' worked in clinics and mental hospi tals, 4 in teaching or 
organising work and only 27 in other forms of social work - a number 
that was not on the increase)2 Psychiatric social workers were 
separated from social work more generally, and were viewed with 
suspicion and a certain amount of hostility. She suggests that there 
was little trace of psychoanalytic influence in the literature in 
family case-work and almoning prior to the Second World War. The 
exception was the Charity Organisation Quarterly, whose frequent 
references to psychoanalysis she takes to be a consequence of their 
belief that it supported their individualistic approach to social 
problems)3 And Yelloly sees family case-work over this period as 
retaining its association with poverty and material relief, the 
worker as co-ordinator and dispenser of resources. She ci tes 
Elizabeth Macadam, wri ting in 1934, to support her case. Macadam 
wrote of family case-work that it: 34 
seeks to assemble for the benefit of the family which has fallen 
on evil days the particular forms of help required - the outfit 
for the father who has providentially found work, blankets, 
coals or boots which are lacking after a long spell of 
unemployment, spectacles to enable the grandfather to read his 
paper, convalescent change or rest for the mother, and a home 
help to take care of the children in her absence. 
No doubt Yelloly's analysis points to genuine limi ta tions on 
the extension of the psycho-social strategy in the inter-war period. 
But her characterisation of the first half of the twentieth century 
in purely negative terms, as a "withering of the promise of the later 
19th [century]" is in part a consequence of the perspective from 
which she constructs her historical investigation. 35 As we have 
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already pointed out, writing from the point of view of post-war 
Bri tish· social work tends to obscure just how significant a 
transformation was involved in the development of welfare work in the 
first decades of this century. And Yelloly's priori tisa tion of 
psychoanalysis, as the indicator of social work's modernity obscures 
the extent to which the central characteristic of the psycho-social 
strategy was not that it was a realisation of the principles of 
Freudian theory, but an operationalising of the new psychology and 
its conception of the nature of the family and its role in the 
production of psychic and social maladjustment. However confined was 
its inter-war field of applica tion, the alliance between a type of 
psychology and a type of social work had significance for the 
transformation of both in the post-war period. It provided 
condi tions for the lessons of the war to be learnt in a particular 
way, and for the generalisation of a familialised psychological 
social work in the fifties. What was this psycho-social strategy? 
When William Moodie considered the role of the social worker in 
his discussion of child guidance by teamwork, it was clear that her 
role was still the familiar one of co-ordinator and relay. The 
social worker conveyed "advice and instructions from the psychiatrist 
which he could not himself afford the time to discuss", discussed 
practical difficulties with the parents, obtained information on home 
conditions and "had the duty of discovering and arranging all 
necessary social activi ties, Scouts, clubs and so on".3 6 Yet over 
the thirties this role began to transform. What apparently happened 
was something like this. Social workers attached to Child Guidance 
Clinics would go into the homes, talk to the parents - or usually the 
mother - about home conditions, material circumstances and so on, and 
try to explain the work of the clinic. But these workers found that 
a sort of emotional tie-up was developing with the mother which 
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initially seemed to be a problem as it was hampering the objectivity 
of the information gained. Instead of finding out what actually 
happened, one would find out what the mother wanted the social worker 
to think had happened, or wha t she wanted to happen, feared would 
happen, or thought would happe~ 
But a slight shift of perspective turned this apparent 
disadvantage into a valuable opportuni ty. For a link could now be 
drawn between the child's problems and these beliefs, wishes and 
fears of the mother. Suddenly the child's problems seemed themselves 
not the point at issue. They were only the signs of, and the 
consequences of, the feelings that the mother had about the child -
the signs of a problem in the emotional relations of the family. And 
this one relationship - between the mother and the child - was 
revealed in another - between the mother and the social worker. What 
was gOing on in the social worker's interview was not the gathering 
of information but the manifestation of feelings - a sort of 
transference. These were feelings which the mother herself was not 
aware of - unconscious beliefs and wishes, feelings of guilt and 
disappointment and so on. But in the rela tionship wi th the social 
worker these unconscious aspects could be made conscious, the mother 
could be made aware of her phantasies, desires, conflicts which had 
been at the root of the disturbances of the child and hence remove 
herself and the child from their sway. In short, the relationship of 
the social worker to the mother could become therapeutic.37 
Of course, this transformation - from welfare work to social 
work - was by no means the simple effect of the experience of those 
attached to the child guidance clinics nor, for that matter, of 
probation officers who developed a similar conception of their role. 
It was, rather, a consequence of the way in which this 'experience' 
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was construed. In the late twenties and thirties leading ideologues 
of the Tavistock Clinic, the Mental Health Course, the Central 
Association for Mental Welfare and similar groupings actively sought 
to promote a way of conceiving of social work which would legitimate 
a claim to professional status and an independent role in therapy. 
Psychology was to provide the specialised knowledge upon which this 
claim, and this role, would depend. Thus in 1926, Evelyn Fox in an 
unpublished memorandum on the training of social workers, submitted 
to the Joint Universi ty Council for Social Studies by the Central 
Association of Mental Welfare, argued that it was essential to 
provide psychological training as a part of the necessary eqiupment 
of every social worker.38 Psychological knowledge was essential for 
the daily judgments that social workers had to make in their deal~ngs 
with social misfits ranging from maladjusted and delinquent children 
to those showing effects of mental stress as a result of home 
conditions, poverty or unsuitable employment. What psychology was to 
provide, wrote Fox, was a know ledge of the factors influencing the 
reaction Q!. lill. individual to his environment. 
So the new psychology was to enable social workers to 
understand that the individual was no longer merely the expression of 
its heredity or the product of social training. The. individual was 
endowed with a certain force, it entered into a dynamic relationship 
with its surroundings. Each interchange between the individual and 
the environment affected the individual itself; the cumulation of 
these little interchanges was development. The psyche of the adult 
was now construed as shaped by the dynamics of the reactions of an 
individual to his or her environment over the course of their life up 
to that point - a dynamic individual psychology was necessarily 
developmental. In the normal case, what was produced was a 
relationship of individual to environment which could be termed 
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'adjustment'. But sometimes something would go awry, and. the 
consequence would be 'maladjustment'. Let us trace out the 
discussion of these questions in the literature of social work. 
A paper by Alice Raven, published in 1925, shows a first 
attempt at this.39 Human beings were endowed with a store of energy 
which sought outlets along certain channels - instincts - of self-
assertion and submission, of sex or reproduction, the parental 
ins tinct, the herd ins tinc t. The human being became an adul t when 
these instincts were socialised by being sublimated - bound up with 
ideals of conduct. Hence the parental instinct would be channelled 
into a desire for the welfare of the child; the sexual instinct, 
through marriage, would be bound to faithfulness ~nd devotion, and so 
on. Problems arose however when the psychic energy failed to find an 
ou tlet j then it would show itself in all manner of ills: signs of 
discontent, restlessnes, lack of concentration, fits of ill temper, 
jealousy, exaggerated self- esteem or self- pity, a tendency to 
phantasy often heightened by the use of artificial stimulants. The 
social worker could right this wrong in the mental development of the 
individual, find a useful outlet for unused energies in these 
'neurotics' and 'difficult cases' through sympathy, encouragement and 
the inspiration of hope, self-respect and self-confidence. 
In this account there was a separation between the register of 
the familial and the register of the psychical: the environment was 
made up of all those things outside individuals which impinged upon 
them in the form of experience hence facilitating or obstructing the 
appropriate channelling of the instincts. But for the psycho-social 
strategy to be able to operate, it was not just the psyche that would 
have to be re-conceptualised. The environment would also have to be 
re-construed in terms of other people. Thus, in an article on 
468 
psychiatric social work, Robert Gillespie stressed that children's 
'nerves' were a product of their relation with other people in their 
family - the attitudes of brothers and sisters, mothers and fathers, 
disharmony in familial relations. 40 It was information on these 
questions which the social worker had to discover and bring back to 
the psychiatrist treating the child. Gillespie gave some examples: a 
boy who stole, lied, wet his bed and bi t his nails - discovered in 
the school - turned out to have a father who thought he was in a 
degrading job, who had a critical attitude to others, and a mother 
who was proud and thought she had married beneath her. Here the 
information gleaned by the social worker on the family relations 
revealed the problem - the child ~ not loved enough. A girl who 
was timid, full of aches and pains, a bad sleeper, turned out to have 
an over-anxious mother who sought to care for and protect her 
daughter against all dangers - here the child .H..ru2. loved too much. 
Another child was over-protected because the mother felt guilty at 
wanting a son and producing a daughter - here the child liM. not loved 
for ~ she was. 
Reading through this literature, one rapidly becomes familiar 
with the range of these family parables without which no article is 
compl ete. Hugh Crichton Miller recounted the following in his 
discussion of 'The Unconscious Motive of the Juvenile Delinquent,:41 
- the regressive juvenile to whom infantility and mothering have 
become too attractive, who is afraid to grow up, of responsibility, 
of making the effort; 
-the unwanted child, who steals because she feels she is not wanted, 
not loved or valued for her own sake - because she is illegitimate, 
or a girl whose parents desired a boy child; 
- the child who uses delinquency as a weapon against his parents 
because they have projected the disappointment and feellngs of their 
469 
own lives onto him; 
- the child defrauded of love, who uses his delinquency to get his 
own back at his parents, becase he is jealous of the loss of his 
mother's love to a younger sister or brother. 
Cosens summarised the many sad ways in which love might go 
wrong, and their consequences, in the following terms: 42 
If in childhood we have our sense of individual capacity cramped 
by a pampering and protecting and possessive parental love, or 
by an oppressive sense of our inadequacy founded on some 
physical or mental handicap, the result is likely to be either a 
nervous and over dependent attitude that wants someone to lean 
on all th~ough life, or, the other extreme, a rebellious 
assertive attitude that intends to make itself felt, by fair 
means or foul, in spite of the protections and prohibitions of 
possessive love, or in spite of the hated limitations that we 
can't adjust to. Again, if in childhood we find ourselves 
unwanted by any loving parent, or substitute for a parent, we 
are likely to choose one of the same two opposite reactions. On 
the one hand we may retreat into nervousness, and perhaps 
compensate by loving ourself in a daydream world of which we are 
the centre, or we may engage in a perpetual search for a parent 
substitute to lean o~ On the other hand, we may compensate by 
exaggerated satisfaction in our own feeling of power and 
capacity, self assertion, self love and egotism making up for 
the fact that our love is not allowed to go out to its 'natural 
parental end. 
And as the thirties progressed, social workers and probation 
officers increasingly began to draw certain conclusions from these 
arguments. If the problems of the child lay in the wishes, feelings 
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and beliefs of the parents, and if the person most in touch with 
these was the social worker, then social workers could be more than 
conveyors of information, psychiatric aids. Social workers, that is 
to say, could have a directly therapeutic role. For the key thing 
about these disturbed and disturbing family relations was that the 
things that motivated them were unconscious. What the social worker 
could do was to reveal the fundamental roots of anxiety behind their 
apparent immediate causes, reveal the conflicts which underpinned 
them, bringing insight to family members and hence acting 
therapeutically - resolving the problem of the child by acting on the 
problems of the parents. The social worker could reveal to those 
concerned that the difficulties, disturbances, delinquencies of the 
child were but a sign of the conflicts, fears and wishes of the 
parents - problems which themselves had their roots in their own 
emotional relationships with their parents. A new form of family 
history had been constructed, in which the psyche and its relations 
were sufficient to transmi t trouble from genera tion to generation 
wi thout invoking any heredi tary mechanisms. And simul taneously a 
therapeutic familial social work had become possible - for if the 
problems lay not so much in the child as in the family and if 
disturbances in the former could be resolved by actions upon the 
latter, who was better placed to act on the family than the social 
worker. 43 
It is true that British social work of the inter-war period did 
not produce any sustained theoretical and pratical account of this 
new psycho-social analysis and technique - no English Hary Richmond 
or Virginia Robinson.44 Sybil Clement Brown was clearly sta ting a 
wish as much as a fact when she wrote in 1939 that the "kina of 
social worker we have come to describe as 'psychiatric' represents, 
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to my mind, a stage of development of social case-Hork as a Hhole, 
rather than a distinct profession."45 But the metbods which she 
described in another article of the same year were indeed those which 
would characterise British social work in the post-war period.46 And 
the investigations which she undertook illustrated that their 
prevalence was on the increase before the outbreak of war. Of the 80 
case'records which she studied in her comparison of 1924 and 1934, 
those of the earlier date were apparently principally concerned with 
such kinds of behaviour as cleanness, honesty, sobriety and with 
material conditons. Those from 1934, she claimed, were concerned on 
the other hand, with aspects of personality and with the specific 
na ture of family rela tions. The change presumably resulted, she 
commented, "from the growing conviction that social problems are more 
dependent upon the attitudes and intimate social relationships of the 
indi vidual than upon his superficial habits and surroundings".47 The 
social worker was now to use the interview not to record 
circumstances, but the individual's attitude towards circumstances. 
Events, experiences and attitudes recounted could no longer be taken 
at their face value, they must be interpreted in terms of the 
unconscious wishes which gave them a meaning for the mother, and the 
unconscious elements in the mother's relationships' to the social 
worker which coloured her account. 
The terms of description were now far from those entailed in the 
psycho-eugenic conception of character, or the neo-hygienist 
conception of welfare. What were salient now were not sobriety, 
diligence and thrift, nor cleanliness, healthy diet and hygiene. 
They were fears, early experiences, anxieties, atti tudes, 
relationships, conflicts, feelings of persecution, wishes, desires, 
phantasies and guil t. The way of resol ving probl ems was not 
segregation or sterilisation, nor moralisation by instruction in 
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virtue and technique. It involved 'becoming aware of the conflicts', 
'learning to handle the problem', 'coming to understand onesel f', 
'sorting out one's real needs'. This was the psycho-social strategy, 
through which psychological knowledge would provide the rationale for 
a complex and expanding system of social regulation of personal life 
in the post-war period. But this was not through the medium of 
psychologists themselves, but through this new social work; as 
professional agents, psychologists remained in a secondary and 
subordinate role in the clinic, testing but not diagnosing, supplying 
information but not directing treatment. Why should this have been? 
~e temperament or individual psychology 
Cyril Burt had seen the Child Guidance Clinic as a site in which 
psychological expertise would be dominant, coordinating and 
integrating information from the other disciplines, diagnosing and 
directing treatment. 48 But in England between the wars this was not 
to be. By 1939, only two of the forty-three English clinics were 
directed by psychologists; the others were all under medica.l 
direction.49 The opposition between the claims of medicine and those 
of psychology, which we saw previously in relation to the problem of 
feeble-mindedness, was extended to these other behavioural disorders 
of childhood. This opposition travers~d the child guidance movement 
throughout the thirties and, indeed, does so until the present.50 
From the early thirties the medico-psychiatric position was in the 
ascendancy. When Dame Evelyn Fox resigned as Honorary Secretary of 
the Child Guidance Council, she was replaced by Dr William Moodie, 
and the Council adopted the policy that all clinics should be under 
medical directio~51 The division of labour was clearly laid out in 
Moodie's Child Guidance .Qy Team Work, published in 1931, and in the 
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different topics discussed in psychiatrists' and psychologists' 
sections of the Child Guidance Council's Inter-Clinic Conferences. 
Psychiatry was the directing science of the clinic. It was a branch 
of medicine which covered the normal and abnormal mechanisms of the 
mind, their diagnosis and treatment. Psychology was essentially the 
study of the operations of intelligence and its measurement by 
standardised techniques, but included also testing using other 
devices - what psychology was, however, was clear: it was the 
technique of mental testing.52 
By 1939, when the Medical Director of the Child Guidance 
Council edited A Survey of Child Psychiatry, designed to publicise 
the experience gained in British, as opposed to American, child 
guidance work, the 'medicalisation' of the clinic was eVident.53 As 
Henderson and Gillespie had hoped in 1932, psychiatry had indeed 
become the expertise competent to manage the behavioural disorders 
and emotional troubles of childhood. In the medical arguments, 
explicit and implicit, for such a role one sees the reactivation of 
those points which had succeeded in relation to the inspection of 
school-children and the ascertainment of feeble-mindedness. One had 
before one a troubled child, and the cause of these troubles might be 
anything from a physical illness, through an organic mental illness, 
to a 'family neurosis' or troubles at school. One needed information 
on physical, mental, familial and social conditions supplied by all 
the various members of the child guidance team. But the diversity of 
sources and professions made it all the more important that one 
person was responsible for integrating all this information and 
taking a decision in relation to it, and only a medically trained 
agent was competent to assess the weight of all the different factors 
involved, to make a differential diagnosis, and to decide on 
treatment in that light. MacCalman quotes with approval the views 
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expressed in a review of American child guidance work: "Training in 
medicine with psychiatric emphasis is more likely than other 
professional training to bring to the clinic the leadership which 
will ensure a consistent orientation to the total organism.1l54 
And indeed medicine seemed to have assimilated the lessons of 
the new psychology. The first section of the Survey discussed the 
influence of physical diseases upon maladjustments of behaviour, 
Winnicott contributing a paper suggesting tha t the potential 
depressive was often mistaken for a rheumatic and proposing a sort of 
psychoanalysis of pain. The second section discussed problems 
relating to mental illness, ranging from psychoses (organic and 
untreatable, according to Gillespie) to 'the family neurosis'. 
Bowlby's paper on hysteria stressed the need to look for physica~ 
causes such as smouldering appendicitis, as well as the child's 
personality and the emotional atmosphere in the home - quarrelling 
parents, fussy mothers, mothers playing on their children's 
affections and trying to buy their children's love. And William 
Patterson Brown described, in familiar terms how "Neurosis is a 
family problem ••• the seeds of neurosis are sown in childhood in a 
neurotic family settingll. The child became neurotic for the familiar 
reasons: as a result of the unconscious play of hostility between the 
parents; the mother compensating for her husband's lack of 
masculinity by projecting her concern onto her boy child; anxieties, 
guilt or martyrdom leading to over-mothering or under-mothering and 
so forth. The articles on family, school and social maladjustment, 
and juvenile delinquency were also contributed by doctors, and 
construed the problems in similar terms. 
Physical factors and diseases had to be considered, diet taken 
into account, there were differences in the mental apparatus of the 
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child itself, these differences were affected by the way in which the 
parents 'managed the ri tuals of waking, sleeping, feeding, bathing, 
urinating and defaecating, and by the play of their own fears, 
anxieties and hostilities across the psyche of the child. If all 
these failures of adjustment were caused through such a complex 
interaction between social, familial, mental and physical conditions, 
and if each case was the consequence of a unique concatenation of 
such factors, medicine was surely the only instance capable of 
differential diagnosis, for it was the only one which possessed a 
clinical expertise. Psychology had a role which was specific, 
delimited and subordinate: to supply information on the mental 
equipment of the child derived from the administration of mental 
tests. 55 
The notion of psychology as the science and technique of mental 
measurement was certainly not anathema to the individual 
psychologists. Indeed, despite the occasional urging, by those who 
had abandoned the new psychology in favour of psychoanalysis proper, 
that psychologists in the clinic should free themselves from the 
limitations of testing, psychology accepted this role as if it was 
its destiny.56 It had been formed as an effective discursive 
practice in the image of the test; measurement was the horizon of its 
though t and it could not think outside it. This is not to say that 
psychology wished to limit itself to the assessment of intelligence. 
The existence of the clinical site, and its rationale, provided the 
impetus and the possibility for the extension of assessment along two 
inter-connecting lines: the notion of development as a principle of 
organisation for psychological thought; and the notion of temperament 
as a new object for psychological quantification. In both these 
fields, English developments were very much subsidiary to those which 
took place in the United States of America. 
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The clinic and the nursery school made a psychology of 
development possible. Of course the mind and behaviour of the 
growing child had been an object of psychological discussion prior to 
the 1920s. The new psychologists of development ritually 
acknowledged the pioneering detailed studies of the development of 
individual infants and children undertaken by Darwin, Preyer, Shinn, 
Sully, Claparede and Stern, as well as the observations collated 
under the impetus of the Child Study movement. 57 But the problem 
with such investigations was their idiosyncracy, their anecdotal 
quality, their lack of systematic observation, the absence of 
consideration of the effects of surroundings, their variable methods, 
their lack of comparabil~ty - in short, their lack of scientific 
rigour. However suggestive their reflections and observations, 
whilst they directed our attention to the ways in which the abilities 
of children changed over time, they did not themselves found a 
psychology of childhood. 
But what the clinic and the nursery school made possible, it was 
argued, was precisely such a psychology. For they allowed the 
observation and collection of data covering numbers of children of 
the same ages, by skilled psychological experts, under controlled, 
experimental, almost laboratory conditions. They thus simultaneously 
allowed for standardisation and for normalisation - the collection of 
comparable information on a large number of subjects and its analysis 
in such a way as to construct norms. A developmental norm was a 
standard based upon the average abilities or performance of children 
of a certain age on a particular task or in a particular actiVity. 
It thus not only presented a picture of what was normal for children 
of such an age, but enabled the normality of any individual child to 
be assessed by comparison with this norm. In the movement that was 
477 
characteristic of the psychology of the individual, the individual 
subject in its uniqueness and variability could become the object of 
scientific investigation when it was viewed from the perspective of 
the population of which it was deemed a part. 
\~hat the clinic and the nursery school also made possible was 
the formation of a psychological conception of development. The 
gathering of data on children of particular ages over a certain span, 
and the organisation of this data into age norms, enabled the norms 
to be arranged along an axis of time, and seen as cross-sections 
through a continuous dimension of development. Growth and 
temporality could become principles of organisation of a psychology 
of childhood. And normalisation and development enabled individuals 
to be characterised in relation to such norms in terms of this axis 
of time - as 'normal') 'advanced' or 'retarded'. 
Whilst the construction of the test of intelligence had made 
this possible in the restricted sphere of the intellect, it was now 
feasible to utilise a fundamentally similar approach in a much wider 
domain. 58 The work of Arnold Gesell and his collaborators is 
testament to the potency of this new mode of conceptualisation for 
the generation and organisation of vast quantities of psychological 
data on childhood into a coherent conceptual schem~59' This work was 
initiated at the Yale Psycho-Clinic which had opened in 1911 for the 
observation and treatment of children having problems at school. As 
befi tted its hygienic ra tionale, the Clinic was loca ted in the New 
Haven Dispensary which held weekly baby-welfare conferences across 
the hall, and it soon began to have some 'normal' children in 
attendance.60 The Clinic was used as the basis for the selection of 
a sample of children of certain ages, who were visited and assessed 
at home, as well as for the detailed observation of children by means 
of the invention of various technical devices to keep the observers 
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hidden from those whom they studied. Behavioural items 
characteristic and distinctive of the various age levels were 
defined, and organised into scales in four fields of behaviour -
motor, language, adaptive and personal-social - with a specification 
of the ages at which a given proportion of children could achieve 
various levels on each scale. Gesell's work brought non-intellectual 
behaviour wi thin the sphere of psychological evaluation. Norms of 
posture and locomotion, of vocabulary, comprehension and 
conversa tion, of personal habits, ini tiati ve, independence and play 
could now be deployed in evaluation and diagnosis. 
In the following years, others attempted to utilise the same 
tactics in relation to more highly specified and practically 
important questions.61 Katherine Banham Bridges' attempt to produce 
scales of emotional and social adjustment was the work of this type 
which was most often referred to in the English discussions. 62 
Bridges had adapted the method of Gesell for the nursery school, 
which, she asserted, served as a laboratory for the study of 
children's development. But whilst Gesell's scales merely sought to 
organise and normalise different sorts of behaviour which children 
manifested, Bridges sought to investigate social and emotional 
behaviour in the familiar terms of adjustment. The social 
development scale ranged items in terms of "the acquisi tion of an 
increasing number of socially accepted reactions with regard to 
others, and ••• the evolution of more and more adequate or suitable 
adjustments to social situations.,,63 Similarly, emotional 
development was evaluated in terms of "the decreasing frequency of 
intense emotional responses... the progressive transfer of responses 
to a series of stimuli determined by experience and social approval, 
and ••• the gradual change of the nature of the overt responses in 
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accordance with social dictates ••• an increase in ability to adjust 
to emotibn-producing si tua tions.,,64 The criterion of social approval 
and the conception of adjustment enabled the developmental 
normalisation of the scale to comply with the requirements of a 
socially normalising practice of evaluation and interventio~ 
The Bridges scale did not meet an enthusiastic reception in 
England. On the one hand, the concepts and techniques of the scale 
were anathema to the mode of investigation favoured by the 
analytically inclined. Susan Isaacs commented on Bridges work 
ascerbically that "the rate of change in children towards behaviour 
which is considered desirable is not more significant psychologically 
than the actual behaviour which they do show at any given stage".65 
Even Isaacs, however, could not fail to recognise the value of the 
scales in introducing normativity into development: 66 
It will not only provide norms for individual development, with 
far reaching effects on educational standards and techniques. 
It will also suggest significant inter-relations of 
psychological processes, by showing which aspects of development 
tend to hang together, and outlining the changing picture of 
their inter-relations at succeeding ages (in the way 
intelligence tests have done for certain aspects of intellectual 
development) • 
But, whilst Isaacs gradually introduced discussion of Gesell's norms 
of development into her advice to parents, she argued that the scales 
produced by Bridges oversimplified and homogenised psychologicaLly 
distinct aspects of behaviour, implied a single and unbroken axis of 
development towards adjustment, and were founded on the belief that 
behaviour could be measured outside the specific concrete situations 
in which it occurred and which gave external events their inner 
meaning and significance in the psychic life of the child. 
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In fact Gesell himself had argued in a somewhat similar, way 
about the use of his scales. Whilst stressing the value of the 
scales in encouraging the cultivation of the normative and 
comparative thinking necessary for clinical work, much of his text of 
1925 was a polemic against psychometrics, for substi tuting the 
mechanical application of a partial measure for the complex process 
of interpretive diagnosis which a clinical psychology required. But 
nonetheless it was the psychometric objections which formed the 
other, and probably more influential, prong of English opposition to 
the scales. A scale is not, after all, a test. Bridges reckoned 
that one month of daily observation was required to complete the 
schedule for her scales. And the scale was linked only in a tenuous 
and ex post facto way to a theory of what it was supposed to be 
measuring in terms of the inherited or acquired mental capacities of 
the child. When English psychology approached the new problem with 
which it had been presented by the clinic, this was the issue that 
concerned it - the development of techniques for measuring the non-
intellectual mental capaci ties which were manifested in the 
behavioural disturbances of childhood and the delinquencies of yout~ 
The problem was one of devising a test of the manifestation of 
instincts and energy in di sposi tions, sentiment and character - of 
constructing a test of temperament. 
In the late twenties and early thirties, the psychology of the 
individual sought to constitute a new object - the temperament. 
Though initially somewhat hesitantly designated (character, 
temperament and personality were given different significance in the 
different texts) this referred to that which ,the old facul ty 
psychology had designated 'will' - the domain of strivings, of drives 
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and instincts, of purposive behaviour. Of course there was a 
venerable philosophical and psychological literature on the issue of 
the will, its nature and development. But the problem for the 
psychology of the individual was a new one. It was one of measuring 
the nature and force of 'will', characterising its direction and its 
strengths and weaknesses, assessing that of one person in relation to 
another, or to the population at large. Individual psychology could 
conceptualise this domain only insofar as it was measurable, 
differentiable, insofar as one could submit it to the techniques 
which had been so successful in the annexa tion of intelligence to 
psychology. But temperament proved less tractable to 
psychologisation, and in this fact was grounded the interruption of 
the development of clinical psychology. 
In fact the Uni ted States of America was the place where the 
psychology of the will really got off the ground. There was a 
proliferation of 'dynamic' theoretical systems, of synthetic texts of 
one sort or another, and of techniques of assessment. Authors vied 
with one another to promote catalogues of personali ty types, 
character dimensions and temperamental traits. 
There were developments of behaviourist and quasi-behaviourist 
learning theories, for example E B Hol t's (1915) The' Freudian Wish 
and its Place in Ethics; R S Hoodworth's (1918) Dynamic Psychology; E 
C Tolman's (1932) Purposive Behaviour in Animals and Men; E L 
Thorndike's (1935) The Psychology of Hants, Interests and Attitudes. 
There was the construction of the related concept of attitude and its 
measurement in the work of Thurstone (1931) and Likert (1932). There 
were developments from Gestalt psychology and the synthesising texts 
of Stern ([1935] 1938), Allport (1937) and Lewin (1935), which sought 
in one way or another to characterise personality as a dynamic unity. 
There was the work which tried, in different ways, to integrate 
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psychoanalytic concepts with experimental findings - notably that of 
Henry Murray at the Harvard Psychological Clinic, gathered together 
in Explorations in Personality (1938), and that of Dollard, Doob, 
Mowrer and Sears, at the Yale Institute of Human Relations, laid out 
in the 1939 monograph Frustration and Aggression. 
Sheldon (see his text of 1942) developed Kretschmer's ([ 1921] 
1925) Typology of Body ~ and Disposition, reworking the original 
dichotomy of slender or spindle-shaped individuals with a schizoid 
disposition versus globular, rounded types with a cycloid 
disposition, into a tripartite division of body build into endomorph, 
mesomorph and ectomorph with associated types of temperament - a 
trend of research which generated much controversy, and a ple,thora of 
publications. There were schemes based on Jung's (1921) description 
of introverts and extraverts and Abraham's (1925) oral and anal 
types. A plethora of assessment techniques were devised. 
Inventories were developed from the scheme Woodworth produced in 1919 
for the evaluation of army recruits. Rorschach's (1921) scheme for 
assessing personality based on the influence of the individual's 
affective life upon their perceptions, was developed in America by 
Levy and Beck (1937). Morgan and Murray (1935) developed the Thematic 
Apperception Test, which sought to assess aspects of personality by 
evaluating subject's responses to a standard set of ambiguous 
pictures. There were attempts to evaluate personality on the basis 
of handwriting, like those of Downey (1919) and Powers (1933). When 
Raymond Cattell, who like McDougall went to work in America, 
published his attempt to establish the primary traits of personality 
in 1946, Lewis Terman estimated in his introduction that the past 
twenty five years had seen over one thousand publications in the 
field of personality, including over one hundred on a single test.67 
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Compared to this massive American psychological colonisation of 
the domain of the personality, the developments in England might 
appear somewhat meagre. It is true that no major schools vied with 
one another, no lasting theoretical syntheses were published. \"rha t 
occurred was more modest, more practical and, in the end, more 
constraining. For it was organised around the search for a means of 
assessment which would solve the problems faced by all those who were 
interested in character and temperament because they had to take 
decisions in the light of it - in the work of vocational guidance, in 
decisions as to the treatment of juvenile delinquents and in the 
child guidance clinics. Again and again contributors to these 
discussions remarked on how little progress had been made in this 
field for many years, how little had been contributed by academic and 
philosophical reflections on the will and character. And how it was 
under the pressure of practical concerns that a new way of 
approaching these questions had been forged - one that started from 
the problem of assessing the temperament of the troublesome 
individual with a view to making a decision or recommendation as to 
action. 
From about 1925 onwards, regular papers began to appear in the 
pages of the Bri tish Journal of Psychology on the development and 
evaluation of tests of temperament. These took their place alongside 
the material that was its staple diet in the inter-war period: 
articles on intelligence, its analysis, assessment, new statistical 
methods, comparisons of differences between groups and so forth on 
the one hand, and on the other all that material which had as its 
organising focus the problems of industry, notably those of 
efficiency and fatigue - attention, discriminative ability, auditory 
and visual perception, effects of training on the senses and skills, 
reaction time, fatigue and so forth. Authors agreed that the 
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existing state of techniques for the assessment of temperament, was 
something like that which had characterised the evaluation of 
intelligence at the beginning of the twentieth century - none of the 
available devices was reliable or exact enough to be of much 
practical service in the diagnostic activities of the clinic or 
elsewhere. Cattell minimised the difficulties in the book which he 
published in 1936, which was introduced by an enthusiastic foreword 
by William Moodie. This was a sort of compendium of all the schemes 
of tests available - intelligence, aptitudes, interests, attitudes, 
object libido investment, temperament, character and emotional 
adjustment - intended to act as a practical handbook for practicing 
psych010gists.68 But a rapid review of the various routes which the 
psychology of the individual took in order to find a means of 
diagnosis appropriate for the new problems of maladjusted and 
delinquent children will demonstrate why it was that it was not able 
to take up the clinical role to which it had aspired. 
In his Inquiries into Human Faculty, Galton had devised a 
method of investigation involving word associations. He would 
present himself with a word, see which other words came to mind, and 
analyse the associations in various ways including timing how long it 
took to produce them, showing how even apparently inexplicable 
connections could be made intelligible when linked to long forgotten 
memories, and that whole strata of mental operations had lapsed out 
of consciousness.69 This method of word association had much in 
common with that utilised in psychoanalysis, and Jung's Studies 1Jl 
Word Association had been published in translation in 1918.70 Jung 
had sought to use word associations in a large scale testing 
programme to investigate the eXistence of unconscious complexes. He 
observed the appearance of delay in response to certain words, 
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coupled with various 'indicators' of the existence of a 'repressed 
complex"- blushing, coughing, sighing, stammering and so forth - and 
not only suggested that such techniques could be used as a starting 
point in analysis, but also that one could use them in personality 
typing. In The Young Delinquent, following American studies, Burt 
sought to put this test to a more prosaic use, interspersing items 
such as 'money, 'anger' and so on in the list of words, measuring 
reaction times, and comparing resul ts wi th delinquents wi th those 
from a thousand 'normals'. The significant results - those that were 
unusal or delayed - could not only be used "to lay bare the man's 
deeper emotional interests, but also to unveil a guilty consciousness 
of some specific crime".71 But while this served as an 
individualised mode of investigation of emotional life, it hardly 
provided the standardised and normalised assessment technique which 
individual psychology desired. 
The same was true of the second technique for the assessment of 
temperament which was based upon psycho-galvanic reactions -
alterations in skin conductivity to a small electrical current 
excited by some particular word, name, object, picture or question, 
registered by a deflection on a galvanometer. Prideaux and Smith had 
suggested the use of this technique for toe measurement of the 
emotions in the early twenties and again the suggestion was that it 
could be used for an exploration of feelings, perhaps in combination 
with the word association method.72 But this technique, and the 
similar suggestions for the utilisation of other devices initially 
constructed in the assessment of reaction times for this new end, 
suffered from a number of m aj or drawbacks - principally tha tone 
didn't know what one was measuring and that such an essentially 
investigative device did not admit of ranking, scaling and the 
comparison of individual scores with population measures in order to 
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effect a diagnosis. The same appeared to be true in the e~d of 
another possible device for assessing the presence of 'complexes' -
the Pressey x-a test -despite the attempts of some to standardise it 
and produce Bri tish norms.73 And the Rorschach Test, however 
suggestive it might similarly be in individual cases, was for the 
same reasons unable to carry out the task which individual psychology 
required of it.74 
This is why so much attention was paid to June Downey's Test of 
Will-Temperament.75 This was a test based on the principle that 
temperamental qualities were expressed in muscular movements. The 
subject had to write in various ways - normal, slow, rapid, 
disguised, when distracted and so forth - and the handwriting was 
then analysed to present a graph representing the 'will profile' of 
the individual, in terms of such traits as adaptability, self-
confidence, powers of restraint and patience in detailed work. 
Whilst Vernon was cri tical of its pseudo-obj ecti vi ty, Collins 
concluded that the test "differentiates the strong character from the 
weak, the careful from the careless, the quick from the slow" and was 
certainly tapping innate qualities. But the main problem appeared to 
be the low reliability of the test and its lack of correlation with 
any independent estimate of personality at all - again the English 
psychologists regretted the fact that it was more useful in 
suggestive explorations of individual cases than as an objective test 
device. 
Hence the attraction of the so-called 'moral tests' like the 
Kohs Ethical Discrimination Test which attempted to measure moral 
judgment by noting how often the child singled out moral reasons for 
actions in preference to others. For example in the sub-test on 
Offence Evaluation, the subject had to evaluate different actions by 
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saying whether they deserved a response of praise, nothing, scold, 
jail, prison or kill. The tests, which, of course, provided the 
right answers, allowed for the calculation of a moral age and a 
'moral IQ', but was considered problema tic because it involved 
intelligence as well as character, and one couldn't really assume 
that what a subject said in the clinic about questions like these was 
a good indicator of what he or she would do on the street.76 
Given these problems, there seemed to be only two lines to 
pursue. The first was an attempt to measure the strength of traits 
of character, and, in particular, to look for a small pumber of 
factors that seemed to be involved in all aspects of the temperament. 
Webb, as early as 1915, had carried out a factor-analytic study of 
ratings of students and schoolboys on various qualities of character 
and concluded that there was a general factor, which he called li (for 
will) involved in all the moral qualities and deeper social values. 
In the twenties and thirties a number of investigators tried to 
refine this and provide it with a theoretical basis, usually by 
linking it to a McDougall-Shand notion of instincts and emotions, and 
by analysing covariance between ratings on character traits derived 
from their inventories. Burt, Ca ttell, Oates and others sought to 
establish the existence of a single general, and possibly innate, 
factor, harking back to Burt's earlier notion of a 'general 
emotionality' (Cattell promoted the term 'surgency') which 
underpinned all those oppositions like extravert/introvert, 
cyclothyme/schizothyme and so forth, coupled with a number of smaller 
and more specific group factors. There was a sort of common fund of 
energy powering all the instincts, together with more specific and 
non-interchangeable funds attached to specific instincts - the 
particular combinations accounting for the temperament.77 But again, 
the problem was that this complexi ty did not lend itself to simple 
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measurement, and hence failed to meet the very clinical demands which 
had sparked off the search. This was so despite Cattell's valiant 
attempt to dragoon devices constructed for completely different 
purposes by means of a claim, put forward more in hope than belief, 
that they correlated moderately with his own factors.7 8 
So, despite all this labour, all that the English psychology of 
the individual had to offer to the clinical requirement for the 
assessment of character and temperament was precisely what it had 
sought to replace - observation of behaviour and the personal 
interview. It did, of course, try to put a respectable gloss on this 
residual posi tion. The most ingenious idea was to offer the 
intelligence test itself as the solution to the problem which it had 
at first appeared to ignore. It now, apparently, could allow for the 
assessment of temperament too, by providing a standard situation in 
which behaviour could be observed and compared as between subjects. 
One could look for disparity, for example, between scores on verbal 
and non-verbal items in order to identify the presence of a 'verbal 
neurosis'. Or one could simply observe behaviour while the subject 
was undertaking the test, looking for such things as perseverance in 
the face of difficulty. After reviewing the alternatives, Earl 
concluded that "although little has been written about this method, 
it is the one most generally used in practice for personality 
assessment. "79 
Burt himself preferred a psychologisation of the interview. He 
prepared a classified list of temperamental and moral qualities and, 
during the course of such an interview, rated the disturbed or 
delinquent child on each quality, using a five point scale - holding 
in his mind, as he assured his readers, the standard deviation as the 
unit of classification. 80 But other psychologists, of a critical 
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inclination, cast doubt upon the validity of even these techniques. 81 
In the end, it appeared, all the psychology of the individual had to 
offer in relation to the novel domain of character, temperament and 
personality Vlhich had been offered up to it by the new problems of 
maladjustment and delinquency Vias a version of procedures long 
utilised by medicine - and one not enriched but reduced and etiolated 
by the attempt to assimilate it to the impoverished conceptual 
structure of psychometrics. 
At the very beginning of The Young Delinquent, Cyril Burt had 
confidently asserted that "what the method of mental testing does for 
the study of intellectual capacity, that the method of psychoanalysis 
performs for the study of the growing character.,,82 But what he had 
in mind was the use of psychoanalysis as some sort of diagnostic tool 
which would enable the construction of population norms of character, 
personality and temperament and the assessment and diagnosis of 
individuals insofar as they could be located by the degree of their 
deviation from such norms. However orthodox psychoanalysis was a 
'science of the individual' in a very different sense Not only did 
it problematise the links between conformity to social norms and the 
absence of psychical disturbances, it also eschewed the possibility 
of specifying general norms for evaluating psychic 'health' at all. 
The new psychology could form the basis for a normalising social 
practice by establishing precisely this link between conformity to 
the requirements of social and moral standards, personal happiness, 
and psychologi cal heal th defined in terms of the absence of 
troublesome symptoms. But its diagnostic judgments were made within 
a clinical practice in which 'normality' was a standard which did not 
need to be assessed or bolstered through comparison with the 
variations of particular qualities in the population as a whole. The 
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whole project of individual psychology, however, depended upon such a 
congruity between norms of healthy mental functioning, norms of 
social demand and expectation, and statistical norms of the 
distribution of variations in a population. The psychology of the 
individual founded itself in the belief that the normalising 
intentions and evaluations of social regulation could find their 
objective grounding in the laws of large numbers and a congruence 
between statistical and social conceptions of populations and their 
variations. Its limits were marked out by the type of explanation in 
which 'to diagnose' was construed as 'to measure'. 
In his famous paper on The Problem of Lay Analysis, published in 
English in 1928, Freud looked forward to the prospect of analytically 
trained 'social workers' combatting the neuroses of civilisation, and 
of analytic educationalists treating the inconspicuous neuroses of 
children as a method of prophylaxis.83 If something of this has come 
to pass, we have demonstrated that the condi tions for it, and the 
bases for the form which it would take, were established in England 
in the period between the two World Wars, and in the events which we 
have been discussing. The consequences of these developments for the 
rationale of government and for the regulation of social and personal 
existence have been revolutionary. But it was not simply the 
professional dominance of medicine, or the success of its tactical 
manoeuvres, however important these might have been, that precluded 
the psychology of the individual from occupying the role of secular 
healer of souls which Freud had proposed. One major condi tion for 
the failure of the psychology of the individual to achieve a clinical 
status was the mode of conceptualisation of normality and abnormality 
upon which it was founded. 
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CONCLUSION 
The conclusions of this study of the formation of the psychology of 
the individual in the period from 1870 to 1939 lie in three principal 
areas: methodological, historical and conceptual. 
The fruits of archaeology 
This study has demonstrated that archaeological techniques of 
investigation are fruitful in examining such an issue. It has been 
possible to describe the conditions of possibility for the formation 
of the psychology of the individual: the emergence, in a number of 
specific practices and institutions, of the problems which it would 
address; the ways in which these were brought into relationships with 
one another to form the objects of a scientific discourse; the 
theore tical condi tions for the development of par ticular modes of 
conceptualisation of these objects, and the form of the explanations 
produced; the organisation of the psychology of the individual as a 
discursive practice within particular strategies and around specific 
objectives. 
The complex description which has been produced also provides 
sUbstantiation for the criticisms made, in the first two chapters of 
this study, of other ways of analysing the history of the human 
sciences and their practical consequences. It would certainly be 
difficul t to construe the events which we have been considering in 
terms of a progressive and cumulative development of psychological 
know ledge towards the truth of its obj ect, as proposed in the 
authoritative histories of psychology. 
But nor would it be helpful to use the' interest' analyses of 
the 'strong programme' to confer intelligibility upon these 
happenings. For example, an explanation of the formation of 
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conceptions of the nature, measurement, distribution and consequences 
of intelligence in terms of the interests of the participants would 
be partial and limited. It would fail to consider the complex 
political concerns and conditions which placed the problem of the 
feeble-minded on the social agenda for regulation in the first place, 
the conceptual conditions for the establishment of statistical 
arguments about population variation, the ways in which these became 
organi sed into particular types of explana tion and s tra tegic 
orientation, the different positions taken up by various forces in 
the field. 
One cannot convincingly differentiate between the different 
strategies which we have identified, and which contested wi th one 
another, in terms of the class interests they represent or the class 
composi tion of their membership. Little would be understood about 
the nature and terms of the opposition between psycho-eugenics and 
neo-hygienism, for example, by reference to the class allegiance of 
the members of the organisa tions invol ved, or of the leading 
protagonists in the debates. And to explain the opposition in terms 
of professional interests, in the absence of any more convincing 
economic differentiation between them, would merely be to assume what 
one is setting out to explain - the existence of groups organised 
around differing and opposed objectives, or advocating different and 
opposed courses of actio~ 
Further, to conceive of the emergence of the various strategies 
which we have traced in terms of deviance and social control, would 
be to radically oversimplify, and to sidestep the issue of how 
particular problems for social regulation were formed, and the 
specific nature, objectives and consequences of the different 
strategies which were promoted. The feeble-minded individual, the 
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hygienic mother and child, the shell-shocked soldier, the juv~nile 
delinquent - these were not singled out for regulation on account of 
their 'deviance', but because of the techniques, priorities and 
exigencies of certain conceptions of government, certain objectives 
vis-a-vis the population, certain technologies of socialisation, 
education, adjudication and reformatio~ 
And the strategies we have identified did not seek to 'control' 
deviance, but to maintain the quali ty of the population, prevent 
degeneration, produce socially beneficial habits, increase health and 
well-being, promote happiness and adjustment. The negative and 
constraining instances are merely one aspect of the range of 
objectives of strategies, and strategies are as much directed to the 
production of positive capacities - such as fitness, virtue and 
contentment - as they are to the elimination of undesirable conducts. 
Further, to analyse the process we have been considering in 
terms of any general tendency towards the 'rationalisation' of social 
control through its allocation to 'experts' is to neglect the 
analysis of the conditions under which certain knowledges laid claim 
to expert status, the terms in which these claims were made, the 
reasons why some claims were not successful and others were accepted 
as well founded, and the particular consequences of the success of 
one claim rather than another. It is also to ignore the fact that 
the rel~tions between experts and their subjects differ within 
different discursive practices. The relation between tester and 
child in the practice of intelligence testing differs from that 
between doctor and patient in 'the new psychology', between welfare 
worker and mother within neo-hygienism, and between worker and family 
in social casework. 
Even worse, to reduce all this to a process of 'medicalisation' 
is to ignore the specificity and variability of the strategies, 
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objects, ,modes of conceptualisation and subject positions established 
within the different discourses and practices which have made up 
medicine, and the opposition and disputation between medicalising 
strategies and their opponents. 
It would also be unhelpful to see the diversity of strategies 
which we have examined here as ultimately having an economic 
rationale. Certainly, as we have seen, issues of production and of 
the economy did enter into the formation of some strategies, at the 
level of the calculation of certain social forces and the 
specificaton of objectives. But many strategies were directed 
towards the regulation of dimensions which should not so quickly be 
reduced to their economic functions. The dimension of social 
contentment, for example, wherein lie concerns for the promotion of 
happiness and well-being through public tranquility and personal 
harmony. The dimension of the biological life of society, to which 
are relevant such issues as the minimising of illness, suffering and 
premature death and the promotion of heal th, wel fare and physical 
efficiency. The dimension of ethics, of all those concerns about the 
morality and immorality of social and personal conduct, and the ways 
in which a virtuous life should be led. Perhaps one could interpret 
the various forces active in these fields as representing the 
interests of one class or another, or as serving real interests 
unbeknown to the participants themselves. And, no doubt, it would be 
possible to see strategies and objectives concerning these dimensions 
as merely serving functions prescribed by capital accumulation, the 
reproduction of labour power, the legitimation of state power and the 
advancement of imperialism - the highest stage of capi talism. It 
must be up to the reader to judge the conceptual protocols which 
allow such interpretations, and the extra intelligiblity which is 
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conferred by the reduction of these diverse aspects of social 
existence to the more or less direct expression of economic 
exigencies. 
The formation of the psychology of the individual 
The historical events we have traced in this study have been outlined 
in the Introduction, and this summary need not be repeated here. The 
psychology of the individual cannot be understood as the application 
of a psychological knowledge of normality, gained through theoretical 
reflection or laboratory investigation, to a domain of practical 
problems. On the contrary, it was through these attempts to 
diagnose, conceptualise and regulate pathologies of conduct that 
psychological knowledge and expertise first began to establish its 
claims for scientific credibili ty, professional status and social 
importance. 
Of course, the specific concepts, theories and explanations of 
intelligence, personality and so forth produced within the psychology 
of the individual rapidly became bound up in theoretical debates 
which were not constrained by the exigencies of the strategies and 
problems within which such arguments had originally been formed. It 
is true that there has been an enormous development of differential 
psychology or psychometrics in the post war period, the proliferation 
of standardised measures, the use of advanced statistical techniques 
such as complex factor analytical procedures, the deployment of tests 
in education, psychiatry, industry, the criminal justice system, the 
prison and the army. But these techniques of measurement, 
standardisation and normalisation, whatever their social 
significance, occupy only a small, if disputatious, part of the 
psychological domains of cognition and personality. As we have seen 
in this study, the rules governing the development and transformation 
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of scientific discourses do not merely reflect extra-theoretical 
conditions; the sciences are regulated by their own norms of truth. 
One cannot derive the conceptual structure of contemporary psychology 
either from its current social eXistence, or from any founding 
moment, or initial strategy. 
Hence, the events which we have been tracing here were not 
the origin of the modern enterprise of scientific psychology. Their 
role was more modest: through them, conditions were established 
within which a scientific discourse of psychology could begin to be 
enunciated: institutional sites; professional agencies; a corpus of 
authorised texts; systems for the organisation and dissemination of 
research and discussion; ways of formulating arguments; relations 
between psychologists and their subjects; styles of psychological 
experimenta tion and adjudica tion; objects and domains appropriate 
for psychological judgment. 
Perhaps it is true that the only lasting contribution to 
psychological modernity which was made by the psychology of the 
individual in England over this period was the standardised test of 
intelligence. And it is also true that individual psychologists were 
certainly not a socially powerful instance, and their. strategies met 
with rather limited success before the Second World War. But however 
short lived the specific doctrines and proposals were, and however 
tenuous was the toehold that the psychology of the individual gained 
as a professional instance within the field of social regulation, the 
importance of these events should not be underestimated. For what 
they made possible was a science of the human individual which 
allowed the social regulation of individuals and populations in terms 
of their mental attributes and capacitie~ 
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Norms or. lire, norms or number, and norms or social government 
Much of this study has been concerned with the conception of 
normality around which the psychology of the individual constituted 
itself, and the possibilities and limitations which this established 
for its functioning as a socially effective clinical practice 
alongside medicine. We have argued that the psychology of the 
individual grounded itself in the belief that there was a symmetry 
between three registers of norms - norms of socially desirable 
conduct, norms of the distribution of psychological characteristics 
and attributes in the population, and statistical conceptions of the 
normal distribution of variation in large groups. This mode of 
conceptualisation was central both to its theory of its object -
intelligence, temperament - and to its techniques of assessment and 
claims to diagnostic ability. In conclusion, therefore, let us 
consider briefly this issue of norms in relation to clinical 
judgments. 
It is to Georges Canguil hem that we are indebted for the most 
illuminating discussion of the relations between the concept of norm 
and the sciences of life. 1 Over-simply, one could say that biology 
and medicine owe their modernity to the way in which they construe 
the specificity of their object - life. For such discourses a 
knowledge of life becomes possible through conceiving of life as 
itself a normative proces~ Life, in that it consists of processes 
which are homeostatic and self-regulating, has an inherent 
normativity. Thus medical and biological discourses could organise 
their evidence and their concepts and explanations in terms of this 
essential normativity of their object and its consequences for the 
analysis of specific phenomena. Two consequences are significant 
here. 
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Firstly, normality, and the processes of regulation which tend 
to return the organism to it, has a very particular status. 
Normality is equivalent to health, it is the state to which the 
organism tends by virtue of its organisation, it is its state whilst 
untroubled. Thus health, for the living organism, is normality and 
normativityj health cannot be merely a numerical value. Canguilhem 
is fond of quoting Leriche: health is life in the silence of the 
organs. 
Secondly, disease is an essential problem for the sciences of 
lifej one that, however conceived, must be understood in relation to 
the normativity of life itsel~ In relation to this normativity, and 
the health which is associated with it, disease is a negative value. 
It is dis-ease, a certain perversion of normal functioning, a 
disquiet of the bodily processes. But in relation to knowledge of 
life, disease acquires a positive value, in that the existence of the 
biological normal is revealed through its infraction. The 
normativity of the life processes makes itself evident when these are 
disturbed and seek to re-establish themselves. It is thus to the 
possibility of disease that we owe the possibility of a scientific 
awareness of life. 
Now it is no doubt true that to derive the normativity of 
medical discourse and practice from the ontological normativi ty of 
its object is to take an epistemological shortcut. It is also to 
think internal to contemporary medical and biological knowledge. It 
is, of course, necessary to consider the theoretical and social 
conditions which made it possible to think in normative terms about 
health and disease, and to be able to examine the historical and 
cultural variability of such norms, which cannot merely be ascribed 
to their object. Nonetheless, Canguilhem's argument enables us to 
distinguish between knowledges which base their conception of norms 
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upon the, normativity of their object, and those which derive their 
norms in other ways. 
One important condition for the emergence of clinical medicine 
was undoubtedly the statisticalisation of disease - aetiology, 
symptomatology, prognosis - that was made possible by the hospital. 
But even so, one would wish to insist that a medical norm is not 
merely a statistical value. Medicine does not derive its concepts of 
its object from a calculation of average levels of functioning. Even 
those attributes of medical normality - signs of health or indicators 
of disease - most amenable to quantification have the peculiar 
character of a double normativity. The normal population values for 
such diagnostic indicators as pulse rate, temperature, blood pressure 
and so forth are always linked to a conception of the normal 
opera tion of the homeostatic mechanisms of the body itself. 
sta tisticalisa tion, for clinical medicine, was a condi tion of 
discovery of the normativity of life, it was not its foundation. 
The rules of formation of the psychology of the individual 
differ on almost every count. Individual psychology derives its 
conception of its object from the statistical normativity of the 
population. The norms which it proposes are not those of life but 
those of large numbers. The possibility of a knowledge of the 
individual, for the psychology of the individual, is not provided 
through a conception of the psyche, its processes, its homeostatic 
mechanisms, the laws of its development and the abnormalities which 
they can give rise to. It is founded upon a metaphysic of the 
quantification of qualities and the laws of variation in populations. 
A knowledge of the individual is possible not on account of the 
specificity of the psyche and its variability, but precisely because 
it is conceived of as non-specific. Once this variability can be 
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numerically specified, it differs not at all from the variability of 
any other quali ty in large groups. And indeed, on this premise are 
based the objects, means and techniques of quantification themselves, 
for those measures of qualities which do not accord with the 
statistical norms for variability in general can have the status only 
of errors to be discarded. It is more than merely metaphor which is 
invol ved in the assumption of equivalence between populations of 
numbers and populations of persons. It is the constitutive doctrine 
of the psychology of the individual. 
But individual psychology requires a second level of equivalence 
of norms. It was founded through the identification of norm in the 
register of the statistical with norm in the register of the social. 
The operation which made individual psychology possible was the 
identification of statistical norms of variation with social norms of 
expectation. The abnormality which was so crucial in the founding of 
a medical notion of bodily norms was a disturbance in its object, the 
body itsel~ But the abnormality around which individual psychology 
was organised was not an abnormality of a life process, or one 
specifiable in terms of ease and dis-ease. It was an abnormality in 
terms of a norm of functioning specified by particular social 
apparatuses. The unease which enabled the normativity of individual 
psychology to be established was consti tuted by the objectives of 
government ra ther than the vicissi tutes of the psyche. It was the 
school, the courts, the police and the army which provided the 
psychology of the individual wi th those whom it would have to be able 
to construe as abnormal. 
It is true that at its inception the project of measuring 
intelligence, in both England and France, was linked to a theory of 
the intellect, and that the techniques devised were thus articulated 
upon such a theory. Anthropometrics did indeed seek to derive a 
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means of. differentiation of individuals from its theory of bodily and 
mental energy. But the psychology of the individual only began to 
establish i tsel f as a functioning discourse when it abandoned the 
puri ty of an thropome - tric meas ures and dirtied its hands wi th the 
requirements of educational administration. The statistical 
techniques developed within anthropometrics were now utilised without 
a detour through the abilities of the body - they were applied 
directly to the assessment of the degree of conformity with social 
expectations. The trajectory of individual psychology began with the 
combination of norms derived from particular conceptions of 
population and its regulation with norms derived from a particular 
conception of numbers and their varia tion. The norma tivi ty of the 
object of individual psychology was constructed by a process of 
extrapolation from these norms of a completely different order. 
The theoretical object which is constituted by the psychology of 
the individual thus has to conform to a double requirement. Firstly 
that the variability to which it is subject conforms with the 
distribution which is already known - the judgment of school, court 
or whatever. Hence, as far as devices of assessment are concerned, 
items enter or leave the tests on the grounds of tqeir ability to 
differentiate according to the norms prescribed by the social 
institution in question. Secondly that the distribution across the 
population conforms to the demands of statistical theory and the 
normal distribution curve. The existence of the psychology of the 
individual depended upon it being able to align norms from the two 
registers; the whole project of development and standardisation of 
tests seeks to carry out this task, and does so, paradoxically, in 
the name of scientific rigou~ 
Medicine can function as a clinical practice on account of the 
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organic relations which it establishes between its conceptions of 
normality and pathology. This enables it to operate as both a 
diagnostic and a therapeutic instance. Individual psychology, 
equipped with a technique but not a theory, a project but not a 
concept, and a notion of deviation without an account of normality, 
was condemned to repeat neurotically the operation which had founded 
it. This is so, not only in the test of intelligence, but in all 
those other techniques of assessment which have succeeded it since 
the Second World War. Hence its destiny was to become not a clinical 
but an administrative practice. 
From its inception up un til today, individual psychology, 
differential psychology, psychometrics, sought to extrapolate a 
theory of psychological functioning from a means of differentiatio~ 
No wonder the meeting between psychometrics and a theory of cognition 
has been repeatedly postponed. To derive a theory of normality from 
a conception of the normativity of a life process and the incidence 
of pathology is one thing. To derive a theory of normality from the 
normativity of a statistical average and the incidence of variations 
from it is another. A problem which is exacerbated if it takes place 
within a practice, and by means of a technique, which depends upon 
discarding that which individuals share and attending only to that 
which differentiates them. And one which is exacerbated further when 
what counts as abnormality is set by a norm of adaptation to the 
conventions of a socio-economic order. Health, for the psychology of 
the individual, is not so much life in the silence of the organs as 
life in the silence of the authorities. 
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NOTES TO CONCLUSION 
Canguilhem, 1978. 
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